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ABSTRACT
This case study is an examination of recent political and
institutional changes in the Massachusetts correctional system. It
is the analysis of a movement which emphasized community based correc-
tions as an alternative to incarceration. In this study we discuss
the characteristics of the prison reform movement, reformers and their
organizations, the opposition to corrections reform, development of
the omnibus corrections reform bill, and the political and social con-
text in which these activities took place.
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INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the attack by the New York State Police
and prison officials which ended the four day prisoner uprising at
the Attica Correctional Facility on September 13, 1971, there was a
wave of general disruptions in corrections institutions throughout
the country. The significant result of these disturbances was that
prisoners, prisons, and prison conditions became national issues.
National attention focused on the methods for correcting criminals;
the administration and operation of penal institutions; and the possi-
bility that prisons 'were operated in such a manner as to be ineffec-
tive in combatting crime and of questionable value in rehabilitating
offenders.
Protests within prisons aroused a good deal of public interest
and sparked a great political debate on the causes and prevention of
future prison disturbances. These intellectual and emotional concerns
generally elicited one of two major political responses: either a
great deal of trepidation accompanied by a tightening of the prisons'
security with more steel, concrete and sophisticated equipment for
the surveillance and control of the inmates, or much less popularly,
I
2indignation and a call to alter the operation and administration of
the corrections system through a variety of reforms. This latter
position was the one embraced by the Governor, some progressive legis-
lators and many private citizens of Massachusetts when prisons in the
Commonwealth were struck by a series of inmate protests and work stop-
pages during the Fall of 1971. Just as Massachusetts was the home of
one of the most influential organizations in the country devoted to
criminal justice reform during the 1830's, the Boston Prison Disci-
pline Society, during the 1970's a similar reformist fervor marked
the beginning of a major movement for corrections reform in
Massachusetts.
This essay is a study of the efforts to bring about positive
changes in the Massachusetts prison system. It is the story of some
alternative methods of delivering correctional services in Massachu-
setts. Also, it is the story of the appointment of a Black man,
John 0. Boone, with a reputation as a reformer and an innovative
corrections administrator, as the new Commissioner of Corrections in
Massachusetts and his efforts in reforming the Commonwealth's penal
system. Probably, even more than any of the other themes, correc-
tions reform in Massachusetts during this decade is the story of the
development of a piece of comprehensive corrections reform legisla-
tion emphasizing community corrections; the ensuing struggle for that
3bill's successful passage through the legislature and its enactment
into law; the difficulty of implementing Chapter 777, the new correc-
tions reform act; and the rather significant opposition, not only to
the corrections reform bill, but to any actions directed at improving
prisons in Massachusetts.
Corrections reform was an extremely controversial and vola-
tile issue in the Fall of 1972. Resistance to corrections reform grew
and became widespread among legislators, prison administrators and
employees, especially the corrections officers. Public anger and
furor surrounding the political consequences of Governor Sargent's
continued support of reform in the prison system became so costly that
he modified his support of Boone as Commissioner of Corrections. On
June 21, 1973, almost eighteen months after his appointment as Commis-
sioner, Boone was forced to resign. The story of that shortlived
attempt to reform the Massachusetts prison system raises some very
interesting questions about corrections reform in Massachusetts. An
analysis of the Massachusetts case enables us to make some general
observations about influences on public policy, factors influencing
the delivery of public services, the process of institutional change,
as well as some rather specific statements about the nature and con-
sequences of corrections reform in Massachusetts as a social and
political movement.
4The first set of questions suggested by this scenario
describe and analyze the corrections reform effort in Massachusetts.
What were the origins of the corrections reform movement in Massachu-
setts during the early seventies? What specific factors, personali-
ties, and/or events provided the impetus for corrections reform
through progressive legislation? Who were the prison reformers? What
ideologies or world view shaped their ideas about corrections reform?
What were their tactics and strategies for correctional change? Why
did they advocate corrections reform? How did Chapter 777 come into
being and what kind of penal philosophy did it reflect? How and why
did it proceed through the legislature rather successfully? Why was
John Boone selected as Commissioner of Corrections? What were his
views on corrections and corrections reform? Did Boone and Governor
Sargent share the same philosophy about correctional change? How did
Boone respond to the continuing unrest in the state's correctional
institutions? What did Boone accomplish as Commissioner? Who were
the opponents of prison reform in Massachusetts? What ideologies or
world view shaped their opposition? How did they impede the correc-
tions reform effort? Why did they oppose prison reform? What was
the significance of the corrections reform movement in Massachusetts?
What did Chapter 777 accomplish? How was the bill implemented? What
were the long term consequences of corrections reform in Massachusetts?
5The second set of questions attempt to derive broader state-
ments and implications from the case study of corrections reform in
Massachusetts to general issues of social and institutional change
that may be applicable to other social service systems and the deliv-
ery of these services; the politics of reform movements and their
role(s) in social change; the efficacy of legislation as a vehicle
for reform; and finally, the characteristics and problems of social
reform movements. What are the findings and conclusions of this
analysis of the Massachusetts corrections reform movement during the
seventies? Are these results generalizeable to reform movements in
other areas? What are the formal and informal constraints on the
success of a reform movement? What are the effects of often con-
flicting and ambiguous goals, purposes, and functions of service sys-
tems which popular movements seek to reform? How, why and when do
institutions change or respond favorably to reform movements? Is
legislation the most effective vehicle for social change?
The historical development of incarceration as the major
response to crime in American society since the turn of the century
has significance for present day penal practices. Chapter I
describes and analyzes the evolution of community corrections as an
innovation in correctional practice and as the hallmark of the cor-
rections reform movement in Massachusetts. Particular attention is
6given to conditions prevailing within the Department of Corrections
and the Commonwealth's correctional institutions in 1970 and 1971
from which the reform movement emerged.
Chapter II chronicles the work of the Joint Correctional
Planning Commission from its creation by Governor Sargent in the Fall
of 1970 for the purpose of planning for improved correctional services
and coordinating activities among the different corrections agencies
in the Commonwealth. This organization is of singular importance
because it is from the JCPC deliberations that the philosophy and
policies embodied in the corrections reform legislation introduced
by Governor Sargent in February, 1972, came into being.
The legislative history and passage of Chapter 777 are dis-
cussed in Chapter III. This third chapter explores the motivations
and strategies employed by the organizations and individuals involved
in the formal campaign for corrections reforms as well as the "behind
the scenes" lobbying efforts.
In Chapter IV, attention focuses on the new Commissioner of
Corrections, John 0. Boone, his correctional philosophy, his efforts
to administer effectively the Massachusetts corrections system and
his role as a reformer/administrator. Boone's very major success in
getting Chapter 777 passed is discussed in this chapter as are the
7extreme conditions inherent in the nature of prison life which made
implementation of the reforms very difficult.
Opposition to the reforms proposed in Chapter 777 intensified
once the bill passed and Boone began to implement the new law. The
well calculated and successful tactics employed by corrections
officers to obstruct the successful administration of the new reform
policies within the Massachusetts Department of Corrections are ana-
lyzed in Chapter V. Resistance to reforms in the corrections system
and the controversy surrounding their implementation were quite
intense. As a result, prison reform became a political liability
and support for the movement waned among politicians and even the
reformers. This loss of support and other factors explored in the
chapter are key in Boone's subsequent ouster.
The final chapter summarizes the significance of Chapter 777
and the consequences of the Massachusetts experience with corrections
reform to other movements for social and institutional change.
The data for this case study were gathered from a variety of
sources. Literature in the fields of corrections, prison reform,
social change, social movements and state government was reviewed as
the starting point for the research. The daily newspapers in Boston,
The Herald American and The Boston Globe were the sources from which
a chronology detailing on a daily basis, from September 1971 to
8July 1973, the events in Massachusetts relevant to prisons and the
reform movement was developed. This chronology, contained in Appen-
dix A was based primarily on newspaper accounts, legislative records
and the personal files of many persons involved in the events of
that period.
From this chronology and initial research, thirty-five indi-
viduals and organizations that were active participants in the cor-
rections reform movement were identified (see Appendix B). These
actors were subsequently contacted for interviews by letter contain-
ing the interview schedule. In addition, follow-up phone calls were
also made. Most of the reformers were extremely responsive and
enthusiastic; they wanted to share their views on the successes and
failures of the movement and to assess its consequences. The ques-
tions were open-ended and most of the interviews lasted one and one-
half hours or longer. In some cases the interviews extended over a
period of forty hours. Interestingly enough, corrections officers,
their union leaders and individuals within the Department of Correc-
tions who represented the traditional and nonreformist vain were not
available for interviews, nor would they answer the interview ques-
tions in writing. The most frequent explanation for their non-
cooperation was the lack of time. Several former corrections officers
who had served during the period under investigation spoke with me
9very briefly and on an informal basis. It was beneficial that almost
three years had passed since the passage of Chapter 777 and Boone's
departure because people talk more freely of past struggles than
those in which they are presently involved. The disadvantage of this
historical perspective was that specific dates, events, and general
information become vague. Quite fortunately, other data sources were
available, but the richness of the interviews, despite their loosely
structured character and possible over-representation of supporters
of reform, was most valuable to the analysis.
Additional data were derived from all the existing documents
of the Joint Correctional Planning Commission and the Legislative
Task Force of that group which prepared the original draft of the
bill on corrections reform; the personal files of Van Lanckton, one
of the men who wrote the original bill; the official and personal
papers of former Commissioner of Corrections, John 0. Boone; the
records of the Joint Social Welfare Committee pertaining to the cor-
rections reform act; and all of the files of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Prison Reform, one of the major actors in the reform effort. Phyllis
Ryan, Evelyn Bender, Arnie Coles and most especially, John Boone,
were particularly generous in making available their personal files
and correspondence on the prison reform movement.
10
This research is relevant to contemporary public policy
issues, because there presently exists no documentation of the attempt
to reform the adult corrections system in Massachusetts. Corrections
reform in this instance is particularly significant given that an
earlier and similar reform movement occurred in the deinstitutional-
ization of juvenile corrections facilities in the Commonwealth. Sub-
stantial resources have been devoted to studies of the reforms in the
juvenile corrections, but the same is not true for adult correctional
reforms. A study of recent reforms in the Massachusetts prison sys-
tem would provide an initial base for future comparative studies of
the two systems.
In almost all social services, but particularly mental health,
welfare, health care and corrections, the new trends are toward com-
munity based facilities and programs and reintegration of individuals
with special needs back into their home communities. Community care
which has been growing in popularity in this country suggests to many
that there is an anti-institutional mentality which prevails in
today's society. This study is potentially significant because it
will offer some insight into the limits and extent of this anti-
institutionalism as it relates to the corrections systems. It also
analyzes one example of the cyclical or pendulum-like nature of
reformers and reform activities. A further consequence of this study
11
to contemporary issues in public policy is its analysis and critique
of reform legislation as one vehicle for institutionalizing correc-
tional reforms.
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to document and
analyze the attempt to reform the adult corrections system in Massa-
chusetts. From this case study, general issues of social and insti-
tutional change applicable to reform in other social service systems
are explored. The study will also be useful in gaining a greater
understanding of the politics of reform movements and the character-
istics and problems of reforms affecting social policies in modern
day institutions.
C H A P T E R I
THE IMPETUS FOR REFORM
To understand the emergence of community based corrections as
a major thrust of correctional policies in the late sixties and early
seventies, knowledge of the history of corrections in America and the
penitentiary is important. Particularly important is an understand-
ing of a series of issues related to the origins of the (present day)
penitentiary; the place of crime, criminals and the penitentiary in
colonial America; and the relationship of correctional policies to
the attitudes, morals, and values of society at any given point in
time. Events in society determined much about the corrections sys-
tem. Increased organization and the growing complexity of society
resulted in new ways of dealing with criminal offenders.
It was not until the beginning of the nineteenth century that
confinement in penal institutions as we know them today, became popu-
larly accepted as the principle method for handling lawbreakers.
Prior to that time, justice was a highly individualized enterprise.
An individual dealt with wrongs done to him or his family in whatever
way he chose. Usually the individual was motivated by a desire for
12
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revenge, retaliation or compensation for loss.2 As life became more
socially interdependent and "governments" formed, these "governments,"
usually represented by the chief or king, assumed responsibility for
the protection of persons and property as well as for the punishment
of offenders in the name of public peace.3 This shift in responsi-
bility for the handling of offenders from the individual citizen to
the state broadened the tradition of justice based on retribution.
Even at this time, however, imprisonment was not viewed as a means
of punishment.
In colonial times, the death penalty was the most common
response to serious crimes. Criminal codes of the era prescribed a
wide range of punishments for (lesser) offenses, which usually
included fines, public flogging and other mechanisms for shame and
public degradation such as the stocks, pillory, public cage and
banishment.4 Rarely did the statutes rely upon institutionalization
for any purpose. A sentence of imprisonment was uncommon and was
never used alone. Though local jails existed throughout the colonies,
they held persons about to be tried or those awaiting sentence or
5
those unable to discharge their contracted debts. It was most
uncommon to detain convicted offenders as a means of correction dur-
ing the colonial era. To the colonists, given their views of deviant
behavior and institutional organization which relied upon the family
14
model, jails could not rehabilitate, nor intimidate nor detain
offenders effectively. Harsh penal codes and non-institutional
penalties for unlawful behavior characterized criminal justice in
colonial America.
The Quakers provided the impetus for the development of
America's modern penitentiary system. Shortly after independence,
Americans began to reappraise and revise the prevailing methods of
social control. The population of the new republic increased greatly
from 1970 to 1830. There was also rapid urbanization during that
period, with the growth in the number and density of cities. It was
a time of intellectual activism, and the ideas of the Enlightenment
challenged Calvinist doctrine. Industrialization also occurred with
the development of factories throughout New England and the Middle
Atlantic regions. Each of these demographic, social, intellectual,
and economic changes encouraged the Americans in the process of
rejecting many of the premises upon which the colonial system was
based, but did little to clarify how to order the emerging society.
As David Rothman notes in The Discovery of the Asylum:
In the immediate aftermath of independence and nationhood, Ameri-
cans believed that they had uncovered both the prime cause of
criminality in their country and an altogether effective anti-
dote. Armed with patriotic fervor, sharing a repugnance for
things British and a new familiarity with the faith in Enlight-
enment doctrines, they posited that the origins and persistence
of deviant behavior would be found in the nature of the colonial
15
criminal codes. Established in the days of oppression and ignor-
ance, the laws reflected British insistence on severe and cruel
punishments. . . . The mother country had stifled the colonists'
benevolent instinct, compelling them to emulate the crude customs
of the old world. The result was the predominance of archaic
and punitive laws that only served to perpetuate crime. 7
Similarly in Europe, Cesare Beccarias' treatise, Essays on
Crime and Punishment argued that criminal laws were often inhumane
and self-defeating. He argued that severe punishment emboldened men
to commit the very wrongs it was intended to prevent. Beccarias'
antidote to this dilemma was to promulgate laws that were clear,
simple, and enforceable by the total governmental apparatus.8 This
advice was well-received because of its compatibility with America's
history and revolutionary idealism.
The advent of modern democracy in Europe and America coupled
with the post-revolutionary skepticism of many citizens towards the
colonial system lead to the repeal of the criminal codes of most
states by the second decade of the nineteenth century.9 Quakers were
instrumental in this drive for repeal of state criminal statutes. 10
The results of the Quakers' efforts to bring about more humane treat-
ment of offenders were laws that either abolished capital punishment
for all offenses except murder or greatly restricted its use to all
but a limited number of the most serious offenses. Instead of cor-
poral and capital punishment, the new statutes substituted
incarceration. These new laws relfected a view of deviancy rooted in
the legal system and not in the individual criminal. Passing the
proper laws, it seemed, would end the problem of deviant behavior.
New statutes gave rise to the construction of prisons in Pennsylvania,
New York, New Jersey, Virginia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Vermont, New
Hampshire and Maryland during the 1790's. This focus on the legal
system and imprisonment as the appropriate means for dealing with
crimi-nal behavior was the initial step in altering the older forms
of punishment.11
A repulsion from the gallows rather than any faith in the peni-
tentiary spurred the late-eighteenth century construction. . . .
To reformers, the advantages of the institution were external,
and they hardly imagined that life inside the prison might
rehabilitate the criminal. Incarceration seemed more humane
than hanging and less brutal than whipping. Prisons matched
punishment to crime precisely; the more heinous the offense,
the longer the sentence.12
When the new more rational legal codes with certain punishment
failed to reduce crime, public attention shifted away from the legal
system to the deviant and the penitentiary. This new wave of ideas
acknowledged that the roots of deviancy were so complex that a solu-
tion such as certain punishment was inadequate and so simplistic as
to be rather ineffective.13 Now more Americans critically examined
the life history of the criminal and reached the conclusion that in
the individual's formulative years, particularly if the upbringing
17
and family life were disorganized, lay the origins of deviant
behavior. 14
The doctrine was clear: parents who sent their children into
the society without a rigorous training in discipline and
obedience would find them someday in the prison. 15
This new perspective viewed deviance as environmentally determined.
Criminal behavior was therefore the predictable result of observable
situations and circumstances such as a disorganized home life. As
crime was not inherent in te nature of man, it was therefore not
inevitable. The belief that crime was not inevitable gave some early
Americans an optimistic outlook for the future control of crime.
They believed crime could be reduced and more order brought to society
if the conditions breeding criminal behavior could be controlled.
There were several reform proposals for eradicating these environ-
mental conditions which produced criminal and other types of deviant
behavior. Warning and advising families to fulfill their tasks of
providing care and strict discipline for their children was one tac-
tic. Another was to organize societies which would shut down taverns,
brothels and other establishments which were thought to have a cor-
rupting influence on the moral order of society. Because these tac-
tics were time-consuming and did not produce immediate results,
reformers of that day thought they were insufficient. There was an
almost desperate need for a tangible and immediate solution that
18
would reduce crime and produce an alternative environment for the
deviant. Construction of a special environment for deviants became
not only a feasible but an essential solution:
Remove him from the family and community and place him in an
artificially created and therefore corruption-free environment.
Here he could learn all the vital lessons that others had ignored
while protected from the temptations of vice. A model and small-
scale society could solve the immediate problem and point the way
to broader reforms. 16
The Jacksonians' theories on crime and deviancy placed their
origins within society. They particularly felt that inadequacies of
upbringing and family life and the rampant spread of vice and immoral
behavior throughout the community were the causes of deviant behav-
ior. 17 These notions on the origins of crime were very important
because they gave rise to the invention of the penitentiary as the
solution for protecting society and eradicating deviancy.18
The invention and design of the penitentiary attempted to
eliminate the specific influences that bred crime in the community and
to demonstrate the fundamentals of proper social organization. As an
institution, the penitentiary was designed to join practicality to
humanitarianism, to reform the criminal, to stabilize American society
and to demonstrate how to improve the conditions of mankind. New
York and Pennsylvania were leaders in the movement which began in the
1820's to construct large, fortress-like institutions for confining
19
criminal offenders. The new structures differed from the earlier
prisons of the 1790's in that they separated prisoners not only from
the larger society, but from each other, and they organized, routin-
ized and supervised every aspect of the inmates' being. The thinking
was that, "Just as the criminal's environment had led him into crime,
the institutional environment would lead him out of it." Advocates
of both systems based the promise of institutionalization upon isola-
tion of prisoners and the establishment of a disciplined routine.20
Advocates of the penitentiary were also concerned with prison
architecture. Because these supporters of the prison system viewed
architecture as a moral science such things as the layout of cells,
the methods of labor, and the manner in which inmates ate and slept
assumed great importance to them. Implicit in their views on the
architecture of morals was that construction of particular .types of
buildings, penitentiaries specifically, had a direct effect on the
improvement in morals, not only for prisoners, but also in remedying
many of the problems in society.
Never, no never shall we see the triumph of peace, of right, of
Christianity, until the daily habits of mankind shall undergo
a thorough revolution. . . . Could we all be put on prison fare,
for the space of two or three generations the world would ulti-
mately be the better for it. Indeed, should society change
places with the prisoners, so far as habits are concerned, tak-
ing to itself the regularity, and temperance and sobriety of a
good prison, "then the goals of peace, right, and Christianity
20
would be furthered." As it is, . . . taking this world and the
next together . . . the prisoner has the advantage.21
By the 1830's the American penitentiaries were world famous.
Several European countries sent official representatives to investi-
gate and observe the institutions at New York and Pennsylvania which
represented the principle models for organizing prisons throughout the
country. The most famous of these European visitors were de Tocque-
ville and Beaumont who wrote a famous treatise about the two rival
prison systems in America entitled, On the Penitentiary System. The
Auburn or congregate system was an admixture of isolation and communal
work spaces. Under this system prisoners worked together in a work-
shop during the day, but while working, eating or in their cells they
could not talk to each other. At night, prisoners under the Auburn
system slept alone in their individual cells. Some people attacked
the congregate model because they claimed it did not isolate as
totally as the Pennsylvania system. Supporters of the congregate
system responded to these charges by pointing out that their system
combined incarceration and flexibility and was therefore more practi-
cal. They also contended that the Pennsylvania system did not per-
fectly carry out its espoused program of total inmate isolation.
Advocates of the Auburn system in their countercharges claimed that
the walls of the Philadelphia prison were not thick enough nor its
21
sewer pipes arranged compactly enough for its supporters to claim that
inmates imprisoned under the Pennsylvania system totally abstained
from any form of communication.22 Proponents of the Auburn model
criticized the Pennsylvania system, not only for its structural defi-
ciencies, but they argued that the unrelieved isolation and solitary
confinement which characterized the system were unnatural conditions
and ultimately lead to insanity.23 In the debate over the most per-
fect of the two systems, the most compelling argument put forth by
supporters of the congregate system was that the separate system was
no more perfect than theirs, but that the congregate prison was
cheaper.
Auburn-type institutions, their defenders flatly and accurately
declared, cost less to construct and brought in greater returns
from convict labor. Since the two systems were more or less
equal, with faults and advantages fairly evenly distributed,
states ought not to incur the greater costs of the separate plan.
By having prisoners work together in shops, Auburn's cells did
not have to be as large as those at Philadelphia; also, a greater
variety of goods could be efficiently manufactured in congregate
prisons. The New York program provided the best of both worlds,
economy and reform.23
Total isolation characterized the Pennsylvania system. The
prisoners ate, worked, slept and exercised in isolation not only from
the world but from each other throughout their period of confinement.
Under the Pennsylvania system convicts avoided all "contamination" and
through separation from external influences began the process of
22
reform. Relatives and friends could not visit prisoners. Only
carefully selected visitors whose moral uprightness was unquestion-
able were allowed contact with inmates. Isolation in that system
was essentially absolute. The prison officials prohibited all cor-
respondence, denied access to newspapers and any other sources of
information about external affairs. Prisoners were only allowed to
read "morally uplifting" literature such as the Bible. No precau-
tion was too elaborate to guarantee that the prisoners avoided all
contamination.
"Each individual," explained Pennsylvania's supporters, "will
necessarily be made the instrument of his own punishment; his
conscience will be the avenger of society." Left in total
solitude, separated from "evil society . . . the progress of
corruption is arrested; no additional contamination can be
received or communicated." At the same time the convict "will
be compelled to reflect on the error of his ways, to listen to
the reproaches of conscience, to the expostulations of religion."
Thrown upon his own innate sentiments, with no evil example to
lead him astray, and with kindness and proper instruction at
hand to bolster his resolutions, the criminal would start his
rehabilitation.25
Thus, the Pennsylvania prison system offered a well-ordered,
quiet, secure, remote and artificial institutional environment
intended to reform criminals. Its advocates applauded the Pennsyl-
vania system because it was straightforward and uncomplicated. Good
training for the guards was unnecessary because they had only super-
ficial contact with the inmates. Security and order prevailed in
23
institutions modelled after the Pennsylvania system because men in
isolation did not have the opportunity to violate prison regulations
nor to develop escape plans. Both models for prison organization
emphasized separation or isolation, strict obedience to authority
and hard labor. As such, the two systems were quite similar. The
point of major dispute was the degree of separation--whether the
convicts should work silently in large groups or individually within
solitary cells.
Penitentiaries were an outgrowth of the intellectual, scien-
tific and social changes which occurred during the nineteenth century.
Though there was a great deal of debate on the advantages and disad-
vantages of the Auburn model as against the Pennsylvania model little
else mattered. Few Jacksonians, if any, gave thought to other forms
of punishment.
No one thought to venture beyond the bounds of defining the best
possible prison arrangements, and this narrowness of focus was
clear testimony to the widespread faith in institutionalization.
People argued whether solitary should be continuous and how ducts
ought to be arranged, but no one questioned the shared premise
of both systems, that incarceration was the only proper social
response to criminal behavior. To ponder alternatives was un-
necessary when the promise of the penitentiary seemed unlimited.26
For more than a century, there was a basic acceptance of institution-
alization as the most appropriate way of reducing crime and treating
offenders. Imprisonment was the major sanction and chief penalty of
24
the criminal law and remains so today. With the exception of parole
and probation services during the last half of the nineteenth century,
there were no major changes in this view. One criminologist stated
that ". . . the genius of American penology lies in the fact that we
have demonstrated that eighteenth and nineteenth century methods can
be forced to work in the middle of the twentieth century."27
The nineteenth century was an era of rapid change and social
concern. This social or humanitarian concern influenced the direc-
tion of many aspects of life at that time. Various reform organiza-
tions began crusades to abolish slavery, to prevent cruelty to animals
and, later to children, and to improve treatment of the insane. This
period was one of agitation for women's suffrage, temperance reform,
labor organization, territorial expansion, and technological change.
The establishment of the first state board of charities in Massachu-
setts occurred during during this period in 1863 and in that same
state some six years later, the first state board of health reflected
the new focus. Corrections was also influenced by the times in that
prison reformers demanded more humane treatment of prisoners and work
experiences that would help them become good citizens.
[They] . . . deplored institutions that did no more than incar-
cerate and punish. They saw no social utility in retribution for
retribution's sake. They did not believe that severe sentences,
of themselves, were deterrents to crime. They believed the
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greatest deterrent lay in helping offenders find their way back
to self-respect and acceptance in the community.28
The theory was that prisons should reeducate minds and redirect emo-
tions, thus producing prisoners who returned to society as reformed
or corrected individuals.
Probation and parole services grew out of the social ferment
of the nineteenth century. Probation began informally as an alterna-
tive to imprisonment in 1841. The probation service started as a
treatment program in which final action in an adjudicated offender's
case was suspended, so that he remained at liberty, subject to condi-
tions imposed by or for a court, under the supervision and guidance
of a probation worker.29 The first probation worker was John Augustus,
a Boston shoemaker, who believed that many offenders only required
the sincere interest of another human being in order to improve their
lives. He convinced the court of his idea and worked for eighteen
years in housing, feeding and clothing his charges, most of whom were
poor. Augustus operated his probation services without any legal
authority. He chose those individuals whom he regarded as promising
candidates for probation based on "the previous character of the
person, his age and the influences by which he would in future be
likely to be surrounded." Augustus' program was so successful that
of the first 1,100 individuals on whom he kept records only one
forfeited bond.30
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After his death, the work of John Augustus continued and
became more formalized. Probation services in America were first
regulated by statute in 1878 when Massachusetts passed a law which
authorized the mayor of Boston to appoint a paid probation officer
as a member of the police force with jurisdiction in Boston's crim-
inal courts. The statute, however, placed no restrictions on proba-
tion eligibility. With the statute, the probation officers became
official agents of the courts, but under the "general control" of the
police chief. The first probation officer's duties included attend-
ing court, investigating prisoners charged or convicted of a crime
and recommending to the judges the advisability of placing defendants
on probation.31 By 1900, Massachusetts provided for statewide proba-
tion, and several other states including Missouri (1897), Vermont
(1898), Illinois, Minnesota, and Rhode Island (all in 1899), and New
Jersey (1900) enacted laws that authorized the courts to grant proba-
tion. The growth of probation services throughout the country was
slow and it was not until 1967 that all fifty states, Puerto Rico,
the District of Columbia, and the federal criminal courts system
authorized probation by statute.32
In a manner similar to probation, parole services in America
began as an alternative to continue imprisonment. Parole started as
a treatment program in which an offender, after serving a portion of
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a sentence in a correctional institution was conditionally released
under supervision and treatment by a parole worker. 33 The antece-
dents of the parole system date back to sixteenth century England.
In the middle of the nineteenth century, New York became the first
state to appoint an agent to supervise the children in such arrange-
ments and to protect them from exploitation.34
Reduction of sentence for "good time" and commutation laws
also preceded the parole system in the United States. Using the
ticket of leave, some convicts were released from confinement after
a part of the sentence was served. Such offenders lived independently
within a circumscribed district conditional upon their continued good
behavior and without governmental supervision and supportive services
of any kind. In 1817, the New York legislature adopted a commutation
statute which began to reflect the need for greater individuality in
treating offenders by allowing time off the definite sentence for
good conduct and work willingly performed. Though the law was not
implemented in any of New York's correctional institutions, four years
later in 1821 Connecticut passed an effective commutation law appli-
cable to its workhouse inmates.
With the enactment of the indeterminate sentence by New York
State in 1824 and the construction of the reformatory at Elmira, the
first parole system in the United States came into existence. The
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Elmira Reformatory was built with reformation as its goal and with
some provision for aftercare upon release. Many penal reformers
viewed prisons as a failure and developed reformatories as a solution.
The commitment to institutionalization remained, but the premise was
new. Elmira Reformatory deemphasized punishment for the sake of pun-
ishment and substituted reformation and reeducation of the offender.
When the Elmira Reformatory began operation in July 1876 it utilized
the mark system, whereby the inmate earned marks or wages through
hard work and good behavior which could be used to purchase earlier
release. Other new practices begun at the Reformatory were grades
of incarceration, the indeterminate sentence, and conditional release
or parole. 35
Parole and the indeterminate sentence spread from Elmira to
other institutions in the state, and from New York into other regions
of the country. By 1891, eight states had authorized the indetermin-
ate sentence, but only for first offenders. New York State was the
only exception. Today, however, every state and the federal judicial
system have statutes which provide for both juvenile and adult parole
services.
Though probation and parole systems did not replace prisons,
their development was significant because it emphasized a less puni-
tive approach to corrections and the beginnings of non-institutional
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correctional settings. Parole and probation systems pursue goals of
rehabilitation, reintegration, surveillance, and economy; both assist
law enforcement agencies, the courts, and correctional institutions;
statutory conditions are attached to the grant or revokation of
either; in both cases the offender is under the supervision of some-
one with access to coercive authority; and particularly significant,
the community is the correctional setting.36 Probation and parole
were precursors to present day community based correctional practices.
As an extension of the philosophy that prisons should reedu-
cate minds, redirect emotions
inmates become good citizens,
community to work on farms, o
end of the nineteenth century
largely because of complaints
unfair competition. In 1913,
the Huber Law which permitted
from prison during the day in
jobs. With the exception of
labor outside the institution
for the institutions, because
and provide work experiences that helped
some prisoners were sent out into the
n road construction and the like. By the
however, this practice diminished,
by labor unions that prisoners were
the Wisconsin state legislature passed
certain misdemeanants to be released
order to work and maintain their regular
the Huber Law, early forms of inmate
did little other than provide income
inmates were not paid, they were not
learning marketable skills and they remained isolated from community
residents. Though the Huber Law did not germinate into full-fledged
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furlough and work release programs, it represented a beginning step
toward community based corrections as we have come to understand the
term today.
The notion of the community as a correctional setting was a
broad departure from the ideas and values of the Jacksonians who
launched the then radical view of a penitentiary system last century.
Even today only limited progress has been made toward expanding our
approaches to correction to include a system of community correctional
programs and facilities. According to one source, the community
treatment idea as we know it today is a relatively recent phenomenon;
which gained prominence in correctional theory and practice in the
forties and fifties and it may well become the most memorable develop-
ment in corrections during the latter half of the twentieth century.37
In the period preceding World War II, sociologists from the
Chicago School influenced much of the thinking and practice about
corrections, particularly for juveniles. The twenties and thirties
was a period in which slum neighborhoods of large cities developed
experiments to increase citizen participation in the prevention of
delinquency. The Chicago Area Project, an experiment with community
organization, emphasized involvement of community residents in delin-
quency prevention. In the forties, interest shifted somewhat from the
community to the individual. Psychoanalytic treatment and individual
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counselling were believed to be the most appropriate forms of help
for juvenile offenders. The individual treatment model lost support
and group models for handling juvenile delinquents developed into a
few experimental pilot community based programs, including the Provo
Experiment, Highfields, and Essexfields. Though many of these early
changes occurred in the juvenile area, the adult field had counter-
parts on a more limited basis in work release furloughs, pre-release
centers and halfway houses which developed from the fifties onward.
Innovations in correctional theory and practice which focused
on the community were a post World War II phenomena. In the mid-
fifties there were prison riots, parole scandals and evidences of
correctional maladministration which caused many people to become
concerned about prisons. Citizens and politicians believed that
prisons were not effective and they demanded abandonment of the con-
ventional prison for all except those few offenders who were extremely
dangerous or irredeemable. These citizen activists gave their atten-
tion to new alternatives to incarceration largely as a result of their
dissatisfaction with the organization, the methods and the results of
the correctional system in all its dimensions. 38 It seemed apparent
to them that imprisonment alone did little to insure public protection
over the long run because less than 5 percent of those sent to prison
for the most serious offenses died there and an even smaller percentage
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of those committed for shorter periods to jails and juvenile insti-
tutions were not eventually released. The situation was such that
the public was paying huge sums of money to maintain large residen-
tial establishments for offenders and all that taxpayers were getting
for this expenditure was short periods of incapacitation. The con-
clusion was that there should be alternatives to incarceration
whenever public welfare and safety were equally well served.39
Over a century ago when individuals were concerned about
crime and methods for controlling offenders, the conclusion was that
there was a need to construct a special environment, the penitentiary,
in order to eliminate the specific crime inducing influences in the
community. In this century the premise that crime and delinquency
are symptoms of failures and disorganization of the community as well
as the individual offenders was extended. The societal failures were
seen as depriving offenders of contact with the institutions of
society that were basically responsible for assuming the development
of lawabiding conduct. Therefore the task of corrections was to
build or rebuild solid ties between the offender and the community,
reinstating the offender into the community and re-establishing family
ties, obtaining employment and education, and securing in the larger
sense a place for the offender in the routine functioning of society.
Implicit in this concept was the notion of not only changing the
33
offender, the nearly exclusive focus of rehabilitiation, but also the
mobilization and change of the community and its institutions.40 The
new thrust was on community care and moving the offender into a state
of maximum functioning in the society. Not only in corrections was
there a trend toward community care, but policies and practices in
such areas as health care, social welfare, and mental health reflected
a decreasing reliance on institutional care.
Public assistance, medical care, and programs for the mentally
ill have all gone the route of drastic reduction in institutional
confinement with major emphasis on community care. Poor houses
and orphanages have all but disappeared from the social scene;
hospital time for virtually all medical conditions has been
drastically reduced; hospitalization of the mentally ill is
becoming obsolete for all but a few. Each of these changes has
been achieved with wide recognition that physical and social
functioning of persons in the community is not only more humane,
but more efficient, more restorative, less damaging and less
expensive than maintenance in large total institutions. 41
Community care was a major tenet of the rehabilitation philosophy
which formed the basis for much of present day correctional practice.
This new focus on community care in corrections came from
several sources. Perhaps most important was public concern over
spiraling crime rates and dissatisfaction with the traditional meth-
ods of dealing with offenders. American citizens were increasingly
disillusioned with the ineffectiveness of incarcerating offenders in
traditional correctional institutions. In addition, crime and crime
control were major political issues in large urban areas and on the
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national level. Humanitarian and utilitarian interests combined such
that those citizens concerned about prisons agreed there was a
desperate need for change in prisons throughout the country.
The conviction grows that unless society is prepared to acknowl-
edge and support a rising cyclical pattern of criminality,
followed by arrest, trial, imprisonment and parole, some effec-
tive and positive action must be taken to help reintegrate the
object of that cycle back into the community.42
In addition to the public's interest in crime and prisons,
during the mid-sixties the judiciary, particularly at the federal
level, became more involved with legal aspects of the operation of
prisons.43 This new judicial concern had a major role in altering
the almost absolute discretion which prison officials exercised over
the people in their custody. Until the mid-sixties, prison officials
operated with immunity from judicial scrutiny because of the courts'
traditional "hands-off" policy. The typical judicial attitude
toward the rights of prisoners, prior to the sixties, sanctioned the
excessiveness of some prison officials:
For the time being, during his term of service in the peniten-
tentiary, he (the convicted felon) is in a state of penal servi-
tude to the State. He has, as a consequence of his crime, not
only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except
those which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for
the time being the slave of the State. 44
The "hands-off" doctrine was abrogated largely because pris-
oners agitated for their rights and acquired access to the courts.
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The demands of Black Muslim inmates for legal protection of their
constitutional rights to freedom of religious expression helped to
erode the foundations of the hands off doctrine as did the Courts'
revival of a nineteenth century statute which, when passed, had
enabled blacks to enforce their newly protected constitutional rights
against state officials.45 In Cooper v. Pate,46 the Court explicitly
confirmed that state prisoners were entitled to the protection of the
Civil Rights Act. Some courts continued to defer prisoners' com-
plaints to the supposed needs of prison discipline, but the renewed
use of the Civil Rights Act permitted the federal courts to examine
the claims of state prisoners to determine whether constitutional
rights had been violated.47
Even though the Warren Court heard very few prison cases, its
decisions in Mempa v. Ray48 and Johnson V. Avery49 were monumental.
In Mempa v. Ray, a case concerned with the revocation of probation,
the Supreme Court applied the due process requirement of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the operations of the corrections system. The
court held that counsel was required in deferred sentencing proceed-
ings. In the second case of Johnson v. Avery, the Court attempted to
ensure prisoners' access to court by forbidding officials from deny-
ing them the aid of "jailhouse lawyers," so long as no other counsel
was available. The Court stated that "where paramount federal
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constitutional or statutory rights supervene . . . state regulations
applicable to inmates of prison facilities may be invalidated." These
decisions provided for judicial review of prison regulations and
administrative actions that affected constitutional rights.
Basically, the rights that prisoners sought to establish in
the courts included rights to physical security and the minimal con-
ditions necessary to sustain life; the protection and guarantee of
their civil rights (e.g., freedom of religion, freedom of expression,
freedom from racial discrimination, the rights to privacy, the rights
to defend oneself against criminal charges) and protection of their
right of access to court.50 The new practice of judicial interven-
tion in correctional administration meant that inmates and prison
reformers would have an additional arena in which to pressure for
change and that prison administrators would have to contend with an
expanded body of law dealing with prisoners' rights in their opera-
tion of penal institutions.
At the same time as the courts became more involved in correc-
tions so did the federal government. In 1965, President Johnson
created the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Admin-
istration of Justice. After two years of work, the Commission pre-
sented its report, which called for an increased role by the federal
government in the problem of law enforcement. The Commission
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recommended increased federal support of efforts to reduce crime and
delinquency. The support envisioned by the Commission was largely
financial and the type in which several hundred million dollars
annually could be spent profitably over the next decade to bring
crime under control. Under the Commission's provisions, funds were
made available to state and local governments to develop comprehen-
sive law enforcement plans. 51
The precedent for federal aid to local criminal justice
operations, particularly police operations, was set by the Law
Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965. This act gave the federal gov-
ernment authority to make grants to, or contracts with, public or
private non-profit agencies to improve training of personnel, advance
the capabilities of law enforcement bodies, and assist in the preven-
tion and control of crime. Administration of the program was by the
Office of Law Enforcement Assistance, established by the Attorney
General and responsible to him. Congress appropriated $7.5 million
for each of three fiscal years beginning in 1966 to carry out the new
projects. The projects funded under the Law Enforcement Assistance
Act of 1965 were concluded in June 1968, and that act was superseded
by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets of 1968.
The background to the Safe Streets Act was interesting because
it originated in part from the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965
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and the comprehensive plan designed by the President's Crime Commis-
sion for federal involvement in the national crime problem. There
was also a national mood which was ready and anxious to do something
about crime. In addition there was also a political mood which
prompted many Congressmen to get as much mileage out of the crime
issue as possible. Both political parties wanted credit for decreas-
ing crime and were not willing to share just part of the credit. As
a result the legislative history of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 was a partisan battle of rewriting and
amending the legislation. Finally on June 19, 1968, some sixteen
months after the bill had been introduced, it was signed into law.
The Crime Control Act of 1968 was particularly important
because it created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
which formally began its operations on October 21, 1968. From its
inception LEAA was the center of controversy. The agency was thrown
into the political arena more than many other agencies because of
the "politicization" of crime as a partisan issue. LEAA was also a
controversial agency because crime and law enforcement were tradi-
tionally local functions with little federal involvement. The agency
was criticized because during its first year, 79 percent of the
federal funds were spent for law enforcement, 14 percent on correc-
tions and 6 percent on courts. Since that time the corrections share
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of the total budget increased to as much as 33 percent for fiscal
1973 in some states. Through its block grants to states for improve-
ment of police, courts, and corrections, LEAA provided the first
federal funding for community-based corrections programs. LEAA dis-
tributed approximately $63 million in 1969, $268 million in 1970,
$529 million in 1971, $699 million in 1972, and $855 million during
1973 to the various states (see Appendix C). One of the objectives
of correctional planning funded by LEAA was to develop a continuum of
services related to an offender's correctional needs from the time of
arrest to eventual reintegration in society. The mental health field
greatly influenced new trends in corrections.
In 1960, the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health
published a report which articulated the importance of assisting the
patient to maintain himself in the community in a normal manner, to
minimize the regressive effects of institutionalization and to pro-
vide a wide range of supportive aftercare services--day hospitals,
night hospitals, aftercare clinics, rehabilitation centers, work
services, former patient groups, and others.52 The Commission's pro-
posals on a range of community services for mental patients had obvi-
ous implications for the correctional system. A few years later,
the Correctional Task Force of the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice Administration emphasized the need
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for new directions in corrections and with this report laid the
conceptual framework for community based corrections programs.
The general underlying premise for new directions in correc-
tions is that crime and delinquency are symptoms of failures
and disorganization of the community as well as of individual
offenders. . . .
The task of corrections therefore includes building or
rebuilding solid ties between the offender and the community,
integrating or reintegrating the offender into community life--
restoring family education, securing in the larger sense a
place for the offender in the routine functioning of society.
S. . . This requires not only efforts toward changing the indi-
vidual offender, which has been the almost exclusive focus of
rehabilitation, but also the mobilization and change of the
community and its institutions. 53
The growing national trend toward community care for persons
with special needs, new legislation, the recommendations of various
national crime commissions endorsing alternatives to incarceration,
and the availability of federal funds for such programs had a tremen-
dous impact on popularizing the concept of community based corrections.
Another factor which helped to make community corrections a major
policy direction in the debate about correction reform was a basic
disillusionment by many, but particularly veterans of social reform
movements, with traditional corrections programs which they deemed
unsuccessful in achieving rehabilitation or even stability in the
prisons. Advocates of corrections reform were guided by notions of
decency, good will and economy. For example, they supported community
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correctional programs because they were believed to be more humane
and consequently more effective than institutionalization. At least
they were tauted as being no less effective in reducing the probabil-
ity of recidivism than more severe forms of punishment. Second, there
was the belief that the further an individual was allowed to penetrate
the formal criminal justice system, the more difficult it was for the
person to be successfully retrieved and returned to the community. In
this regard it was important to divert offenders from the criminal
justice system as early as possible. A third assumption about commun-
ity corrections was that such a system cost less than an institution-
ally based corrections program and therefore saved the taxpayers
money. Fourth, supporters of community based corrections assumed
that because staff and offenders were closer to the community
resources, such a program was more likely to be effective in improving
the probability of successful client reintegration. The validity of
these assumptions was not tested, but inmate strikes and riots in the
prisons of America led many to embrace community care as the new
policy thrust in corrections during the decade of the seventies.
Because reform efforts were frequently a response to emotionally
disturbing situations the tendency was to produce an instant cure to
the problematic situation.
42
The four day prisoner uprising at the Attica Correctional
Facility in New York was the most fatefully extreme of the numerous
prison disturbances. The attack by New York State Police on Septem-
ber 13, 1971, left thirty-two inmates and eleven corrections officers
dead and more than eighty other persons wounded. The events at
Attica were important because they dramatized the problems of correc-
tions, in New York State and in the entire country, and made prisons
and prison conditions national issues. For the first time since the
Reports of the Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice and passage of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, national attention focused on our
methods for correcting criminals and public policies related to the
administration of penitentiaries. We also began to realize that
perhaps our prisons were operated rather poorly as a result, they
were ineffective in combatting crime and in rehabilitating offenders.
One of the findings of the Attica Commission was that dramatic
reforms of the New York prison system were inescapable, if the state
were seriously committed to reform. Restructuring of the prison sys-
tem in New York, according to the Special Commission on Attica, meant
that prisoners generally retained the rights of other citizens except
that of liberty of person. Further, when released from prison, they
should not be saddled with the legal disabilities which impeded their
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ability to exercise the rights of free men. The Commission advocated
removal of restrictions on the circulation of literature, newspapers,
periodicals, and broadcasts; establishment of regular procedures to
assure access of the press to prisons; and creation of programs which
let inmates out of the institution on a controlled basis, such as work
release and furloughs. Other proposals by the Commission called for
prison policies and programs which elevated and enhanced the dignity,
worth and self-confidence of inmates, including having inmates conduct
their own affairs. Community groups, volunteers and professionals
were encouraged to become involved in the life of each correctional
facility and particularly to participate in the shaping of overall
policy. Because the interaction between corrections officers and
inmates is so central, the Commission proposed that all correctional
facilities should be staffed by persons motivated.to help inmates
including ex-offenders. Educational programs and vocational training
within the institution were encouraged. The Commission felt that
inmates should be paid for their work and that inmates ought also pay
"the reasonable value of the services provided them by the state."
The final area in which the Commission proposed some changes was
parole. Clear and comprehensive standards for the grant or denial
of parole were to be developed and disseminated to inmates in advance
and once the parole was granted, and upon the inmates release he
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should also be assisted in finding a job. The Commission voted that
the problems of Attica were not Attica's alone: "We cannot expect
even the most dramatic changes inside the prison walls to cure the
evils of the criminal justice system, nor a society at large."
Changes needed to occur such that justice was dispensed fairly, equ-
ally and swiftly at every stage of the criminal justice system. 54
The public wanted to know how Attica happened and more impor-
tantly why it happened. Politicians particularly wanted to know how
to prevent future Atticas from occurring within the prisons of their
own states. Some others began to think about how to constructively
change and improve prison conditions. The findings of the Attica
Commission and the political, intellectual, and emotional concerns
about the causes and prevention of prison disturbances catalyzed a
movement aimed at reforming prisons. Some responded to the challenge
of corrections reform with a great deal of trepidation and moved to
tighten prison security with more steel, concrete and sophisticated
equipment for the surveillance and control of the inmates. Others
responded to the challenge by trying to rethink the assumptions under-
lying existing correctional concepts and altering the operation and
administration of the corrections system so as to make it more
rational and effective.
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For those who wanted changes in the correctional system, the
Attica rebellion epitomized the bankruptcy of the custodial approach
to corrections. These reformers were troubled by their belief in
rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders into productive members
of society and the inadequacy of many existing programs and attitudes
inside the prisons to accomplish the two ideals. Whatever their con-
cerns and solutions to the problems of prisons, reformers generally
agreed that there was a desperate need for change in prison systems
throughout the country. It was therefore a rather natural occurrence
that reformers embraced community based corrections as their solution
to the problems in the prison.
Just as Massachusetts was the place of origin of many early
correctional reforms during the 1830's which provided the basis for
many present day correctional practices, during the 1970's Massachu-
setts was the center of a full-scale corrections reform effort.
Though national policy changes in corrections and the new legal atti-
tude of the courts regarding prisons affected the entire country,
these general events and others unique to Massachusetts profoundly
altered correctional practices in the Commonwealth.
Even prior to Attica and the other occurrences in the late
sixties, prisons emerged as a priority item for the new governor,
46
Francis Sargent. Shortly after he became the Commonwealth's chief
executive in 1969, Governor Sargent proposed major changes in organi-
zation of state government. The legislature passed Chapter 704 of
the Acts of 1969, which created the Governor's Cabinet. The Act
became effective April 30, 1971, and basically restructured state
government. Under the new law, the cabinet structure eliminated all
305 existing state departments and agencies and consolidated them
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into nine executive offices, resembling the federal cabinet. The
new arrangement decreased the number of central agencies with the
desired result being greater economy and efficiency. Reorganization
divided the Commonwealth into eight regional groupings and established
citizen advisory councils within each of the regions. One of the pur-
poses of regionalization was to encourage citizen involvement in state
programs and to decentralize those administrations which provided
direct services to citizens, for example Family and Social Services,
Rehabilitation, and Community and Mental Health. The new law was to
streamline the state governmental apparatus so as to improve the
quality and effectiveness of services in the Commonwealth.
Each Executive Office had a full-time Secretary appointed by
the Governor to serve at his pleasure. The Secretary's duties
included planning, co-ordinating, conducting studies of operation,
promoting efficiency, reviewing and acting upon budgets, and
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recommending to the Governor desirable changes in the laws and prac-
tices of the departments and agencies within his Executive Office.56
Even though the Secretary acted as "the Executive Officer of the
Governor" and had major responsibility for the operations of the
departments and agencies within his Office, he had no administrative
control over the governmental units within his Executive Office.57
Reorganization was important because it placed the Department
of Correction and the Parole Board under the Executive Office of
Human Services. Prior to reorganization, the Department of Correc-
tion was a separate agency reporting to the governor. With the
Commonwealth's correctional programs as a part of the human service
system, there was now a direct and natural link with other agencies
concerned with providing services to people in need of special
services such as delinquents, welfare recipients, veterans, and the
like. This meant that the Commonwealth's five major institutions--
MCI-Bridgwater, MCI-Norfolk, MCI-Walpole, MCI-Concord and MCI-
Framingham, and the three forestry camps--Plymouth, Monroe and War-
wick--could now be reevaluated for the consistency of their goals and
operation with those of other agencies within the Executive Office
of Human Services.
Thepurposes of the new Human Service Secretariat were to meet
the needs of the individual citizen where he was unable to meet the
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needs himself or with privately furnished assistance; to provide
services for those individuals such as health care, income supplemen-
tation, personal counselling, and rehabilitative training; and to
counter those forces which were primarily identified as contributing
to individual problems requiring such services.58 In addition to the
basic goal of protecting society by separating and holding offenders
in secure custody, prisons could now legitimately be expected to
rehabilitate offenders through their programs and to place them in
the community as useful and law-abiding citizens. Implicit in this
new view of corrections as a human service was the notion of prisons
as humane institutions intended primarily to correct and not neces-
sarily to punish.
Now that the Department of Corrections was within the Execu-
tive Office of Human Services, it became a part of a broader social
change movement within the Commonwealth and the nation as a whole.
That movement's purposes were to more efficiently coordinate the
programs of major public agencies providing services for individuals;
to centralize responsibility and authority for meeting the basic needs
of the Commonwealth's citizens; and to temper the operation of cen-
tralized authority by delivering decentralized services at the local
level with active community participation in the formulation of poli-
cies governing the new programs and facilities.
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We find additional evidence of this larger movement for
social change in the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services.
Under the direction of Dr. Jerome Miller, the new Commissioner of
Youth Services, the Department began to reform its system for deliv-
ering services. In 1969, the Massachusetts General Court enacted
legislation to reorganize the Department of Youth Services. Reorgan-
ization meant a process of deinstitutionalizing and regionalizing all
the activities of the Department of Youth Services. The Reorganiza-
tion Act elevated the old division to the status of department and
moved it from the Department of Education to the new superagency,
Human Services consisting of Welfare, Health, Mental Health and Cor-
rections. The Act set a new professional tone for Youth Services
that focused on therapy, prevention, community services, purchase of
services and research. Finally the Act empowered DYS to "establish
necessary facilities for detention, diagnosis, treatment and training
of its charges including post-release care." The language of the Act
enabled Commissioner Miller and his staff to implement a nonistitu-
tional system. State run institutions for juvenile delinquents were
closed between 1969 and 1973 in a series of dramatic and unexpected
moves by then Commissioner Miller.59 Regional offices were developed
throughout the Commonwealth as field administration centers and with
responsibility for contracting with private agencies for services to
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juvenile offenders. There was also a shift in policy to purchasing
services to juvenile offenders. There was also a shift in policy to
purchasing services from the private sector and to placing youths in
the community.
Similar policy changes occurred in health, public welfare and
mental health services. The Commonwealth began to purchase these
services from privately operated health and welfare services by con-
tracting Medicaid payments to Blue Cross and Blue Shield or other
private health insurers. In the fields of public welfare and mental
health the new trends were in purchased or contracted services and
the development of community service centers. As these examples
illustrate, reorganization was intended to strengthen and centralize
administrative control; to decentralize the delivery of services; to
disengage the major departments within Human Services from the running
of institutions and to improve the overall quality of services avail-
able. Though these policy and structural changes were occurring in
the organization of many services provided by the Commonwealth,
prisons in Massachusetts basically remained the same.
The Massachusetts prison system in the late sixties was not
directly nor immediately affected by all of the changes occurring in
social services nationally nor within the Commonwealth. At that time,
the Department of Corrections was the state agency with responsibility
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for all the Commonwealth's adult correctional institutions not under
the authority of county officials. The Department had direct author-
ity over approximately 3,000 adult offenders whom the courts felt it
necessary to separate from society for varying periods of time by
imprisonment. Basically, the Department of Corrections was concerned
with protecting society and rehabilitating offenders, so that they
might return to the community as useful citizens. 60
The Massachusetts corrections system consisted of eight insti-
tutions: MCI-Bridgewater, MCI-Norfolk, MCI-Malpole, MCI-Concord, MCI-
Framingham, the only correctional institution for women, and the Com-
monwealth's three forestry camps at Plymouth, Warwick and Monroe (see
Appendix D). In the late sixties, Massachusetts had approximately
1,800 prison employees, excluding hundreds of contractors and consul-
tants, to guard about 3,500 inmates. Most of the inmates had done
time in either juvenile training schools, county houses of correction
and state or federal prisons previously. One writer described them
as victims of society and the prison system:
Lastly, prisoners are victims of the prison system itself, a
system which guarantees that more than half of all prisoners
will be imprisoned again after release, usually for a more
serious offense. In fact, many prisoners are men and women
who keep going back and forth through prison doors all of
their lives. . . . More often than not, prisoners are men and
women doing "life on the installment plan"--never able to
break the cycle of poverty and imprisonment. 61
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Massachusetts taxpayers were spending approximately $32,000,000 a
year in 1972 supporting the prison system. The bulk of the budget
or about 80 percent of the total operating expenses, went directly
for prison employees' salaries.62 If salaries for employees serving
a custodial function comprised the greatest expenditure, we can ask
how was it possible for prisons to accomplish rehabilitative goals?
MCI-Bridgewater, the largest of the state correctional insti-
tutions, had a population of 955 in June 1973. Located in the town
of South Bridgewater, approximately 35 miles south of Boston on 1400
acres of land, this institution opened in 1855 as an almshouse for
paupers. In 1872, it became the State Workhouse and after 1887 it
became the State Farm. Though the institution's uses had changed,
there were no changes in the physical plant. There was however, a
change in the institution's name in 1955, when it became designated
a Massachusetts Correctional Institution along with all the other
adult correctional institutions in the Commonwealth. In 1967, the
General Court allocated an initial grant of $340,000 to build a new
450 bed State Hospital on the grounds of MCI-Bridgewater.
The major divisions of MCI Bridgewater are the Addiction
Center which provides care and treatment for alcoholics, drug addicts
and other drug dependent persons and the State Hospital for the crim-
inally insane. The Bridgewater State Hospital is a maximum security
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facility. This institution is unique in its administration because
the patients are directly under the care of a Medical Director
appointed by the Commissioner of Correction, but requiring the
approval of the Commissioner of Mental Health who has supervisory
and investigatory responsibility for this hospital. In spite of the
role as a hospital for the mentally ill criminal, it is under the
direct control of the Superintendent of Bridgewater and under the
legal jurisdiction of the Department of Correction. Bridgewater
State Hospital is therefore responsible to the Department of Mental
Health and the Department of Correction, jointly. Bridgewater is
interesting, because it contains a very mixed population. It has
mental patients, alcoholics, drug addicts, sex offenders, prisoners
on "protective custody," men being held for pre-trial psychiatric
observation and male and female inmates from the other state facili-
ties who are sent to Bridgewater for punishment or -segregation. Some
are committed to the hospital before trial because they were deemed
mentally ill and not competent to stand trial. Others were committed
because they were found not guilty after trial by reason of insanity
at the time of the criminal act. Still other Bridgewater patients
were transferred from correctional institutions because they developed,
after commitment, some mental illness that those institutions could
not handle. A very small percentage were transferred to Bridgewater
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from Department of Mental Health Hospitals because they were escape
risks needing greater security or they were dangerous to other
patinets and personnel. 63
In 1967 there was an inevitable confrontation between the
Hospital commitments and the due process law. The procedure in prac-
tice for years was that a man would be committed to Bridgewater by
the court before trial for a period of observation. The Medical
Director, after observation and testing by the staff, reported to
the court that the man was either not competent or he was mentally
competent to stand trial. He was then committed to the Hospital
without representation by counsel. The commitment as a patient was
for an indefinite period. Often the offender remained there after
the expiration of the period of time he would have served as a pris-
oner had he been found guilty and sentenced for the crime with which
he was charged. This procedure was a denial of due process protec-
tions because the man had no notice or hearing on the question of
commitment. In addition, he was deprived of his liberty without
further appearance in court. The Attorney General, the General Court
and many officials concerned with this problem in light of Supreme
Court rulings in the area of prisoner rights recommended the enactment
of a special emergency law to establish special procedures for persons
allegedly committed or confined unlawfully to any mental hospital. 64
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The emergency law allowed any person who believed that his
commitment or confinement was unlawful to petition the Superior Court
of Massachusetts for a hearing. Under the law the Court appointed
counsel if the individual were not so represented and ordered an
immediate hearing at the Bridgewater Institution. The hearing was
presided over by a single Justice of the Superior Court without a
jury, in the presence of the petitioner, with notice to all concerned.
If the Court determined that the petitioner was not unlawfully con-
fined or committed, the petition was dismissed. If the Court deter-
mined that the petitioner was illegally confined then he was dis-
charged. If the individual were in further need of care at a mental
hospital he was either committed by a civil procedure to a Department
of Mental Health hospital or to the Bridgewater State Hospital if he
were found dangerous enough to himself or others to require strict
security. Whenever such commitments were made the Medical Director
reviewed the case at the end of 60 days and every six months there-
after in order to determine if the man were still dangerous and not a
proper subject for transfer to another state mental hospital. 65
In response to the Courts' emphasis on due process in rela-
tion to all commitments at Bridgewater and criticism from lawyers,
psychiatrists and reformers, Chapter 123 of the General Laws regu-
lating the treatment and commitment of the mentally ill and the
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retarded was repealed. The new law, Chapter 888 of the Acts of 1970
required periodic reviews of each patient on admission, once during
the first three months after admission, and again during the second
three months and annually thereafter. The review required considera-
tion of possible alternatives to continue hospitalization. It assured
that at hearings relative to commitment, patients would have the
right to counsel, appointed by the state if they were indigent, and
other detailed statutory protections of their constitutional rights.66
When MCI-Norfolk opened in 1931, it represented a forward
step in Massachusetts penal policies. Planned "for the more hopeful
and adaptable men," it was built on the assumption that farm work and
fresh air would rehabilitate criminals from the city slums. Located
in the town of Norfolk, this spacious medium security institution
with its dormitory units instead of cell blocks is considered the
first "community prison" in the country for male offenders.67 Even
today, Norfolk might appear to be a model for correctional reform,
because it is the site of the prison hospital and the new Diagnostic
Center for "scientific" classification of prisoners. The institu-
tion's average daily population for a few selected years was 690
inmates in 1973, as compared with 703 in 1972, 765 in 1971, 716 in
1967, 788 in 1966, and 791 in 1962.
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The courts do not commit men directly to MCI-Norfolk. Unlike
most other prisons in the Commonwealth, selected inmates sentenced
to MCI-Walpole or MCI-Concord are transferred to MCI-Norfolk. Most
of those so transferred complete their sentences at Norfolk while
some of these same men are found not suitable for a medium security
institution and are returned to their original institution. A not-
able feature of MCI-Norfolk is the range of activities available to
the inmates. These activities include Norfolk's debating team; the
Norfolk Quiz Club which competes against area colleges; the Inmate
Council, an advisory group which facilitates communication between
staff and inmates; the Norfolk Fellowship, a non-sectarian group with
a spiritual base which brings "outmates" from churches around Massa-
chusetts into the prisons for discussions with the inmates at Norfolk;
and the musical and literary groups.68
Inmates at MCI-Norfolk, presumably work in the prison shops
where they make clothing, fabricated metal items, concrete novelties,
mattresses and shoes. Though furniture upholstering, woodworking,
welding, drafting, and automotive repair vocational training programs
are supposed to exist at MCI-Norfolk, most of them were not in full
operation during 1973 and 1974. Even if all the vocational programs
operated at capacity, they would only involve a minority of the
prison population. Some of the ex-offenders who were interviewed
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saw such prison programs as a sham. According to them, prisoners
fake participation in programs to earn parole, and program adminis-
trators fake success to keep their jobs.
MCI-Walpole, the Commonwealth's maximum security state prison,
officially opened in February 1956. It is located on 40 acres in
South Walpole, about 25 miles from Boston. When the new facility
opened, all the inmates who were confined in the old institution at
Charlestown, which was then the oldest state prison still in use in
the United States, were transferred to Walpole.
In recent years the crime for which more men are committed
to Walpole in robbery, both armed and unarmed. The age group 21 to
24 inclusive, represents the largest age group at time of commitment.
Over half of all those committed in 1970 were under the age of 30.
Of all those committed in 1970, 72 percent had previously served time
in some penal or correctional institution or juvenile training
school. 69
Walpole contains both a "segregation unit" and an "isolation
unit."' The segregation unit opened in 1959 and is a separate build-
ing within the walls. There are accommodations for 60 men in the
unit. This unit contains furnished cells and limited recreational
facilities, but with no access to the rest of the inmate population.
Inmates in the general institutional population of any of the
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correctional institutions for males whose presence there is "detri-
mental to the program of the institution" may be transferred to this
unit for an indefinite period by the Commissioner upon request of
the respective superintendent. An inmate may be returned only when
officials believe the troublesome inmate is ready to abide by the
rules. The isolation unit, by contrast is available "for the enforce-
ment of discipline" and is provided with light, ventilation, adequate
sanitary facilities and some furniture. Inmates may be confined
there by the Superintendent for no longer than 15 days and during
confinement, they must be provided with at least one full meal daily.
There is not even a pretense of rehabilitation in either of these
units.
Walpole's average daily population in 1962 was 595 as com-
pared to 572 in 1971 and 531 in 1967. The count on June 2, 1973, was
576, as compared to 612 the previous year. MCI-Walpole is the State
Prison to which any man serving a life sentence for a felony is com-
mitted and its population is usually close to capacity. There is.
very little variation in the inmate population from year to year at
Walpole. When it reaches capacity, men can be transferred to other
correctional facilities. (Quite a number of lifers are transferred
to MCI-Norfolk. In 1973 there were approximately 130 lifers at
Norfolk.) MCI-Walpole is considered a very brutal institution and
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over the past few years it has been the scene of inmate riots and
other violence. Perhaps more than the other prisons, it had a very
critical role in the correction reform movement in Massachusetts
during the seventies.
MCI-Concord opened in 1878 as the State Prison to replace the
old one at Charlestown which was temporarily closed. As a result,
Concord was and still is a maximum security institution. After its
construction, prison authorities, long concerned by the mixing of
young offenders with recidivists and older men, decided to re-open
Charlestown for the latter group and to reserve Concord for the
younger men. Therefore from 1884 to 1955 Concord was known as the
Massachusetts Reformatory and it was one of the early correctional
institutions for youthful offenders. At that time, no one over the
age of 30 was committed to Concord, though there is no age limit for
inmates incarcerated there today. It is the Department's policy,
however, as of December 1972, that Concord be designated a correc-
tional facility for youthful offenders between the ages of 17 and 24
years inclusive. The average age of those committed there by the
courts is about 19 or 20 years. Some critics of the Massachusetts
prison system have labelled Concord as nothing more than a younger
prisoners' Walpole. The records show that at the time of commitment
in 1970 about 64 percent of the youthful offenders had previously
served time in some institution, usually a jail, a house of correc-
tion or a juvenile facility.
Concord's inmates include both misdemeanants and felons.
There are about 18 men serving life sentences at the institution.
The great majority of Concord men serve relatively short sentences
usually a two to five year sentence. More men are committed to Con-
cord for the crime of robbery, armed and unarmed, than for any other
offense.
Concord is plagued with a serious drug problem. About 75 per-
cent of the population at any given time has a history of "hard drug"
abuse, yet there are few programs at the institution to deal with the
drug related problems of inmates. Outside the walled institution
there is a minimum security housing facility known as "Overflow,"
where about 25 percent of the Concord population is assigned. The
men housed in this facility are primarily engaged in work and educa-
tional release and enjoy many more privileges than their counterparts
behind the walls.
Concord's average daily population in 1972 was 627 in 1971,
374 in 1967, and 546 in 1962. Its count on June 2, 1973, was 404 as
compared to 675 on the same date in 1972. Concord's population fluc-
tuated considerably over the past few years during a period of
readjustment to new policies.
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MCI-Framingham is famous, because when it opened in 1877 as
the Reformatory Prison for Women, it was only the second institution
in the country built exclusively for women. In 1911 the word prison
was removed from its title because the minimum security institution
had essentially become a reformatory in spirit and operation.
Women in Massachusetts convicted of any crime for which the
sentence was one of imprisonment were committed to Framingham unless
the Commissioner designated some other correctional facility, a jail
or house of correction, as more appropriate. For quite some time,
most of the women were committed to Framingham by the District Courts
for misdemeanors, although recently there has been an increase in
felony commitments. Though commitments for drunkenness have ceased,
the DOC must maintain at Framingham "a facility for the treatment and
rehabilitation of alcoholics, subject to the approval of the Depart-
ment of Public Health." Aside from drunkenness, more than half of
the commitments are for felonies, such as larceny of over $100, nar-
cotic drug violations and drug-related crimes, and some manslaughter
and prostitution cases.
Although no exact figures are obtainable it is believed that
from 60 to 65 percent of the crimes were drug related. In 1970
about 21 percent of the women were under the age of 21 at the
time of commitment. About 44 percent of the 134 committed that
year were serving their first commitment in any jail, prison,
or correctional facility.70
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The major change at Framingham during its nearly 100 years
of existence is that men may now be transferred from Walpole, Norfolk
and Concord to Framingham. Most of the men so transferred are near
their parole or discharge date and are transferred there only upon
their own initiative after meeting some departmental requirements.
To qualify for transfer to Framingham, a man must be in minimum-
custody status with no disciplinary reports on their records for six
months preceding the transfer. They must be recommended by the offi-
cials of the institutions from which they are transferred, they must
be within 18 months of parole eligibility, and they may participate
in the educational and vocational programs which are available at the
institution. In the new, more natural co-educational setting, men
and women residents are permitted to mingle during meal hours and
recreation periods.
In 1952, following national trends toward more minimum secur-
ity institutions, the Department of Corrections opened a forestry
camp in the Myles Standish State Forest reservation (near Plymouth)
on a 14,000 acre tract under the control of the Department on Natural
Resources. The second camp was opened in 1955 in the Monroe State
Forest reservation about 140 miles from Boston near the Mohawk Trail
in the town of Monroe. The third camp opened in 1964 in the town of
Warwick at the Warwick State Forest Reservation, about 70 miles from
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Boston near the New Hampshire line. State law required that all
camps were built on land under the control of the Department of
Natural Resources with an exception for one camp on a Metropolitan
District Commission site. Prisoners assigned to these camps are
employed in "reforestation, maintenance and development of state
forests."
Only male prisoners are eligible for the forestry camps. The
courts do not commit men directly to the camps, but the institutional
classification committees select prisoners from MCI-Walpole, MCI-
Concord, or MCI-Norfolk who wish to go. The men are required to be
in good physical condition with good work and prison records, and
with only relatively short time left to serve on their sentence. For
several reasons, including location of the camps and the severity of
the work, few prisoners want to go to the forestry camps. In 1973,
only about 7 percent of all male prisoners, excluding those ar Bridge-
water, were in the forestry camps.
Because the camps are minimum security with no walls or other
security barriers, there is a potentially serious problem with escapes.
There are strict sanctions against escape from one of the camps. An
escape from a forestry camp may result in an additional sentence of
up to ten years, a return to the offender's original institution, and
forfeiture of all deductions for good behavior, from the sentence he
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was then serving. Until 1972, men serving life sentences or those
convicted of certain sex crimes were not eligible for transfer to
the camps. In 1972, the legislature approved an amendment to permit
the transfer of lifers who had served at least 12 years and who, in
the Commissioner's judgement, could be properly removed to the for-
estry camps. This amendment still forbade the transfer of any pris-
oner serving a life sentence for first degree murder or a sentence
for rape, assault to commit rape, or an attempt to do so.
In the Massachusetts correctional system of the late 1960's
and early 1970's much like other correctional systems in the United
States, prisoners were confined in large and overcrowded institutions.
They provided the inmates in theory with little opportunity for
acquiring educational or vocational training, and only limited con-
tacts with the outside community. Much of American penal practice
rested on the assumption that lawbreakers were deficient and that
these deficiencies resulted in their criminal behavior. Since most
criminals were from the lower classes and were poorly educated, there
was a belief that offenders should receive vocational training, if
they were to avoid future infractions of the law. Incarceration was
therefore a way to prepare prisoners for future employment, to instill
in them the protestant work ethic, to have them become law abiding
citizens. The American prison was an unhappy place of apathy,
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isolation, idleness, and paradoxically, of psychological tension and
physical assaults.72 As discussed at the outset, the prison was not
totally isolated from the larger society, nor was it completely auto-
nomous. It reacted to and was reacted upon by differing interest
groups within the society. One of the fundamental areas in prison
studies where this is true is correctional goals and objectives. A
prison's objectives and its means for achieving them are often deter-
mined by authorities outside the institution. This is particularly
true of society's expectations that prisons be maintained for the
protection of society. As prisons have grown in size and as society's
concept of their functions have changed, new services and roles have
been added.73 An understanding of the espoused goals and objectives
of penitentiaries is important because these same goals are often
imposed upon community based corrections developed as a reaction
against prisons and incarceration.
There is some disagreement as to the purposes of prison, but
usually the justifications for placing an offender in prison are
related to the purposes of incapacitation, retribution, deterrence
and rehabilitation. As a purpose of prisons, incapacitation is an
uncomplicated process of confining an offender such that he is made
innocuous to the larger society. Imprisonment keeps law violators
out of sight and out of the public mind. The basic idea of
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retribution or punishment is that a person who has committed a wrong
or hurt must suffer. In modern penal practice this idea is extended
beyond merely depriving an individual of his liberty, but also by
imposing painful conditions under which the prisoner must live within
the walls. Very often this particular function is not articulated,
yet it is implied in the operation and administration of most prisons.
Penologists, prison psychiatrists, prison administrators,
judges--all are far more apt to claim that we do not place the
criminal in prison to secure retribution but to accomplish
better things. Yet there is some reason to doubt that this
denial of punishment as a legitimate aim of imprisonment
accurately reflects the opinions of the general public. How-
ever harsh an insistence on retribution may appear to be, it
cannot be ignored as a social force shaping the nature of the
penal institution, whether in the form of community reactions
to accusations of "coddling" prisoners or the construction of
budgets by the state legislators. 75
Deterrence as a goal of corrections is a bit more complex. Deter-
rence as a purpose of prison is based on the view that the nature of
imprisonment is so negative that it has the effect of deterring an
offender from future criminal infractions. Deterrence occurs not so
much because the offender's values and attitudes about crime change,
but rather it presumably occurs because the criminal's awareness of
the penalties attendant to unlawful behavior is heightened. Inter-
estingly, deterrence as one of the purposes of imprisonment suggests
that criminal behavior is the outcome of a logical and rational
thought process in which all the possible outcomes are considered
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before the criminal act is committed. There is no evidence that
criminals analyze and assess the consequences of their illegal activ-
ity, nor do we have evidence that all or even most crimes are pre-
meditated. Given the difficulty in evaluating penal measures, the
effectiveness of the deterrence function of incarceration in unknown.
What is significant about the deterrence objective is that it offers
a compromise for the humanitarians who disagree with vengeance as a
goal of corrections as well as the cynics who doubt the corrections
system's capacity to reform offenders. The remaining objective of
the corrections system is rehabilitation. In seeking to imprison
for the purpose of rehabilitation, the aim is to transform an indi-
vidual and to eradicate those causes of crime which lie within the
individual offender. Some of those who view rehabilitation as a
valid goal of corrections advocate a medical or therapeutic model
based on psychological and psychiatric methods for changing a pris-
oner's personality and attitudes such that he is rehabilitated.
Others advocating the same goal propose a sociological or educational
model whereby prisoners are offered meaningful employment, given voca-
tional training and provided the opportunity for educational advances.
More generally, the goals of correctional institutions are
characterized on the basis of the relative importance of custodial or
treatment purposes. Custodial goals are operative when an
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organization devotes energies and resources to the control and con-
tainment of inmates. Treatment goals, by contrast, are operative
when organizational resources and energies are devoted to rehabili-
tation and positive social change of inmates.76 Custody implies
containment and treatment implies intervention. This typology of
correctional goals is very simplistic, yet it captures a central
dichotomy or inconsistency in the corrections field. Most prisons
operate on more than one specific correctional goal. Having mixed
goals or multiple tasks for prisons is quite acceptable provided we
are capable of translating these general tasks into specific organi-
zational procedures and we have the techniques and strategies for
achieving the goals. Problems arise because of the inherent incon-
sistency of correctional policies which attempt to exert vengeance,
terrify the actual or potential offender, isolate those adjudged
criminal from the larger society, constructively educate and train,
and at the same time maintain the institutions in an orderly and
secure fashion.
All of these difficulties existed in the Massachusetts cor-
rectional system during the seventies. The challenge to reformers,
corrections administrators and policymakers, therefore, was to develop
alternative approaches to incarceration that would clarify and dis-
entangle the espoused objectives from the practice. In the 1970s,
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the Massachusetts corrections system espoused a commitment to reha-
bilitation based on the sociological or educational model. While
training, rehabilitation and treatment were a part of the official
policy rhetoric, in practice an orientation toward custody prevailed.
There were few training programs at the prisons and those which
existed accommodated a very small proportion of the inmate population.
Further evidence of the actual commitment to custody was found among
the corrections officers, who had daily responsibility for implement-
ing policy. In discussions with guards the major themes which kept
recurring were the need for rules and regulations, greater security,
and control over the inmates. This disparity between the correctional
theory espoused by the administrators and the correctional theory
practiced by the guards made reform of the correctional system a
difficult undertaking.
Post-Attica reverberations were also evident in Massachusetts.
Shortly after the Attica rebellion, inmates at MCI-Walpole and MCI-
Norfolk staged four days of non-violent demonstrations and partial
work stoppages. Prisoners at these institutions demonstrated their
solidarity with the Attica inmates and dramatized their own demands
for reform of prison and parole conditions. Their demands included
restructuring the parole system, particularly the controversial two-
thirds law and revising the membership of the parole board. They
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also demanded improvements in regulations governing visiting, such
as, night visiting, conjugal privileges, and no splitting of families
during visiting period. There was a demand for increased funds for
education and better educational facilities throughout the state's
correctional system including county jails and prison camps; and
finally the protesting inmates wanted several staff members removed
for alleged discrimination, incompetency, or improper procedures.
Protesting prisoners aired these grievances to top corrections offi-
cials and legislators, among them Mr. John Fitzpatrick, Commissioner
of Corrections, and Senator Jack Backman (D-Brookline), Chairman of
the Joint Social Welfare Committee.
Many legislators and the top public officials also met with
aggrieved inmates. They listened to the inmates' grievances and
pledged their support for the "human and decent" changes which the
inmates sought. Some supporters thought the inmates' grievances were
reasonable and just demands. Other supporters were less convinced
of the justness of the demands but supported them out of fear of
another Attica occurring in Massachusetts and as the only rational
way of averting violence in the state's prison system. With these
pledges of support and a desire to work for change in a peaceful
manner, the inmates ended their work strike. Shortly after the end
of the work strike,. an atmosphere of good faith and confidence
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prevailed. Concrete steps were taken to correct some of the problems
in the state's prisons.
One year earlier, in September of 1970, the Massachusetts
Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Criminal Justice, the state body which administered LEAA monies in
the Commonwealth, appropriated federal funds to create the Joint Cor-
rectional Planning Commission, JCPC. The Joint Correctional Planning
Commission's mandate was to develop a unified and consistent policy
direction for the Massachusetts correctional system and to provide a
comprehensive approach to fragmented criminal justice planning by
establishing an overall planning capability for the Department of
Correction, the Parole Board, and the Probation Department. Much of
the groundwork for the major legislative and administrative change
which occurred in the state's correctional system was undertaken by
this group.
In addition, Governor Sargent responded to Attica and the
disturbances in Massachusetts prisons by giving a high priority to
corrections reform in the Commonwealth. Because of the reorganiza-
tion of the Executive Office of Human Services into a single cabinet
level agency including corrections and the Parole Board, the new
Secretary for Human Services, Peter C. Goldmark, had major responsi-
bility for much of the early stages of the correction reform effort.
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It was Secretary Goldmark who chaired JCPC, the Joint Correctional
Planning Commission, the organization responsible for establishing an
overall planning capability within corrections, parole and probation.
On September 28, 1971, Governor Sargent appointed a special
panel, the Massachusetts Citizens' Committee on Corrections to study
and identify the specific grievances of both prisoners and prison
staff; to assess channels of communications and if necessary to recom-
mend change; and finally to identify new priorities for improving the
correctional system. The Committee represented a cross section of
the general public as it included minorities, women, an inmate, an
ex-inmate, a corrections officer and a DYS staff member. The chairman
of the Committee was Judge Harry Elam of the Boston Municipal Court.
Independently of the designation of the Citizens' Committee,
the Department of Corrections and prison officials began to take steps
toward prison reform. They changed the mail censorship policy such
that inmate mail was no longer read by prison officials, but all in-
coming mail was checked for contraband. Corrections officials placed
more stringent educational requirements on prison guards and in 1971,
a high school diploma or an equivalency certificate became mandatory
for all new corrections officers. At this time all guards over fifty
years of age were also required to take re-orientation training.
Another change initiated by the Department of Corrections was that
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inmates enrolled in work programs at State mental hospitals and
schools for the retarded received two and one half days good conduct
time per month for these activities. The effects of these changes is
difficult to assess because they were not always enforced.
In the wake of the Attica rebellion and unrest in Massachu-
setts prisons, prison reform was a big issue. The legislature moved
on prison issues at this time because of the publicity and attention
given to disturbances in prisons throughout the country, and pressure
from constituents to prevent the occurrence of another Attica in
Massachusetts. Another factor prompting a legislative response to the
problems in the prison system was Massachusetts' impressive history
of passing progressive legislation in the area of human welfare. The
legislative response to the apparent crisis in the prisons was reactive.
There was no well coordinated nor well planned comprehensive legisla-
tive plan for addressing prison reforms, but the legislature responded
to the unrest in the prisons. During the 1971 legislative session,
more than fifty prison reform proposals were filed. Governor Sargent
filed a bill to repeal the two-thirds parole law even though it had
failed in the House earlier in the year. Some of the reform proposals
were refiled after defeat the previous year. These included measures
to create greater community and inmate interaction by establishing
community correctional centers, expanding work release, and allowing
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selected inmates to attend classes at colleges and vocational schools
near their prisons. There were also bills which called for major
changes in prison industries such as upgrading the standards of opera-
tion of prison industries so that they conformed to the same standards
of private business, and raising the prison industries pay rate from
the maximum of 50t per day. Other bills planned to abolish the
Commonwealth's three remaining county training schools; to centralize
all state, county and youth correctional institutions; and finally to
guarantee and expand upon new social and legal rights for prisoners
and parolees. With the notable exception of the closing of the county
training schools, the legislature failed to act decisively in any
other area of prison reform during that session. Particularly disap-
pointing was the failure of the General Court to pass the bill filed
by Governor Sargent to repeal the controversial two-thirds parole law.
This bill would have made all prisoners eligible for parole review
after serving one-third of their sentences.
The legislative defeat of all reform measures in the area of
adult corrections and continuing tensions between inmates and guards
shattered the shortlived hopes for immediate redress of grievances and
reforms through the legislature. Three events occurred within the
first ten days of November 1971 that further exacerbated the situation
with regards to prisons. The public became aware of the fact that
76
Walpole inmates were locked in their cells for several days during a
shakedown of the prison in which contraband, weapons and goods were
di 78discovered. 
There were night raids at Norfolk Prison by State Police and
prison guards on November 9, 1971. During the raid sixteen inmates
were forcibly transferred out of the prison without warning. Accord-
ing to a former corrections officer at MCI-Norfolk, prisoners were
dragged from their cells and taken in the raid at the indiscriminate
whim of prison guards.79 Interestingly enough, most of those trans-
ferred were inmate leaders or members of the inmate grievance commit-
tee. The raid and transfers were justified as a preventive measure
because of alleged threats by inmates to burn the prison and to take
correction officers and civilian employees of the prison as hostages.
On November 13, 1971 however, most inmates who had been transferred
were returned to Norfolk.
Whatever the justification, the raid was brutal and the
inmates felt betrayed, particularly by Commissioner Fitzpatrick who
presumably knew in advance about the transfers and had approved them.
A former Norfolk corrections officer revealed that the Norfolk guards
met on Saturday before the transfer with the Commissioner and demanded
that over thirty inmates be transferred. The Commissioner insisted
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that he would only approve the transfer of ten inmates, but in either
case, all the transfers seemed unnecessary.
The day after the Norfolk raid the third event of that week
took place, Commissioner Fitzpatrick announced his resignation due to
illness. Ill health, the pressures of the job and the controversy
surrounding the Norfolk tranfers all contributed to Fitzpatrick's
decision to resign. The announcement of the resignation was quite sud-
den and owing to this, it would not become effective until the Governor
named a new Commissioner of Corrections.
Events in Massachusetts during the Fall of 1971 were occuring
at an almost confusing rate. The legislature acted rather schizophren-
ically with regard to social welfare issues. All the crucial measures
related to prison reform were defeated, yet bills to eliminate the
crime of public drunkenness and to establish detoxification centers
for alcoholics received a favorable passage. A second major bill
reduced penalties for those arrested with small amounts of marijuana
and allowed probation and the eventual sealing of records for the
first possession of marijuana. Both these laws reflected an insipient
reformist attitude in the General Court, though it was not to be
immediately extended to inmates. Unrest among inmates, growing
executive concern about prison conditions and the problems in the
institutions, the tense aftermath following publication in newspapers
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of the revelations by a former guard of the events leading up to the
raid,80 and the administrative upheaval brought about by the imminent
resignation of the Commonwealth's Corrections Commissioner made cor-
rections in Massachusetts ripe for some kind of change. The conver-
gence of all these events and a general feeling of frustration about
prisons aroused public concern and anger which in turn mobilized
certain segments of the public to act.
An interracial and interfaith group of concerned citizens,
which later became the Ad Hoc Committee on Prison Reform, began meet-
ing in order to address their post-Attica concerns for the situation
at Walpole, Norfolk, and Bridgewater. These were mostly middle and
upper middle class professionals from such organizations as Packard
Manse, a spiritually based social concern group, the Massachusetts
Council of Churches, as well as some ex-offenders. On November 30,
1971, this informal grouping of people concerned with prison reform
sent a telegram to Governor Sargent which was signed by 100 religious,
legal, academic and civic leaders. The telegram urged the Governor
to visit the correctional institutions to see the poor conditions
firsthand. They also wanted him to close by executive order the
solitary confinement units at Bridewater. Primarily, they wanted him
to restore order in the corrections system by emphasizing to the public,
the corrections officers, and the inmates that everyone's best interest
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and the good of the Commonwealth and the corrections system were all
served through constructive prison reform. The telegram backed by a
massive post card campaign of more than 1,000 responses lead to a
meeting with the Governor and selected representatives of the Packard
Manse based group.
On the very day that the broad-based community group sent
their telegram, Judge Elam, Chairman of the Massachusetts Citizens'
Committee on Corrections released that Committee's report. This
permitted citizens to have a voice in shaping new policy in correc-
tions. The Committee's report recommended new legislation to remedy
the problems found within the massachusetts corrections system. The
report indicted the Department of Corrections for its emphasis on
punishment and control rather than corrections and rehabilitation.
That punishment remains as the state's primary response to a con-
victed criminal is a critical flaw in the correctional system.
Vocational training tends to be obsolete--the prison industries
are generally low skill industries for which there are no jobs
in the open market; educational programs are completely inade-
quate--there are no post high school programs in Massachusetts
Correctional Institutions; and attitudes of many staff do not
respect the offender as a person with certain basic rights.
Whatever the reasons--lack of money, timid leadership, an
unresponsive legislature, low public priority--control not
corrections seems to be the dominant theme in many institutions.81
The Elam Committee's Report was important because after the
members of the Committee visited all the major correctional institu-
tions in the Commonwealth, held hearings, and met with inmates,
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teachers and social workers82 their findings echoed in many respects
the report of the Wessell Committee of 1955 that "public interest and
public concern have been the short-lived aftermath of prison disorders,
escapes, or attempted escapes." The Wessell Committee was similar to
the Elam Committee in that both were citizens' committees appointed
by two different Governor's some twenty years apart to study the
Massachusetts correctional system. The earlier committee, the Gover-
nor's Committee to Study the Massachusetts Correctional System was
chaired by Nils Y. Wessell, President of Tufts University. The Wes-
sell Committee recommended that the corrections system be overhauled
and that an administrative head of the Department of Corrections, a
Commissioner, be named with wide discretionary powers to implement
changes in the corrections system. Some of the changes.proposed by
the Committee were to establish a new prisoner classification system;
to reorganize the probation system such that the procedures were work-
able and instrumental in the handling of cases; to liberalize the
parole provision of the law. One of the most controversial recommen-
dations in the report was the one allowing Corrections Department's
experts to decide what institution was best suited to the individual
offender rather than the courts. Many judges, particularly, opposed
this recommendation. Other recommendations were changing the names
of all penal institutions so that they would become known as
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"Massachusetts Correctional Institution" at . . . the town in which
they were located. The irony of the two reports was that, in almost
twenty years, things had changed very little in the philosophy and
operation of prisons in Massachusetts.
Corrections '71, the report of the Elam Committee.provided
guidelines for action in four general categories: inmate and staff
problems, internal administration, legislation and communications.
The reforms suggested by the Committee ranged from such basics as
requiring all kitchen staff to possess a food handlers certificate to
administrative changes in disciplinary procedures. Of particular
significance were the various legislative changes which the Commit-
tee recommended that the Governor submit in a legislative package for
the forthcoming session of the General Court. Measures to be in-
cluded in the package were repeal of the two-thirds law; parole
eligibility for lifers after they had served fifteen years of their
sentence; increased opportunities for selected inmates to participate
in the community through expanded work release, education release,
and furloughs; an amendment to Chapter 127, Section Fl of the General
Laws to allow receipts from the labor of prisoners to return to the
Department of Corrections for the purpose of increasing compensation
to inmates; and finally allowing those ex-offenders, with unique
ability to improve the correctional system, to be hired by the
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Department of Correction. The major significance of this report was
that it gave even greater impetus to the growing movement for correc-
tions reform in Massachusetts.
Shortly after the release of the Elam Committee's report and
as citizen pressure for some type of definitive action became more
intense, Governor Sargent met with representatives of the concerned
citizen's groups. Governor Sargent often actively sought citizen
involvement and input into the decisionmaking process in many areas
of state government. Suprisingly, the Governor's views and those of
the citizens who advocated changes in the correctional system were not
too divergent. The Governor informed the group that he would appoint
a citizen advisory panel to help implement the recommendations
recently presented by the Massachusetts Citizen's Committee on correc-
tions and that he would allow private prison reform groups to inter-
view prospective candidates for the position of Commissioner of
Corrections. The reformers were not satisfied because there were
four other issues on which they desired the Governor to act. They
wanted him to visit the various state prisons and forestry camps
believing that if he could see the deplorable conditions he would
affect immediate changes in their administration and operation. Visit-
ing of the facilities was especially important to them in terms of the
desegregation units at MCI-Bridgewater. The reformers complained of
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brutality, unsanitary living conditions and poor professional treat-
ment of the inmates at Bridgewater who were criminally insane or
inmates who had been disruptive of prison life at other institutions. 83
Feeling that the atrocities occurring at Bridgewater far outweighed
any possible therapeutic or rehabilitative value derived from such
treatment, the reformers wanted its desegregation units closed. For
the reformers, it was not only important that the Governor visit the
corrections facilities, but it was necessary for him to make a public
policy statement emphasizing his commitment to reform of the state
prison system. They felt this public gesture would indicate the
seriousness of his commitment to prison reform in spite of the pos-
sible political consequences. The final issue which the concerned
citizen group wanted the Governor to address was to order the return
to Norfolk of all the inmates who were illegally transferred to other
prisons following the work stoppage in November. The reformers were
quite successful at this meeting because Governor Sargent made com-
mitments to visit the facilities in the state's correctional system;
to close the D.S.U at Bridgewater; to make a state-wide television
appearance in which he would outline his reform program; and to endorse
peaceful negotiations between inmates and prison administrators at
the troubled institutions.
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In spite of these seemingly conciliatory moves, tensions
mounted over how best to deal with the prison situation. On Decem-
ber 4, 1971, exhausted, exasperated and in the middle of cross fire
between corrections officers and staff who wanted more security and
more law and order within the institutions and an assortment of
reform-minded citizens who stressed positive and constructive train-
ing programs and better treatment of the inmates, Commissioner of
Corrections John Fitzpatrick resigned his $23,500 post, before a new
Commissioner was chosen. Deputy Commissioner Joseph Higgins, a vete-
ran of the Department of Corrections was appointed acting Commissioner.
Immediately thereafter, efforts to find Fitzpatrick's successor were
intensified. The Governor wanted a reform minded and innovative man
with a national reputation who could change the Massachusetts system
for the better as the new Commissioner. Eventhough a national search
was initiated to find a new Commissioner, the major drawback in
attracting the type of individual they wanted for the post was the
low salary of approximately $25,000.
Just before Christmas, Governor Sargent announced his reform
agenda. He began acting upon the demands of the citizens' groups by
making unannounced visits to state corrections facilities, and most
importantly, he announced his choice to fill the post as new Commis-
sioner of Corrections for Massachusetts. Under his reform plan forthe
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Commonwealth, there would be a state-wide system of halfway houses
and community corrections centers. This community-based system would
supplement the corrections institutions. The proposed reform reflected
the deinstitutionalization ethic, that was gaining prominence in cor-
rections circles at the time. Despite its previous failures in the
legislature, another major component of the Governor's reform plan
was repeal of the current two-thirds parole law, which was expected
to relieve some of the tensions and pressures created by the inequi-
ties of prison life. Because the community-based corrections system
would not supplant the present system of corrections institutions,
Governor Sargent also proposed measures to humanize life inside the
institutions. The Governor wanted to make major changes in prison
industries by creating a non-profit prison industry corporation and
paying the inmates $1.75 per hour. Additional reforms which the Gov-
ernor proposed centered around staff improvements. He proposed a plan
to recruit Black and Spanish-speaking correctional officers. The
thinking was that since approximately forty percent of the population
in state prisons was comprised of minorities there should be more
black and brown prison guards. The final component of the Governor's
prison reform package was to establish inmate-staff councils in all
state prisons in order to provide a mechanism for addressing insti-
tutional grievances.
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At this same time, Governor Sargent announced his selection
of John 0. Boone, a forty-nine year old black man, formerly Super-
intendent of the Lorton Correctional Complex, a federal penitentiary
in Virginia, as the new Commissioner of Corrections for the Common-
wealth. Almost one month after his appointment and official intro-
duction as the new Commissioner of Corrections in Massachusetts, Mr.
Boone was sworn in by Governor Sargent on January 17, 1972 and assumed
the duties of his new post. Mr. Boone's initial statements and actions
indicated he believed in a very progressive approach to corrections
administration. He stated his belief that "prisons have failed miser-
ably in the past" and that in prison, inmates "only learn how to be
better criminals." Mr. Boone favored a process of gradual reintegra-
tion of inmates into society and in this regard he was impressed with
the Governor'a policy statement on prison reform, especially his plans
for community corrections.
After his appointment, the new Commissioner, Mr. Boone, along
with members of the Governor's staff, aides and lawyers from Human
Services and groups of concerned citizens joined forces and worked to
formalize Governor Sargent's prison reform policy statement into a
substantial piece of legislation that would have far reaching conse-
quences on meaningful and positive changes within the Commonwealth's
prison system if approved. In the end it was this attempt to
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redirect the Massachusetts corrections system through reform legis-
lation that marked John Boone's major success as the Commissioner of
Corrections, as well as the source of his greatest vulnerability.
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C H A P T E R I I
DEVELOPMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE CORRECTIONS
REFORM LEGISLATION
On February 9, 1972, Francis W. Sargent, Governor of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts filed legislation which called for "a
comprehensive and complete overhaul of the structure of the Depart-
ment of Correction." The proposed measure also gave the Department
"the tools necessary to rehabilitate the offenders committed to it so
as to allow them to enter society with a lesser likelihood of com-
mitting another crime." This bill held the possibility of changing
Massachusetts corrections law in several major ways.
Essentially the proposed corrections reform legislation was
a plan to give the Department of Corrections greater continuity and
improved tools for protecting society while rehabilitating those
incarcerated in the state prison system. This legislation was also
significant because it represented an attempt by a number of politi-
cally disparate groups and individuals to develop a system of unified
and coordinated correctional services in Massachusetts. Even though
the bill was submitted to the legislature by Governor Sargent, it was
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produced in a non-partisan, deliberate forum under the sponsorship
of the Massachusetts Joint Correctional Planning Commission (JCPC).
In 1970, the Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement became
concerned that the Commonwealth's corrections agencies were not using
the federal funds which had been available to them over the past two
2
years. Corrections agencies did not avail themselves of LEAA fund-
ing prospects because they often felt that they could not meet the
matching requirements. There was also a reluctance to accept federal
money, because of the fear of excessive federal control and interven-
tion in the administration of local correctional programs. Federal
funds were unpopular sources for additional revenue, because planning
was often not a priority activity in many correctional agencies. In
other cases there was a recognition of the importance of the planning
function, but often the agency lacked the staff and the technical
ability to prepare the necessary proposals, or to implement and super-
vise the programs, or to develop systems for monitoring and evaluating
the programs once implemented. These problems of staff and skill lim-
itations were compounded because the Governor's Committee did little
to aggressively campaign or assist corrections agencies in a more
extended use of federal funds to improve their existing programs or
to develop new ones. Primarily, the Governor's Committee lacked a
focus in the allocation of its resources and to some extent this
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penalized local criminal justice agencies. The Governor's Committee
spread funds thinly rather than moving the system along in a carefully
determined and well-integrated manner. Based on these realizations
and deliberations with individuals and agencies concerned with plan-
ning for the whole spectrum of human services, the Governor's Commit-
tee deemed it appropriate to have an independent and autonomous body
address the problems of planning in Massachusetts correctional
agencies.
On September 30, 1970 Governor Sargent created the Massachu-
setts Joint Correctional Planning Commission by Executive Order
No. 77 partially in response to the Governor's Committee concerns about
the need for planning in selected areas of the Massachusetts criminal
justice system:
There shall be established a Joint Correctional Planning Commis-
sion which shall consist of not more than thirty members who shall
serve at the pleasure of the Governor. The chairman of the Com-
mission shall be designated by the Governor from among members of
the Commission. The Commission shall serve as an adjunct of and
work closely with the Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Criminal Justice (the Governor's Public Safety
Committee).3
This group's major function was to direct cooperative activities
among corrections agencies in order to establish a continuum of inte-
grated services to the offender throughout his involvement with the
correctional process.4 Primarily, JCPC was organized to help utilize
98
law enforcement funds by the Department of Corrections, Probation and
the Parole Board in areas of greatest need and the best chances for
successful implementation. As an integral part of this process, the
Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement wanted to develop an ongoing
planning capability within each agency. In addition, the Commission
(JCPC) was established to identify priorities where improvements in
agency performance was essential and develop administrative and legis-
lative recommendations to fulfill the required improvements; develop
joint planning, communication and coordination among correctional
agencies; analyze and evaluate existing correctional activities and
develop a specified integrated process; establish a research capa-
bility to evaluate programs with an emphasis placed on interagency
programming; contribute to the comprehensive planning efforts of the
Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice; and
develop public understanding and support for correctional reform in
Massachusetts.5
Shortly after establishing the Commission, Governor Sargent
appointed Dr. Harold Demone as its Chairman, and Dr. Walter Stern was
hired as the Executive Director. Dr. Demone and Dr. Stern brought
more than thirty-five years of experience in comprehensive planning,
design and delivery of human service systems to JCPC. They worked
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together at the United Community Services (now known as the United
Planning Corporation) as Executive Director and Senior Planner,
respectively.
Because JCPC was created to assist the Governor's Committee
on Law Enforcement in its comprehensive criminal justice planning
efforts, the Commission undertook selected research projects such as
developing a proposal in conjunction with the Boston College Center
for Corrections and the Law for studying the pre-trial detention
needs in the Greater Boston area; examining the information needs of
the Massachusetts correctional system in relation to improving the
system's decisionmaking capacity; and conducting staff training pro-
grams for corrections, probation, and parole. Another role that
JCPC played in its overall assistance to the Governor's Committee
was that of educating the public to the necessity of its support for
efforts to integrate, coordinate and improve correctional activities
within the Commonwealth.
In effect, however, all of JCPC's activities revolved around
five tasks. The background or preparatory task was to do a compre-
hensive literature search and review of existing documents about the
State corrections system. This research would then be the basis of
a description, analysis and evaluation of such correctional programs
in Massachusetts. Another task was to strengthen interagency
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coordination, communication and joint programming so as to reduce
duplication and to produce a more efficient corrections system. In
the early 70's a good deal of attention was given to alternatives to
incarceration as the appropriate means for dealing with most offend-
ers. One of JCPC's initial tasks was to identify priority areas for
developing administrative, programmatic, and legislative recommenda-
tions which focused on community based correctional programming in
those cities of the Commonwealth where the incidence of crime was
highest.6 The legislative recommendations were to be presented to
the Governor beginning on January 15, 1971 and on the same date for
each succeeding year of the Commission's existence. Five years since
its creation, most people remember little else about JCPC other than
its recommendations for major changes in the state's correctional
system which subsequently became Chapter 777, the Omnibus Corrections
Reform Act. 7
This is most ironic given the fact that preparation of cor-
rectional reform legislation was not the central charge to the Joint
Correctional Planning Commission. As decisions about priorities were
clarified, it became apparent that implementation of these new pro-
grams required legislative changes. The new programs were greatly
influenced by a broader movement in the field of human services to
place care and treatment of individuals and families with special
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needs in the community. An outgrowth of this trend was that JCPC had
responsibility to recommend and present a comprehensive plan to the
Secretary of Human Services and the Governor for organizing correc-
tions agencies within and in relation to the new Executive Office of
Human Services by July 1, 1971. JCPC's final task was to establish
an evaluative research capability so that the new programs could be
assessed in terms of their effectiveness. Each of the tasks repre-
sented an expanded capability through JCPC for innovative planning
and program development for corrections in Massachusetts by greater
use of federal funds.
In early October, Governor Sargent selected the first
twenty-four members of the Commission. His appointees primarily
represented State and local correctional service agencies. Members
of the Commission were also appointed based on their experiences with
the operation of the corrections system in Massachusetts. The Commis-
sioners of Correction, Probation and Youth Services, and the Chairman
of the Parole Board were appointed as members of JCPC.8 Other members
of the Commission were from the Boston area and affiliated with such
state agencies as the Rehabilitation Commission, the Department of
Public Health, the Department of Education, the Department of Mental
Health, and the Division of Employment Security. There were no
representatives from the academic community on the Commission and
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only nominal representation from the general public and the private
sector.9
During the first few months of its existence, Attorney
General Robert Quinn informed Dr. Demone, chairman of JCPC, that he
was personally interested in representing his office at JCPC meetings.
Shortly thereafter, the Attorney General began attending the meetings.
The members of the Commission voted to officially expand
their membership to forty-five in February 1971 because they felt that
as constituted the Commission was limited and weighted too heavily
with people from state agencies. Even though the members thought the
Commission needed broad public and private input during its delibera-
tions, they also recognized that there was a very practical need for
members who represented organizations which could be influential in
the implementation of the Commission's recommendations.10 Suggestions
were made to include ex-offenders, minorities and women on the Commis-
sion as well as a broader geographic distribution among new Commission
members. Representatives of grass roots organizations, corrections
officers' unions, law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, the legis-
lature and private citizens were among those who could become members
of the JCPC if the membership were increased.
In anticipation of the Governor's approval of the request, a
membership subcommittee met and recommended the inclusion of
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twenty-two new members on the Commission. The nominees were contacted
and sixteen agreed to serve when they were approved and appointed by
the Governor. Some of the sixteen began to attend meetings and took
an active part in JCPC prior to their official appointment.
One of those nominated was James Reed, and ex-offender and a
board member of the Self-Development Group, Inc., an ex-inmate self-
help group. The Commission members unanimously recommended Mr. Reed
to the Governor in November 1970 as a new member. The issue of the
involvement of ex-offenders with JCPC became quite controversial when
Reed's nomination was reported to the Manchester Union-Leader with
extensive coverage of his criminal record. The controversy worsened
when radio stations also carried stories of Reed's prison record.11
In responding to the press and the Governor's Office, JCPC reaffirmed
its previous recommendation that Reed be appointed as a member of the
Commission. The members also commented that former offenders would
make an important contribution to the deliberations of the Commission
because of their special insights into the correctional process.
Threr was also a strong feeling in JCPC that the public had to realize
that an offender should not be punished continuously for past crimes.12
Because of the controversy surrounding Reed's nomination, the Gover-
nor's Office did not approve any nominations and the Governor changed
the procedure for nominating persons to fill vacancies.13
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Arnold Rosenfeld, Executive Director of the Governor's Com-
mittee on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Criminal Justice
conveyed to members of JCPC the Governor's wish not to expand the
Commission beyond thirty members at that time and the new procedure.
The new procedure required that before an individual was notified
that he was under consideration for membership on the Commission, his
name had to be cleared through the Governor's Office and that at least
three names should be submitted for each vacancy. Rosenfeld indicated
that Governor Sargent wanted the Commission to submit two additional
names in the case of the nomination of Reed. In spite of the Commis-
sion member's continued unanimous endorsement of Reed and the consider-
able effort by other individuals and groups throughout Boston to have
Reed confirmed in the position, Rosenfeld relayed the Governor's view
that he should have latitude in appointing someone to this position
and therefore he wanted two other individuals to be nominated.14
At the JCPC meeting of October 4, 1971, the nominating com-
mittee gave its report and recommended that the names of Abdur Rahman
Raus and Richard Woods be added to that of Reed as nominees to repre-
sent ex-inmates on the Commission. The nominating committee also
nominated Justices Reuben Lurie, Joseph Ford, James Roy, and Thomas
Dwyer as possible representatives from the Superior Court. From the
District Court came the following nominations: Chief Justice Franklin
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Flashner and Justices Lee and Mayo. After this date, there is no
mention of Reed, nor either of the other two ex-offenders nor any of
the judges nominated to represent broader intersts in any of the
written records of JCPC. Based on a January 1972 membership roster
and discussions with former JCPC staff members, no ex-offender or
judge was ever appointed to the Commission as a member. The nominees'
names were submitted to the Governor, but as of October 1972, he had
not approved any of them.
The series of events concerning the appointment of an ex-
offender to JCPC were significant, because they illustrated the
ability of the media to influence events and to promote controversy;
the Governor's sensitivity to adverse publicity; and the public's
ambivalent attitude about ex-offenders and the degree to which it
permitted those released from prison to enjoy their full rights as
citizens. JCPC's membership throughout its existence was white,
liberal, professional and middle to upper income. This bias was often
reflected in the Commission's work.
In the Fall of 1971, discussions began between Demone and
Secretary Goldmark about the possibility of the Secretary investing
a significant portion of his time and that of his office to correc-
tions. Discussion concerning the development of substantial and
defined links between the Secretary's office and JCPC were undertaken
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because each of the Commonwealth's Secretaries had a mandate to plan
for the reorganization of the agencies under their authority. Such
links were also necessary, because of the overlapping responsibility
of JCPC and those of the Office of Human Services to provide effec-
tive planning and implementation of correctional programs. This was
especially true in view of the fact that the Secretary of Human Ser-
vices had jurisdiction over the State Department of Correction and
the State Parole Board, but none over probation services which were
administered by the Office of the Commissioner of Probation and oper-
ated through the various District and Superior Courts. Attorney
General Quinn indicated that it would be important to establish a
close working relationship with the Secretary for Human Services so
that the Commission's desire to place greater emphasis on rehabilita-
tion than punishment in correctional programs and planning could be
realized.
With the likelihood of Secretary Goldmark's increased involve-
ment with JCPC, a Commission member, Arnold Rosenfeld, raised the
possibility of Secretary Goldmark becoming the chairman of JCPC with
Dr. Demone as co-chairman. There was apprehension among some Commis-
sion members that such a move would identify JCPC too closely with
Governor Sargent's office, thereby making it more difficult to get
bi-partisan support for its legislative programs. Dr. Demone, the
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chairman of JCPC at the time, spoke in favor of the idea. He felt
that the close relationships with the Secretary's office would be
helpful in implementing JCPC programs that involved cooperation
from other state agencies, such as the Department of Mental Health,
Public Health, the Employment Security Commission, because they
provided specialized services to offenders in the community and in
the prisons. In November 1971, Governor Sargent named Peter Goldmark,
Secretary of Human Services, as Chairman of the Massachusetts Joint
Correctional Planning Commission and Dr. Harold Demone as co-chair-
man. All other appointments to the Commission remained the same.
Reaction to this appointment was mixed and in retrospect, most members
felt that once Goldmark became chairman, the members of the Commission
lost significant control over the affairs of JCPC. Goldmark exercised
tremendous influence over JCPC and it was during his term that
JCPC's major accomplishment, development of the Omnibus Corrections
Reform bill was achieved. 15
Structurally, JCPC was a very loose organization. The entire
group met at least once per month, but the various sub-committees met
weekly. The sub-committees included one each on: Legislation,
Public Information, County Detention Needs, and Correctional Priorities.
Members of the Commission volunteered to serve on these ad hoc sub-
committees and this was the place where the maximum use was made of
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the Commission members' expertise and specialized knowledge. Addition-
ally, most of the real work took place in the sub-committee meetings
even though the major recommendations and policy decisions were made
by the entire Commission. Under the Commission's rules and procedures
for operation, the sub-committees' and/or the Commission's staff
would bring recommendations based on their research to the Commission
as a whole so that all the members could vote on a course of action.
The membership agreed with this procedure, but felt it was necessary
to set up an executive committee of at least five appointed members
to act on behalf of the JCPC between the monthly meetings, if and
when necessary.
JCPC's responsibilities and the nature of its work required
a flexible staff structure. Most of the work of JCPC was carried
out by the Commission's core staff comprised of individuals with
competencies in planning, law, social science research, and special-
ized knowledge about corrections. As previously indicated, policy
decisions were made by the total Commission, but the staff along with
the various subcommittees did all the background work necessary for
shaping policy decisions.
To carry out its work JCPC also utilized liaison planners from
the Department of Corrections, the Parole Board and the Office of the
Commissioner of Probation. The liaison planners were appointed by
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and primarily responsible to the heads of their respective correc-
tional agencies. They also represented JCPC's initial attempt to
institutionalize a research and planning capability in the correc-
tional related state agencies. They were helpful in providing inform-
ation about their agencies and in facilitating necessary contact
between JCPC and their agencies. Basically, the liaison planners
were responsible for developing long range plans within their indi-
vidual agencies; formulating a comprehensive design for the entire
correctional system; and recommending the best means of initiating
administrative changes and new programs. The liaison planners
devoted at least 40 percent of their time in each working week to
meetings and planning responsibilities with the Joint Correctional
Planning Commission. The salaries of the liaison planners were
determined by the respective commissioners in consultation with the
Governor's Committee. Full-time Commission staff members, those
directly available and responsible to the Commission and its Chair-
man coordinated with the liaison planners and engaged in full-time
interagency planning.
Planning was new within these departments and a good deal of
time was spent in specifying and clarifying this new function in order
to prevent the planner from undertaking administrative responsibilities
which were not directly related to planning and which could actually
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distract from long and short term planning goals. The Department of
Corrections made the most progress in incorporating the planning
function, by reorganizing its planning committee and developing a
written statement on the role of planning in the Department of
Corrections. Planning input also came from meetings with the Commiss-
ioner of Corrections, his division heads and the planners, as well as
from the regular meetings of the superintendents of the prisons. 16
The role of the planner in the probation system of Massachusetts
was complicated because probation was a highly decentralized, court-
based activity. The Parole Board was so preoccupied with staffing
problems that they were never able to designate one of the agents
as a liaison planner. JCPC did, however, maintain close contact
with the Chairman of the Parole Board so that they could determine
ways in which the Parole Board might become more actively involved
in overall correctional planning.17
The work of the liaison planners was supplemented by the
full-time JCPC staff. At its height, in terms of size, the JCPC
staff included the liaison planners from each corrections agency,
four staff associates, one research assistant, one associate director,
one executive director and secretarial and clerical help. Outside
consultants and sub-contractors were used extensively by JCPC. One
major consultant was the Technical Development Corporation (TDC) which
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provided technical assistance and administrative advice to the Com-
mission.18 TDC also prepared various reports and papers on selected
subjects, chaired some of the Commission's subcommittees and generally
provided a flexible staffing capability to JCPC, including persons
with a wide range of skills who could assist with long or short term
projects. Most consultants were hired by the Commission to fill gaps
in substantive knowledge and to provide expertise in developing
various program models. Some people, including students,were hired
as research assistants on a temporary basis, and along with volunteers,
they rounded out the JCPC staff.
JCPC administrators were heavily involved in staff recruitment
for the first few months of the Commission's existence. By the
Summer of 1971, however, all the key staff positions were filled
(Appendix E). One of the concerns of the recruitment effort was
that ex-offenders should be considered for employment because they
could communicate with prisoners and they had knowledge of the Mass-
achusetts corrections system because of their personal involvement
with it. No ex-offenders were ever hired as full-time, permanent,
and salaried employees. The reason given for the absence of ex-
offenders on the staff was that the Commission's work required a
staff with technical training and prior research experience. Dewitt
Stewart, an aide to Representative Chet Atkins, did some volunteer
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work for the Commission for a short time, and that is the only ex-
offender, according to existing data sources, that was involved with
JCPC.
Much of JCPC's work was a constant process of modification
and refinement of the initial priorities suggested by the Governor's
Committee or it involved the development of tasks that were necessary
adjuncts to the initial priorities. In a report that focused on
the activities of JCPC from January 1971, through October 15, 1971,
the end of its first year of operations, Dr. Walter Stern outlined
eight priority areas and made the following comment:
We do not primarily view our function as planning, but to
contribute to action and change in the field of corrections
with planning as a major tool. At this time it seems as
if we can best achieve this by being of service to the
Commissioners and their respective correctional agencies, by
helping to coordinate correctional activities being carried
out by different agencies and by supporting innovative
programs, research, new administrative arrangements and an
effective service delivery system throughout Massachusetts.
In keeping with the interests of the heads of the state cor-
rectional agencies, and the Governor's Committee, much of JCPC's
initial work and forthcoming plans focused on the development of
community based correctional services as noninstitutional alternatives
to incarceration. This community corrections emphasis was a part of
JCPC's coordinating function, because various components of community
based correctional services were being explored or undertaken in an
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unrelated fashion by numerous state and local criminal justice agencies.
There was no mechanism for stimulating joint programming and research,
interagency communication, nor for delivering comprehensive community
based correctional services and JCPC worked to fill these gaps, as
well as to increase local correctional resources. By providing staff,
assisting with research and information gathering requirements, and
helping to organize and develop appropriate interagency working
agreements, JCPC supported and increased the planning capacity of the
Commonwealth's correctional agencies.
Because of mutual concerns and overlapping responsibilities,
JCPC assisted the Secretary of Human Services in the area of correc-
tions. The assistance took the form of recommending priorities for
action; recommending appropriate structural changes within correc-
tional agencies and in their relationships with one another; develop-
ing a service delivery structure for comprehensive community based
correctional services including appropriate fiscal and administrative
arrangements; helping to develop necessary interdepartmental agree-
ments to improve correctional services; and providing an overview
of current and projected developments in corrections including policy,
manpower, programs and research.
The most significant of JCPC's priority areas was the develop-
ment of a legislative program. In the Summer of 1971, the Commission
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staff began gathering and organizing a variety of proposed pieces of
corrections legislation into one overall corrections bill. JCPC also
supported and lobbied for bills filed by others which had direct
bearing on its own program and administrative recommendations.20
In developing a range of community based programs, JCPC did
not intend to duplicate the activities of existing correctional
personnel in the community, that is, probation and parole officers,
house of corrections personnel, and others, but to provide residen-
tial and non-residential community services to offenders in a pre-
release status, or post release status with or without parole super-
vision. Primarily the community programs were designed to help
probationers and parolees to stay out of prison and to help persons
coming out of prison to readjust to community life.21 JCPC worked
regularly with the Department of Corrections during the life of the
project. This was due to the fact that the Corrections liaison
planner was a young, particularly competent and well-trained social
scientist. The other explanation for this close working was that the
Commissioner of Corrections, Fitzpatrick was trained as a social
worker and was interested in moving the Massachusetts corrections
system toward a philosophy of rehabilitation. Additionally, Fitz-
patrick enjoyed a long standing personal and professional friendship
with Dr. Demone. Whatever the reasons, JCPC worked closely with the
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Commissioner of Correction to formulate plans for a reception-diagnos-
tic center, a pre-release center and to identify private agencies
with which contracts would be negotiated to provide residential
services. The Commission staff, along with departmental personnel,
met with community groups in the Boston State Hospital area to discuss
the possibility of establishing correctional facilities on the hos-
pital grounds. These early efforts by JCPC lead to further
discussions and agreements on the development of the Boston State
Hospital Pre-Release Center which was finally opened by the Department
of Corrections in 1972.22
It is rather difficult to assess the real impact of JCPC on
the Massachusetts corrections system. The Commission did play a
role in moving the corrections system toward community based correc-
tional options and contributed toward the integration of planning
activities into the standard operations of the state agencies princi-
pally involved with corrections.
Few people would say that the Commission actually developed
a well coordinated and unified corrections system. What JCPC did
accomplish was to bring corrections, probation, and parole personnel
into contact with one another for a period of time and to make each
agency and its administrators aware of the interdependence of their
functions with the other two agencies. JCPC also provided an
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opportunity for discussion and possible solutions to correctional
problems of concern to all three agencies in a cooperative manner.
Another JCPC contribution was that planning became a legitimate and
ongoing activity in each of the corrections agencies.
An area in which JCPC did make some strides was that of
correctional staff development. The heads of the Massachusetts
correctional agencies asked JCPC to write a proposal for comprehensive
correctional manpower development. Plans in the proposal were to
set up inservice training, recruitment and education programs for
staff of the corrections system in order to improve their utilization
of community based correctional services; expanding recruitment efforts
with special emphasis on recruiting minority group members;23 to
strengthen the rehabilitation orientation and relevant skill of
correctional personnel at all levels; and to undertake joint train-
ing programs among probation, corrections and parole whenever feasible.24
In the formulation of the proposal for staff development, the JCPC
identified additional areas that needed study. The final proposal
included plans for a review of the Commonwealth's civil service
statutes and regulations, because of their effect on proposed training
and recruitment; salary structures and career ladders within
particular jobs; utilization of volunteers, para-professionals and ex-
offenders in positions related to the correctional system;
117
promotional policies and educational leaves; and management and union
cooperation. 25
The staff training and recruitment proposals were funded and
the three correctional agencies were able to establish a training
program for their line and supervisory staff. Parole and probation
set up a joint training program and JCPC handled the minority recruit-
ment program for the Department of Corrections. They recruited
minority people from Worcester, Springfield, Boston and New Bedford
for employment in corrections. To enhance the viability of this
recruitment program, the staff and paid consultants participated
in the revision of the Department's Training Academy Curriculum and
submitted funding requests to amend the Civil Service Examination.
The Commission staff worked closely with the Civil Service Commission
in revising the proposal. The initial class of twenty-two minority
group trainees began their training in March of 1972 and were
graduated from the Training Academy during May of 1972 and were
assigned as provisional corrections officers to prisons in the towns
of Concord, Walpole and Norfolk.
JCPC's charge was to make legislative recommendations to
Governor Sargent by January 15, 1971. After only three months of
existence, JCPC recommended that the Governor include corrections in
his annual message and then, to submit his legislation at a later
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time. The JCPC long term strategy was to submit recommendations on
the basis of an overall theme of rehabilitation of the offender and
of coordination of public and private correctional agencies. In
that first year, JCPC endorsed legislation, publicly and privately,
and the Governor's legislative secretary was kept informed of all of
the Commission's legislative activities.
Even though JCPC did not sponsor any corrections legislation
for 1971, it did vote to support several bills filed by other
organizations during the Spring legislative session. Specifically,
the Commission endorsed bills to provide for the sealing of criminal
records after ten years; to repeal the two-thirds parole law; to
decriminalize alcoholism; and to increase the number, salaries and
qualifications of Parole Board members. Bills to which the Commission
gave less active support established that probation was not a sentence,
required special adjudication of youthful offenders and preparation
of pre-sentence reports, extended work release, and permitted
certain inmates to attend public meetings. Of the bills which
received major JCPC endorsement, H. 588, the sealing of criminal
records after ten years was redrafted as H. 5362 and enacted by the
House and Senate on April 28, 1971, and May 20, 1971 and finally
defeated on June 2, 1971. The legislation concerned with changes
in parole eligibility, H. 335, was reported in the House April 13, 1971
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and amended and rejected April 26, 1971 despite the Governor's
endorsement. S. 1002, pertaining to qualifications and salary of the
Parole Board received a favorable committee report and was referred
to Senate Ways and Means. In particular, JCPC supported amendments
to S. 1002 that continued the requirement that at least one member
of the Board be a woman and that Parole Board members devote full
time to their duties on the Board with other employment, such as
teaching being undertaken only with the approval of the Chairman of
the Parole Board. The measure accompanied H. 2510 and was approved
later during the legislative session. The comprehensive alcoholism
bill was redrafted ad H. 5515. It received favorable committee
reports and was also referred to Senate Ways and Means. Finally, it
too was enacted later in the session.26
Decisions about the bills were made by the Legislative Sub-
committee of JCPC and approved by the Commission as a whole. This
subcommittee devoted a great deal of time to selecting and modifying
bills for Commission endorsement and then in participating in efforts
to win support for them in the Legislature. JCPC's major support
of legislation meant that the Commission developed testimony for
legislative committees and the Commission members testified at
public hearings. support also meant that members of JCPC contacted
individual legislators to secure their votes for the measures; and
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they wrote letters of endorsement. Basically, JCPC felt it was
appropriate to support a wide range of correctional legislation which
corresponded with its overall policy of finding alternatives to
incarceration. For future legislative action, it was necessary to
focus on those bills with direct bearing on the program of the Commis-
sion.
As an outgrowth of this new strategy, the JCPC staff developed
a proposal for comprehensive correctional legislation. This compre-
hensive approach was a response to past failure in getting disparate
and fragmented pieces of good correctional legislation passed. The
piecemeal method proved very ineffective, because each individual
petition was difficult to defend rationally and politically. The
uncoordinated presentation of several different corrections bills was
inefficient because it diluted the efforts of proponents with similar
goals. A non-systematic approach decreased the public's interest
and support for reform measures. Legislators were frustrated and
confused by the various bills. The JCPC staff believed that a compre-
hensive long range legislative approach would increase the chances for
a favorable reception and passage of corrections reform measures in
the Commonwealth. The evidence from previous sessions of the General
Court indicated that health, welfare, and mental health legislation
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that were presented in a comprehensive manner had better possi-
bilities for passage than did scattered bills. 27
With this approach, the legislature was asked to establish
a clear public policy giving priority to rehabilitation and to give
all the necessary departments and agencies the ability to implement
community-based correctional programs. In view of the plans to
develop a comprehensive correctional legislative package, the Com-
mission decided that its legislative efforts would be more effective
if there were greater involvement of state legislators in the project.
These plans were also shaped by discussions with Speaker Bartley and
Senate President Harrington, who made it clear that the JCPC's chances
for getting support of its legislative program in the General Court
were much greater if there were legislators actively participating
in the Commission's work.
During the Summer of 1971, the JCPC staff developed a proposal
for comprehensive correctional legislation. Many meetings took place
with representatives, senators, the Office of the Secretary of Human
Services, the Governor's Committee, inmates, ex-offenders, and cor-
rectional agencies to further define the substance of legislative
programs and to plan strategy. Frank Laski, a new lawyer on the JCPC
staff assumed primary responsibility to develop the comprehensive
correctional legislative package. Laski, with his previous experience
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in mental health and social planning, was knowledgeable and effective
in preparing the legislation and in developing agreements with state
agencies in the provision of supportive services to adult offenders.
The philosophy and assumptions which shaped the development
of the JCPC legislative activities were contained in three documents
written by Laski over the Summer of 1971.28 The first, "Rehabilita-
tion Model for Corrections," focused on the individual offender as a
disqualified or disadvantaged person without access to many social
opportunities:
Those factors which influence an individual to engage
in antisocial or asocial conduct resulting in conflict with
the criminal law are similar to those factors which act to
deny many individuals in our society thetopportunity to
develop the abilities and skills necessary to fully partici-
pate in community life and to achieve personal dignity. To
put it simply the offender is a disqualified person. This
concept focuses not on the cause of the offender's qnduct
but on the present fact of his activity limitation.
Based on this premise, rehabilitation was then defined as the process
of providing services to move the individual from a status of dis-
qualification to qualification and into a maximum state of functioning
in the society.30 Services included in the rehabilitation process
were prevention, referral, classification, treatment, prevocational
services, vocational training, placement and follow up.31 This rehab-
ilitation model contained an implicit requirement that correctional
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agencies were responsible for seeing that all needed services were
provided.
The second document, "Notes on the Organization of Correctional
Services and the Jurisdiction of the Secretary of Human Services," was
an assessment of available correctional services in Massachusetts and
working definitions of the correctional system. First, it defined
corrections as a process concerned with the post conviction phase of
criminal justice, that is, what happens after the establishment of
guilt in a court. According to the second definition, the correc-
tional process began with the first contact with the police and did
not end until the ultimate discharge from custody.32 This latter
definition was necessary for total understanding of the correctional
process and.was of great potential value for planning. Problems arose,
however, when efforts were made to impact upon corrections in its
totality. These problems were largely attributable to the operational
and jurisdictional realities. Because the police, courts and prisons
operate so atuonomously, the JCPC focus had to be on the post-con-
viction aspects of corrections, and even that was complicated.
No state governmental function is more fragmented than the post
conviction phase of criminal justice. Responsibiltiy for control
and rehabilitation of convicted offenders is divided among six
state agencies, the fourteen counties and the city of Boston.
Thirty-four state and county institutions house more then 7,500
convicted adult offenders and juvenile delinguents. An additional
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46,000 arS3under the formal supervision of probation and parole
officers.
Basically, the fragmentation of correctional services in
Massachusetts was due to three organizational and functional divisions:
the institutions vs. community corrections split; county corrections
vs. state corrections; and the dichotomy between juvenile corrections
and adult corrections. Laski's paper concluded that even though the
Secretary for Human Services had responsibility for planning, coord-
inating, and supervising a limited piece (only 9,000 of the 61,000
convicted offenders under formal custody of corrections agencies in
the Commonwealth and only $31 million or two thirds of the $46 million
totally expended on corrections) of a highly fragmented correctional
system, the Secretary's long range impact on corrections would depend
directly on his willingness and ability to bring together diverse
and presently unrelated parts of the system. To be successful, any
plan for reorganization or integration of correctional services in
Massachusetts would have to take into account the elimination of the
various divisions, if possible.34
The first two documents represented a desirable model for
solving problems in the Massachusetts correctional system as well as
a definition and assessment of the problems inherent in that system
as it was in August, 1971. A paradox existed, because in spite of
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a clear problem and a possible solution, there was no mechanism for
moving corrections agencies toward coordinated, integrated and rehab-
ilitative programming.
While there may be some debate as to exactly how far new correc-
tional programs can be developed under present law, it is clear
that in many areas the law is a substantial barrier to a modern
correctional system. Even if we assume optimal staff, resources,
administrative and political leadership, research and planning
capacity, for all of our correctional agencies, in the last anal-
ysis it is the law which defines the boundaries of their activities
which either enables them to test and develo 5new approaches or
limits them to the practices of the present.
In 1971, the legal framework for the operation of state and
county correctional institutions, probation and parole services was
a combination of 1955 reform legislation which was based on the recom-
mendations of the Wessell Committee and laws carried forward from the
last century. While the Wessell Committee's recommendations were
far reaching and comprehensive, the ultimate impact of their implementa-
tion was on the Department and its institutions.36 The reforms required
professional qualifications for Department of Corrections officials
and training for state corrections officers. No such professional
requirements nor training were mandated for top level correctional
administrators nor for parole, probation or county officers. Similarly,
the sentencing structure, a basic determinant of the limits of
correctional policy, remained unchanged and so did the prison industries.
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In the prison industries the concept of employment for the benefit of
the Commonwealth was carried forward and industrial production retained
primacy over vocational training. Even some sections of the law, those
providing for a reception center to house a comprehensive classifica-
tion program were little more than paper reforms.37 The point was
that almost twenty years after the Wessell Committee, its fundamental
goal of establishing a "basic correctional philosophy common to the
entire system," had not been achieved.
The statutes governing probation, parole and correction did
not convey a clear and consistent policy for each of the other branches
of the correctional system. In essence, the law seemed to deny the com-
mon interest among correction, parole and probation;38 the need for
administrative coordination and joint planning; the need for con-
tinuity and cooperation at the operational level; and the efficacy
of concepts such as prevention, rehabilitation, community reintegra-
tion and differential treatment. Because the existing correctional
code did not provide policy direction and administrative authority
enabling the agencies governed by it to work together toward
achieving statewide goals of post conviction custody of offenders, the
third document effectively and compellingly demonstrated the need for
comprehensive legislative revision. For example, a rigid legal frame-
work precluded any degree of flexibility in program planning on the
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part of state and county institutions. Correctional administrators
were also locked into institutionally based programs. Corrections
programs also had to be planned around restrictions imposed by
sentencing and parole laws which basically ignored the rehabilitation
component of disposition and mandated custody arrangements based
upon the nature of the crime rather then the characteristics of the
offender.39
Perhaps more restrictive than the correctional laws was the
general attitude of those involved in the management and operation of
correctional institutions that the law was an inflexible obstacle to
change. That particular attitude derived from a literal construction
of thecorrections statutes and a traditional legislative propensity
to become involved in even the smallest changes in custody arrange-
ments and institutional management. For example, Chapter 126, s. 27
which authorized sheriffs to remove prisoners and to take measures
to protect them in case of fire was amended by Chapter 399 of the
Acts of 1971 to allow similar action in case of bomb threats. In
corrections, rather then developing administrative practices and
informal procedures to mitigate the effect of restrictive legislation,
such legislation was strictly construed and non-specific mandates
became dead letters. A case in point would be the supervisory
relationship of the Department of Corrections to the county
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institutions which has not taken on any meaning through the years.
The statute (G.L. 34, 3.14, G.L. 126, s 36) gave the Commissioner of
Corrections authority to approve all jail and prison construction in
the Commonwealth, but the role of the Department of Corrections in
county facilities planning and construction was not clear. The
effect of disapproval, the liability of the Commissioner in approving
standard plans, and the criteria for approval should have been
precisely defined and they were not. The conclusion, based on the
current state of correctional law, existing problems in the correc-
tions system, and an acceptance of the rehabilitation model was that
there was a definite need to revise the Commonwealth's correctional
law in a comprehensive manner that balanced the need for definite and
clear legislative policy with the need for administrative account-
ability for day to day care and control and dispositional decisions.40
An omnibus approach, that of "developing a legislative pack-
age covering many aspects of corrections, probation, and parole
grounded in common correctional philosophy and goals, and presented
in a systematic and coordinated manner" was viewed as the most
effective approach. Quite importantly, an omnibus approach avoided
many of the strategic and substantive dangers of piecemeal reform.
This approach gave visibility to corrections as a system, allowed
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each legislative proposal to be considered on its own merits and yet
evaluated in relationship to its impact on the entire correctional
system.
In addition to the objective recognition of the need for
progressive changes in Massachusetts corrections law, there were
several factors which combined to give added impetus to actions aimed
at a revision of these laws. These factors were enumerated in chapter
one and will only be mentioned briefly here. Governor Sargent's
advocacy of the creation of community correctional centers was an
example of how the availability of federal funds under the 1970
amendments to the Safe Streets Act influenced changes in corrections
legislation and programming. According to Laski, another indication
of the positive climate for correctional change was the growing
interest in corrections within the legislature as evidenced in a
pending order for the Joint Committee on Social Welfare to conduct
an in-depth study of the state penal system. Public interest and
awareness of corrections issues also increased. This interest was
largely due to recent policy changes on media access in prisons which
gave corrections visibility in the public arena. Suits against
prison administrators throughout the country and an abrogation of
the courts' "hands off" policy brought about a re-examination of
institutional policies, post conviction rights and civil rights of
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inmates. Increased judicial awareness contributed to concern about
the urgent need to develop guidelines for prison officials and to
institute fair and equitable procedures within the institutions.
Inclusion of the Department of Correction, the Parole Board and Youth
Services within the newly created Office for Human Services furthered
the process of corrections reform through legislative changes. The
mandate to plan and reorganize these agencies under the authority
of the Secretary of Human Services increased the possibility that
legislation relating to administrative organization, procedures and
practices in all human services would be implemented. The imminent
completion and filing of proposed criminal law revisions helped foster
an atmoshpere conducive to correctional change, because the criminal
law greatly influenced the extent which correctional agencies could
utilize new techniques and provide alternative methods of control
and treatment.42 The Commissioner of Corrections, the Commissioner of
Probation, and the Chairman of the Parole Board were all concerned
about the ineffectiveness of their individual efforts to secure
legislative reform. Each of the three correctional agency heads
endorsed the omnibus approach and they also agreed to actively par-
ticipate by supporting the work of JCPC in this effort. The existence
of JCPC, the availability of additional staff resources and the
emergence of a planning capability within the correctional agencies
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made it possible to follow through on a joint legislative program by
developing strong legislative liaisons.
To achieve the objective of the JCPC Legislative Subcommittee
to develop and prepare a comprehensive legislative package for
presentation to the General Court and to secure enactment of omnibus
corrections legislation required some changes in JCPC's operation.
The changes involved expanding the JCPC legislative subcommittee
membership; expanding the JCPC staff commitment to support subcommittee
work; and involving all interested parties in the JCPC legislative
program both before and after filing legislation.43
A working group, known as the JCPC Task Force on Correctional
Legislation was formed and essentially it replaced the old JCPC
Legislative Subcommittee. The JCPC Task Force on Correctional
Legislation was offically established in October 1971 to examine
legislative issues and to formulate draft legislation necessary to
implement new community correctional projects and other correctional
reforms. The Task Force membership included a large number of
legislators, unlike most other JCPC sub-committees. Following
preliminary discussions with JCPC members concerned with legislative
activity, Chairman Goldmark consulted the leadership of the House and
Senate about the possibility of their participation in the legislative
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work of the task force. The first contribution of Speaker Bartley
and President Harrington was that the following members of the General
Court were named to the JCPC Task Force on Correctional legislation:
Senators William Bulger and Roland MacKenzie; and Representatives
Johathan L. Healy, Paul Murphy and Michael Flaherty. Most of the
other members of the Task Force represented a number of government,
human service and criminal justice agencies. The Chairman of the
Task Force was Peter C. Goldmark, the Commonwealth's Secretary of
Human Services who was also the Chairman of JCPC. There were repre-
sentatives from parole, probation and corrections on the task force.
Representatives from these agencies were Martin P. Davis, Chairman
of the Parole Board; the Rev. Michael Haynes, a member of the Parole
Board; C. Eliot Sands, the Commissioner of Probation; and John
Chmielinski and Walter Waitkevich of the Department of Corrections.
Three lawyers also served on this task force to draft new corrections
legislation. They were Michael Feldman, Senior Attorney of the
Boston Legal Assistance Project; Dennis Sullivan, Assistant Attorney
General; and the lone representative from the academic community,
Prof. George Brown of the Boston College Law School. The remaining
task force members were Harold Demone, Jr. of United Community Services
and co-chairman of JCPC; Walter F. Stern, Executive Director of JCPC;
Arnold Rosenfeld, Executive Director of the Governor's Committee on
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Law Enforcement and the Administration of Criminal Justice; Steve
Teichner of the Governor's Office; and Chela Tawa of United Community
Services.
Frank Laski, the JCPC staff member who had been so successful
in moving the Commission to an omnibus approach to corrections legis-
lative change coordinated the Task Force and devoted full-time to the
legislative program. In November 1971, Mr. Arthur Van C. Lanckton,
an attorney from the Office of Human Services was assigned to JCPC as
a legal consultant and he primarily prepared draft legislation at the
direction of the Task Force. The Task Force's role in drafting the
legislation was largely a reactive one. It was Laski and Lanckton
who wrote the omnibus correctional reforem legislation that was filed
by Governor Sargent in February 1972.
At the Task Force's weekly meeting in November and December,
Laski and Lanckton prepared the group's background and research papers,
developed and refined the ideas generated at the meeting, and wrote
the eighteen working papers which provided the background to the sub-
stantive areas included in the omnibus corrections legislative pack-
age. The working papers were reviewed by the Task Force and they
reacted to them. The working papers covered the following issues;
powers and duties of the Commission of Corrections; classification;
education; training and employment; transfers; standards of care and
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and custody; discipline and grievance procedures; legal assistance;
rules and regulations; parcle structure; county-state relations; and
administration of prison industries.44
A major concern of the Task Force was to include as many out-
side groups as possible to participate in the development of the
legislative program and to enlist their support in the enactment of
omnibus corrections legislation.45 It was important to have
legislators, agency personnel, inmate groups, ex-offenders, private
agencies, citizens groups and university based research and study
groups to contribute their ideas and to react to the Task Force's
proposals, in order to develop the broad-based support and coordinated
effort that was previously lacking in corrections reform through
legislative change. This concern was never fully realized until
after the bill was presented to the General Court. During its develop-
ment, however all activities were centralized and handles through JCPC.
In keeping with the commitments to maximum participation of
outside groups in the development of the legislation and broad based
support for the proposed corrections legislation, the Task Force
reviewed the work of the Massachusetts Cri-minal Law Revision Commiss-
ion which had been working for more than two years on a new criminal
code for the Commonwealth. Of utmost importance to the Task Force
were those proposals in the revised code dealing with sentencing,
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probation and parole which were most likely to increase the respon-
sibilities and discretionary authority of post conviction corrections
agencies in formulating custody arrangements for offenders. It was
also important to have the Task Force be familiar with the work of
the Criminal Law Commission in order to eliminate duplication of the
two groups' related efforts. The feeling was that the legislative
activities of JCPC should examine those sections of the proposed code
which would impinge on present correctional structures and should
develop legislation which would enable corrections, parole and pro-
bation to be responsive to the requirements of a new criminal code.
Also the Task Force accepted and reviewed recommendations for legis-
lation based on studies by JCPC and other groups; it prepared initial
drafts of revisions of Chapters 124 through 127 dealing with increased
interaction with legislators and outside groups; and constantly
reviewed, revised and redrafted materials to be included in the
omnibus bill.
By the middle of January, 1972, the Task Force hoped to com-
plete its omnibus legislative package for correctional reform as well
as to develop a strategy for filing and insuring passage of the bill.
Ancillary to this were plans to set up a system for public informa-
tion and education about the necessity for comprehensive changes in
the corrections system. Based on the preliminary interest and
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response to the work of the Task Force by the leadership of the
House and Senate, the legislators, the Governor, the Secretary for
Human Services and others who were politically significant, the polit-
ical climate seemed quite favorable for the support of corrections
legislation on a bi-partisan basis.
During the birth of the JCPC Task Force on Correctional
legislation, the tempo of activity in adult corrections picked up
considerably. The Governor publicly restated his commitment to
community corrections and other correctional changes during the coming
year. Secretary Goldmark of Human Services became the Chairman of
JCPC in November and also chaired the JCPC Task Force on Corrections
Legislation. He worked personally with the JCPC legislative effort
and assigned several of his staff to work exclusively on correction,
especially on the proposed legislation. Attica had occured in New
York State and in its aftermath there were disruptions in several of
the Massachusetts correctional institutions. In November, the Com-
missioner of Corrections, John J. Fitzpatrick, also resigned and a
national search began for his replacement. Robert Montilla, the
former Deputy Director, Department of Correction, Washington, D.C.
was employed as a consultant to Secretary Goldmark in corrections and
was instrumental in developing priorities for community based adult
46
correctional programs. The Governor's Citizens Committee on
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Corrections, also known as the Elam Committee issued its report in
late November. The report indicted the Massachusetts corrections
system for its poor state of affairs and made major recommendations
for improvements.47 JCPC was very much in the midst of all these
happenings in corrections. The Commission staff worked closely with
the Governor's Committee in an unsuccessful attempt to repeal the
two-thirds parole law. JCPC also submitted its proposal for the
Correctional Staff Development Project to the Governor's Committee at
the end of November 1971 with the approval of Secretary Goldmark and
the heads of the correctional agencies; it participated with the
Governor's Committee and Mr. Montilla in developing the 1972 adult
correctional plan for Massachusetts as well as continuing its ongoing
planning projects and research in parole, probation and corrections.48
Some of the JCPC staff began to participate regularly and voluntarily
with more inmate and ex-inmate organizations.49
In developing drafts of the corrections reform legislation,
the legislative task force of JCPC began its work by focusing on six
broad areas and their relationships to the Commission's goal of
developing a corrections system in Massachusetts that provided uni-
fied services to offenders. These six areas were the structure of
the system, community-based correctional services, institutional
management, operation of probation, operation of parole, and sentencing,
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particularly in terms of sentencing provisions and procedures. Over
time these broad areas were refined and reformulated into a number of
specific issues. The staff spent a considerable amount of time in
analyzing the Massachusetts correctional system and its legal basis.
The task of casting the areas of general concern into issues appro-
priate for legislative action was based on the shared belief of many
task force members that prisons as presently operated were not reha-
bilitating nor correcting offenders. They felt that the prisoners'
poor performance, as measured by the recidivism rate, was due to the
strict law and order mentality and custodial orientation of many law
enforcement officers and employees of the corrections system. In
order to rehabilitate offenders, the task force members felt it was
necessary to "humanize" the corrections process. To them, it was
important to equip prisoners with educational and vocational skills
that would allow the offenders to become constructive and productive
members of society upon release. Implicit in the views of the draft-
ing group was an acceptance of a continuing need for prisons and a
belief that rehabilitation could occur within the prison walls, but
that rehabilitation could best occur when inmates had access to the
community and when community resources were utilized as part of the
corrections process. Another influence on the drafting committee was
its recognition that over 90 percent of those presently incarcerated
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would some day be released. A strong belief in community based cor-
rections, the rehabilitation model and a respect for inmates as human
beings were the primary bases for much of the Task Forces's work. In
addition to the personal and collective views of task force members
about corrections, the specific issues for legislative action were
fashioned by corrections law reforms and model penal codes from
around the country as well as the recommendations of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice.
Once the Massachusetts corrections system was studied, Laski
and Lanckton then defined and justified the changes in the laws
governing the system which the task force desired. One of the first
changes necessary to achieve unified correctional services was to
solidify the relationships between state and county corrections as
well as to integrate operationally, the work of the Department of
Corrections, the Parole Board, the Probations Office and other court
based services. Another structural change was that of the reorganized
Office of Human Services assuming ongoing responsibility for main-
taining linkages among the various parts of the correctional system;
coordinating service delivery between corrections and other state
agencies important to rehabilitation such as health, welfare and
employment security; and achieving some degree of uniformity in policy
and effectiveness in resource allocation.
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In the area of community based correctional services, grad-
uated release programs were to be initiated. The objective of such
programs was to allow as many inmates as possible to take advantage
of education, training and job opportunities in communities away from
the institutions. Other changes proposed in community based correc-
tions were to establish new correctinal settings which would meet the
changing needs of the inmate population and the requirement for public
safety, and to purchase correctional services from the private sector,
and finally the authority to legitimize and support diversion
programs.
Specific changes in the area of institutional management
which the Task Force considered important were utilization of alter-
native custody arrangements such as furloughs and various types of
graduated release programs in order to ease institutional tensions
and to help inmates maintain positive family and community ties; the
authority to remove and transfer inmates in such a way as to facili-
tate implementation of classification decisions and to allow for the
development of specialized programs and facilities. The Task Force
wanted to implement standards for the institutional management of all
correctional facilities having to do with nutrition, clothing, bed-
ding, safety, health care, discipline, counseling, religious practice,
recreation, correspondence, visitation and solitary confinement so
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that a healthy, humane and rehabilitative environment would exist.
Development of classification procedure and programs was another pri-
ority item that the Task Force members wanted to include in the draft
legislation. With a classification procedure, it would be possible
to provide for comprehensive medical, psychological, social and voca-
tional diagnosis and evaluation for all convicted offenders as early
as possible before permanent assignment to an institution and a
program of rehabilitation.
Prison industries were important to the Task Force members.
The general attitude was that prison industries should engage inmates
in vocational training at useful trades and occupations or at least
equip inmates with some marketable skills rather than at production
of goods and services which could be purchased elsewhere more effi-
ciently. Basically, the Task Force wanted prison industries to con-
tinue provided their operational standards required modern equipment
and production techniques; prevailing outside wage scales, and com-
petitive efficiency standards; provisions for compensation of prisoners
for accidents, indemnification for employees and departmental person-
nel; a modification of state use and development of relationships
with private industry. The Task Force members wanted prison indus-
tries to approximate an ordinary work environment and to guarantee
protections to inmates similar to those accorded most workers in the
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general labor force. Discipline and grievance procedures were of
importance to the Task Force, especially in view of judicial inter-
vention into some correctional matters where the rights of inmates
were allegedly violated. The members of the drafting committee
wanted to provide standardized guarantees and administrative proced-
ures for the fair and speedy resolution of individual inmate conflicts
with respect to enforcement of institutional discipline as well as to
provide a mechanism for the discussion and resolution of general
inmate grievances and inmate participation in institutional decision-
making. There were a number of points of discussion about the opera-
tion of parole and probation among the task force members. Eligibility
criteria, conditions, revocation and modification, qualifications and
training of parole officers were among some of the critical issues
discussed by the Task Force in regard to parole and probation. In
terms of possible standards for parole, the group wanted to initiate
the use of pre-sentence reports and to encourage more investigation,
supervision, and maintenance of records including expungement or
sealing. Likewise with parole procedures, the Task Force wanted to
incorporate due process requirements in all parole activities.50
At the Massachuesetts JCPC meeting of January 31, 1972, Laski
described the bill which was developed by an Ad Hoc Legislative Task
Force. According to Laski, the bill was designed to accomplish six
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objectives. The draft required continuing diagnosis and evaluation
of offenders. It provided for use of a diagnostic center for initial
classification and for monitoring the offender's progress. The first
objective would also require county institutions to establish classi-
fication procedures for long term inmates. The second objective
authorized more extensive use of community programs by giving the com-
missioner greater flexibility to use community based pre-release
centers and work release and educational release programs. Prepar-
ing inmates for jobs through vocational and educational training
was the third objective. As such, the bill stated that inmate
rehabilitation was the primary purpose of prison employment. This
new emphasis therefore permitted the Department of Correction to
utilize private industry in the operation of new correctional
industries; it increased inmate wages up to the State minimum wage
for non-training jobs; and expended the markets for prison industry
goods and services. The fourth objective was to clearly define
minimal institutional standards and inmate rights. To accomplish
this objective, the Commissioner of Corrections had to establish
standards for state and county institutions and also had to establish
written grievance and discipline procedures for inmates. The fifth
objective was an outgrowth of the earlier Task Force discussions
regarding the structure of the corrections system and institutional
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management in that it strengthened departmental organization and man-
agement. The bill established a deputy commissioner of community
services in the Department of Correction. The measure also placed
parole officers under the supervision of the new deputy commissioner
of community services, though the Parole Board remained as an indepen-
dent quasi-judicial body. Expanded staff training and authorization
of the department of contract for purchase of offender services were
additional provisions of the bill. The final objective of the bill
was to clarify state and county responsibilities. Under the bill the
counties maintained responsibility for the operation of their houses
of corrections, but it also defined the Department's responsibility to
set standards and clarify the department's enforcement powers.51
Commissioners of the Commonwealth's correctional agencies and
social service agencies made their comments on the bill along with
other members of JCPC. Though the members of the Commission were
urged to give their comments on the bill, they were not asked to give
a formal vote of endorsement at that time, because there was still
flexibility in the bill. The process had already begun of discussing
the bill with employees representatives, sheriffs and other concerned
groups.
Dr. Robinson of the Department of Public Health felt that the
bill as presented did not go far enough in addressing the problems of
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inmate medical care. The Department of Public Health wanted the bill
to set standards for medical examinations and the Department of Public
Health also wanted additional legislation to improve inmate care.
Finally, the Department of Public Health wanted legislative authority
to supervise the quality of care in all institutions.52 Commissioner
Sands was very concerned that the grievance and disciplinary proce-
dures in the bill were not detailed and explicit enough. He also
felt very strongly that parole officers should be under the super-
vision of the parole board and not the Department of Corrections, as
proposed, because they served as agents of the board. He offered an
alternative arrangement, that of combining probation and parole, as in
the federal system.53 A Commission member, Margaret Lynch, who was
also affiliated with the State League of Women Voters asked about the
absence of any section of the proposed bill to seek repeal of the
two-thirds parole law.54
In response to the various concerns, Goldmark and Dr. Demone
offered explanations. To Dr. Robinson's,Goldmark explained that
while the legislation might not look strong enough in some areas,
"the Task Force decided that looking at the bill as a whole, it seemed
about right." Chairman Goldmark also reassured Dr. Robinson by
pointing out that the bill did require the Department of Public Health
to check inmate medical services regularly. Dr. Demone addressed
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Commissioner Sands' problem with the proposed legislation by explain-
ing that all detailed standards had been pulled out of the bill itself,
but they could be used by the new Commissioner, John Boone, as first
drafts of official departmental regulations which the bill required.
Montilla responded to the Commissioner's suggestion of combining pro-
bation and parole, by citing a report of the President's Crime Com-
mission which criticized the present combined federal system under
the courts. It was his opinion that the best parole and probation
departments were those within the executive branch. He also believed
that a move into the Department of Corrections would open up broader
career opportunities for parole officers.55 Provisions for repeal of
the two-thirds law were not included in the bill because the feeling
was that most organizations represented on JCPC would support a sepa-
rate two-thirds repeal bill.56 Most probably, the two-thirds law was
omitted because it failed to pass in the House the previous year and
because it was an extremely controversial measure. The other pos-
sible reason for its omission was some legislators, particularly
those on the Social Welfare Committee, were calling Governor Sargent
to repeal the law administratively. Had repeal of the two-thirds
parole law been included in the corrections bill, it would have been
a focal point of opposition by many legislators, without any consid-
eration of the desirable changes which the bill hoped to accomplish.
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Some JCPC members thought that the bill would encounter oppo-
sition from parole officers who might object to being under the
supervision of the Department of Correction. Other possible opponents
were the county commissioners and sheriffs who would possibly oppose
the sections requiring stricter standards for county houses of correc-
tions and jails as usurpation of their local authority and as a waste
of money since the operating costs of the facilities were likely to
increase with the proposed standards. Laski and Montilla planned to
hold meetings with the parole officers associations and the county
commissioners to explain the bill and to allay their fears about the
.bill. Sheriff Hedges, a JCPC member, had arranged a similar meeting
with the sheriffs' association and the chiefs of police were also
being contacted.
To this point, all the activity surrounding the development
of the corrections bill centered around the Massachuesetts JCPC.
Preparation of the bill was a highly centralized project. After
preparation of the draft bill, and with the discussion and reactions
to the bill and the lobbying strategy, activities became diffuse and
difficult to recapture.
Dr. Demone discussed the lobbying plans, which originally
he was to coordinate at the same meeting where Laski presented the
bill. According to Dr. Demone, the bill was to be submitted as a
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special message of the Governor in early February with a scheduled
hearing before the Joint Social Welfare Committee on February 16th.
State officials and private organizations were asked to testify in
support of the bill. In this regard, Lynch felt that the League of
Women Voters would give full support to the bill. Mascarello also
indicated that his organization, the Massachusetts Correctional
Association, planned to prepare a summary and analysis of the correc-
tions bill for distribution to legislators and others. Some JCPC
members were requested to testify at the hearings and to contact
individual legislators. In addition, Frank Laski and Van Lanckton
gave personal briefings to Senators McCann, McGhee, Charles Flaherty,
DiCarlo, Backman and Ward. Members of the Massachusetts Council on
Crime and Corrections contacted other legislators, among them Repre-
sentatives Conte, Atkins, Bertonazzi and Linsky.57 The Committee for
the Advancement of Criminal Justice (CACJ), the legislative lobbying
arm of the Massachusetts Council on Crime and Corrections also played
a crucial role in lobbying for passage of the corrections bill.
Laski and Lanckton continued to improve the bill and circu-
lated their final draft to the Governor's Office for technical review
in early February. The highlights of the JCPC bill were that it made
changes in the Commonwealth's corrections system in four key areas:
administration, employment programs, community services, and state
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and county responsibilities. Some of the administrative changes
included the Commissioner's authority to establish, designate and
discontinue the use of correctional facilities as well as to contract
for purchase of services. Training programs were expanded with spe-
cial emphasis on pre-service minority recruiting. Employment pro-
grams within the institutions were to be reorganized with first
priority on their training value to inmates followed by their rele-
vance to job opportunities and finally their profitability. Inmate
wages were increased under the changes in the employment programs and
there were also provisions for dedeucitons from wages for such things
as room and board, court ordered payments such as fines, restitution
to the victim or the victim's family and voluntary family support or
debt payments. Changes in community services included the appoint-
ment of a deputy commissioner, for community services who would plan
and develop programs outside the correctional facility in education,
training and employment for inmates and who would also supervise and
direct parole officers as a new part of the Department of Corrections.
The new state and county responsibilities required the state to set
standards for state and county facilities, with the counties operating
their own facilities and the state inspecting these facilities and
enforcing the standards.58
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C H A P T E R I I I
A BILL BECOMES LAW: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CHAPTER 777
In a press conference at Brooke House, one of the first half-
way houses in Massachusetts, Governor Sargent outlined the provisions
of S. 1161, "A Special Message Recommending Legislation to Accomplish
Necessary Reforms in the Correctional Process."
Concern about the ability of our Department to perform its duties
exists in all branches of government and with interested citizens
as well. . . . All of us believe this legislation points in the
direction toward which the Commonwealth must now move and all of
us believe this bill provides an important and reasonable frame-
work around which to focus our efforts. In these efforts, every
attempt has been made to look at the way the Department is set
up, its relationship to other agencies, and its ability to
develop and operate rehabilitative programs. For instance, the
legislation outlines in detail the duties of the Commissioner of
Corrections. It also clarified the relationship between the
state and county institutions and proposes an updating of our
laws dealing with the prison industries. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, it proposes a system with continuity in it, so
that an inmate will be supervised by the same person or group of
people from the day he enters the system until he is finally off
parole.2
The proposed bill was presented by Governor Sargent because of his
commitment to penal reform in Massachusetts and the possibility that
his support of the legislation would increase the likelihood of its
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passage. Practically, it was necessary for Governor Sargent to pre-
sent the bill in a special message becaust it was after the first
Wednesday in December. Legislative rules required that all petitions
were filed with the Clerk of the Senate or House before 5 o'clock p.m.
on the first Wednesday of the General Court.3 After that time, the
Committee on Rules had to issue a report signed by at least a major-
ity of the members of each committee and approved by four fifths of
the members of each branch voting before a bill could be introduced. 4
Governor Sargent's initiative simplified introduction of the bill,
but also created problems in later stages of the development of cor-
rections reform legislation.
From the day of its introduction in the General Court to its
final action, S. 1161 was steeped in controversy. Many considered it
much too ambitious, particularly those sections of the bill pertaining
to inmates' rights, payment of minimum wages to inmates and the trans-
fer of parole officers from the jurisdiction of the Parole Board to
the Department of Correction. In addition, S. 1161 was criticized on
the grounds that it contained areas which did not require new legisla-
tive authority in order to be implemented.5 Given the diverse reac-
tions to S. 1161 the key issues were how many of the proposed reforms
could be accomplished without legislation and secondly, how to accom-
date critics and potential opponents of corrections reform while
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lobbying for the bill 's enactment. The task was massive and wrought
with difficulty, but the campaign for successful passage of a new
corrections bill was the basis for a reform movement which focused
on the state prison system in Massachusetts. Individuals and organi-
zations began to allign themselves around issues and evolving ide-
ologies. The corrections reform movement embraced a plethora of
individuals and organizations with varying interests and backgrounds.
A commitment to the very general notion of corrections reform was the
unifier. This commitment meant that prisoners should be treated
decently and that conditions in prisons should conform to acceptable
standards for safety, good health and general well being.
Basically, S. 1161 gave the Department of Correction author-
ity it lacked in several areas and it carried forward the present law
with unimportant changes. (See Appendix F) The proposed bill created
the new position of deputy commissioner for community corrections
with responsibility for supervising parole officers. Several sections
of the bill empowered the Commissioner to designate and establish
(community) correctional facilities and also to purchase services for
offenders. The bill facilitated minority recruitment by extending the
Department's training programs. County correctional facilities were
affected by the new legislative proposal in that it authorized the
Department of Corrections to establish and enforce standards for the
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county facilities. Provisions regarding isolation and segregation
were modified under the new law to eliminate their use capriciously.
Training was the priority of inmate employment programs within the
institution under S. 1161. Community programs providing educational
and vocational opportunities for inmates were established under the
new law, as was the furlough program. Other major changes proposed
by S. 1161 guaranteed inmates the right to adequate medical care,
free exercise of religious beliefs, and access to adequate informa-
tion about the rules and regulations governing their conduct while
incarcerated. The proposed legislation offered no changes that were
patently radical or revolutionary. In essence, most of the proposals
reflected ideas gaining currency in correctional practice throughout
the country. Such notions as community corrections, work release,
education release, furloughs, prisoners' rights, and unification of
correctional services had been advocated in one form or another by
groups as diverse as the American Correctional Association, the
American Bar Association and even governmental agencies such as the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice.6 What was different about the proposed reforms was they
represented a systematic and comprehensive effort to codify various
reform aspects of correctional practice in the Commonwealth. Senate
Bill Number S. 1161 was unique because it implied a new policy
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direction with rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders as the
foremost goals. Despite its basically moderate recommendations,
S. 1161 was perceived as very radical and many were fearful of the
proposed bill's long term policy implications.
One week after Governor Sargent presented S. 1161, the Joint
Social Welfare Committee held a one day public hearing on the measure.
There were a large number of witnesses and they overwhelmingly sup-
ported the bill. John Boone, the new Commissioner of Corrections,
addressed his testimony to critics who charged that the bill was too
vague about matters affecting inmates. Detailed new rules of such
things as disciplinary and grievance procedures, censorship rules,
transfers and medical care were being formulated by the Department of
Corrections, he testified. He also invited legislators, representa-
tives of inmates, corrections officers and concerned citizens to
participate in the formulation of the new rules. In addition to pub-
lic participation in the Department's efforts, Boone also encouraged
the public to be involved in the Joint Social Welfare Committee's
work to insert greater detail into the bill. 7
Boone's views were echoed in the testimony of Peter Goldmark,
Secretary for Human Services and Co-Chairman of JCPC. Goldmark indi-
cated that the changes proposed for the Massachusetts corrections
system were consistent with every major study and national commission
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concerned with corrections and penology. He urged support of the bill
because it would help the Commonwealth to accomplish its goals of pro-
tection of society and rehabilitation of offenders. Like Boone, he
too addressed those critics who asked, "why doesn't the Department of
Correction exercise the powers it has right now, instead of coming in
here asking for new powers?" His response was that legislative and
administrative changes were both necessary as the Department did not
have all the powers it needed.
The fact is that the Department is moving in the direction of
community-based corrections, it does have a minority recruitment
process started. But the Department has been frustrated by laws
which this bill would change. Its authority to establish com-
munity corrections centers is extremely limited; this bill would
extend that authority. The pre-release center the Department is
now proposing would be open only to those who have already been
given a parole date, and the law is ambiguous as to the programs
which may be carried out there; this bill would resolve these
ambiguities and provide a more realistic term of supervision in
the center. The law on appointing and training correction offi-
cers inhibits minority recruitment. The Department now has no
authority to enforce minimum standards in the county jails and
houses of correction. These are some of the reasons this legis-
lation is needed.8
Attorney General Quinn, Dr. Demone, representatives from JCPC
and private agencies such as the League of Women Voters, the Massa-
chusetts Council on Crime and Correction, and the Massachusetts Cor-
rectional Association all testified in support of S. 1161.9 Inter-
estingly enough, there was no vociferous opposition to S. 1161
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articulated during the hearings. Critics or those persons with reser-
vations about the bill exercised caution and restraint. They neither
attacked nor supported the bill, but maintained a neutrality evidenced
by their silence.
Two witnesses did testify, however, as supporters of the
principle of corrections reform, but they did not view S. 1161 as an
acceptable reform measure. They were Dr. James Nash, Director of
Social Relations for the Massachusetts Council of Churches and Rev.
Edward Rodman, an Episcopalian priest, and Chairman of the Ad Hoc
Committee on Prison Reform. 10
Dr. Nash explained that his position was not based on indeci-
siveness, but on the ambiguities of the proposed legislation which he
described as a mixture of reform and repressive elements. He enumer-
ated a few of the positive and negative features of the bill and
called for a stronger, more ambitious bill that could be legitimately
called a prison reform bill. Dr. Nash noted in his testimony that
the bill commendably permitted the transfer of inmates into community
correctional facilities, but that it simultaneously allowed the trans-
fer of inmates to out of state prisons, without due process safe-
guards. Such safeguards were necessary, he felt, to prevent the pro-
cedure from becoming a form of punishment. The guarantees of the free
exercise of religion were praised by Dr. Nash, but he was critical of
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the provisions which restricted such freedoms arbitrarily or at the
discretion of the Commissioner. According to Dr. Nash, S. 1161
rightly established an employment and training program accompanied by
a minimum wage, but at the same time permitted such a range of salary
deductions that an inmate's resources under the new program might
not exceed his present wages. He wanted the deductions limited to a
numerical maximum of an inmate's gross income, for example 30 percent.
Dr. Nash and others were particularly concerned about the omission of
a section on the rights of inmates in the bill. To him, the bill as
written was such that prisoners' rights depended too greatly upon the
good will of the Commissioner.
Personally, I have great trust in the Commissioner, but no man
should be entrusted with defining without benefit of statutory
protections, the rights of those whom he controls. The only
exception might be children, yet despite the assumptions of this
legislation, prisoners are not children! 11
Rev. Rodman in his statement on behalf of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee for Prison Reform supported several features of S. 1161,
namely, community based correctional programs, minimum wages for pri-
son labor, and giving the new Commissioner clear authority and respon-
sibility. The Committee was convinced that the new Commissioner was
prepared to make substantial and positive changes in the prison
system and they endorsed the mandate giving Boone authority to make
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these changes. There were features of the bill however, which the
Ad Hoc Committee viewed as objectionable. Even more importantly,
there were omissions without which, members of the organization felt
there could be no prison reform. Specifically, Rev. Rodman noted
that the bill spent many paragraphs authorizing a variety of punish-
ments for prisoners such as isolation, segregation, transfers, and
the like as prison reform with no protections of prisoners' rights.
The Ad Hoc Committee shared Dr. Nashs' concern about the absence of
any guarantees of due process in the execution of these punishments.
The Ad Hoc Committee was troubled by the lack of safeguards against
arbitrary, malicious, or illegal use of these punishments. He fur-
ther criticized the bill for its cursory and ambiguous treatment of
prisoner's grievances and provisions for the redress of such griev-
ances. Similar criticism was levelled at the bill, because it
scarcely touched on the issue of prisoners' basic human rights.
"Even on the one issue of this nature that is mentioned--the right of
free practice of religion--the legislation spends more words in spell-
ing out restrictions of this right than in guaranteeing it."12 More
specifically, the Ad Hoc Committee was troubled because the bill did
not specify a role for citizens in the corrections process nor did it
mention a procedure to implement the Governor's alleged promise of
prison councils. Rev. Rodman's concluding statement was similar to
Dr. Nash's:
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In summation, this bill is not, in our view, a substantial enough
contribution to prison reform as it now stands. This judgment
comes from a group that has made prison reform its business and
that includes many ex-prisoners, lawyers, volunteers, and others
who know the prison issues from the inside out. We feel quali-
fied to provide our definition of prison reform and this bill,
without substantial alterations, additions, and deletions would
not be so defined and would not merit support. 1 3
It is very important to understand and take special notice of
these two positions, particularly that of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Prison Reform. Because of their strong inmate and ex-offender orien-
tation, members of the Ad Hoc Committee were viewed as radicals by
the more traditional supporters of prison reform. In addition they
were considered radicals because of the principles on which they
based their notions of prison reform. According to the Ad Hoc
Committee, meaningful prison reform required that prisoners have the
right to negotiate with the administration through elected spokesmen;
due process safeguards for inmates accused of offenses inside the
institutions; and the establishment of a valid role for citizens
independent of the corrections bureaucracy and including ex-prisoners.
The latter principle was important because it was connected to the
problem of accountability and effective redress of prisoners'
grievances.
Members of the Ad Hoc Committee envisioned their role to
include free communication and visiting of prisoners, arbitration of
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grievances, and evaluation of the rehabilitative results of prison
programs. The proposed legislation did not directly address any of
these issues.14 The effect was that the Ad Hoc Committee was caught
in a very precarious ideological position. They were asked to support
a bill which they viewed as inadequate, yet not to support the bill
would be interpreted as being against penal reforms. It was also
unclear that their views to reform would prevail in future discus-
sions on S. 1161. This kind of dilemma characterized many of the
Ad Hoc Committee's positions throughout the legislative struggle for
prison reform. Members of the Committee were advocates for prisoners'
rights and they sought more fundamental changes in the corrections
system of Massachusetts than most other proponents of corrections
reform. As efforts mounted to get a corrections reform bill through
the legislature, the difficulty of the Ad Hoc Committee's position
intensified. In later stages of the movement, the Ad Hoc Committee
began advocating abolition of prisons as the key to meaningful correc-
tions reform. This position effectively alienated many of the origi-
nal supporters of corrections reform. The Ad Hoc Committee was then
in a very isolated position with few allies. Divisiveness within a
very loose coalition of reform groups over ideology and strategies,
once the implementation process began, seriously fractured and dimin-
ished the impact of the reform movement.
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After the hearing, it was apparent that considerable support
existed for the legislation, but that some modifications in the bill
were necessary. As S. 1161 sat before the Joint Committee on Social
Welfare, the Committee for the Advancement of Criminal Justice (CACJ)
initiated discussions around the bill in March 1972. CACJ was
created by members of JCPC and MCCC as a neutral forum for discus-
sions, and information exchange of issues of concern in corrections
reform. Lobbying efforts for S. 1161 were also coordinated by CACJ.
Sam Tyler of MCCC asked Margot Lindsay to chair the Committee for the
Advancement of Criminal Justice and to a large extent she spearheaded
the lobbying effort.
The organizations and actors involved in lobbying for S. 1161
viewed the CACJ headquarters at 3 Joy Street as the central informa-
tion base for prison reform activities. To that extent these groups
and people maintained continuous communications with the CACJ offices.
Aside from the central communications links between prison reform
activists, most other things about the lobbying effort were rather
diffuse.
After the hearing, Annalee Buckland a CACJ staff member dis-
cussed with Van Lanckton plans for a strategy meeting with regard to
further lobbying for S. 1161. The CACJ did set up a series of meet-
ings which included citizen representatives, representatives from
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the Attorney General's and Speaker's Offices, representatives from
the Social Welfare Committee, as well as Laski and Lanckton, major
draftsmen of S. 1161. These meetings focused on changes in S. 1161
and on effective lobbying for the passage of a corrections reform
bill.
Laski made arrangements with Senator Backman for a meeting
with the Social Welfare Committee in executive session to discuss
the bill further. Lanckton discussed with Commissioner Boone the
process for issuing the new regulations in greater detail. A sum-
mary was prepared of the testimony given at the hearing on S. 1161.
Lanckton arranged a meeting with the Ad Hoc Committee to review
their objections to S. 1161 and to attempt to formulate a compro-
mise position, if possible. Lanckton also suggested to Commissioner
Boone and Secretary Goldmark that the Governor's Office should have
a very minor role in the development of the revised bill.
For the next several weeks all the reform organizations were
meeting with each other, usually under the auspices of CACJ, and
often meeting independently to determine the most effective future
course of action. Meetings around S. 1161 were held by CACJ every
two weeks. Among those attending the meetings were Evelyn Bender,
Corrections Specialist of the Massachusetts League of Women Voters;
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James Magnan, assistant head of the guards' union, Henry Mascarello
of the Massachusetts Correctional Association; John Gavin, a former
Commissioner of Correction; James Nash of the Massachusetts Council
of Churches; Joseph Reilly of the Massachusetts Catholic Conference;
Michael Feldman of the Boston Legal Assistance Project and former
chairman of the sub-committee on legislation of JCPC; Van Lanckton
and Frank Laski of JCPC; and Margot Lindsay and Sam Tyler. From time
to time members of the Ad Hoc Committee would attend these meetings.
Because of tactical and ideological differences, with the more main-
stream reformers, the Ad Hoc Committee tended to operate independently.
A critically important participant in those CACJ delibera-
tions was James Magnan, president of the 220-man Norfolk Correction
Employees' Union. This union along with the others wielded consider-
able power within the correctional establishment and the legislature.
Guards' unions existed at MCI-Walpole, MCI-Norfolk, and MCI-Concord.
Primarily these co-called unions were independent organizations which
represented the guards' perspective to the public, corrections admin-
istrators at the state and institutional levels, and legislators.
Though none of the unions was officially recognized and none of them
had collective bargaining rights, the organization for corrections
employees at MCI-Walpole was affiliated with the Massachusetts Ameri-
can Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME).
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The corrections officers from Walpole, Norfolk and Concord came
together to form the Penal Committee, an umbrella organization for
guards at all the Commonwealth's correctional facilities. Dominic
Presti, president of the Officers' Union at Walpole also chaired the
Penal Committee. As a representative of the Penal Committee and of
the Norfolk Corrections Officers' Union, Magnan's presence at these
early discussions on corrections was of singular importance. If the
guards were unhappy about the bill or if they felt their jobs
threatened by it, they had the power and the organization to force
its defeat in the legislature. Magnan's involvement in this redraft-
ing stage was intended to reduce the likelihood of such an
16
occurrence.
CACJ's operation at one level, required a good deal of com-
promise. Once a consensus was reached on any point, Lindsay checked
it with a staff member of the Joint Social Welfare Committee, usually
Frank Blake, If there were problems with the revision from the per-
spective of the Social Welfare Committee, the staff member reported
back to Lindsay or made further suggestions. Problems usually arose
over the political feasibility of a given measure. In addition to
this "official" link to the legislature, members of the CACJ with
good contacts at the State House solicited information, rumors and
sentiment about the bill from the legislators and shared them with
the group.
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Linkages were also important to CACJ's functions. Each per-
son attending the CACJ meeting represented a larger constituency.
During the deliberations, members of CACJ worked to delete and incor-
porate certain changes in S. 1161. Once a compromise was reached on
an idea or a specific part of the bill, these same individuals had
to convey these changes to their various organizations. Reaching a
compromise within CACJ was difficult enough but conveying the changes
to their constituent groups was often an extremely arduous task for
CACJ members.
Of all the prison reform groups that were functioning in the
Spring of 1972, the Ad Hoc Committee was considered most obstreperous.
When the Ad Hoc Committee participated in the CACJ deliberations, its
revisions continued to reflect the group's particular definition of
reform which emphasized prisoners' rights, citizens' access, advocacy
and accountability. More specifically, the Ad Hoc Committee recom-
mended alternatives to the combination of parole and corrections that
ranged from providing more resources for the Parole Board to the
actual elimination of parole. Human experimentation and the princi-
ple of informed consent were serious concerns of the Ad Hoc Committee.
As a result, this group wanted S. 1161 to prohibit human experimenta-
tion in state correctional facilities. Given the ambiguities of
S. 1161, as regarded the inmates freedom of religious expression, the
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Ad Hoc Committee sought insertion of a definitive statement in the
legislation. They wanted a statement which would allow an offender
to have the right of free exercise of his religious beliefs, the
right to change or adopt such beliefs, the right to receive visita-
tions from a clergyman or other representatives of his faith, in
addition to freedom from compulsory religious participation.
The Ad Hoc Committee was gravely concerned about access to
the prisons by attorneys and the protection of inmates' rights to
legal counsel. To remedy these problems, the Committee suggested
an addition to the bill that would allow an inmate's request for an
attorney to be honored within one working day of the request. Con-
sistent with the themes of access and accountability, the Ad Hoc
Committee wanted the bill expanded to specify that records of prison
grievance proceedings were available to the public with the consent
of the involved inmate. The Ad Hoc Committee wanted the draft ver-
sion of S. 1161 amended to require publication of departmental rules
and regulations, because such a requirement was not covered by the
section on administrative procedure of the proposed bill. Discipli-
nary procedures, isolation and segregation were concerns of the Ad
Hoc Committee and the group's opinion was that S. 1161, as drafted,
allowed for the continuation of previous disciplinary abuses. They
suggested several changes which specified that discipline could be
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enforced only for specific infractions of rules and only following
a disciplinary procedure; 3 meals a day equivalent to those served
the remainder of the prison population were to be provided to inmates
in the segregation unit; and setting of a maximum time limit of 15
days for confinement in the segregation unit. Such a limitation
would have the effect of eliminating segregation as a disciplinary
tool. The Ad Hoc Committee wanted an evaluation component built
into all programs created by the proposed legislation and they wanted
to broaden the basis for participation in the new programs by elimi-
nating the requirement of parole board authorization of inmates for
participation in community programs.
The Ad Hoc Committee viewed the section on transfers of
S. 1161 as regressive. The feeling was that involuntary interstate
transfers should be allowed only with the inmate's consent or after
procedures which would guarantee due process. The Ad Hoc Committee
also suggested that inmate rights be enumerated in the law and
that the Commissioner be given a mandate to enforce and protect
inmate rights be enumerated in the law and that the Commissioner be
given a mandate to enforce and protect inmate rights relative to cen-
sorship, religious freedon, visitation, medical rights, right to
counsel and inmate-guard relationships. The final point of discus-
sion at the meeting was the Ad Hoc Committee's suggestion that the
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background qualifications for the Commissioner include experience in
other allied professions as well as correctional administration. 18
Though some of the traditional reformers attempted to ignore
the existence of the Ad Hoc Committee for Prison Reform, such an atti-
tude was naive. The Ad Hoc Committee could not be ignored. First,
the Ad Hoc Committee had a legitimacy which none of the other prison
reform groups had. It's membership included many of those directly
affected by the injustices and inhumanity of the Massachusetts prison
system, particularly inmates, ex-offenders and their families. The
Ad Hoc Committee contained a large number of indigenous reformers or
persons who would be directly affected by the reforms.19 In addi-
tion, the group had a total membership which represented more than
21 different organizations concerned about prison issues. It had
also generated the support of nearly 1,000 people from the fields of
labor, law, education, human rights, as well as active, voting citi-
zens in its earlier drive for a meeting with the Governor. Its press
and information person, Phyllis Ry an, was competent and effectively
used good press releases and contacts with people in the media to
give the organization a significant amount of media coverage. The
group's telegrams, post card campaign and subsequent meetings with
the Governor and Commissioner Boone were further indications that
these reformers could not be ignored completely.
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As indicated previously, the Ad Hoc Committee on Prison Reform
represented indigenous reformers, that is, prisoners, ex-prisoners,
their families, friends and other supporters. This organization more
than other prison reform groups also included minorities and the dis-
possessed. The Ad Hoc Committee was non-traditional not only in terms
of its racial composition, but also its operation. Unlike the more
traditional professional prison reform groups, the Ad Hoc Committee
did not have an annual budget, permanent office space, a paid staff
nor a board of directors consisting of prominent and wealthy citizens.
There were no formal requirements for membership, but the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee's supporters generally shared the belief that most people in
prisons were victim's of the racist and capitalistic system in
America. The philosophy of the group was that incarceration should
be used only as a last resort in dealing with offenders; that there
should be available a range of alternatives to incarceration; and
that if incarceration were used, then inmates should not be denied
their basic human rights. A minority faction in the Ad Hoc Committee
opposed incarceration and wanted to abblish all prisons in the
Commonweal th.
The group was formed after a very successful telegram and post
card campaign and a December 6th meeting with Governor Sargent at
which the Governor made commitments to visit the various state
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prisons; to close the desegregation units at Bridgewater; and to make
a state-wide television speech emphasizing his commitment to reform. 20
One of the original conveners of the Ad Hoc Committee described the
organization:
It was a mixed group of lawyers, ministers, writers, poor people,
and most importantly ex-cons. There were blacks and whites in
the organization; there were also Protestants, Jews, Catholics,
etc.; and finally it included working class people as well as
middle and upper class people. Initially, the Ad Hoc Committee
was the most unaggravating group I have ever worked with. It
worked with incredible external discipline. There was genuine
respect among the members and there was also concern. The organ-
ization held the possibility of not only doing prison reform, but
also of being a model of a genuine coalition, across class and
color lines, for social change. 21
When S. 1161 was introduced, the Ad Hoc Committee mobilized to do leg-
islative lobbying and other political action. Its emphasis was on
the inmates' and ex-convicts' perspective. Two of the groups initial
activities were to hold a meeting with incoming Commissioner Boone and
to begin to monitor the Governor's original Omnibus Corrections Reform
package.22
At the initial meeting between Commissioner Boone and the
Ad Hoc Committee, representatives of the reform group stressed their
agenda of prisoners' rights and advocacy in the context of citizens'
access and accountability. Based on this first meeting with the
Commissioner, the Ad Hoc Committee began a close working relationship
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with the new Commissioner of Corrections. The Ad Hoc Committee and
Boone both advocated deinstitutionalizing the state's prisons, but
deinstitutionalization was not a major plank in the dominant correc-
tions reform platform. The Ad Hoc Committee was favorably impressed
and convinced that Boone was committed to depopulating the correc-
tions institutions and to making substantial and positive changes in
the prison system, therefore, in testimony before the Joint Social
Welfare Committee, they supported giving Boone the mandate and
authority to make changes. At that same hearing the Ad Hoc Committee
Chairman, Rev. Edward Rodman, articulated the group's objections to
those features of the bill which did not alter the inhuman conditions
that destroyed men and women who were incarcerated. The position
was that, "You cannot rehabilitate a man at the same time you are
dehumanizing and humiliating him."23
CACJ arranged a special meeting on March 2, 1971 with repre-
sentatives of the Ad Hoc Committee because the Ad Hoc Committee had
made its presence felt in the prison reform movement. The outcome of
the meeting, however, was such that the suggestions and recommenda-
tions of the Ad Hoc Committee were not incorporated into the final
version of S. 1161. CACJ was cautioned by other individuals that the
legislation encompassed in S. 1161 was important, but that its total
impact appeared to be intimidating to the legislature. John Gavin, a
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former Commissioner of Corrections in Massachusetts, shared this view.
He urged CACJ to be prepared for legitimate compromise and to give the
reforms with the greatest importance a high priority and to incorpo-
rate other reform measures into a long range plan for corrections
reform that could be implemented in the future. The reason for his
position was that much of what was proposed in S. 1161 had been sought
over the past ten years by previous Commissioners. Gavin had particu-
lar reference to such things as a first offender unit, a diagnostic and
reception center, community corrections centers, improved industrial
programs, more staff training, broadened work release programs, educa-
tional furloughs and the like. Based on his previous experience as
Commissioner, his knowledge of legislative politics and his understand-
ing of the general public's resistance to correctional reform, he spe-
cified in a letter to CACJ where the priorities should be.
Gavin's priorities were on job training and employment pro-
grams. He endorsed the proposals which strengthened the Commis-
sioner's authority to make administrative changes effectively. He
recommended that all programs, but particularly employment programs
which helped men become reintegrated in the community, provide mean-
ingful jobs with fair and honest wages commensurate with the indi-
vidual's ability. His final recommendation was that all institutional
preparation during the final two years of an inmate's confinement
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be aimed at preparing him for adequate employment opportunities upon
release.24
Gavin felt strongly that the proposal to place parole under
the new Deputy Commissioner for Community Services should be elimi-
nated from the present reform package and action on it postponed.
Prior to legislative approval of such a measure, he recommended that
the inevitable personnel problems of such a change be studied. He
had even stronger reservations about the sections of S. 1161 which
proposed a strengthening of state county relations in the corrections
field. Gavin thought the proposal would accomplish little other than
opposition from the county sheriffs to the total corrections reform
package. The real problems of the county corrections system were the
dire need for additional staff and more financial resources with
which to implement corrections programs.25
In essence, Gavin's position was that the time was ripe for
acquiring some of the changes needed to make corrections in Massa-
chusetts more effective, but that not all changes were possible at
once. The new cabinet structure according to Gavin offered the
possibility of providing more and varied services to incarcerated
offenders. Resources available in such Departments as Education,
Vocational Rehabilitation, the Division of Employment Security, Mental
Health, Public Health, Welfare, and others offered new opportunities
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for treating inmates more completely. Gavin reasoned that all these
factors, combined with citizen support and better public relations
for a few key changes would result in the successful enactment of
some version of the reform bill during the current legislative
session.26
During those hectic days, CACJ members also met with Boone
to discuss S. 1161. In these meetings he stressed the need for
community treatment centers, furloughs, and work release. The
Commissioner felt that the provisions for community treatment centers
were futile unless the Department of Corrections could release pris-
oners to such facilities. For this reason, the Commissioner wanted
the bill expanded to give the Commissioner the authority to trans-
fer inmates from one state facility to another including privately
owned or operated halfway houses or similar community treatment cen-
ters. Boone also expressed his desire to see the sections in the
bill referring to training expanded to all correctional workers,
because civilian workers were badly needed in the Department of Cor-
rections. He wanted the law to provide for civilian workers in the
Department because he thought they would be more sensitive to the
changing roles for correctional employees. The Commissioner acknow-
ledged the difficulty in fashioning a new statutory definition of the
relationship between the Department of Corrections and the Department
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of Parole, as called for in S. 1161 and that the proper responsibil-
ity for coordinating the two agencies should rest with the Secretary
of Human Services.27 Expanding the Commissioner's power to place
inmates in correctional institutions within the state system and
employing civilian workers in line jobs in the institutions reflected
the Commissioner's commitment to community corrections.
After the CACJ meetings, the meetings with the Ad Hoc
Committee, Gavin's letter, discussions with Commissioner Boone, Sec-
retary Goldmark, the Governor's Office, and various legislators,
Laski and Lanckton, prepared a revised version of S. 1161. The sum-
mary of the substantially revised S. 1161 was circulated to Senator
Backman and Representative Michael F. Flaherty along with a few other
key people on March 23, 1972. The new version was somewhat shorter
and simpler than the original; and its major revision was the elimina-
tion of all provisions which were unnecessary because of existing
administrative authority.
The revised and simplified version of the bill contained no
section dealing with prisoners' rights. There was no mention of
grievance procedures, transfers, right to counsel, nor disciplinary
proceedings. In effect, most of the suggestions made by members of
the Ad Hoc Committee at the March 2nd meetings with Dr. Demone, Laski
and others were not considered relevant to the present bill and were
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ignored in revising S. 1161. The impact of Gavin's suggestion for
revisions were also difficult to measure because both his low
priority items of supervision of the parole officers by the new
deputy commissioner of community services and strengthening of state
county relationships remained in the new version of S. 1161.
As revised, S. 1161 created a new position of Deputy Commis-
sioner for Community Services who had responsibility for supervising
parole officers among other things, which in turn modified the powers
and duties of the Parole Board. Now the Department of Corrections
was subject to the administrative procedure act for purposes of
issuing regulations and in its power to make contracts, and the
selection of the site of any new state correctional facility was sub-
ject to the approval of the Governor. The new power given to the
Commissioner of Corrections under the revised S. 1161, was the
authority to "designate, establish, maintain and administer such
state correctional facilities as he deems necessary." Under the new
version of S. 1161, the law relating to the training of correction
officers was revised to stimulate minority recruitment, to permit
preservice training and to expand and modify the Department's curric-
ulum. Unlike other corrections measures, the revised version of
S. 1161 gave the Department the same flexibility in housing female
offenders as the rest of the bill allowed for male offenders. The
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sections in the original version which allowed the Commissioner to
set standards for county correctional facilities which also made
substantial changes in prison employment programs and which extended
the limits of the place of confinement of the committed offender
remained the same in the new draft of S. 1161. The new version of
the bill also amended the timetable which placed the parole officers
under the Deputy Commissioner of Community Services. 28
Supporters of the correctional reform act pushed for passage
of the new S. 1161 on the basis of its importance to the success of
community corrections. The essential elements of a community correc-
tions program as defined by the supporters of the bill were residence
in small (25 to 50 bed) facilities prior to release; participation
in meaningful work experiences in the community prior to release; and
continuity of programs and supervision before and after release. The
authority mandated by S. 1161 was necessary to develop a comprehensive
new prison system, with community corrections as a major feature.
On April 20, 1972, after several weeks of intensive review
and subsequent revisions to the corrections reform legislation,
S. 1161, the Joint Social Welfare Committee reported it out favorably
by a vote of 15 in favor, 5 not voting and 1 absent. The final form
of the bill according to Senator Backman and Representative Flaherty
was the result of a lengthy Committee executive working session
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during which S. 1161 was redrafted with several deletions and
amendments agreed upon by the Committee.
From an original bill of over 40 pages that was extremely
cumbersome, the Committee developed a concise reform package of only
18 sections aimed at improving custody conditions and the rehabili-
tation process within the prisons through employment and educational
programs. The reform measure was also intended to prepare prisoners
more effectively for their re-entry into society by creating voca-
tional and job opportunities and providing community services. The
prison reform bill reported out by the Social Welfare Committee
included reforms in prison employment programs, in community services
for committed offenders, in county state relationships, and in admin-
istrative procedures. Major changes in the corrections system that
would be brought about by the prison reform bill were: expansion of
educational, training and employment programs for prisoners both
within and outside of the institutions; new authority for the Commis-
sioner of Corrections to establish community correctional centers;
creation of a Correctional Employment Fund to upgrade and modernize
prison industries; granting of regulatory power over county jails
to the Commissioner of Corrections; increasing the powers and duties
of the Commissioner to include responsibility for planning emergency
and riot procedures in coordination with the Commissioner of Public
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Safety; development of pre-service and in-service Training programs
for correctional officers; and the institution of a classification
system for all prisoners entering the state prison system. The
omnibus prison reform bill incorporated measures introduced by
Representatives Jonathan Healy, John Cusack, Max Volterra, John King
and Carter Kimbrel.
In order to arrive at a reform package that had a real possi-
bility of passage, the Social Welfare Committee in conjunction with
the Governor's Office, primarily, deleted sections of the original
bill that represented an unnecessary duplication of present adminis-
trative procedures. For example, the sections giving inmates the
right to the minimum wage for their labor, and others dealing with
prisoners' rights were deleted because they were possible adminis-
tratively under existing laws. Even though these changes were pos-
sible administratively, if the Commissioner were not supportive of
them, the changes would never be instituted. This decision relied
upon the Corrections Commissioner's commitment to change as crucial
to implementing some of the reform measures. The bill as reported
out contained no sections dealing with prisoner's rights nor did the
Social Welfare Committee release a separate bill concerning those
rights. 29
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In addition, the Social Welfare Committee received a strong
commitment from the Executive branch that the portions of the origi-
nal bill pertaining to a fundamental prisoners' bill of rights,
including medical services for inmates, freedom to practice their
religion, current rules and regulations upon commitment, rights to
conferences with attorneys, grievance procedures, elimination of
poor conditions in segregation units and elimination of isolation
units would be implemented administratively. Commissioner Boone and
Secretary Goldmark committed themselves verbally to take whatever
steps were necessary to guarantee the rights of inmates.
The sections related to transferring parole officers from the
jurisdiction of the Parole Board to the Department of Corrections
were not included because the measure was viewed as politically
impossible to accomplish, but even more importantly this provision
was considered expendable given the push towards community corrections
and expanded training for corrections workers.
Tradeoffs were made in the language of the bill in order to
give the Commissioner increased discretionary and administrative flex-
ibility. Restrictive sounding language placated critics, yet still
allowed statutory power for correctional change. These modifications
in the bill concerned the Commissioner's authority to establish and
designate community corrections centers. The changes were predicated
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on the assumption that Boone would use his discretionary powers cre-
atively to implement programs consistent with his reform ideology.
The amended version of S. 1161 was reported out of the Social
Welfare Committee after undergoing considerable political and admin-
istrative streamlining. It was printed and renumbered with the
following important changes prior to its review by the Ways and Means
Committee. Under the new version, the Commissioner was required to
develop "emergency riot procedures" in cooperation with the Depart-
ment of Public Safety, but the new Commissioner had no responsibility
for evaluating new programs as had been requested by the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee. The Parole Department, under the revised version of the bill,
would not be under the control of the Department of Correction. In
fact, the revised bill made no changes in the duties and-responsi-
bilities of the Parole Board. The provisions for community-based
options, under the new bill, used an expanded definition of the term
"correctional facility" to mean any structure used for custody of
offenders, thus providing for community based facilities very similar
to those in the original S. 1161. And like the earlier version of
the reform bill, lifers and other categories of inmates were still
largely ineligible for programs outside the traditional prisons.
There was no category "in custody" in the amended version of the bill
as there had been in the old version. Also in the Social Welfare
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Committee draft of the bill, it was the Commissioner and not the
parole board who authorized participation in community programs for
the otherwise ineligible inmates. The Commissioner of Corrections,
however, maintainted the authority to give offenders 14 day fur-
loughs for a variety of reasons. Though the revised bill required
the Commissioner to establish training and employment programs both
inside and outside of the institutions, it no longer required estab-
lishing a minimum wage for inmates. This change in the bill put all
income from products and services of inmates into a Correctional
Employment Fund which could be used, at the Commissioner's discretion,
to defray the cost of programs or to pay inmates. The new bill
retained a provision that any woman serving a sentence must be sent
to MCI Framingham or another state corrections facility and not to a
county jail. All of the provisions for training of guards that
appeared in the original S. 1161 were also retained including the
category of correctional officer trainee.30 Training for the guards
was retained in the bill in order to satisfy them. Such training
could have been done administratively, but it was important strate-
gically to keep the guards happy. The simplified corrections reform
act, now numbered S. 1330, was reported favorably by the Joint Wel-
fare Committee and then referred to the Senate Ways and Means
Committee.
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On June 27, 1972, the Senate Ways and Means Committee
recommended that the bill ought to pass and it appeared in the Orders
of the Day for the next session. The next day, June 28, 1972, S. 1330
was read a second time and at that time several amendments were
adopted. The amendments that were offered modified the bill in a
number of ways. The amendments limited the eligibility of every
inmate in community correctional programs to the period beginning
18 months before parole eligibility; and also limited furloughs to
within the Commonwealth and for a total of 14 days in a given year
with no one furlough exceeding 7 days at one time. Another major
change brought about by the amendments was the establishment of
institutional evaluation committees in each of the state's prisons.
The institutional evaluation committees was made up of five people,
including at least two corrections officers and three other correc-
tions employees to interview inmates and to make recommendations
regarding the inmates' participation in all programs outside the
correctional facilities other than parole. Final amendments stated
that appointments of provisional corrections officers should be made
only in the absence of a suitable civil service eligibility list;
and they also authorized use of municipal police training facilities
and programs for corrections personnel. The bill was read a third
time after it was amended and engrossed on July 5, 1972.31 After
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Senate engrossing, the bill was referred to the House Ways and Means
Committee on July 5, 1972 where it went through substantially the
same process as in the Senate. The Ways and Means Committee recom-
mended that the bill ought to pass. The rules were suspended and
the bill was read a second time. The rules were again suspended and
the bill was read a third time, followed by a House amendment and it
was then passed for House engrossing. The motion to reconsider the
bill was denied. On July 5, 1972, the rules of the Senate were sus-
pended and the Senate concurred in the House amendment with a fur-
ther amendment. The next day the Senate amendment was referred to
the House Ways and Means Committee. The amendment was reported favor-
ably by the Committee; the rules were suspended and the House con-
curred in the Senate amendment (see Appendix G).
The bill provided for community correctional centers, work
release programs, furloughs of up to one week for selected inmates,
modernization of prison industries, minimum standards for all correc-
tional facilities, correction officer training, employment of former
prisoners in non-security positions within prisons, an extended scope
for the parole board and an institutional classification board. On
July 7, 1972, S. 1330, the Omnibus Prison Reform Bill, was enacted
by the House and Senate. Governor Sargent signed the bill into law
on July 18, 1972 at a news conference held at MCI-Norfolk. On that
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date the bill became Chapter 777 of the General Laws of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts. Ninety days later on October 15, 1972, the
act became effective (see Appendix H).
For many supporters of corrections reform, it was a concept
whose time had come. Action was necessary to quell the disturbances
in the state prisons. Fear motivated many of the actors in the prison
reform drama to support corrections reform. Humanitarian concerns
and a desire to right the wrongs imposed upon an underpriviledged
and dispossessed group, that is inmates, spurred some citizens to
push for changes in the Commonwealth's correctional system. Another
factor which gave rise to support for Chapter 777 was self-interest.
It was in the self-interest of inmates, their families, and friends
to support corrections reform. Improvements of any kind within the
correctional system would have a direct impact on this category of
supporters, whom we have also called indigenous reformers. By con-
trast, the self-interest of the traditional reformers was served,
because they needed a cause, civil rights, anti-war, and anti-poverty
concerns were less prominent and were perceived as less critical
issues in the seventies. Responses to these issues no longer required
protests and massive agitation for change and as a result reformers
needed a new "battleground." Corrections reform in Massachusetts
became a powerful and compelling concept during the seventies, largely
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because of a citizens movement which translated outrage and horror
into action for social and political change. The vital legacy of
Attica; the support of a politically secure Governor, and of powerful
leaders in the State legislature; a new and innovative Commissioner
of Corrections; the precedent set for correctional reforms by the
Massachusetts Department of Youth Services with deinstitutionalization
as the new policy thrust; and extensive coverage of the prison system
by the major newspapers in Boston, combined with the previously men-
tioned factors to create a sense of urgency about prison reforms and
to intensify the existing momentum for corrections reform. In the
wake of Attica, prison unrest across the country, disturbances in
Massachusetts' prisons, and public agitation for reform, the General
Court was flodded with bills concerning corrections. Only a very few
of these bills were enacted, however. The most significant of these
proposed measures was the Omnibus Prison Reform Act, Chapter 777 of
the Acts of 1972.
Repeal of the two-thirds parole law, a perennial bill, was
reported out favorably by the Social Welfare Committee, but was hob-
bled with amendments on the floor of the Senate and later in the
House. When no compromises could be reached, the measure was killed.
Other legislation receiving favorable action was Chapter 154 which
affected a technical reform in crediting parolees whose permits were
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revoked with time on parole up to revocation as time served; Chap-
ter 172 required lifers, other than those convicted of first degree
murder, to serve twelve years before they were eligible for transfers
to prison camps; Chapter 293 corrected a serious inequity which had
arisen from the statutes allowing indeterminate sentences to the
maximum of the statutory term for the offense committed; Chapter 297
set up a requirement of a high school diploma or equivalent for cor-
rectional officers; Chapter 382 excused civil service applicants from
furnishing information as to arrests which did not result in convic-
tion or as to arreats or disposition for drunkenness, simple assault,
speeding, minor traffic violations, affray or disturbance of the peace,
ten years or more before filing applications; Chapter 404 allowed
persons with a record in a delinquency court more than three years
old with no further intervening record to apply to the Commissioner
of probation to seal such records. Such sealed records were not to
disqualify individuals from public service nor be admissable in evi-
dence except for determining a sentence in subsequent proceedings for
crime or delinquency. Positive action on these indicated that there
was a mood in the legislature to take some kind of action to reform
prisons. Interestingly enough, these reforms did little to change
the administration and operation of the Massachusetts corrections
system. Primarily, the new laws were technical reforms.
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The first seven months of 1972, the time of greatest activity
to get a corrections reform bill passed, there was considerable tur-
moil and confusion in the prisons of Massachusetts. There was the
St. Patrick's Day riot at Walpole which caused damages in excess of
$1.6 million. Corrections officers at Walpole, Framingham and Bridge-
water staged work stoppages and "sick-outs" during this period. The
Superintendent at Framingham, Mrs. Gloria Cuzzi, was fired and rehired
within the space of one hour and several weeks later was permanently
discharged of her duties at MCI-Framingham. During this time there
were numerous inmate-initiated disturbances and acts of violence as
well as peaceful demonstrations within the institutions. On at least
one occasion, riot equipped state troopers were called in to restore
order. Despite the seeming chaos in the corrections system during
the critical period of the bill's movement through the legislature,
the corrections reform bill was enacted.
Turmoil in the prisons lead many in the legislature and a
majority of the public to believe in and accept the need for positive
action in the correction area in order to quiet things down. On the
other hand, violence in the prisons also created an anti-corrections
reform backlash among a small group of people. Supporters of reform
considered prisons a failure and they believed that strict regimen-
tation in the prisons had not worked well; they wanted a fresh
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approach! Some people viewed the reform bill as a panacea; the new
bill was to solve all problems associated with prisons. When the
turmoil in the prisons continued even after the bill passed, some
reformers were confused and troubled. There was a solution, but the
solution was not working! The lack of understanding about the poli-
tics of prison reform accounted for the simplicity of some of the
attitudes held by those who supported reform. Much of the real signi-
ficance of the seven months in 1972 associated with efforts to pass a
corrections bill, was that a melange of people with varying back-
grounds and different corrections reform ideologies came together to
work for the passage of Chapter 777. Unfortunately, the reform bill
and efforts related to its passage did not provide the perfect solu-
tion which many of them sought.32
Unlike the so-called "new radicals" of the sixties, correc-
tions reformers, particularly the traditional reformers, in Massachu-
setts were not in revolt against "the establishment" nor the highly
developed, capitalistic and bureaucratized American society of the
seventies. These prison reformers did not reject the affluence and
values associated with their middle class and upper middle class
stations in life. Basically, prison reformers in Massachusetts
were middle-aged whites who believed in individual liberties, basic
human rights and a pluralistic society; who supported free enterprise
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and an economic order based on capitalism; and who abhorred injustices,
yet felt that society's ills could be remedied through orderly and
evolutionary change which did not disrupt the existing social order.
Their acceptance of legal and legislative changes as the appropriate
response in the Massachusetts correctional system displayed a rather
typical American faith in the power of law to remedy all evils. Mas-
sachusetts correctional reformers viewed social and institutional
changes as the result of effective citizen input into electoral
politics. They lobbied, they petitioned, and they agitated through
the media. Civil disobediance and direct confrontations were not
among the tactics employed by supporters of prison reform in Massachu-
setts. Corrections reformers in Massachusetts were not radical nor
revolutionary, even though the indigenous reformers perceived them-
selves as radicals. Once the corrections reform bill was passed,
however, the reform rhetoric became more aggressive, particularly
among the indigenous reformers. The reformers should be commended
for their untiring efforts and their critical role in the passage of
Chapter 777. They favored corrections reform without an in-depth
knowledge of the criminal justice system; without the benefit of any
kind of analysis regarding the causes of crime and criminal behavior;
and without a thorough understanding of the forces within the correc-
tions status quo that would resist changes. Because of their lack of
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a reform ideology, clarity about the corrections status quo, and
their limited political knowledge regarding issues beyond the bill's
successful passage, corrections reformers in Massachusetts minimized
the long term benefits of their movement,
How and why S. 1330, the corrections reform bill, passed with
so few changes was nothing short of miraculous. One interviewee cited
the absence of any active opposition to the reform legislation as one
of the reasons that it was enacted.33 Another interviewee stressed
the importance of good support and proper timing as key to the success
of Chapter 777.34 An interesting observation was that in 1972, there
was not a lot happening legislatively; it was also an election year;
the omnibus corrections reform bill was the major bill of the session
and a number of members of the General court campaigned on the bill. 3 5
That Governor Sargent introduced and supported the corrections
reform legislation was problematic, as mentioned earlier. When the
bill came to the Joint Social Welfare Committee, it was Governor
Sargent's bill, though many others, particularly members of the legil-
lature who served on the JCPC task force which drafted the bill, had
worked on it. Some people resented the bill being tagged as the
Governor's bill, because it represented a bi-partisan effort and
political neutrality that was essential to its passage. There was
also a feeling that Governor Sargent had not been that instrumental
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in developing the bill. If there were any credit or political bene-
-fits to be derived from the bill, then they all should not go to
Governor Sargent.36 Early on, supporters of the bill had to overcome
the problem that the Governor made the bill political, by calling it
his bill. The general feeling was that it was a real mistake for the
Governor to call the bill his bill. In spite of this problem, the
support of the leadership in the House and Senate greatly facilitated
the bill's approval in both branches of the legislature.
House Speaker Bartley indicated his early interest in prison
reform and other liberal pieces of legislation by appointing Repre-
sentative Michael Flaherty as co-chairman of the Joint Social Welfare
Committee. Representative Flaherty, considered a moderate with some
liberal inclinations, replaced Representative Desmond, a much more
conservative legislator. Representative Flaherty teamed with Senator
Backman and the Backman-Flaherty co-chairmanship provided the commit-
tee with liberal leadership which was vital in making corrections
reform legislation happen more easily. Senate President Michael
Harrington also became an early supporter of corrections reform and
this helped to garner a great deal of support among the Senators.
Another key supporter of the corrections reform act was Attorney Gen-
eral Robert H. Quinn. He sent a personal letter of endorsement to
every member of the Massachusetts General Court in late May, 1972.
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In this letter he reiterated part of his testimony before the Social
Welfare Committee on February 16th.
I called upon the Governor to throw away his legislative mask,
and act administratively in those areas proper for administrative
action, while leaving for consideration by the General Court those
areas proper for legislative reform. I'm happy to report to you
that Senate 1330 encompasses this philosophy. . . . As a poli-
tician, I realize that the correctional reform issue is not about
to produce many votes in this, an election year. The recent dis-
turbances in our state and county correctional institutions only
solidify that conclusion. Yet, I am confident that you, in your
dedication to act in the best interest of today's and future
generations, will ignore any lack of political "glamor" in this
legislation. I trust you will agree with me that what we are
seekin 9 to accomplish is, indeed the only right and justifiable
goal.3
The support of top political leaders in the Commonwealth was an impor-
tant factor in the development of S. 1161 into S. 1330 and finally
into Chapter 777 of the Acts of 1972. The personal contact between
many reformers and legislators aided the bill's passage.
The campaign for passage of the reform legislation was well
orchestrated. Reformers took individual legislators and contacted
them for support. After the bill was reported out favorably by the
Social Welfare Committee, every influential legislator was visited and
had the bill explained to him by someone from the Executive Office of
Human Services, the Department of Corrections, the Committee for the
Advancement of Criminal Justice or one of the various citizen groups
which supported the corrections reform bill. Commissioner Boone and
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Walter Williams of the Department of Corrections held a series of
meetings with key floor people, the Ways and Means Committee, the
Senate President, the Speaker, the Governor and the Attorney General,
in their efforts to insure the bill's passage. Williams divided the
legislature into three groups: the supporters, the marginals or those
whose position was unclear and finally, the hard-liners to whom he
said, "Okay, you oppose the bill, but at least don't keep it off the
floor." Williams did a lot of explaining and talking to legislators
about the reform bill, but he concentrated on the legislators that
were considered pivotal in the legislative struggle for passage. In
the House, Speaker Bartley was considered pivotal. If he supported
the bill, then it was likely to be approved in the House. Quite
fortunately, he became an early supporter of corrections reform.
Meetings with floor leaders in the House, particularly Michael Fla-
herty, were very important. After these meetings, the strategy was
to get the bill through on a voice vote rather than a roll call,
because there would be less opportunity for challenges and opposition.
In the Senate, the pivotal Senators were less clear; there
was greater diffusion and uncertainty as to who had to support the
bill in order to insure passage. Senator Backman was an early sup-
porter, but it was important to have more neutral Senators supporting
the legislation. Backman's support was potentially detrimental due
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to his reputation as a radical. Senator DiCarlo became the neutral
supporter. Walt Williams spent a good deal of time talking with
DiCarlo about the necessity of corrections reform. DiCarlo was
convinced and largely took the initiative away from Backmam as a key
supporter. Strategically, this was important. DiCarlo's support
of the bill balanced and moderated the impact of Backman's support.
Sen. Quinlan, whose constituency included most of the guards from
MCI-Norfold and MCI-Walpole, was very important. The amendment to
place guards on the furlough reveiw committee in each correctional
institution was a concession to Quinlan and his constituents who
were beginning to raise questions about a limitation of their power
dnder the proposed legislation. Quinlan was also interesting, because
in spite of his public opposition to the bill, he privately expressed
his support for corrections reform.
Approximately two weeks away from a roll call vote on the
bill in the General Court, in various meetings with representatives
of the Department of Corrections and legislators, the status of
the legislation was discussed. It was agreed that it was essential
that there not be a voice vote on the bill and that the bill not
be debated on the floor, because these two things would mean
disaster. Reformers thought that individual legislators would be
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reluctant to vote at all on a roll call vote. If the roll were
called, many of the ambivalent legislators would vote against the
corrections reform legislation. As the Attorney General expressed in
his testimony, corrections reform lacked political glamor. Inmates
were also politically powerless, that is, they could not vote, and
as a result, it was not necessary for legislators to curry their
favor. For these reasons, the relative anonymity of a voice vote
was considered the most strategic means for minimizing opposition to
the reform legislation.
Shortly after this meeting, Quinlan and his aide, Tom
Saltonstall, drafted a new section of the law which became known as
the Quinlan amendment. Under this section, a committee comprised of
five persons from within the institutions was established to review
all prospective cases for furloughs and to give a written recommenda-
tion to the Superintendent to either grant or deny an inmate a
furlough. Of the five on the committee, the proposal required that
at least two members of the committee would be corrections officers.
The Quinlan amendment was written with Commissioner Boone's knowledge
because he met with Senator Quinlan to arrange something for the
guards. It was a good move, strategically, because the corrections
officers felt they got something that would be very useful and that
would allow them to maintain a good deal of control. In effect, they
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felt that the reformers had conceded to their damands. In reality,
however, the institutional furlough review panel was something that
Mr. Boone could support because he viewed the Advisory Committee as
perfunctory.
On the day of the projected roll call, Senator Parker, the
Republican minority leader, asked for a twenty minute recess. He
caucused with all the Republicans, Boone, Deputy Commissioner Higgins,
Carney of the DOC research division, and a lawyer from Secretary
Goldmark's office. At that caucus, Quinlan gave a speech, the essence
of which was that if his amendment were passed initially, then all
Republicans should support the corrections reform package. Higgins
spoke on behalf of the DOC at that caucus. His presence was signifi-
cant because of his credibility with the guards and the legislators.
Higgins had been a guard at one time and had risen through the ranks
to become deputy commissioner, a key administrative position within
the Department of Corrections. The legislators listened to him
because of his previous experience as a guard and his more than twenty
five years experience in the Massachusetts corrections system. In his
statement he argued that the Department could not be expected to do
its job with outmoded legislative tools and for this reason among
others, the reform law was necessary. Agreement was reached that the
Republicans would vote for the Quinlan amendment and if it were
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successful, they would then support the reform bill on a voice vote.
Senator Parker relayed this consensus to Senate President Harrington
who allegedly had been under extreme pressure from the Globe and
his cousin, Michael Harrington to get the corrections reform
legislation passed. When the Senate resumed, Senator McCann and
Senator Quinlan rose simultaneously to offer amendments. Senator
Quinlan was recognized, he made his amendment and it was passed.
Senator McCann was then recognized and he decried the proposed
reform legislation as "the worst piece of garbage." He then made
his amendment that no one who had ever been a felon or who had been
confined in a jail or a house of correction could serve as a
corrections officer. This was Senator McCann's first amendment and
it was passed, but he was never subsequently recognized to have any
more of his amendments heard.
After the caucus, it was certain that if the Quinlan amendment
passed and if there were no roll call, even though Senator McCann
desperately tried to get a roll call, the reform bill would get
through the Senate. The legislative leadership did not succumb to the
pressure of conservative members for a roll call vote, because they
knew that if the votes of individual legislators had been recorded,
it would have been much more difficult to get Chapter 777 passed.
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After the bill was favorably reported out of the Social
Welfare Committee, the discussion focused on the community corrections
aspect of the bill. The major fights were over furloughs. To the
extent that community based facilities were controversial, the
controversy was over local control, and the location of the facilities.
Commissioner Boone and other supporters reassured people that he
had no plans to close all the state's adult correctional facilities
nor was he going to release all inmates into the community. In
addition to these reassurances, one of the selling points of the
bill was that it was a money saver. It was more economical for the
Commonwealth to operate community based programs than it was to
house people in the Commonwealth's prisons.
In the lobbying effort, Williams and others sold the reform
program as a way of reducing crime and as a way of reducing the
costs for corrections. The supporters of the measure pointed out
that within 18 to 24 months after release from prison, approximately
70 percent of the offenders recidivate, that is they return to
prison. Upon going to prison, many offenders often learn nothing
more constructive than how to be better criminals and how to avoid
apprehension. They argued that the reform bill could do something
about these dismal realities. Presently, it cost the state approx-
imately $8-10,000 per year to keep a man confined in one of the
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state's correctional institutions and it is estimated that it costs
between $14-20,000 per year to keep a woman confined in MCI-Framing-
ham, the state prison for women. Community based corrections programs
for both sexes would cost $4-5,000 the first year of operation and
would level off the second year to about $2-4,000 per year according
to the Department of Corrections. The idea, he argued, was to
convert custodial money into programs, especially community based
programs. In community corrections only about 15 percent of the money
would go into overhead and custody related activities.
The supporters emphasized to the legislators that S. 1330 would
have nominal costs to the Commonwealth and that the Commonwealth
would not be committed to any significant expenditure of funds in the
immediate future. Costs of implementation of the reform programs
would largely be borne by federal LEAA funds. As early as 1971,
funds had been committed to support development of the community
correctional program pending passage of necessary legislation. It was
also argued that correctional programs proposed in the legislation
would reduce some correctional costs. One important area of
possible cost savings was in capital outlay. The Commonwealth's
male institutions were overcrowded. Population projections by the
Department of Corrections indicated that at least one new correctional
institution would be needed within the next five to ten years at a
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cost of at least $7.5 million in capital outlay. The cost of con-
structing a new facility could be avoided with the development of
community based facilities and programs provided for in the bill.
Costs associated with capital outlay could also be avoided if the
community corrections programs were established on a contractual
basis; or at the very least, the capital costs would be much less
than for traditional correctional facilities. Costs savings were
also expected to be derived from the work release program, because
participants would be contributing towards their room and board,
support to families, taxes, and reimbursements to the Department of
Public Welfare. Savings were also anticipated in financial and
human costs associated with a reduction in recidivism which was
expected as a result of implementation of programs under S. 1330.
Interestingly enough, many legislators did not realize the
potential consequences of their support for the corrections reform
bill. In the House, where the most opposttion and the greatest
difficulty in terms of passage were anticipated many representatives
did not read the bill. In the Senate, more attention was given to the
bill. The legislators relied on their information about the bill
from the reformers. Had they been better informed, they probably
would have restricted the Commissioner's ability to contract with
private agencies to run the Department of Corrections and its
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various facilities and programs; they probably would have also
sharply restricted the Commissioner's ability to designate correctional
facilities. Unknowingly in many instances, the legislators gave the
Commission more administrative flexibility then they realized.
The bill originated in the Senate, because there was a feeling
that it had a greater chance of passage in the Senate. Basically,
the reformers felt that if the bill went into debate in the House
the likelihood of passage was bleak. The House was a larger body
than the Senate and based on size, there was a greater probability of
opposition in the Senate. The real irony of the legislative battle
was that its passage in the House was inevitable. Speaker Bartley
supported the bill and merely prorogued it. He delayed putting
the bill forth for a vote until he was sure of its passage. Once the
reform package was accepted in the Senate, its passage through the
House occurred very easily. The Speaker of the House called for a
vote and the bill was approved. Representative Flaherty then moved
for reconsideration of the bill which in effect guaranteed that the
bill would not be reconsidered. The Speaker called for a vote,
rapped the gavel and the bill became law.
One rather cynical supporter said that "Legislators could be
supportive of prison reform because a vote for S. 1330 was like being
for motherhood.',38 It was politically fashionable to support
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prison reform. One could support corrections reform without supporting
substantial changes in the corrections system. There was and always
is the question of implementation and the extent to which Walpole
inmates would participate in the various reform programs. Another
observer pointed out that in Massachusetts there is a history of
passing a major law in corrections every fifteen to twenty years,
usually in response to some crisis or disruptions in the prison
system.
After Attica and in spite of the "law and order" atmosphere
emanating from Washington and gaining some popularity in the society
at large, it was quite hard for public officials or even private
citizens to take a stand in public against corrections reform. In
spite of the anti-prison reform sentiment, there was dissatisfaction
with the corrections system. The public wanted to know how prisons
could correct or "rehabilitate" offenders effectively. In addition,
there was concern among many citizens about the high costs of
operating the prison system and methods for reducing these costs.
After Attica, corrections reforms became more acceptable, because
it was hoped that they would have the effect of preventing future
Atticas in other states. Therefore, activity in the legislature
was marked by the absence of any major opposition. The bill was
cumbersome and many legislators relied on the explanations and
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material produced by the reformers, which was obviously biased, as
their information base. Many legislators did not grasp the possible
ramifications of the reforms porposed in S. 1330, because the
reformers ususally did not discuss any portions of the bill that
were possibly controversial and they downplayed those aspects of the
bill which were likely to make legislators question it critically.
The prison disorders that occurred throughout the country helped
Shape Chapter 777 and contributed to its successful passage. Fear
that an Attica in Massachusetts was imminent lead some to believe
that such a thing could be prevented with new corrections legislation.
Rarely was this perspective verbalized, but it was tacit in the
minds of some persons who supported corrections reform.
July 18, 1972 was a particularly momentous day in the history
of the Massachusetts corrections system. That was the day on which
Governor Sargent signed Chapter 777, the Omnibus Prison Reform Bill,
into law in a ceremony at MCI-Norfolk. The bill provided new tools
for corrections administration and the statutory legitimacy for the
Commissioner of Corrections to introduce community correctional
services into the system and to make changes in employement programs,
security provisions and state-county relations.
The Commissioner of Corrections had the authority, under the
new law, to establish and designate correctional facilities as well
211
as to contract with competent public and private agencies for purchase
of services. This new authority gave the Commissioner tremendous
flexibility in establishing community correctional programs. Further
administrative changes which the new law made possible were that the
Parole Board was strengthened in its decision making role because it
could now hire an attorney and an executive secretary to assist the
board members thereby freeing them to better serve greater numbers
of inmates; introduced administrative procedures for rule-making
in the DOC; and expanded training provisions, including a pre-
service training program similar to the police cadet system, for
correctional officers and other employees of the department.
Chapter 777 mandated the sound development of a system of
community based correctional programs designed to meet the pre-
release and post-release rehabilitative needs of offenders more
effectively. Under the law, prisoner eligibility for community
rehabilitation programs was restricted to those inmates within
eighteen months of parole eligibiltty. Inmates convicted of violent
crimes could not participate in such programs unless approved by their
Superintendent and the Commissioner. Because the bill called for a
new administrative post of Deputy Commissioner for Community Services,
one top correctional administrator now had full-time responsibility
for planning and developing community correctional programs on an
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operational level. The deputy commissioner's responsibility for plan-
ning and developing community corrections coupled with the Commis-
sioner's authority to establish education, training and employment
programs outside of correctional facilities and his authority to
establish and designate correctional facilities, meant that the
Department of Corrections had enormous legal power to change correc-
tions. In the years subsequent to the bill's enactment, the real
world has shown that legislative authority to produce change in cor-
rections, no matter how far-reaching the mandate, is meaningless
without the political capability for effective implementation.
Prison industries or prison employment programs as they were
known in the omnibus reform legislation and modifications in state-
county relationships were provisions of the corrections reform act
that remained rather intact from the time they were filed as provi-
sions of S. 1161 until they were enacted as sections of Chapter 777
of the Acts of 1972. Under the law, the new criteria established for
operating correctional employment programs were their training value,
relevance to the free employment market and their profitability. Even
though the specific provision to pay inmates a minimum wage for their
labor was not included in the law, with outside training and employ-
ment proceeds, it was expected that inmates would receive competitive
wages. The new law opened the private markets, under certain
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conditions to the goods and services produced in correctional indus-
tries. Perhaps the most controversial provision of the employment
programs section of Chapter 777 was that it permitted appropriate
deductions from inmate wages for room and board, court ordered family
support, and reimbursements for local welfare departments. There is
some irony in inmates defraying costs of their incarceration or more
crudely, paying for their own punishment.
In the portions of the bill relevant to state and county
relations, the powers of county commissioners, city councilmen and
other local officials were not modified, but the Commissioner of
Corrections was provided with regulatory powers and the duty to
enforce minimum standards for all correctional facilities in the
Commonwealth, including local jails and county houses of correction.
The new law gave clear guidance regarding the scope and content of
regulations, outlined the process for promulgation of regulations and
provided for collaboration among state and county officials in setting
these standards and in insuring their compliance.
Security provisions were incorporated into the new law,
partially as a response to the major violence which occurred in the
prisons during the period of the bill's progress toward becoming a
law. The security provisions required the Commissioner to make con-
tingency plans for riots and other emergencies with the Commissioner
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of Public Safety. The other security provision was to double the
maximum penalty for inmates who escaped from work release programs.
Interestingly enough, there were no stipluations in the bill for
punishing or sentencing escapees from community-based corrections
centers nor for furlough escapees. In the aftermath of several well
publicized furlough escapes, the absence of these penalties later
became the focal points of intense opposition to implementation of
corrections reform programs in Massachusetts.
Even though the omnibus corrections reform act became law,
the real battle for corrections reform had only just begun. The
reformer's attention had been almost exclusively on getting the bill
passed. Once Chapter 777 came to be, the opponents to reform actively
opposed the bill's implementation. Positions on the question of cor-
rections reform solidified and the opposition overtly impeded the
implementation process. There were problems even though the correc-
tions reform act passed. From the preceding two chapters on the
development and legislative history of Chapter 777, one may conclude
that there was widespread popular and political support for the cor-
rections reform legislation which masked the many different views on
corrections reform competing for preeminence at that time. This super-
ficial view must not be interpreted to mean that there was total sup-
port for the aggressive implementation of corrections reform policies.
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Consensus among supporters of the reform bill was not as
broadly based as it appeared nor was there a commonly held view of
what the end result of prison reform should be. Five to ten years
after the bill, few if any of the proponents of corrections reform
had a vision of how the reformed Massachusetts corrections system
would operate nor of what it would be. There was no definite number
of groups, nor individuals who comprised the supporters of the cor-
rections reform bill; nor was there one easily discernible ideology
or philosophy which characterized the reformers. They supported
everything from closing down the institutions to establishing a
legislative committee to study the problems in the corrections system.
There was, however, a particular reform view which informed a partic-
ular strategy and both prevailed and dominated the legislative effort
for correctional change in Massachusetts during the early seventies.
That prevailing reform philosophy was cautious, traditional
and ambivalently anti-institutional. This reform posture rested on
beliefs which saw the continuing need for correctional systems and
processes, including some form of institutional confinement, for those
who were habitual lawbreakers and for those who were criminally insane.
Basically, the dominant reform ideology was concerned with getting
those people out of traditional prisons and into community correc-
tional programs who were likely to succeed. Another concern of the
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reformers was to improve prisons and conditions in them for those who
could not be released into the community. The majority of reformers
were not committed to abolishing prisons in the long term, and they
definitely did not advocate the immediate abolition of prisons.
Often the rhetoric of corrections reformers was anti-
institutional, for example--"One hundred years or more of experi-
ence have led to the conclusion that institutionalization does not
work"; "isolating and warehousing people who do not follow the
established rules of society into remote environments, separate and
distinct from society has served neither the public nor the person
confined"; "more and more professionals in youth services, mental
health and the correctional field in general have come to believe
that society can be better served by alternatives that include a
setting within the society to which the person in trouble must ulti-
mately return."39 The somewhat anti-institutional rhetoric continued,
but many reformers were caught in a real paradox, namely that the
rhetoric changed but the basic precepts were unchanged. Many
reformers were still committed to notions of vengence and retribution
as the purpose of corrections. Reformers believed in punishment
for criminal offenses tempered with humanity. They were desirous
of achieving these ends in settings that were not offensive. Peni-
tentiaries became reformatories; industrial schools became training
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centers; punichment was changed to corrections and later rehabilita-
tion; and now community corrections and reintegration--the process of
preparing the prisoner to return to society with some confidence so
that he can become one with society. The new terms have a decidedly
more humanitarian connotation, but it is doubtful whether the changes
in the jargon are indicative of changes in the prisons. Inmates,
particularly, rarely see any resulting differences in the manner in
which they are treated.
Former Commissioner of Youth Services, Jerome Miller, in
explaining the basic latent functions of our correctional system
revealed that society had an abiding and persistent need to punish in
a spirit of hostile retribution those who broke the norms and thus
challenged our roles.40 Most corrections reformers in Massachusetts,
during the era under discussion, had not confronted the ancient
dilemma of why we punish. There were, therefore, inconsistencies in
their rhetoric and their approaches toward the sentenced offender.
The overriding reform ideology did not negate the idea that violaters
of the law should be punished, but this reform view insisted on humane
punishment. The majority of reformers were actually supporting some-
thing nearer to "benign punishment" than corrections reform. Most
reformers had a latent commitment to confinement. Therefore, the form
and location of the institution changed, but only towards the end of
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the offender's sentence. The institutions were now smaller, dormitory-
styled residences, located nearer the urban communities which were the
homes of many of the offenders. None of these changes, however,
altered fundamentally the traditional premises for the existence of
prisons.
This cautious reform perspective dictated certain tactics and
strategies. The dominant strategy was to work through the political
system in order to achieve a corrections reform bill which allowed
41the development of a community based corrections system. The major
tactics were lobbying and public education. With the exception, per-
haps, of the Ad Hoc Committee, most of the other reform groups avoided
confrontation as an inappropriate tactic for change. Organizations
like the Committee for the Advancement of Criminal Justice, and groups
such as the Massachusetts Correctional Association, the Massachusetts
Council on Crime and Correction and the League of Women Voters,
embraced the public education and lobbying approach to corrections
reform.
Chapter 777 was a major accomplishment given the enormous
frustrations of attempting to influence a state legislature. In
spite of the difficulties, fundamental changes in state prison systems
demand legislative reversal of previous enactments. Citizen activism,
effective lobbying, executive support, a reform-minded Commissioner,
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a reasonably sympathetic legislature, the politicization of inmates,
and the emergence of corrections reforms as an issue in response to
publicity were all factors which helped to accomplish the Omnibus
Corrections Reform Bill. Had not prison reform groups, even though
they were mainstream reformers, been involved in the politics of the
legislative body, the changes would probably have been more consistent
with the interests of persons representing prison guards and the
powerful law enforcement lobby. Pressure from prison reformers with
some degree of political sophistication is necessary for the enactment
of major revisions of the prison system.42 Chapter 777 focused on
concrete prison conditions, structural changes and new programs.
While many of the reforms would lead to some specific improvements in
the corrections system, Chapter 777 was largely ameliorative, permis-
sive and directive. Its passage was necessary and important, but it
raised the expectations of many reformers and inmates. To say that
a thing must be done is not to say that it can be done or that it will
be done well. 43
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C H A P T E R I V
JOHN BOONE, THE REFORM COMMISSIONER
When John 0. Boone was sworn in on January 17, 1972, as the
Commissioner of Corrections, the corrections system was in a turmoil.
He assumed responsibility for a corrections system whose legislative
mandate had not kept pace with changes in penology nor with the
changing characteristics of the inmate population. The fact that a
new comprehensive corrections reform law was in the final drafting
stages when he arrived was significant. Getting the law passed was
the major priority during his first months in office. From the time
he was sworn in, Commissioner Boone had to respond to one crises
after another. The early days of his administration coincided with
a time of unprecedented violence in the prisons. There were riots,
inmate work stoppages, guards' strikes, murders, and stabbings.
Though Chapter 777 became law, its implementation was difficult.
Reformers became more aggressive in their demands for correctional
change and implementation of Chapter 777. Corrections officers
began to oppose the reform programs and to sabotage implementation
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efforts. Prisoners expected an immediate overall improvement in their
plight. Almost simultaneously, legislative support of reform mea-
sures in the corrections system began to subside. This summary of
events beginning from the time of Boone's arrival raises several
questions: What was Boone's correctional philosophy, and how did it
relate to Chapter 777? What was Boone's strategy for implementing
Chapter 777? Was Boone's correctional philosophy realistic in view
of the nature of prison life? Finally, was his implementation stra-
tegy feasible in the Massachusetts correctional system?
Until the Omnibus Correctional Reform Act of 1972, the only
other recent corrections legislation was Chapter 770 of the Acts of
1955. In 1955, the General Court acted promptly upon the recommenda-
tions of the Governor's Committee to Study the Massachusetts Correc-
tional System, also known as the Wessell Committee after its chairman,
to make important changes in the Commonwealth's correctional laws and
procedures. Following an escape attempt at the old state prison in
Charleston in which hostages were taken, the General Court passed
Chapter 770 which was designed to create a modern and well integrated
correctional system.
A major conclusion of the Wessell Committee was that the Bay
State's penal system was in a deplorable condition and as a result
the new measure repealed many of the antiquated correctional laws. 2
226
The position of Commissioner, with wide discretionary powers, was
designated under Chapter 770. The bill created three deputy com-
missioners with specific responsibilities for Institutional Services
(for planning and directing the efficient administration of the
institutions); for Classification and Treatment (for planning and
directing the rehabilitation services); and one for Personnel and
Training (for planning and direction procedures for appointment,
assignment, transfer, training, supervision, discipline and compen-
sation of officers and employees).3 In addition to these adminis-
trative changes, the new law emphasized the need for good public
rel-ations and directed the Commissioner to develop more public
interest in the work of the Department, to make use of specialized
community agencies and to conduct research studies. 4
The new law directed the inauguration of a training program
for correctional officers; it reorganized and modernized prison
industries, authorized a new pay scale for inmates, abolished soli-
tary confinement of inmates in bare and unlighted cells on bread and
water diets, liberalized good behavior time such that inmates could
receive up to a miximum of 12.5 days per month off their sentences,
instituted a new classification system in order to assign new pri-
soners to the institution and duties best suited to their needs, and
also authorized a Reception Center to which all male prisoners
227
sentenced by the courts to MCI-Walpole or MCI-Concord were sent for
interviews and classification. Female prisoners were not sent to
the proposed Reception Center, but were placed at the women's prison
at MCI-Framingham where classification procedures had been provided
for many years.5
Another change directed by the twenty-year-old legislation
was to establish an unpaid Advisory Committee on Corrections to give
advice and to make recommendations to the Commissioner and the
Governor. This group was composed of prominent citizens and it had
no other powers or duties. The Committee members and chairman were
aapointed by the Governor. They met at least twice a year and visited
each of the state's correctional institutions at least once during
6the year. In an effort to unify the Department of Corrections'
eight institutions, the Corrections Act of 1955 gave each a common
title, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, differentiated only
by its geographical location, for example, MCI-Framingham, MCI-
Walpole, and so on.7 Changes mandated by Chapter 770 were largely
administrative. Those changes affecting inmates reflected a focus
on individualized treatment and classification.
After former Commissioner Fitzpatrick's hasty resignation
in 1971, under the weight of disruptions in the prisons, public
pressure, the insolence of the guards, and his poor health which
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worsened as a result of the tensions in the corrections system,
a national search began for a new Commissioner of Corrections.
Governor Sargent and Secretary Goldmark were specifically looking for
a man with extensive professional experience in the corrections field
and an individual with a national reputation as a reformer and an
innovative corrections administrator. Robert Montilla, consultant
to the Executive Office of Human Services on corrections, told
Secretary Goldmark and his aide on correctional matters, James
Isenberg, about John Boone and his innovative administration at the
federal prison in Lorton, Virginia. Montilla's recommendation,
together with favorable reports of Boone's performance as head of
Lorton and his professional credentials, made him the top contender
for the job.
Boone's credentials and experience were impressive. He
served from 1951 to 1952 as a corrections officer at the federal pen-
itentiary in Atlanta, Georgia. From 1952 to 1954 he worked as a
parole officer in Atlanta. That job entailed program planning and
casework counseling. Boone then moved on to a federal job as case-
work superviosr in the Atlanta federal prison. He remained in this
position until 1964 when he was transferred to the federal peniten-
tiary at Terre Haute, Indiana. At the Terre Haute institution,
Boone was head of the classification and parole department. In July
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of 1966, Boone left Terre Haute and the federal service to direct a
special research project on crime and corrections that was funded by
the Ford Foundation. Three years later, Boone left that project to
work for the United States Department of Justice as a community
relations specialist. On January 7, 1970, Boone was named commis-
sioner of correction at Lorton, Virginia, one of five institutions in
the Washington, D.C. prison system and one of the potentially most
explosive prison complexes in the nation.
There were about 2,500 inmates incarcerated at the Lorton
Correctional Complex. Of the Lorton inmates more than 90 percent
were black. Though there was a major riot only two months after he
became superintendent, Boone restored order quickly, gained the
trust and respect of the inmates as well as the guards, and estab-
lished new programs for prisoners. These programs included varieties
of education release programs whereby men participated in higher
education programs outside the instituiton at Federal City College
and D.C. Teachers College. While at Lorton he granted citizens more
access to the prison with more liberal visiting regulations.
Perhaps the most significant of the programs which Boone introduced
at Lorton was the evaluative furlough.
The basis of many of the programs which Mr. Boone initiated
at Lorton was his creative interpretation of the Federal Prisoner
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Rehabilitation Act of 1965. The Act included provisions for work
release, short term furloughs and the transfer of adult offenders to
community treatment centers. He interpreted the Act in such a way
that a compelling community interest existed to help men in prison
become productive and law abiding citizens upon release. According
to Boone's philosophy, the way to accomplish such results was to
get inmates outside the prison walls and involved in the community.8
These previous work experiences, Boone's training as a social worker
and his personal and family background as a Southern Black from a
strong Baptist tradition contributed much to his evolving views on
corrections reform.
Boone's correctional philosophy embraced concepts such as
love, mercy, grace, redemption and salvation. Though his rhetoric
never included these specific words, the thrust and orientation of
his correctional philosophy reflected religious principles. Chris-
tians preach that a personal encounter with Jesus Christ can trans-
form lives and make old things new. Boone preached that when
correctional systems are operated in a humane manner, when inmates
are accorded dignity and respect, and when community involvement
is a vital part of programming then transformation and rehabilita-
tion occur. Parallels between the Christian conversion experience
and Boone's ideas about the corrections-transformation experience
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are important in understanding the missionary like zeal in his
approach to corrections reform. Such an analogy is not to imply that
Boone was a religious fanatic, but rather that much of his correc-
tional philosophy was based upon his faith or belief in the renewal
or transformation opportunity provided by community-based correc-
tional programming. The interconnectedness of Boone's religious
background and his correctional philosophy are one explanation for
the absence of a systematic and analytical framework with which to
buttress his corrections philosophy. As his tenure became more
difficult and the controversy about corrections reform became a prom-
inent public issue, his ideals and beliefs were inadequate to sustain
a reform effort with broad political implications.
To Boone, the worst aspects of state prisons throughout the
country were the excessive use of individual discretion, arbitrary
decision making by correctional employees, inadequate grievance pro-
cedures for inmates, and a lack of access to the community by
prisoners. Boone's penal philosophy was based on a genuine commit-
ment to provide help and justice for all inmates rather than a few.
If inmates were subjectively categorized into those who were
worthy/eligible and those who were unworthy/ineligible for help and
special programs, he felt the reforms were nothing more than means
of controlling offenders. Another basic tenet in his corrections
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philosophy was that justice should prevail in the prisons and that
inmates should be treated decently, with dignity and respect.
According to Boone:
We need JUSTICE in prisons NOW. At this point in the sorry
history of our prisons, if we had justice, if we had our
citizenry demanding accountability for their money, correc-
tional administrators would be forced to develop alternatives,
and to depopulate.9 -
Philosophically, Boone felt that incarceration was punish-
ment of itself, because it confined, deprived and isolated indivi-
duals. To further punish an individual who was incarcerated was
both unnecessary and excessive, if not sadistic. He was a strong
advocate for getting men and women outside the prison walls and into
the community. Quite simply, he believed that favorable change in
the behavior of offenders could not occur in the compulsory, coer-
cive setting of correctional institutions. Reintegration was
extremely important in Boone's correctional philosophy. But he also
believed in improvements in correctional institutions, because all
inmates would not be participating in community correctional pro-
grams. He opposed notions of rehabilitation that focused only on
improvements within the institutions. His was a more ecumenical
approach to crime and corrections. The mainstay of Boone's reform
views was to get people out of the prisons and reintegrated into
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the community. Building a sufficient number of programs within the
community to reduce the reliance on institutionalization of offenders
was important to Boone's correctional philosophy. Boone described
his philosophy thusly:
I sought to raise the aspirations of your so-called "hard-
core" by saying, "Man, there is something out there in your
community for you. And we're going to gradually move you
back into your community!"
I was committed to doing everything that I could possibly
do legally to get a man back into his community when we felt
that he was ready.
To do that, I had to jump all over, move around and
co-opt custodial people-prison guards and supervisors and
others because they have used tools not to better people, but
to contain them. "Rehabilitation," you know, in prisons has
just gone to reinforce the custodial culture.
But now I'm a man who doesn't believe in prisons at all
for anyone.
Now I believe in "community corrections."
"Community corrections" means that we're going to stop
putting so many people into prisons and making "hard-core"
persons out of them.
Part of that is making communities aware that most of
the people in prison--up to 95 percent of them--are there
because of the lack of an opportunity to learn a skill that
they can sell in the community.
"Community corrections" means that we use community
agencies . . . for people who come into contact with the
criminal justice system.
We can't build a little Harvard in Walpole, but we can
send people to Harvard and Boston University and Boston College.
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We can help a person get a general educational diploma
and send him to a technical school in the community, rather
than attempt to build him a little technical school outside
the prison.
If a person comes into court and we know that he is not
dangerous but needs either mental or medical help, we can
refer him to the community mental health programs that he's
ENTITLED to! Why should we seek to develop them all over
again in prison?
By sending people to prisons, we aren't doing anything but
providing jobs for people who don't know what they are doing. 10
The particularly revealing sentence in Boone's statement of
his correctional philosophy was "But not I'm a man who doesn't
believe in prisons at all for anyone." Though this statement was
made after his departure from the Commissioner's job, it had earlier
been confirmed in the minds of many opponents, particularly the
guards, that Boone's version of corrections reform translated into
the abolition of prisons. Such a statement was one of many examples
in which the rhetoric went beyond the reality. To verbalize such
an idea was senseless. Whether the Commissioner believed in prisons
or not was only meaningful to the extent that this belief shaped his
administrative behavior, but beyond that, the statement was irrele-
vant because existing statutes relating to sentencing made the
abolition of prisons impossible.
The real irony of Bonne's correctional philosophy was that it
embraced notions of crime and deviancy that were quite similar to
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the Jacksonians which placed the origins of crime within the social
environment. Though they begin at a similar point, Boone, other
reformers in Massachusetts and the Jacksonians reached extremely
divergent conclusions on the most appropriate setting for care and
treatment of offenders. The Jacksonians invented the penitentiary
as a controlled environment which isolated the offender from
specific "crime breeding" influences in the community. Boone and
many of the reformers in Massachusetts felt that isolating offenders
from the community ignored the reality that the overwhelming majority
of inmates ultimately return to the community. Boone and those who
shared his view of reform also believed that some cirminal behavior
was the result of an indivudual's inability to cope with his or her
conditions in society. Yet their reform views rarely included
restructuring society or remedying those forces in the society
which give rise to criminal behavior.
Poverty, unemployment, limited educational opportunities
and a disorganized family life were factors that both Boone and the
Jacksonians acknowledged as contributing to crime though more than
a centruy separated their views on crime and corrections. Given
more than a century of experience with incarceration, advocates of
prison reform and even opponents of prison reform talked about the
failure of prisons. Boone believed that prisons failed to correct
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and definitely contributed little towards enabling prisoners to
participate in society such that their minimum human requirements
were met. Boone predicated much of his actions as Commissioner of
Corrections on the belief that only thorugh greater use and reliance
on the community and its resources would offenders be able to func-
tion in society within the legally accepted norms. In other words,
Boone knew that a radical restructuring of the political, economic,
judicial, and cultural bases of American society was not imminent.
He also believed that those persons victimized by such a system, in
this case prisoners, would have a better chance of participating in
society if they were equipped with marketable skills and allowed to
function with whatever material, psychological, and physical supports
were necessary. Boone saw no contradictions or tensions in his
advocacy of community based corrections as an addition, and in
later rhetoric as a replacement to the existing range of corrections
options.
Discussions with the Governor, the Secretary of Human
Services, both Democratic and Republican legislators and members of
JCPC, during interviews for the Commissioner's post lead Boone to
believe that there was bi-partisan support for correctional change
in the Commonwealth. At that time, Boone was convinced that Gover-
nor Sargent was willing to reform the correctional system. Boone
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was promised two years of support by the Governor in order to get the
reform legislation passed and implemented. After which time, the
Governor indicated he would have to begin campaigning for re-election
and Boone would be on his own. Boone also thought that Massachusetts
was a liberal state with a majority of its citizens supportive of
correctional reform. These favorable impressions about the reform
climate in Massachusetts and the potential for correctional change
were reinforced-because comprehensive legislation was already being
drafted to provide officials of the Massachusetts Department of Cor-
rections with the statutory authority to implement new programs and
approaches to corrections in the Commonwealth. Boone had the impres-
sion that Massachusetts would soon initiate a system of community
corrections and other alternatives to incarceration which he fully
endorsed. The possibilities excited Boone and he was challenged by
the prospects.
If he took the job, he would have the necessary administra-
tive power and political support to implement a large-scale reform
program in the Massachusetts correctional system. He saw his role
as a reformer and an administrator who would improve the quality of
services extended to the adults committed to the Department of Cor-
rection. These favorable assessments, coupled with political pres-
sures and changes occurring in Washington, D.C., that had the effect
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of slowing down the reform process there, led Boone to accept the job
in Massachusetts. In retrospect, the former Commissioner's original
assessment of Massachusetts politics and the level of support for
corrections reform were naive. Primarily, this was a result of his
belief that he was given carte blanche to reform the adult correc-
tions system in Massachusetts; that there was a unanimous agreement
on the concept of corrections reform; and that a commitment to
reforms in the prison system superseded all other concerns among
policymakers who supported change.
The political leaders in Massachusetts had no idea of the
consequences of their support for reform, nor did they fully under-
stand Boone's corrections philosophy and its long term implications.
Only after he began to implement Chapter 777 did an identifiable and
powerful opposition surface. It was at this time that the limited
concept of corrections reform which the politicians desired conflict
with Boone's views on corrections. Basically, the politicians wanted
decent treatment for inmates; better programs, which included a limited
amount of community correctional programming; and no disruptions in
the institutions. Of particular interest to the politicians were mea-
ures, reform or otherwise, that would keep the institutions quiet and
prison issues out of the headlines. No one could have predicted the
turmoil and confusion which were a fact during most of Boone's tenure
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as chief of the Corrections Department and the very crippling effect
violence in the prisons had on the implementation of the reforms.
In addition, bureaucracies are generally self-perpetuating and resis-
tant to change; as a result when issues arise which pit principles
of reform and social change against political survival and expediency,
the former notions generally are subverted.
Initially there appeared to be very few constraints on
Boone's authority as Commissioner of Corrections. He was reasonably
free to do what he wanted as far as administering and improving the
corrections system. He primarily wanted to establish community facil-
ities, depopulate institutions, and hire additional staff. He had
the backing of his superiors, Governor Sargent and Secretary Gold-
mark in these initial efforts. To implement new programs and to
introduce a new administrative style required skilled people to plan,
develop, operate and manage programs. It also required an efficient
staff to monitor and evaluate the changes on an ongoing basis. One
person and particularly one top administrator could never do all
these things alone.
When Boone came to Massachusetts, the state's prisons were
in turmoil and lawyers for the sixteen Norfolk inmates who were
earlier transferred to federal prisons were preparing civil suits
against the Department of Corrections. As a new administrator, Boone
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had many managerial and administrative changes to make within the
corrections system and he also had to assess his staff rather quickly.
This was important because even within the central headquarters of
the DOC and particularly at the institutions, there were employees
who did not like Boone and who were also opposed to reform. These
people made every aspect of his job difficult. As a result, Boone
had to rely upon a few people whom he could trust such as Jim Isen-
berg, Walter Williams, Bill Farmar and others to get the legislation
passed.
Commissioner Boone's major tasks were to educate and inform
the public about the proposed reforms in the corrections system and
to lobby in the legislature for successful passage of the reform bill.
He was a most eloquent spokesman for corrections reform. He worked
untiringly with CACJ and other reform groups to get the reform act
passed. 11
Because of Boone's firm personal and professional conviction
that under most circumstances, prisons should not be used, he worked
closely with Paul Chernoff and members of the Parole Board to get
people out of prisons. Parole was one tool which he used rather
extensively and effectively to depopulate the Massachusetts' prisons
even before the reform bill became law. As Boone pointed out, parole
was one method for getting people out of the prisons and into the
community.
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The parade of parole when I was Commissioner was 85 percent.
After I was fired, it dropped down toward 50 percent. That means
the parole board can arbitrarily decide how many offenders we're
going to parole! The parole board can run its rate of paroles
up from 40 percent to 80 percent and back down again, just as it
arbitrarily chooses. 12
These statistics illustrated that the Commissioner was right in his
view that the parole process applied across the board justly, could
get people out of prisons.
Once he bacame Commissioner, Boone began to initiate new pro-
grams. Even before the bill passed, Commissioner Boone exercised his
administrative prerogative to remedy some of the problems within the
Massachusetts correctional system. One of the first things was to
close the Bridgewater segregation unit. Boone also spent a consider-
able amount of time appearing at community meetings and talking to
the public about corrections reform and community involvement in the
corrections process. These speeches were well received and were par-
ticularly important in helping to allay some of the fears that many
people had about community corrections. The biggest fear was that
prisoners would be indiscriminately released from the prisons. Through
his speaking engagements and efforts at public education, Boone was
trying to win support for the proposed reforms by assuring citizens,
that the Department of Corrections would never lose sight of its
public safety responsibility.
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When Boone came into the Department of Corrections with the
new program he also assessed the existing staff. He made his asses-
sment based on his administrative style and his corrections philosophy.
Because a top administrator's program is often unique to that indi-
vidual, he must be able to shift and replace existing staff if neces-
sary and to incorporate his own ideas and people into the organization.
Within the first two months as Commissioner, Boone made some staff
and policy changes. Though he attempted to get control of the cen-
tral administrative bureaucracy, he really couldn's shift or replace
many people at DOC without getting into the civil service system.
Before Boone made any real personnel changes, several months passed.
In this instance, two months was too long before instituting these
very important changes.
Boone appointed a number of new people in various capacities
within the Department of Corrections. The Commissioner's flexibility
in appointing staff was restricted to posts which were not governed
by civil service regulations. This basic problem of removing undesir-
able staff at 100 Cambridge Street, the Department of Corrections
central office, and at the institutions existed through much of his
administration. He overcame that problem to some degree by using
discretionary funds made available to him by the Governor to hire a
cadre of departmental and personal assistants with various
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responsibilities. Among these assistants were Don Speicher, Mel
Bernstein, Dave Farrington, Walter Williams and Jane Shepherd.
Mel Bernstein was hired by Secretary Goldmark to develop a
mechanism for getting public support for the corrections reform bill
throughout the Commonwealth and assisted Boone by handling public
information for the Department of Corrections. He set up a Speaker's
Bureau within the DOC which included himself, Boone, Carney and other
DOC personnel, to garner support for corrections reform throughout
the state. They spoke before civic clubs, church organizations,
fraternal groups and various other public and private groups about
the proposed legislation. Boone was out literally every night and
sometimes during the day to educate and inform the public about the
bill. In addition, Boone had to lobby in the legislature for the bill.
He had to interact with all types of people on issues related to
corrections reform. Bernstein remained with the Department after
the bill was passed and handled media relations and public information.
Walter Williams was another key person in Boone's efforts to
strengthen the DOC's management capability. He had administrative
authority for the DOC's budget and other financial matters. Williams
also had official responsibility for developing the system's community
corrections program. Unofficially, he was also watching Joe Burns,
the Department's veteran comptroller, who did not support the reform
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program. Bill Farmer, an ex-offender, with outstanding organizational
skills was hired as Boone's top administrative aide. John Wynne was
a part of the Core Management Contingent and he worked on the project
to depopulate MCI-Concord. After reviewing the sentences of every
inmate of Concord, Wynne and other staff people discovered that
through early parole consideration and parole, the use of pre-release
centers and outright release, that about one-third of the MCI-Concord
population could be released from the institutions. After all the
eligibles were released, the institution's 100 year old East Wing was
closed. The doors and locks were cut off the cells to insure that
the East Wing would never be used again. Another person hired as a
part of the Core Management Contingent was Jane Shepherd. She served
as an aide to Commissioner Boone and worked with Wynne on the Concord
Impact Program. She was an important advocate for the inmates within
the DOC.
Other new staff were the superintendents at MCI-Walpole and
MCI-Norfolk, both of whom were from out of state. Boone replaced the
superintendents, who favored an orientation toward punichment. The
new appointees to the superintendents' posts were Robert Donnelly at
MCI-Walpole and George Bollinger at MCI-Norfolk. Neither man was a
civil service appointee and this created some animosity among the
guards who felt one of their own should have been promoted. Montilla
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recommended Bollinger and Donnelly to Boone as outstanding correc-
tions administrators. On the basis of Montilla's recommendation and
their records, they were hired. As one interviewee pointed out,
They were corrections superstars. But remember when you start
looking for superintendents, the pool of progressive types is
really small to begin with. At best you therefore end up settling
with the best of what you can get.13
At MCI-Norfolk, Bollinger did a good job initially. He calmed
the institution and initiated good programs. He was quite effective
until the Walter Elliot incident. Elliot was an inmate who killed
two prison employees, his wife and himself in an escape attempt.
This occurred on July 31, 1972, only two weeks after the reform bill
had been signed into law by the Governor. Much adverse publicity
surrounded the event. During the public furor Boone publicly blamed
Bollinger for the tragedy. This proved to be a mistake, because
Bollinger subsequently lost respect and confidence in Boone. Boone's
actions were also interpreted as a lack of support and a vote of no
confidence for one of his administrators. As a result of this,
Bollinger resigned as the Superintendent of MCI-Norfolk shortly
thereafter.
Donnelly, on the other hand, was overwhelmed by the constant
crisis at MCI-Walpole and reacted excessively on several occasions.
An example of Donnelly's extreme responses occurred when Boone and
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Bernstein were negotiating with about twenty inmates in a conference
room at MCI-Walpole and there was a disturbance in one of the cell
blocks. Donnelly left the conference and charged into the troubled
cellblock and began gassing the inmates. In the conference room,
when the inmates learned of Donnelly's actions, things were quite
tense for Bernstein and Boone. Some of the inmates were ready to
take Boone and Bernstein as hostages as a reaction against Donnelly's
excessive behavior. This was averted because other inmates in the
negotiating group said that Donnelly was to blame and not Boone. They
argued that Boone was trying to help them and if they took him as a
hostage, they would have no allies in the DOC.14
After the March 17th riot at MCI-Walpole, which resulted in
almost $2 million worth of damages, Donnelly lost control. Boone was
out at the State Prison almost daily. It appeared that Donnelly just
could not restore order at MCI-Walpole. Rather quickly, Commissioner
Boone lost respect for Donnelly and his ability to manage the institu-
tion and perhaps even more importantly, the guards also lost respect
for Donnelly. Consequently, Donnelly resigned, but not soon enough
to prevent the loss of whatever control the institutional administra-
tion had over the institution.15 Almost immediately after Boone came
on the scene, the guards consolidated their controlling power over
MCI-Walpole. Walpole was therefore a perennial problem for
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Commissioner Boone throughout his term. Getting a superintendent who
could and would control that institution was extremely difficult.
One of the problems Mr. Boone had as Commissioner was in
finding superintendents who would effectively manage and operate the
institutions and yet shared a philosophy of corrections that was
similar to his own. It seemed as though nobody who was really compe-
tent and effective wanted to be a superintendent. Because of the
continuing crisis in the institutions and the inability or the lack
of desire by the superintendts to bring the situation under control,
Boone, in effect, became the Commissioner of Institutions, rather than
the Commissioner of Corrections. This was despite his unwillingness
to run the institutions from headquarters. He preferred leaving the
administration of the prisons to the superintendents. Boone con-
sciously tried to maintain a hands off policy and to allow the super-
intendents to run the institutions, but circumstances often forced
him into a larger role in the running of institutions and in the
resolution of institutional crisis.
The incident with Gloria Cuzzi, the superintendent at MCI-
Framingham, in March was a good example of one superintendent's
inability to handle a tense situation. There were tensions between
the guards, inmates and administration at MCI-Framingham and the
guards threatened to strike. Cuzzi called Commissioner Boone for
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help. When Boone arrived at Framingham, he found there were serious
problems between the staff and Cuzzi which made her ineffective and
he fired her. After Boone fired Cuzzi as superintendent of Framing-
ham, the guards decided they would not strike, that they would discuss
their grievances with Cuzzi and that they would support her. She .was
then rehired. All of this, her firing and rehiring occurred in less
than one hour. Boone admitted his error in initially firing Cuzzi,
but the press portrayed Boone as vacillating, indecisive and bungling.
His admission of an error was represented as a sign of weakness. 16
About three months later in June of 1972, Cuzzi was again fired as
superintendent of Framingham because Boone considered her ineffective
as a corrections administrator. This time she was replaced by Mrs.
Dorotyh L. C. Chase, a black woman with an extensive background in
social work and psychology. Chase was a capable administrator who
ran the institution well and stayed on as Superintendent even after
Boone's departure.
In addition to problems of finding superintendents who shared
Boone's reform views and who could effectively run the prisons, the
Massachusetts corrections system was weak because of the absence of
middle management administrative or functional positions. Lacking
middle management personnel, Boone set the tone and rhetoric for
later reform and he used his administrative power to change and to
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rotate top administrators within the Department. The Commissioner
tried to overcome this particular departmental weakness by using a
substantial amount of the $300,000 from federal funds which Governor
Sargent made available to him to set up a Core Management Contingent
within the Department of Corrections. Some of this money was also
used to develop community correctional programs such as the Boston
State Pre-Release Center. This LEAA money gave Commissioner Boone
some flexibility to hire his own staff. There was always, however,
a problem of finding money for the individuals Boone wanted to hire.
The state pay scale for people with careers in corrections other than
the corrections officers was rather low. Because civil service was
restrictive he really couldn't hire the people he wanted, nor could
he terminate easily those he did not want. The Core Management Con-
tingent was used to bring in new people and to shift some of the old
employees into other jobs.
Administratively, Boone's style was very loose, open, and
responsive to whatever situations arose. He did not build levels of
bureaucracy. He had time for everybody and was not bound by adminis-
trative and organizational orthodoxies. He wanted and needed to get
control when he came to Massachusetts, but he also wanted to do a job
that yielded results. To get results, Boone felt it required ignoring
chains of command and other traditional administrative structures.
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Because of his informal administrative style, Boone was often attacked
as a poor administrator. In a newspaper interview after his ouster
Boone explained his organizational style:
I didn't have a bureaucracy. If a good one had been available, I
could have made good use of it. I probably could have survived
the political thing.
My door was open, and I didn't have receptionists who would make
you wait and all of that. It was possible to move--to get things
done--to do this, that and the other. I was forced to 'manage'
without a carefully outlined administrative process.
I managed to get the legislation passed. I managed to establish
three halfway houses with private agencies. Brooks House and two
others. I established the Boston Pre-Release Center and the
Shirley Drug Rehabilitation and Pre-Release Center and other
things.
That's done by management. You don't get things like these done
by going through a bureaucracy. If you tried to, you'd never get
anything done. You have to jump all over it, or walk around it.
You can't be a paper pusher, or you will never get anything done.17
Flexibility characterized Boone's administrative style. The
process of change involved many ad hoc decisions. Sometimes the
decisions were based on intuition, or responses to a crisis situation,
or the ability to maximize new and often unanticipated developments.
While it was quite admirable that Boone was flexible and accessible,
these very factors made the question of his administrative competence
an easy target for his detractors. There is a real difference in the
.kills required to manage reform programs and those required to admin-
ister a state bureaucracy. The administrative system which Boone
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inherited was extremely decentralized and focused on institutional
autonomy and control by the guards. One of his early tasks was to
centralize and systematize communications between the state's prisons
as well as the administration of new correctional policies and programs.
This task of centralizing and gaining control was difficult,
because Boone was continuously challenged by the guards. The guards
defied many of Boone's directives and often deliberately sabotaged
some of the reform programs. Not only were the prison guards resistant
to change because of animosity toward Boone, but hey also believed some
of the proposed reforms did not represent sound correctional practice.
To some of the guards the provisions of Chapter 777 which allowed
selected inmates access to programs and facilities within the com-
munity, presented a real threat to public safety and security. The
larger threat which the implementation of Chapter 777 posed to the
guards was around job security. If Boone's philosophy and the mandates
of Chapter 777 were successfully implemented, the guards believed
that many of them would lose their jobs because fewer guards would
be needed to staff the Commonwealth's prisons and community corrections
programs.
Throughout his term as Commissioner of Corrections for the
Commonwealth, there were acts of violence and opposition to the re-
forms which Boone tried ti implement. Very often the violence in the
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prison was contrived and manipulated by the guards to embarrass Boone
and ultimately force his ouster as Commissioner of Corrections. In
spite of the opposition to the corrections reform movement, the con-
tinuing crisis within the corrections system, and the unanticipated
political consequences of getting the reform bill passed, Boone did
accomplish some things as Commissioner. Perhaps his most significant
accomplishment was that he catalyzed the corrections reform movement
in Massachusetts. Because he was a powerful speaker, he aroused
public support for reform. As a new Commissioner he was enjoying a
honeymoon of sorts with the media, the politicians and the public,
particularly those who supported prison reform. His charisma and
infectious commitment to corrections reform inspired many of the
reformers.
Even before the law passed, Boone made some administrative
changes in the operation of the corrections system. Administrators
who are also reformers must do as much as possible administratively
to change the system; they must be politically astute and they must
use their administrative authority as creatively as possible. Once
the administrative changes are made it is important that they are
enacted into law. Otherwise administrative changes last only as long
as the administrator making them, or as long as he is there to imple-
ment them. Under Boone's adminstration MCI-Framingham was not only
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depopulated but it became a coeducational institution. In March 1973,
14 very carefully selected inmates from MCI-Walpole, MCI-Norfolk, and
MCI-Concord who were within 18 months of parole eligibility and who
met other strict requirements were transferred to MCI-Framingham.
Shortly after he took over as Commissioner of Corrections, Boone began
planning to expand the Department of Corrections' operation to include
halfway houses and a diagnostic center at Boston State Hospital in
Mattapan.
Within the central office of the Department of Corrections,
Boone added new staff people and in other instances, he shuffled the
existing staff into other positions. In the institutions, Boone
replaced the superintendents at MCI-Walpole and MCI-Norfolk with
younger, less security minded men from out of state. He also fired
Gloria Cuzzi as superintendent at MCI-Framingham. Removal of the
superintendents merely highlighted the divisions and heightened
opposition to reforms within the Deparement. He tried to counter
a possible backlash from some of these displaced individuals by
establishing a security unit within the Department. This unit had
responsibility for developing emergency contingency plans for the
Department in the event of riots and other serious disturbances within
the institution. As an administrative device to remove some of the
opponents of reform from the institutions into central headquarters,
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it was probably a better idea in theory than in reality. The effect
of the device was that it concentrated people who were opposed to
reforms in one place and very near Boone. Because the members of the
security unit basically opposed reforms, they were able to combine
forces with others at DOC and throughout the corrections system to
undermine many of Commissioner Boone's orders and programs.
Once the reform machinery was successful in getting the
corrections reform bill enacted, Boone's strategy for change was not
to wait, but to move aggressively. By his actions he rejected an
incremental and cautious approach to implementation of Chapter 777.
The process for implementing reforms was not planned. It was deter-
mined largely by chance, circumstances, imagination and Boone's
personal style.18 To some extent, Boone saw change as an end in
itself. Very often the strategies used to implement the reforms
depended largely upon options and solutions that arose spontaneously.
He tried to implement the reforms, particularly efforts to depopulate
the adult correctional institutions, and to initiate the furlough
program. As pointed out by Edwin Powers, the author of The Basic
Structure of the Administration of Criminal Justice in Massachusetts:
The total population of the eight institutions on June 3, 1972
was 3,309 as compared to 2,935 on a comparable date in 1973, the
latter figure including the 2 pre-release centers in addition to
the 8 institutions. Thus there has been in one year a population
drop of 11.3%. 'The sizeable decrease in the Department's popula-
tion occurred entirely during the last half of the year (1972).19
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Boone's administration was responsible for a decline in the prison
population, but parole was being used more effectively to get pris-
oners out early. The attitudes and correctional philosophy of the
Commissioner of Corrections greatly influenced the behavior of Parole
Board members.
Progress made in establishing community correctional centers
was another of Boone's attempts to implement Chapter 777. During the
Boone administration three halfway houses were established with private
agencies. In addition, the Department of Corrections established the
Boston Pre-Release Center for men who would be returning to the Boston
area, after discharge from a state correctional institution. Its
counterpart for women was the Charlotte House Pre-Release Center also
located in Boston. Both facilities focused on work release and edu-
cational release. The other community correctional facility estab-
lished by the Department was the Shirley Drug Rehabilitation and Pre-
Release Center, for male offenders under 23 years of age from MCI-
Concord. Only those young men with a history of drug dependency,
with no warrants or detainees awaiting them, who were not sexually
dangerous and who had no record of severe disciplinary offenses were
admitted to the Shirley Drug Rehabilitation and Pre-Release Center.
Chapter 777 authorized furloughs for emergencies and for any
other reasons which officials viewed as consistent with the
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reintegration of a committed offender into the community. Inmates
were eligible for furloughs to attend the funeral of a relative; to
visit a critically ill relative; to obtain medical, psychiatric, psy-
chological or other social services when adequate services were not at
the facility and cannot be obtained by temporary placement in a hospi-
tal; to contact prospective employers; and to secure a suitable resi-
dence for use upon release or parole or discharge. 20
The aspect of Chapter 777 which most clearly focused on Boone's
belief in the dignity of inmates and the importance of inmate and
community interaction was his administration of the furlough program.
Boone believed that furloughs were an important correctional tool to
which inmates were entitled, provided they did not pose a danger to
the community and provided such inmates were not escape risks. Quite
often Boone made statements to the effect that only five percent of
the inmate population was really dangerous and as a result furloughs
should be available to all inmates. He further believed that furloughs
should not be implemented as a privilege nor used as a method of con-
trolling inmates. He pushed subtly and constantly for evaluative fur-
loughs for which all but the most dangerous offenders would be eligible.
In the end there was a compromise reached whereby two types of furloughs
were developed: the quarterly furlough to which everybody was tech-
nically entitled every quarter and the earned furlough which was used
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to give inmates an added incentive to become involved in programs.
The consequences of the furlough program will be discussed in a later
section of this chapter.
The first furloughs were granted in Massachusetts on Novem-
ber 6, 1972. From that date until March 27, 1973, 2,966 furloughs
were granted to 968 individuals for an average of 3.1 furloughs per
individual. During the first four months of the furlough program,
38 residents failed to return and were listed as escapees. By taking
the total number of furloughs granted and the number of individuals
who did not return from furloughs, the Department of Corrections
arrived at a success rate of 98.7 percent for the furlough program.
This figure was impressive for publicity purposes, but a more accurate
depiction would have taken into account the number of individuals
granted furloughs and the number of individuals listed as escapees
for a slightly lower success rate of approximately 96 percent. In
spite of the furlough program's rate of success, after Boone's depar-
ture, the Attorney General and the General Court attempted to place
severe restrictions on the furlough program.
Boone was seriously committed to implementing new policies
based on community corrections and reintegration. He felt very
strongly that most inmates were ready to go out into the community
provided there were programs and facilities for them. Boone's
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corrections philosophy was visionary although it was based on old
fashioned principles of justice, dignity, respect for inmates as well
as a disenchantment with institutions. As an administrator he held
fast to his beliefs and was not afraid to take the risks involved in
implementing his corrections philosophy. His commitment, however,
was not enough to make corrections reform a reality. Successful
implementation of Chapter 777 required a very strong and extremely
competent administrator to run the Massachusetts corrections bureau-
cracy. Additionally, such a person needed to have excellent abilities
as a manager, a leader, an executive and a politician. Unfortunately,
Boone and his staff did not posess these qualities. Boone's flexible
administrative style caused inefficiency, duplication and waste in
the Department of Corrections. Annual reports were not submitted,
requests from legislators for DOC representatives to appear at hearings
were not responded to promptly, and the Department of Administration
and Finance criticized the DOC for errors in its accounting, book-
keeping, and budgetary procedures. The Department's fiscal and
management operations generally lagged behind the rhetoric and the
reform programs. Even Boone's most ardent supporters conceded that
he was not a good administrator, yet they also maintained that under
the pressures and demands of intense and frequent upheavals in the
prison system, it was not possible to implement the reform policies,
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maintain order in the institutions, and run the corrections bureau-
cracy efficiently. The task of implementing reforms was further
complicated by the nature of the system. For example, the corrections
system had endured and perpetuated itself despite failure in its
manifest task of rehabilitating offenders. These and other short-
comings notwithstanding, the corrections bureaucracy demonstrated an
overwhelming ability to close ranks and weather storms of criticism.
Other impediments to substantive change and reform in the
correctional system were the arrangements upon which the correctional
system rested particularly the civil service protections, political
patronage, and institutional bureaucracy which insured no quick nor
meaningful reaction to inequities of the corrections system. Civil
service, by promoting inbreeding and constraining administrators made
it impossible for the Commissioner or the superintendent to move any
corrections officers at the grade of Supervising Correction Officer
or above from one institution to another. According to Boone, "The
civil service system is so heavy. They have this job until they
retire--which is for life. And you can't fit anybody else in. And
even if you do, they're programmed." Though these problems persisted,
they did not make the dream of corrections reform impossible. More
critical to the successful implementation of the bill than Boone, the
reformers, the legislators or the corrections bureaucracy itself were
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the guards. Though these various groups lobbied effectively for
passage of Chapter 777, its implementation was not dependent on the
responses of this external lobby. The guards, a group that impacted
only nominally on the process that lead to the development and enact-
ment of Chapter 777, could not determine its success or failure.
The resistance of the guards to the reforms authorized by the new
legislation created a volatile atmosphere which thrust the Department
of Corrections and particularly the institutions into one crisis after
another. The guards as a force opposed to corrections reform is
discussed in the next chapter.
Staff alienation became a serious problem throughout the
corrections system. The staff at 100 Cambridge Street, the central
office of the Department of Corrections, and the institutional staff
was polarized and this increased opposition to the reform policies.
The guards felt ignored and powerless. They felt that their legiti-
mate grievances and concerns were not acted upon and that Boone was
too inmate oriented. There was the "in group", those persons who sup-
ported the reform policies, who approved the changes occurring in the
corrections system and who actively supported a human services
approach to the administration of the prisons. The members of the
"in group" were by and large the Boone appointees. They were young,
college-educated and had been involved in some form of social and
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political activism. The other group was the "old guard" which con-
sisted primarily of the guards, other institutional personnel and
long time employees of the Department of Corrections who worked at
central headquarters. The "old guard" resented the increasing prom-
inence and influence of certain members of the "in-group", particularly
Bill Farmer, James Isenberg, Robert Montilla and Steve Teichner, to
name a few. Policy changes caused many among the "old guard" to
become demoralized, restive and fearful of the changes. For many of
the corrections officers reforms meant an end to their job security.
One of the key persons among the old guard was Joe Higgins,
a deputy commissioner. Higgins wielded enormous power in the correc-
tions system. During a period covering more than twenty years, he
rose through the ranks from a guard to Deputy Commissioner for Insti-
tutional Services. To the guards, Higgins was their Commissioner.
He had run all of the institutions on a temporary basis at some time
during his career. Before Boone was hired, after he was fired and
during his absences, Higgins acted as Commissioner. Many in the "in-
group" were suspicious and distrustful of Higgins, but he was relied
upon because of his knowledge of the system. Aside from his state-
ment of support to legislators during the final deliberations on
Chapter 777, he maintained a low profile regarding the implementation
of the new corrections law.
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While a calculated and deliberate attempt to undermine Boone's
authority and reform programs was not documented by the research,
there was evidence that inaction was a posture adopted by many people
at the central office as well as those within the institutions who
disapproved of changes in the correctional system. Inaction may have
stemmed from some insidious motive to undercut or undermine the new
Commissioner's policies or possibly the inaction was the result of
ineptness. Whatever the cause, the results were dissension and strife
throughout the Massachusetts correctional system with the overall
effect of maladministration. Distrust, intrigue and fear were per-
vasive during Boone's term as Commissioner of Corrections.
Another equally important component in the formula for suc-
cessful implementation of Chapter 777 were the 2,800 inmates in the
Massachusetts correctional system. These inmates represented a new
type of offender. They were different than prisoners in the past,
because many were the products of the political explosions of the
sixties. This new breed of inmates was generally young, politically
and socially aware, a member of a minority group, from the inner city,
and possessed of a sense of ethnic pride and race consciousness. In
many instances they were the products of single parent homes and
neighborhoods where crime, poverty and unemployment were quite high.
According to Dan Nolan a twelve and a half year veteran of prisons in
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Florida and Massachusetts, approximately 70 percent of the inmates in
Massachusetts prisons were convicted and did "time" for their criminal
behavior in the past; somewhere along the line they "graduated" from
either a Training School, a Reformatory, House of Correction, or one
of the State Prisons. Almost the same proportion, about 70 percent,
of men and women confined in prison had less than an eighth grade
education; and 75 percent were considered unskilled workers.21 Unlike
prisoners of earlier decades, these inmates not only expected but
demanded decent and humane treatment as well as protection of their
rights. These prisoners politicized most of these demands. While
some of the charateristics of the inmates changed, the prison com-
munity remained much as it was at its birth. Inmates are still forced
to make license plates, bird baths, mops, brooms and buckets. Every
aspect of their being is controlled. They are not allowed the oppor-
tunity to be responsible persons, nor to make decisions about their
own lives. Donald Clemmer, a noted criminologist nade the following
observation:
The prisoner's world is an atomized world, its people are atoms
interacting in confusion. It is dominated and it submits. Its
own community is without a well established social structure.
Recognized values produce a myriad of conflicting attitudes.
There is no consensus for a common goal. The inmates' conflict
with officialdom and opposition toward society is only slightly
greater in degree than conflict and opposition among themselves.
Trickery and dishonesty overshadow' sympathy and cooperation.
Such cooperation as exists is largely symbolic in nature.
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Social controls are only partially effective. It is a world of
individuals whose daily relationships are impersonalized. It is
a world of "I," "me" and "mine" rather than "ours," "theirs" and
"his." Its people are thwarted, unhappy, yearning, resigned,
bitter, hating, revengeful. The prison world is a graceless
world. There is filth, stink, and drabness; there is monotony
and stupor. There is disinterest in work. There is desire for
love and hunger for sex. There is pain in punishment. Except
for the few, there is bewilderment. No one knows, the dogmas and
codes notwithstanding, exactly what is important. This picturiza-
tion is not an epitome. The situation is too complex to epitomize.
. . . In a sense the prison culture reflects the American cul-
ture, for it is a culture within it.22
The prisoners world can hardly be anything other than atomized.
Prison inmates "do their time" by making license plates, flags and
sewer covers, street and highway signs, uniforms, cardboard boxes,
and other items used by the state for which they receive 3 to 6 cents
an hour or about 50 cents a day. This pittance is not enough for
tobacco, postage, toiletries or other necessities, so the inmates
plot and scheme to come up with a lucrative "hustle."
Inmates know how to do time and the one predictable feature of
their existence is the pervasive goal of making do--by manipu-
lating the environment. Compensating by illicit means becomes
a game in which prisoners try to "beat" or "con" the staff who
are ostensibly in control. From the inmate perspective making-
do by chicanery is rewarding because it reinforces the belief
that correctional officers are fallible, it shifts some of the
power theoretically held by the staff to inmates and it allo-
cates spoils to the underdog.23
Another difference in the present day offenders who are incar-
cerated and earlier ones is the manner in which they adjust to prison
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life. Clemmer first used the word prisonization in the forties to
indicate the process of taking on in greater or lesser degree the
folkways, mores, customs and general culture of the penitentiary.24
In this process of prisonization, Clemmer noted that every person in
prison was subjected to certain influences which he called universal
factors of prisonization. Even though these universal factors
influences all offenders, whether or not complete prisionization
occurred depended on the individual's personality, the kind, and
extent of relationships outside the prison, an offender's affiliation
in prison primary or semi-primary groups, a chance placement in a
work gang, cellhouse and with a cellmate, and finally acceptance of
rejection of the dogmas or codes of the prison culture. These uni-
versal factors of prisonization, however, included acceptance of an
inferior role; accumulation of facts about the organization of prison;
development of new habits of eating, dressing, working, sleeping;
adoption of local language; recognition that nothing is owed to the
environment for the supplying of needs; and the eventual desire for
a good job.25 Prisonization is important and only mentioned here
because of its effects on an individual's post-prison adjustment.
Clemmer argued that if no other factor of prison culture touched the
personality of a long-term prisoner, the influences of these universal
factors was sufficient to make a person characteristic of the penal
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community and probably so disrupt his personality that a happy adjust-
ment in any community becomes virtually impossible. On the other
hand, inmates incarcerated for periods of a year or more tend to be
integrated into the prison culture only in terms of universal factors
of prisonization. They do not seem to become so characteristic of the
prison community and when they are released they seem to be better
able to adjust to a new life style, upon release, with little
difficulty. 26
Just as the type of inmate has changed, the mechanisms for
coping with the prison environment have changed or at the very least
certain types of older mechanisims have come to the fore. Because
some inmates view themselves as political prisoners and as the victims
of societal racism and classism, they work to nullify the constraints
of imprisonment. They become involved in intensive study of revolu-
tionary philosophers and their ideas, they become active as jailhouse
lawyers or they attempt to educate and organize other prisoners. The
inmate as a political or legal activist is one of the new breed; this
individual is unique because he comes from that small group of inmates
who are rather well-educated, that is, they have a high school dip-
loma or an equivalency, and with the larger number of middle class
youths being arrested and sentenced for drug offenses some of the
inmate activists were college educated. In addition to this type,
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there was the perennial tough guy, or hustler con who not only
exploited the system, but other inmates as well. The hustler type
copes with prison through an elaborate market economy within the
prison whereby a kitchen worker sells state food, laundry workers
charge the other prisoners a fee for machine-washing and pressing
state clothing, others sell their medication, loanshark cigarettes,
gamble. Some sell their bodies for sex and they are the prison
queens. Others sell their bodies in drug and medical experimenta-
tion.27 With the exception of human experimentation which prison
officials condone, there are rules against much of the other illicit
activity. It is tolerated by prison administrators and in some
instances capitalized upon by the guards who participate in the sub
rosa prison economy because such merchandising is profitable for
them and keeps the prisoners distracted, demoralized and divided.28
Homosexuality, drugs, home brew, gambling, robbing cells . . .
all of this is tolerated in the sense that these rule violations
are only arbitratily enforced. Prison conditions being what they
are, it is "better" to have the prisoners struggling against each
other than against their keepers, or revolting against prison
conditions. Every now and then the prisoners do revolt; they
riot or strike or put on a peaceful demonstration. However the
prisoners almost always lose. 29
Though the power of the corrections bureaucracy was overwhelming and
forces in the correctional system were effectively organized to resist
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change, come politically conscious inmates of the Massachusetts cor-
rectional system, particularly those at MCI-Walpole, began a struggle
to improve conditions in the prison system, and to politicize and
unite the inmate population by establishing a chapter of the National
Prisoners" Reform Association.30 The guards and their union leaders
vehemently opposed the prospect of the inmates organizing; the super-
intendents were also against the idea of a "prisoners' union;" Boone
was sympathetic to the idea and somewhat supportive; reformers were
divided, but the Ad Hoc Committee wholeheartedly endorsed the notion
that inmates needed a formally recognized collective bargaining organ-
ization; legislators basically didn't know at first hand about the
organizational efforts, but once informed they opposed the formation
of NPRA. The right of inmates to organize and to establish a chapter
of NPRA only served as another source of conflict between those who
favored corrections reform and the opponents of correctional change.
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C H A P T E R V
THE OPPOSITION TO CORRECTIONS REFORM
Several things confronted Boone while he was Commissioner
of Corrections that made his job difficult, if not impossible. Per-
haps the most significant issue was violence in the institutions and
the continuing intrigues and manipulation of circumstances which
often precipitated the disruptions. There was an unending stream of
violence and brutality in the prisons, all of which received exten-
sive media coverage. Both major newspapers, the Herlad American
and the Boston Globe, detached several top reporters to cover the
prisons and the efforts to implement the reform provisions of Chap-
ter 777. Almost every day a prison related story made front page
news. Because of the sensational and often inaccurate coverage of
prison-related events by the Herald American, this paper was iden-
tified as anti-Boone and anti-reform. The Globe endorsed Chapter 777
and continuously called for reason and patience in handling problems
in the prisons. This paper was the voice of the liberals and the
reformers.
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Violence in the corrections system had the effect of com-
plicating the implementation of reform programs, polarizing the
various corrections reform interest groups, sapping the energies of
corrections innovators within the Department of Corrections, and
arousing a powerful and effective backlash against the reform move-
ment. Managing the violence and other daily crises within the
institutions made administration of the Department of Corrections
a very difficult task. Boone's major challegne was to maintain
order and to simultaneously proceed with reforms in the correctional
system. Despite support for corrections reform from various quar-
ters, after passage of the Omnibus Corrections Reform Act, the oppo-
nents to corrections reform became more visible. They also intensi-
fied their efforts to obstruct successful implementation of
Chapter 777. The important questions, therefore, were who opposed
efforts to implement Chapter 777? Why did they oppose implementation
of the reform? And, what impact, if any, did the opposition to
Chapter 777 have on Boone's administration?
Though seen as the major opponents to corrections reforms in
Massachusetts, the corrections officers always maintained that they
were victimized by the media and misunderstood by the public. The
guards complained that they were unjustly depicted as brutal in
reports of trouble at the prisons even though they carried no clubs,
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guns, handcuffs or other weapons and never used force beyond the
minimum necessary to enable them to maintain security in the prison
and control of the inmates. They also resented being called guards
because they argued, they were not just "turnkeys" as depicted in the
late night movies, but rather professional men actively involved in
improving programs designed to rehabilitate prisoners. In addition,
the corrections officers emphasized the fact that like policemen and
other law enforcement officials, many of them were attending college
in their own time so that they could do their jobs better. But unlike
some policemen who received financial support and/or time off to fur-
ther their education, the corrections officers were paying their own
way and working full-time at the prisons. Corrections officers con-
ceded that they run the prison as some detractors charged, but they
pointed out that they run the prisons only by implementing the regula-
tions set forth by prison officials. Time and time again, the correc-
tions officers said, we do not set the policy of the prison, but we
only make recommendations to improve it. Despite their pronouncements
to the contrary, the corrections officers did not think Chapter 777
represented sound correctional policy or that Boone was capable of
administering a secure and orderly corrections system in Massachusetts.
More than any other group, the corrections officers in the
Massachusetts prisons, and particularly those at MCI-Walpole, were
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the major opponents to Boone's administration and his efforts to
implement the correctional changes contained in the reform bill.
The prison guards were the focal point for the opposition because
they had the daily line and staff responsibilities for actually
implementing or sabotaging the reform measures. The guard's opposi-
tion to Chapter 777 was important, because their positive participa-
tion was critical if reforms were to be carries out successfully.
They were at the forefront of the opposition to corrections reform,
because of the strength of their union and their successful attacks
on Boone and his competence. Boone described the power of the
guards:
You have a very strong guards' union here. Stronger than
in the Federal prison system.
. . . They knew that I was not a crony, and they felt
(although it wasn't true) that I had to be against them
because I was black.
They knew that I had done things in the District of
Columbia prisons--that I believed in sending prisoners
that can be trusted back into their communities. They felt
that this was a threat in the long run to their jobs, because
if prisons are depopulated then you don't need guards. 1
Many corrections officers were fearful and concerned that
the new corrections law and reforms proposed by Boone would have the
effect of putting them out of work. This point is particularly
important, because the prison system was custody oriented and
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therefore labor intensive. Additionally, the guards lacked profes-
sional training; they were accustomed to having their own way and
they were not subject to discipline from their superintendents or
the Department of Corrections. In this regard, the guards were very
astute in perceiving their collective interest and they acted to
protect their future job security by opposing the reform program.
Generally, the guards were opposed to a "liberal and permissive"
method of operating the Massachusetts prison system. With passage
of Chapter 777, the inmates experienced increased expectations for
improvements in the prisons and the guards also experienced an
increase in their anxieties about the reforms. Across the nation
there were prison disturbances. Courts were becoming more involved
in the protection of prisoners' rights, as well as the running of
the prisons, and prisoners were more demanding of their constitution-
al rights. All of these occurrences were threatening to the profes-
sional lives of guards and their world view of how criminals should
be treated in prisons.2
The guards and their unions were also antagonistic toward
Boone because he was an outsider and because he was Black. Had he
not been Black, had he come through the Massachusetts civil service
system and not been an outsider, perhaps the guards would have been.
more cooperative. Basically the guards were unwilling to cooperate
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with Boone and they set about to undermine his credibility as an
administrator. The lack of cooperation stemmed from their belief
that Boone was an incompetent administrator, that he attempted to
implement reforms too quickly and without details, and finally that
there was not enough personnel to carry out corrections reform.
Fear, racism and bigotry were at the basis of the guards' responses
to Boone. Another source of contention for the guards was their
belief that Boone and his appointees were attempting to emascualte
their unions. The opposition to Boone was not only a reaction
against changes in correctional policies, but it was also a fight,
from the guards' persepctive, for their professional survival. The
guards felt they were being ignored, that they had no voice in the
administration of the Department of Corrections, that security in
the institutions was too lax, and that Boone was under the influence
of "do-gooders and radicals" whose main program was to close all
prisons. The guards' perception of the situation was not without
foundation, for during John Boone's 18 months as commissioner, the
Massachusetts adult prison population dropped steadily through exten-
sive and accelerated use of parole and the early release of prisoners
nearing the end of their term. Even Boone's rhetoric contributed to
the guards' fears. Boone publicly stated that his policy was one of
working towards the attrition of the inmate population by practical
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steps that will integrate prisoners back into the community. In
some newspaper accounts of his administration and even in his
speeches, statements about "tearing down the prisons" were attributed
to Boone. Boone's often metaphorical speech, his closing of the
special offender unit at MCI-Bridgewater and the deactivation of
the East Wing of MCI-Concord all contributed to the hardening of the
guards' position as adversaries of Boone and corrections reform.
John Carver, Executive Director of the Massachusetts Council on Crime
and Corrections, summed up the guards' attitude:
Under other commissioners the guards controlled the situa-
tion. . . . They were in control. If there was a riot, if
their was any trouble during those previous administrations,
it would have been in some way a reflection. Aspersions
could have been cast on the guards for not being able to
control the situation, not being able to do the job. Now
Boone comes in and tells the guards that they're no longer
in such a lofty position and we're going to get into com-
munity based corrections, and it minimized the importance of
their job in their own eyes, and they felt a little slighted.
They felt almost as if they had received a mass demotion and
the only way to regain some of their self respect was to
cause such turbulence to happen that they could say, "Well,
the commissioner ordered it this way, and we were just fol-
lowing his orders." Their credibility would somehow be 3
reinstated under this kind of action and Boone would look bad!
In spite of Boone's initial efforts to redress grievances of
the guards, they were almost immediately resistant to many of his
reforms. They were lax in their security responsibilities. The
guards left many necessary things undone; they let the inmates resolve
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their own disputes in some instances, thus increasing the volatility
of crisis within the prisons. Inaction by the guards frequently led
to uncontrollable prisoners and violent disruptions. People in
responsible positions at the Department of Corrections headquarters,
especially those who aligned themselves with the "old guard" also
undermined and disregarded Boone's programs and authority. Poli-
cies and directives were sent from 100 Cambridge Street to the
institutions and they were ignored. Sometimes those directives and
policies were not carried out, because they never left the Superin-
tendents' offices or they were not distributed to the guards for
execution. Editor and veteran social activist, Lou Brin, described
the situation:
There is a continuum from 100 Combridge Street to the insti-
tutions. At every juncture in the continuum, discretion is
built in. Unless the guards and the individual superinten-
dents comply and agree with the directives and philosophy
coming from 100 Cambridge, they can quite effectively
undermine them or simply ignore them.4
The guards were joined in their opposition by some police
officers, other law enforcement personnel and some legislators.
In most instances, such allies provided moral support to the correc-
tions officers. Other opponents to corrections reform included pro-
fessionals and contractors who benefitted from the continued
existence of prisons such as the steel and concrete makers, building
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contractors, pharmaceutical companies, and merchants in the towns
where the prisons were located.5 The opposition of this latter group
was motivated largely because of the economic benefits which accrued
to them as a result of the continuing operation of the state prisons
in their present forms. The guards wielded power in the legislature
because they had competent lobbyists and influence. In confidential
discussions with legislators, it was revealed that part of the guards'
power stemmed from their contributions to candidates in election
years. They not only supplied money, but manpower to the candidates
of their choice. In previous years, members of the guards union
canvassed an entire district and provided transportation for one of
their candidates and his supporters. These links and various forms
of support to legislators created allies for the guards who finalized
the "campaign" to oust Boone.
There were politicians and members of the legislature who
attempted to capitalize on the bill to further their own ambitions
for higher political office. These politicians wanted to use Boone's
efforts in corrections to increase their own visibility. Almost
everything Boone said or did was considered newsworthy; therefore,
some politicians were constantly making statements about corrections
reforms, prison conditions and Commissioner Boone, in order to get
publicity. Several of these legislative "opponents" were Attorney
281
General Robert Quinn, Representative Sacco, Representative Colo,
and Senator McCann. Another political opponent was George Burke,
the District Attorney for Norfolk County, the location of MCI-Walpole
and MCI-Norfolk. Representative Colo headed the Legislative Commis-
sion on Corrections, a commission without portfolio set up to inves-
tigate the Department of Corrections and to hear grievances from the
guards and others concerning security within the institutions.
Senator McCann was a twenty-year veteran of the Massachusetts
Legislature who had been long regarded as the Senate expert on pri-
sons. Early in his career he had been an advocate for a special
facility for first offenders and improved prison industries, beyond
these particular issues he was not supportive of prison reform.
Basically, Senator McCann thought the reforms proposed in Chapter 777
were too broad. Had he been able to defeat it, he would have voted
against the Omnibus Prison Reform Act. Senator McCann vented his
opposition against corrections reform by calling into question the
legality of Boone's appointment as Commissioner of Corrections.
McCann charged that Boone did not have the requisite five years exper-
ience in adult correctional administration. Legally, the challenge
had questionable merit, but politically it created another issue
around which Boone's competence was questioned. There were probably
other legislators who supported Chapter 777 without an accompanying
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commitment to correctional change. Support for legislative change
without the power to enforce the changes is of little consequence,
because the changes will not be implemented.
It was not until passage of Chapter 777 that opposition to
corrections reform became intense and effective. The opponents were
rather passive until the bill was passed and there were attempts to
implement it. Only when Chapter 777 became law did some opponents
realize that corrections reform was a genuinely viable concept.
Efforts to implement the bill, coupled with Boone's more aggressive
and "radical" rhetoric were stymied by the guards. Once the bill
passed, and some people began to understand the full implications of
Boone's reform program, the opposition mobilized. After the reform
legislation did not solve the problems in the Massachusetts prison
system and the legislators realized that they were not going to get
additional votes as supporters of penal reform, positions on issues
related to corrections reform changed dramatically and the support
for reforms began to diminish. After the bill passed, the guards'
actions indicated that they felt that they had lost the battle, but
that they were determined to win the war. One interesting aspect
of corrections reform in Massachusetts during the early seventies was
that the institutions exploded immediately after passage of the reform
legislation and most people were unprepared for such a reaction.
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According to one of the Ad Hoc Committee leaders:
Once Boone set about doing his job as Commissioner, he was the
victim of the conscious malice racism which prevades the society.
Boone was a stinking administrator; he was undercut on every
hand. He was abused and called "coon" to his face. He was also
not the world's best judge of character. . . . There was a huge
amount of paranoia about Boone.6
The most serious of the disturbances occurred on March 17,
1972, at Walpole State Prison and became known as the St. Patrick's
Day Riot. According to the newspaper accounts, the inmates had a
race riot. They went on a rampage in the institution by setting
fires and destroying state property which resulted in damages later
estimated at nearly $2 million dollars. The disturbance also left
one inmate critically injured with a stab wound in the back. In
explaining the events of March 17th, the inmates contended that the
guards instigated the rampage in an attempt to foster a race riot
which would embarass Commissioner Boone and other prison officials.
A former key official within the Department of Corrections substan-
tiated the inmates explanation of the events:
Contrary to newspaper accounts and rumors perpetrated by
the guards, there has not been a full scale riot in any of
the (Massachusetts) prisons. A fight would start between
a black and white inmate and the guards would not make any
attempt to quell the minor fracas, but would leave the cell
block open and then run down the corridor shouting "race
riot" in order to precipitate violence between black and
white inmates. 7
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In the book, The Price of Punishment, which attacked the Massachusetts
prison system as being of no help to anyone, but the people who run it
and which called for the abolition of prisons, they found that riots
were usually provoked by beatings, lockups, searches and other tac-
tics used by the guards to harass the prisoner population.8 The St.
Patrick's Day riot of 1972, according to the writers, was caused by
guards who saw one black and one white prisoner fighting and ran out
of a cell block yelling "race riot!" The prisoners resisted provoca-
tion by the guards to make the fight a racial issue, but black and
white prisoners joined together and dramatized their real grievances
by tearing the prison apart. After several hours, the guards ended
the riot, involving some 150 inmates, by using teargas.
This account differs somewhat from a record of the events con-
tained in Report of the Citizens Committee, MCI-Walpole.9 The Citi-
zens Committee began their investigation on the evening of March 21st
at the request of Commissioner Boone. The six committee members
received full cooperation from Commissioner Boone and Superintendent
Robert Donnelly, who had recently arrived at Walpole from the Cali-
fornia prison system. The inmates refused to negotiate with the
administration because they felt that Superintendent Donnelly had
demonstrated a total lack of good faith by forcing inmates into their
cells and aborting attempts for the continuation of negotiations with
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the administration and thus precipated a clash between inmates and
guards. 10
Upon arriving at the institution, the committee visited each
cell block in the prison to assure the inmates that the committee was
present to assist them and to show the public's concern with the
situation at the prison. From discussions and tours within the insti-
tutions, it became clear that the lack of security in the prison, but
particularly in the minimum security section where none of the cells
could be locked was of critical concern to the inmates. After nearly
seven hours of negotiation the citizens committee and an elected
inmate negotiating committee agreed that it was important to have
community people come into the prison as a demonstration of the com-
munity's interest in the problems of the prison and as a mechanism
for keeping things calm and orderly.
On March 22, scores of community people began a 24 hour per
day watch at the. prison which lasted over a week. Those partici-
pating in the prison watch were mostly JAYCEES, but included members
of other groups such as the Massachusetts Half-Way Houses, Opportun-
ities Industrialization Center, Action for Boston Community Develop-
ment, Massachusetts Council on Crime and Correction, students from
Harvard University as well as business men from Raytheon Company and
the Polaroid Corporation. Over 150 citizens participated in this
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effort. Cooperation from the inmates, guards, and administration was
excellent. The presence of outside people in the institution--moving
freely-- did much to reduce the tensions. Not only was the possibil-
ity of serious clashes between inmates and guards reduced, but the
adverse effects of such a conflict triggering a more serious incident
were minimized with the presence of outside people.
Negotiations around the grievances presented by the inmates
were extremely problematic. Difficulties in the negotiations arose
because the negotiations were crisis bred, and because of the damage
to state property which elicited hostile responses from the public,
a few legislators and other public officials. Racial and political
polarizations among the inmates also hindered the process of negotia-
tions. There were strong feelings that Black and Spanish-speaking
prisoners constituted a disadvantaged minority within the general
prisoner population. Some of the minority leaders felt that the
minority demands should receive the most immediate attention. The
political dichotomy among the inmates was between those inmates who
felt that constructive, traditional negotiations were the best avenues
for change and those prisoners who saw no real prospect for change
through negotiations. Those who believed in negotiations prevailed,
at least temporarily. Because the negotiations took place, an
explosive situation did not, in fact, explode.
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As a result of the discussions with inmates, administrators,
and corrections officers, the citizens committee made several recom-
mendations. Underlying their recommendations was the need for a
built-in, regularized negotiation structure. To this end the com-
mittee recommended formation of an inmate council, comprised of
elected representatives of the inmates at Walpole, to continuously
and permanently speak for the inmate population. They also proposed
an ombudsman committee composed of outside citizens selected by the
inmate council and including ex-offenders to meet regularly with the
inmate council for discussion of institutional matters. They also
recommended that the department of Correction appoint certain of its
correction officers to constitute a liaison between the inmate council
and the Department; that those individuals meet with the inmate coun-
cil and the ombudsman, on a regular basis, and with an agenda of
current issues. Interestingly enough, these recommendations were
not carried out. The last major thrust of the report was to urge the
legislature to enact Senate 1330, the Omnibus Corrections Reform Bill,
because it would do much to improve the operations of the prison
system.
The inmates are in particular sustaining some hope for the pas-
sage of the Corrections Bill. They would be justified in this
because the act constitutes a well-justified positive program
for corrections improvement. Once put forward as it has been,
the act achieves a new significance. Affecting the old status
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quo, hope, morale, other conditions in the institution will be
immeasurably better or worse as the act passes or fails. The
price of defeat of that legislation is to increase the hopeless-
ness and despair of those who had become hopeful. 12
After the March 17th disorder, Boone secured the services of a number
of consultants to conduct crash security training programs at both
MCI-Walpole and MCI-Norfolk. Observations by the consultants indi-
cated a severe lack of many of the most rudimentary custodial skills
among a large number of custodial personnel. The situation at Walpole
was particularly critical because the supervisory and middle manage-
ment personnel lacked the skills to deal with new demands and expanded
supervisory tasks. The problem of a lack of training and educational
opportunities caused some insecurity and fears about safety among
inmates and the guards.
As a result of the St. Patrick's Day riot at Walpole an adver-
sary relationship developed between the supporters of corrections
reform and others. Even though it was not possible to distort the
violence into a racially motivated disturbance, its very occurence
and the extensive coverage by the newspapers, began to further polar-
ize attitudes. No disciplinary action was taken against the correc-
tions officers, nor inmates, but a series of investigations into the
incident were ordered by the Commissioner. Shortly after the Walpole
incident, the adversarial forces headed by the guards' unions began
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to organize conscientously against the Commissioner and his reform
agenda.
The adversarial response stemmed from the fact that humans are
basically opposed to change. Change threatens our security and
makes most people very uncomfortable. From the guards perspec-
tive, they attacked Boone rather than the reform policies. Boone
was used as a scapegoat. The irony of it all was that reform was
coming before Boone came on the scene, but he crystallized the
corrections reform effort. 13
The guards at MCI-Walpole were particularly agitated that no
disciplinary actions were taken against the inmates. In several
newspaper stories in the Herald American, Dominic Presti, president
of Walpole Guards Union, an affiliate of the American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), charged that Boone
was giving more attention to the problems of the superintendents of
the state's penal institutions and to the inmates than he was to the
job problems of the corrections officers. He further denied reports
that the guards were testing Boone, but rather insisted that if Gov-
ernor Sargent had met with the corrections officers as they had
requested in early fall, some of the existing problems would have
been averted.
In April, only about three weeks after the Walpole disturbance,
more than 200 riot equipped state troopers ringed MCI-Norfolk Prison
after a scuffle between inmates and officers touched off a rebellion
by about forty prisoners. Tensions within the institution were said
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to have caused the Norfolk disturbance. Following the disruption
at MCI-Norfolk, on April 24th, a Walpole guard was stabbed and
seriously wounded by an inmate assailant who was being moved to a
cell following a disciplinary problem. As a result of the stabbing,
there was a shakedown and inspection at the prison in which knives
and a homemade bomb were found.14
Following the incidents at MCI-Walpole and MCI-Norfolk,
twenty-five female correctional officers at MCI-Framingham staged a
full-fleged work stoppage. During the period from April 28th through
May 1st, the Framingham corrections officers were joined in their
sickout by almost 200 guards from the correctional institutions at
Walpole and Bridgewater. The guards were protesting against the
"permissiveness" of Boone's administration; the breakdown in morale
due to decisions allegedly handed down by Goldmark and Boone; and
the lack of administrative concern for their general safety at the
institutions. In addition, there was a growing feeling of neglect in
promoting corrections officers to higher status and higher salaried
jobs within the Department of Corrections. The guards' actions
reflected their lack of confidence in Boone's ability to effectively
run the corrections system.
Inexperienced outsiders have been brought in by an outsider,
Secretary Goldmark, with the result that the entire penal system
is in a state of upheaval.
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We are tired of being buffed and rebuffed by stooges and third
stringers who have no knowledge of the matter and who have already
compounded the situation until it now borders of chaos. 15
Boone stated that the guards' grievances were never conveyed
to him and that once they were made known, he would address the com-
plaints. After the spread of the sickout and its continuation into
a fourth day, Boone became concerned that the sickouts created a state
of emergency within the prisons. Instead of calling in the State
Police, Boone called on volunteer agencies such as the JAYCEES to man
the prisons if the guards' walkout continued. Boone warned the guards
that he would take court action and invoke other sanctions, including
dismissal against the officers who called in sick and who did not
have a doctor certify their claims that they were too ill to report to
work during the sickout. The warning was carried out on May 4th and
5th when sixteen corrections officers at MCI-Walpole were suspended
without pay. The Commissioner's actions angered the guards and they
were even more intractable in their opposition to Boone. After notice
of the five day suspensions pursuant to Section 43(e) of Chapter 31 of
the Massachusetts General Laws, meetings were arranged between the
Commissioner, guards, superintendents and state officials of the
AFSCME. The guards resumed their duties only after these meetings
were held.
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Meetings to resolve the grievances of the parties concerned
were held in early May. The guards' major complaints were the failure
to repair locks damaged in the March 17th disturbance at Walpole; the
guards' personal safety within the institutions given the ratio of
inamtes to guards; and the number of homemade weapons discovered
during the recent shakedowns. Another problem was the feeling among
guards that the inmates were running the institutions because of the
lack of disciplinary action against inmate demonstrators and trouble-
makers and the impunity with which the inmates disregarded the authority
of the guards. The guards resented Boone's alleged leniency towards
the inmates. The feelings were summed up in the following statement
by a spokesman for the guards' union.
We are not saying inmates should not be given the opportunity to
demonstrate their responsibility, . . . but we think those indi-
viduals who have not demonstrated adequate responsibility for
running their own lives outside the institution should not auto-
matically, upon incarcertaion, be trusted wjth the responsibility
of formulating policy for our institutions.16
The guards were also concerned about the lack of planning to prevent
further violence in the institutions and the inadequacy of existing
facilities to handle the incorrigible and extremely disruptive inmates.
Because Boone had closed the desegregation unit at MCI-Bridgewater,
the most difficult prisoners were placed in the maximun security
cellblocks 9 and 10 at MCI-Walpole. Officers felt that Boone's
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decision was in error and that there was a real need for reopening
the Bridgewater desegregation unit. Officers at MCI-Framingham wanted
the Commissioner to establish a segregation unit at that institution
in order to handle difficult women offenders; to transfer trouble-
makers; to hire some additional personnel to enforce the rules and
a minimum of five male officers per shift.
Boone rearticualted the two policies which he had initiated
during his first three months, namely that D.S.U. Bridgewater was
closed, that it would not be re-opened under any circumstances, and
that no inmates would be transferred within the corrections system
or outside the system without appropriate hearings. The guards con-
tended that these policies made their jobs more difficult and that
their insight was not sought in promulgating the new policies. Boone
emphasized that he set the policies for the corrections system, but
that he sought advice from inmates, guards, citizens, and superinten-
dents. Boone also stated that the superintendents were in charge of
the institutions and when a problem arose, they had the authority to
deal with it. Departmental policies, he added, were specific yet
flexible enough to be adapted to the particular institutions. Boone
felt that superintendents and guards had to be creative and imaginative
to come up with effective approaches to the problems in their institu-
tions. Until he completed his study of departmental policies and
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issued new ones, Commissioner Boone added that the old departmental
policies were operative. Other concrete actions taken to alleviate
difficulties were reinstatement of guards who were previously sus-
pended, new training programs for corrections officers, improved
communications between the Commissioner, the superintendents, and the
guards and increased support and backing from the Commissioner for the
superintendents. The meetings were useful because tensions subsided
for a brief while and the correctional officers had an opportunity to
air their grievances. Basically, however, things remained the same
and the violence continued.
The summer of 1972 was long and hot in the Massachusetts cor-
rectional system. The situation in the prisons deteriorated. In May,
1972, two Walpole inmates were killed when trying to make a bomb which
exploded. This incident was particularly serious and the Norfolk
County District Attorney, George Burke, launched an investigation to
determine how contraband materials for making guns and bombs ended up
in the hands of two Walpole State Prison inmates. Following this
tragedy, another shakedown was ordered at Walpole, and other weapons
were found hidden in the institution.
On May 31, 1972 to June 1, 1972, approximately 100 inmates in
the century old East ing at the Concord Reformatory broke windows and
smashed furniture when an inmate leader was locked up for drunkenness.
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The disturbances continued the following day when work details were
cancelled and prisoners were fed in small groups. By noon of the
second day, order was restored. The disturbance erupted allegedly
because of rivalry between the Prison JAYCEES and the Peaceful Move-
ment Committee. When the JAYCEES' President was locked up for being
drunk that group argued that if the drunken prisoner had been Black
or a member of the Peaceful Movement Committee (an inmate self-help
program), he would not have been locked up. They also claimed that
corrections administrators only responded to arguments and complaints
raised by the PMC members.18 There were charges and counter charges
in this event which merely increased polarization along racial lines
among the inmates.
In June, Gloria Cuzzi was fired as acting Superintendent of
MCI-Framingham. Dorothy L. C. Chase was appointed the new superin-
tendent of the women's prison in July. Robert Donnelly resigned as
superintendent of MCI-Walpole on July 20th, just two days after Gov-
ernot Sargent signed the Omnibus Correctional Reform Act into law. On
the last day of July, 1972, an unsuccessful escape attempt at MCI-
Walpole ended in the deaths of four individuals. There had been six
deaths in the Massachusetts correctional system in less than three
months. The record was not impressive and the attacks on Boone and
the reform legislation became more vicious.
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On July 31, 1972, an abortive escape attempt by MCI-Norfolk
inmate, Walter Elliot, ended in the killing of two prison employees,
Elliot's wife and himself. The multiple murders and suicide brought
Commissioner Boone under heavy fire from the public and especially
the officials of the guards' unions. The Elliot incident was the
subject of a special investigating committee, the Gavin Committee,
and an intensive investigation by Norfolk County District Attorney,
George Burke and his staff. The fact-finding committee headed by
former Commissioner Gavin absolved Mr. Boone and the prison personnel
at MCI-Norfolk of any blame in connection with the July 31st shootout
at that institution. The report concluded that the incidents which
resulted in the tragic deaths at Norfolk were in no way related to
the reform policies which were recently mandated.
It is the conclusion of this Committee, based on the evidence
presented to it, that existing security policies, procedures,
and practices were adhered to on the morning of July 31. That
is the opinion of the Committee that no employee failed to carry
out his responsibilities according to existing security practices
on the morning of July 31. This is not to say, by any means,
that security practices were adequate on the morning of July 31.
The most glaring inadequacy was the absence of a metal detector.
It is the conclusion of the Committee that the judgements and
decisions made by correctional administrators concerning the
events leading up to July 31 were reasonable ones under the cir-
cumstances existing at both Walpole and Norfolk. This includes
the decision of the Acting Commissioner and her staff not to
transfer the five men (including Walter Elliot) involved in the
alleged escape plan from Norfolk to Walpole at that time, and the
decision of Superintendent Bohlinger and his staff not to lock the
five inmates up in the Norfolk Receiving Building at that time.19
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Almost in direct contradiction to this report were charges against the
Department of Corrections brought by Norfolk County District Attorney,
George Burke. In a statement issued in late August 1972, he blamed
a "wrong policy" followed by Corrections Commissioner Boone's office
for contributing to the July 31st shootout at MCI-Norfolk. According
to District Attorney Burke, he had urged the Commissioner's office to
transfer Elliot, just six days before the tragedy occurred, because
of his alleged involvement with other inmates in an escape plot. The
District Attorney claimed that Boone's new prison policies were lead-
ing to organized crime setting up and operating out of MCI-Walpole and
MCI-Norfolk prisons. Another of Burke's charges was that there had
been a tenfold increase in crime inside the prison walls since January
when Boone took over as Commissioner of Corrections. That this tragedy
occurred so soon after passage of Chapter 777 was alarming, because
many people tried to link the two events causally. The tragedy pro-
vided Boone's adversaries with more justifications for their attacks
on him and his policies.
Senate President Kevin Harrington appointed Senators Locke,
Tobin, and McKinnon "to a special committee of the Senate to make an
investigation and study of the prison system of the Commonwealth,
20
including all laws and matters relating to the correctional system."
In February of 1973, the Locke Committee issued its report and
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recommendations. Included in the recommendations were a call for the
speedy implementation of Chapter 777, but particularly those sections
which provide that intensive and on-going educational and trainging
programs be available to corrections officers; publication of a
written code of conduct containing all the DOC's regulations and pro-
cedures; aggressive efforts to attract, recruit, and train minority
group members for corrections service; immediate establishment of a
diagnostic reception center; continued development of community-based
half-way houses promoting re-integration of inmates into community
life, and the exploration of increased use of forestry camps; the
use of metal detectors on a continuing basis to promote the security
of inmates, other employees, and visitors; and retaining the Depart-
ment of Corrections in its present location within the Executive
Office of Human Services rather than transferring it to the Depart-
ment of Public Safety. The Locke Committee's report contained many
of the provisions which the Ad Hoc Committee had advocated earlier.
Unfortunately, the report received very 1-ittle attention, yet it
demonstrated that the prisons in Massachusetts were a long way from
being reformed (see Appendix I).
Disorders in the prisons continued. The first week of
August 1972, four Walpole inmates were caught preparing to escape.
This escape attempt resulted in a two day lock up of all the nearly
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six hundred prisoners at MCI-Walpole during a shakedown at the institu-
tion. As if the violence in the prison were not enough to interfere
with successful implementation of the new programs and philosophies,
the MCI-Employees Independent Union and the Massachusetts Correctional
Employees Union, Inc. challanged Boone's qualifications to fill the
post of Commissioner of Corrections in the courts. At issue was
whether or not Boone had actually had five years of administrative/
supervisory experience in adult corrections. Boone was represented
in the suit by Attorney General Quinn, whose office initially refused
to represent him. At the insistence of Governor Sargent, Quinn repre-
sented Boone and he told the Supreme Judicial Court that the correc-
tions officers' unions did not have the legal authority to question
Boone's qualifications. The Attorney General's Office maintained
further that even if the guards successfully proved their charges,
they could not force Boone's removal from his job as Commissioner.
The court ruled that Boone had more than the requisite five years
administrative experience in adult corrections and it dismissed the
suit. The suit was more of an annoyance than anything else, but it
was effective in diverting Boone's complete attention from adminis-
tration of the Massachusetts correctional system and causing the public
to doubt his competence.
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During the time of the controversy over Boone's qualifications,
the Presidents of the guards' unions met with Governor Sargent to
demand Boone's ouster as Commissioner because of policy changes which
he invoked and his alleged laxity in running the Department of Correc-
tions. These representatives of the guards also demanded that the
Department of Corrections be placed under the Department of Public
Safety and given police power. The guards' wives joined in these pro-
tests by staging a demonstration in front of the State House against
Boone and the lack of security in the Commonwealth's correctional
institutions. Underlying the protests were claims by the wives of the
guards that unrest, agitation, bloodshed, and dissension ran rampant
within the Department of Corrections because of Boone and his inability
to control the prison system.
About thirty-three inmates at MCI-Concord refused to go to
their cell blocks for nightly lockup on October 2nd. They were pro-
testing the large number of broken windows in the cellblocks as tem-
peratures reached the freezing point. Windows which had been broken
during the May disturbances had not been replaced because of a lack
of funds for maintenance. One inmate was stabbed during the early
morning hours of this particular disturbance.
On October 16, 1972, one guard was seriously stabbed and five
others received various other injuries when 10 inmates at MCI-Concord
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attempted to gain control of the maximum security section. Five in-
mates who were recently transferred to MCI-Concord from MCI-Walpole
overpowered a guard when they were returning from exercising in the
segregation unit. In less than three hours, however, everything was
quiet and all inmates were returned to their cells. 21
On November 13, 1972, Commissioner Boone installed Mr. Ray-
mond Porelle as superintendent at Walpole State Prison. Boone promised
that Porelle would provide the discipline, security and fairness
needed to control the institution. The day after Porelle's appoint-
ment, a Walpole inmate, Ray Rich, was murdered. His assailant was not
apprehended and an investigation into the event took place. From
September on, most of the violence in the Massachusetts prisons
occurred either at MCI-Concord or MCI-Walpole. Shortly after the
Rich murder, fourteen Concord inmates escaped during a disturbance
at that institution. Two incidents had previously occurred that had
bearing on the November 20-22 disturbances. In late September, Daniel
Nolan, a well known organizer and inmate leader involved in negotia-
tions between inmates at MCI-Walpole and the organization of an inmate
union, was transferred from MCI-Walpole to MCI-Concord. Within three
days of his assignment to the general Concord population, a demonstra-
tion occurred with Nolan emerging as a major spokesman. One of the
demands presented by Nolan on behalf of the inmates to Acting
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Superintendent Walter Williams was that inmates be permitted to stand
outside their cells for the normal 7 a.m., 1 p.m., 8:30 p.m., and
10 p.m. counts instead of being locked up for those counts. Williams
did not agree to those demands, stating that such a question should be
dealt with by the new, permanent superintendent who would assume res-
ponsibility for the institution in two months. Following this meet-
ing, the men returned to the East Wing, but did not return to their
cells. Inmates stayed out of their cells for two days.22
The other occurrence with significance was the expression of
interest within the MCI-Concord administration to change the daily
routine of the institution from a two platoon to a one platoon system.
The two platoon system was implemented some time ago by the previous
superintendent, because the institutional count soared to over 700
inamtes and there were not enough school, work or other program posi-
tions available to accommodate the entire population. Acting Super-
intendent Williams reported that the system did not function without
problems. Some specific problems included concern among the industrial
and school program staff that the two platoon system lowered production
and disrupted the learning process. Additionally, Williams received
complaints that under the system inmates were often difficult to
locate and that men were frequently missing. It was in a setting of
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tension, new inmate activism and impending change and apprehension
that the November disturbances occurred.
Preliminary steps taken to initiate the change were interviews
to determine each inmate's choice of program conducted after breakfast
on the morning of November 20, by a committee composed of institutional
staff. The interviews were conducted even though there were work,
school or program slots for less than 400 inmates of a total popula-
tion of 561. Wing residents were to be interviewed first, tier by
tier, in the Old Dining Room, followed by residents of E building.
While the interviews were in progress, the remaining residents were
supposed to be locked in their cells. As the interviews began, many
men refused to leave the tiers and others refused to enter their cells
when they got back. After several hundred interviews the process was
terminated and the population alerted to proceed with a routine
schedule. Inmates did not report to their work assignments, they
resisted lock-ups for the counts, and moved freely from building to
building. A lock-up count was attempted prior to the evening meal,
but inmates would permit a count only outside their cells. After a
late count at 5 p.m. the correctional officers assigned to the East
Wing were ordered to withdraw to the inner control section for their
personal safety, and to protect both the keys and the telephones.
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Even though the unusual withdrawal of officers from their post
occurred, resulting in abandonment of the institutions to prisoners,
the prisoners went to their evening meal on their own. While it was
within his discretion, the decision by MCI-Walpole Assistant Deputy
Fred Taylor to withdraw men to inner control and to man only two of
the seven towers was not very judicious. The first order of business
of any prison is to have a secure perimeter, and this is especially
true during disorders. On the second day of the disturbance, Howard
Doyle, President of the Massachusetts American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees was permitted to dictate to correc-
tional officers that the compound was dangerous and that they should
proceed no further than inner control if they feared for their safety.
Union intervention and the reduction in security during the disturbances
at MCI-Concord pointed to a pattern of unacceptable behavior ranging
from insensitivity and neglect to mismanagement and administrative
error which made the escape of fourteen prisoners possible. This
break at MCI-Concord caused relationships between Commissioner Boone
and guards to further deteriorate. An interim report by the Ad Hoc
Committee to investigate the disturbances cited the lack of common
sense and proper follow-up of change of program procedures involving
the total resident community; the lack of administrative ability and
a breakdown in the proper chain of command, including the union's
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involvement, during the disturbances at the institution; and finally,
the lack of comprehensive departmental procedures pertaining to inmate
disturbances, riots and insurrections as factors which contributed to
the success of the escape plot.
In December, MCI-Walpole, with its new superintendent, was
the location of more violence. There was another murder and a guard
was held hostage by inmates for several hours. Just two weeks after
the murder of Walpole inmate, Ray Rich, another Walpole inmate,
Robert Bennett, was murdered. He was found in his cell, fatally
wounded with fifty stab wounds all over his body. The fourth murder
victim at Walpole of the year, his death raised some perplexing ques-
tions: Where were the guards when he was stabbed? How did his assail-
ant enter the locked cell? The questions were not answered, but the
growing incidence of inmate murders and stabbings lead some people
to believe that the tragedies could only occur with the guards' com-
plicity. The next crisis took place five days before Christmas.
Seven Walpole inmates held a guard hostage in a cellblock to dramatize
their grievances and the slow pace of implementation of reform programs.
After several hours the guard was released unharmed.
Boone's first year as Commissioner was crisis ridden.
Initially his major concern was getting the state legislature to
enact a new corrections bill. Once the bill became law, he attempted
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to implement it. Inmate stabbings; four murders at MCI-Walpole;
general lock-ups; work stoppages by corrections officers; several
changes in top administrators at the institutions, specifically MCI-
Concord, MCI-Framingham and MCI-Walpole; a court suit by the guards'
unions challenging the Commissioner's qualifications, made Boone's
job extremely difficult. Through all of this, however, he maintained
the support of both the indigenous and professional prison reformers,
the Governor and many legislators. His supporters wanted an end to
the violence, but generally they saw the violence either as a natural
consequence of reform measures to make changes in the prison system
or the result of deliberate efforts by the guards to sabotage the
reforms.
Though several investigations were undertaken by the Depart-
ment of Corrections, District Attorney Burke, and the legislature,
none of them specifically investigated the question of the guards'
involvement in prison disorders. Corrections officers were concerned
about the diminuition of their disciplinary authority and control
over the institutions. They felt that their authority had been
unjustly reduced, with a proportionate increase in the inmates' power
and control. Both guards and inmates felt their lives were contin-
ually in jeopardy and both sides blamed the other for the instability
in the prisons. It was the Locke Committee's Report that underscored
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some of the problems of the corrections officers and avoided fixing
the blame. There were problems of qualifications, training oppor-
tunities, the delineation of authority, and seniority considerations. 23
Nonetheless, because much testimony has been limited in its per-
spective, the committee feels it cannot lodge its sympathy with
any single group of participants or observers. Accounts of
hostility and injustice on the part of corrections personnel
have been related by inmates and inmates' families, while other
prisoners have underscored that many guards consistently behave
with utmost equanimity and fairness; members of the news media
are said to depict institutional problems with a gross pro-inmate
bias on one hand, and to provide an opportunity for accurate rep-
resentation of the existing situation on the other; allegations
of racism are heard and subsequently refuted; guards' lives are
said repeatedly to be in danger, and prisoners experience stab-
bings and assaults daily; the pervasiveness of organized crime
is elaborated by some and minimized by others; and endlessly on.
Confronted with such conflicting testimony, the committee finds
it impossible to reach any single decision as to where "blame"
for existing instability may be fixed. The committee deplores
the excessively low level of morale which prevails among guard
personnel; but it also feels that inmates, without being given
opportunities for self-improvement and self-development, would
not willingly respond to any amount of disciplinary authority
which may be vested in the corrections officers. 24
As the guards' opposition to Boone increased and as correc-
tional practices in Massachusetts became more controversial, Boone's
supporters spoke out and defended him. The support was largely
centered in the Boston black community. Rep. Royal Bolling, the
most senior member of the Massachusetts Black Caucus, accused prison
guards of deliberately conducting a campaign to discredit Mr. Boone
in an attempt to force his resignation. Other supporters charged
308
that the corrections system operated for the convenience of the guards
with emphasis on job security and personal advancement. The presidents
of more than eighteen organizations in the black community issued
statements in support of Mr. Boone and they called upon the leadership
of the guards' unions to cease "their opportunistic and self-serving
attacks" upon the Commissioner. More than 400 Walpole inmates wrote
letters of support for Mr. Boone in his difficult role as Commissioner
of Corrections. Reform groups, particularly the Ad Hoc Committee,
alerted and mobilized their constituency around the urgency of their
continued support for Mr. Boone and corrections reform as the crisis
in the prisons continued. One reform group, the Massachusetts Council
on Crime and Corrections, reaffirmed their support for Boone and the
Corrections Reform Act of 1972. MCCC urged constructive communica-
tion among the corrections officers and the Commissioner and offered
to conciliate the differences between them. This show of support for
Boone was important because if his supporters remained silent, then
their inaction could have hastened his removal from office. In
spite of the opposition, Boone re-emphasized his commitment to the
new correctional philosophy of helping inmates re-enter the community
with a greater promise to function responsibly.
When Boone appointed Raymond Porelle as superintendent at
MCI-Walpole in November, 1972, Porelle was charged with bringing order
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to the institution which had been plagued by violence and instability
for more than ten months. Two days after Porelle's appointment, a
Walpole inmate was murdered. Before Porelle completed his first five
weeks on the job, another Walpole inmate was stabbed to death in his
cell, and a Walpole guard was held hostage by inmates, though he was
released unharmed. Because Porelle was bent on running a pristine and
orderly prison, he was committed to ending the lawlessness, the mur-
ders, and the crimes inside the walls. At his most overt and sweeping
drive toward this goal, Porelle instituted a 24 hour lock-up of the
inmates at Walpole on December 29, 1972 and began a shakedown for
contraband. Porelle felt security could be insured only if he con-
ducted a thorough search of the prison for contraband and weapons.
The lock-up was extremely severe because no visitors were
allowed into the prison. Lawyers were included in this restriction
until they received a federal court order which gave them access to
their clients in the prisons. All mail was confiscated and the
prisoners had no contact with the outside and outsiders were denied
entry into the prisons. State troopers were also available to rein-
force the guards if the need arose. During the first week of the
lock-up, Porelle transferred nine inmate "troublemakers" from Walpole
to federal prisons throughout the country. Later, however, the
inmates were returned to Massachusetts, after a federal judge ruled
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that the transfers violated the inmates' rights to due process. At
the end of the first week of the lock-up, Mr. Porelle displayed before
reporters and others more than three hundred items of contraband
confiscated during the shakedown. The contraband included such items
as knives, bombs, files, spikes, narcotics, home brews, pornographic
literature, and the like. In addition to the searches for contraband,
Porelle used the lock-up to gain control of MCI-Walpole. He attempted
to impose controls on the guards as well as the inmates. Specifically,
he tried to bust crime and end the corruption within the prison.
Porelle tried to discipline the guards and upgrade their performance.
Relative calm prevailed at Walpole during the lock-up, in spite of its
severity because Porelle promised to end the lock-up within a few days.
Instead of ending, the lock-up continued and stretched on until mid-
February, becoming the longest lock-up in the history of Massachusetts
prisons. The tensions and animosities caused by the lock-up and lock-
out were so enormous that they divided the various reform groups and
eroded support for Boone. Finally, on January 27, 1973, the first
visitors other than lawyers were allowed into the prison since the
initiation of the lock-up one month earlier. Access to Walpole by
outsiders was still limited, but these early visitors reported that
inmates were brutalized and treated poorly during the lock-up. The
311
visitors also complained that they were harassed by prison officials
and sometimes prevented from visiting.
Conditions at Walpole were impossible. Inside the inmates
were ready to explode, and the guards were comfortable with the lock-
up while outside, the reformers clamored for an end to the lock-up.
On Febraury 15, 1973, after nearly six weeks of almost total silence
on Porelle and the lock-up at Walpole, the Commissioner stepped in.
He praised Porelle's bravery and leadership but concurred with the
Superintendent's physician that Porelle desperately needed to take a
leave.
Monday evening at Walpole, Superintendent Porelle personally led
25 correction officers to fight and put out fires which inmates
had set. His bravery and his professional leadership, saved
lives that night.
Superintendent Porelle is exhausted from three months of working
very long hours. . . His doctor and I have ordered him to rest
and recover. We need his leadership--I hope he can be back in a
week . . .
. . . Because I want all of them to know--well-meaning and other-
wise--that John Boone stands behind Ray Porelle--that Ray Porelle
will continue to run Walpole. And that both Superintendent Porelle
and I are committed to bring reform and new programs to Walpole--
and to do it with better security, better medical care, and better
classification.25
Boone ended the lock-up at Walpole on February 19, 1973; restored
visiting privileges fully; permitted outside observers to enter the
prison; and tried to lessen tensions at Walpole. The lock-up was
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ended only to be reinstituted when Porelle declared a state of emer-
gency at Walpole only six days after returning to his duties as
Superintendent.
Because of Boone's silence during the lock-up at Walpole and
the excessiveness of the lock-up, the supporters of corrections reform
were confused. The seven week lock-up, lock-out and shakedown had
devastating effects on the prisoners and caused many reformers to
re-examine their confidence in Boone and their support for his programs.
Basically, the reformers did not understand how Commissioner Boone
could support Porelle's prohibitions against reporters and representa-
tives of external organizations entering the prison. Many reformers
became totally disillusioned with Boone, because they found his
apparent decision to support Porelle during the brutal lock-up at
Walpole inconsistent with their notions of corrections reform. Porelle
returned on February 22 and declared a state of emergency at Walpole
because inmate leaders of the NPRA broke off negotiations for resuming
regular prison activities. This state of emergency and the new lock-
up further alienated many reformers from Boone.
Traditional and indigenous reformers alike thought that the
only appropriate position for Boone was to remove Porelle as Super-
intendent at MCI-Walpole. When Boone refused to remove him, but rather
tacitly supported Porelle, this position created a serious schism
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within the ranks of the corrections reformers. Initially it appeared
that Porelle's hard nosed, traditional approach was necessary and
successful at Walpole, however, the lock-up continued too long and
neither prisoners, guards nor reformers supported Porelle. Porelle
was committed to order in the prison by any means, including repres-
sive ones, and this is what the reformers questioned. To them
repressive measures such as a seemingly interminable lock-up was too
high a cost for a secure and functional prison. for Boone the issue
was slightly different. Conditions at Walpole were severe; the strikes,
riots, and stabbings had to subside if the reform programs were to
have a chance at Walpole or any of the other insititutions. Boone,
unlike many correctional administrators, firmly believed that inmates
in maximum security institutions should have the right to participate
in community-based and other reform programs. Once Porelle restored
order to Walpole, which it appeared that he would do, Boone thought
the new programs and procedures could be initiated. Porelle became
so obsessed with order at any cost that he received no cooperation
from the guards, prisoners, or reformers. Under such conditions imple-
mentation of reforms was impossible. Porelle was literally running
the prison singlehandedly during the lock-up. He was at Walpole 18
to 20 hours a day. Toward the end of his tenure as superintendent he
entered the prison only with a bodyguard and carried a loaded shotgun
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at all times. His behavior became so erratic and volatile that the
inmates referred to him as "Mad Dog Porelle." Porelle's behavior and
particularly Boone's support of him was a completely unacceptable
stance for most reformers.
What are we to make of this paradox? Commissioner Boone, an out-
spoken advocate of prison reform whose program in penology is one
of the most advanced in the country, supports and defends Super-
intendent Porelle who in a short 12 weeks time at Walpole has
instituted reactionary and repressive controls which suggest a
major set-back in penology.
While realizing the awkward position which Commissioner Boone is
in (his reform measures and his personal qualifications have been
under attack by those reactionary forces that would like to see
him fail while advocates for reform are now critical of him for
not doing enough), we feel that he must reckon with the fact that
poor judgement and irresponsible actions on the part of Super-
intendent Porelle have caused dangerously aggravared conditions.
These conditions are indefensible. Leadership must be exercised
by Boone to begin to reverse the situation.26
In a written message to all Walpole inmates, Boone tacitly reaffirmed
his support for Porelle. The Commissioner invited the responsible
inmates at Walpole to join him and Porelle in resolving the grievances
that had caused a three day stalemate at the facility and obstructed
efforts to make Walpole an integral part of the new reforms in the
correctional process. He defended the prolonged lock-ups at Walpole
as necessary because of the seven inmate fatalities and other violence
in the prison. The lock-up and Boone's support for Porelle marked a
turning point for corrections reform in Massachusetts.
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Boone firmly believed that as a good administrator, he had to
support his subordinates. He also felt that the situation in Walpole
was so disastrous that drastic measures were probably warranted. To
Boone, the lock-up was necessary, but it lasted too long. Boone
backed Porelle, because Porelle had direct responsibility for Walpole.
This was a sound administrative policy, provided one's subordinates
were not only competent but reasonable. Boone later agreed that his
appointment of Porelle as Superintendent of Walpole was perhaps a mis-
take. The turning point for the reform movement occurred when the
reformers not only attacked Porelle, but began to attack Boone. The
question for some was could you attack Boone without sacrificing the
reforms? Some reformers were so dismayed that they felt Boone had
recanted on his commitment to reform. From this perspective, Boone
had to be attacked if the reforms were to continue. Interestingly,
it was the Ad Hoc Committee and the more "militant" reformers who
felt that they could never publicly denounce Boone though they found
the lock-ups abhorrent to their ideas about positive correctional
change. Reformers were generally in a very difficult position,
because they opposed the lock-ups and most of Porelle's extreme
behavior as superintendent, yet they did not want to join forces with
the opponents of reform in attacking Boone. The indigenous reformers
agreed that it was necessary to support Boone in spite of the
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discomfort and uneasiness that the lock-ups caused. They also felt
that Commissioner Boone could receive any amount of criticism from
the opposition because it would probably strengthen him. By
contrast, they felt that criticisms from supporters of reform would
surely lead to his ouster. Their position was that it was important
to attack Porelle, but to keep Boone. This was an honorable and
principled position, but a difficult one, because the Ad Hoc Committee
and reformers in that camp never took a definitive stand on the issue.
Many of the professional or traditional reformers, however, began
to attack Boone at this point.
The day after the original lock-up ended, the NPRA, the
inmate union, claimed recognition by the prison authorities. An end
to the lock-up was achieved primarily through negotiations between
NPRA, representatives of the Department of Corrections, and reformers,
particularly members of the Ad Hoc Committee for Prison Reform. In
presenting their list of demands to Commissioner Boone and Rep. Colo
on March 1, 1973, they concluded with the statement that "the only
answer to the crisis at Walpole is the immediate removal of Porelle."
On March 2nd, Porelle told the Commissioner that he was quitting as
superintendent of Walpole, because the guards were deceiving him.
Porelle's resignation became effective on March 17, and shortly,
thereafter, the NPRA advised the inmates to return to work, to clean
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up the debris, and to enter into good faith negotiations with the new
prison superintendent, Kenneth Bishop. After becoming acting super-
intendent at Walpole, Bishop immediately began to bring things back
to normal at Walpole. He held disciplinary hearings for inmates who
were in segragation; he ended the strip and skin searches of visitors
to the prison; he restored inmates telephone privileges; and he
removed several inmates from segregation to regular cellblocks. In
spite of these efforts to normalize the situation at Walpole, an inmate
was hospitalized after receiving eleven stab wounds and a corrections
officer received minor injuries when he was tut by an inmate. Both
accidents occurred within two days after Bishop came to Walpole.
The guards became more antagonistic and they blamed Boone
for the seven murders, the thirty stabbings, and the administrative
turnover (Walpole had five superintendents in one year). They pub-
licly demanded his removal as Commissioner of Corrections. After the
cutting incident, the guards called the Commissioner to a meeting
at the prison locker room and told him to "pack your bags." Tensions
between the Walpole guards' union and the Commissioner mounted with
Boone accusing the guards of managing Walpole poorly and with the
guards threatening to go on strike over segregation hearings, inmate
head count procedures, and other matters which they opposed as
inconsistent with security. While the Commissioner and the inmates
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were entangled in that controversy, NPRA representatives agreed the
inmates would go back to work only if outside observers were in Walpole
Prison around the clock. After deliberations with the Commissioner,
the inmates went back to work. The guards, faced with disciplinary
actions, reported for their shifts under a "phased supervised return."
Outside observers, coordinated by the Ad Hoc Committee, began to
enter the prison to observe conditions within the institution and to
speak with employees and residents. This turned out to be Walpole's
calmest day after 11 weeks of turmoil. Unfortunately the order was
short lived, because on March 13th, the guards at Walpole went on
strike. Commissioner Boone declared a state of emergency at the
prison and mobilized a skeleton staff to run Walpole. In addition,
the Governor responded to the guards' brinkmanship by threatening to
call out the State Police. With overtime, use of Correction Department
Personnel and other adjustments, the police could run the prison
indefinitely.
This action has been taken, . . . because of an unusually large
number of Walpole correction officers reporting sick, along
with the serious problems created by trying to operate the
institution under abnormal conditions and while delicate nego-
tiations are continuing with the officers union and the leader-
ship of the National Prison Reform Association (NPRA) . .
Absence due to illness must be documented by a medical certificate
of sufficient detail and weight to justify absence during this
emergency situation. During this emergency, conditions such
as sickness or other family problems will receive consideration
only by special permission from the Superintendent. 27
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The corrections officers were striking over what they considered
the deterioration of conditions at Walpole during Boone's tenure as
Commissioner. They claimed that conditions were so intolerable at
Walpole that they posed a serious threat to their lives and safety as
well as the inmate's security. They reiterated their call for the
transfer of the Department of Corrections to the Department of
Public Safety in an attempt to bring order into the institution and to
provide safety and security. They criticized Commissioner Boone's
and Secretary Goldmark's inexperienced staff on corrections and blamed
them for policies which allegedly lead to inmate control of the
prison. Specifically, they complained that Commissioner Boone was
attempting to close Cell Blocks 9 and 10, the maximum security area
at MCI-Walpole. This charge was not true. Boone had ordered hearings
by the classification board, pointing out that some inmates were
placed in segregation for more than two months without due process and
in violation of regulations. More than 200 corrections officers and
civilian employees went on strike and they were notified that they
faced serious penalties if they did not report to work, the penalties
included dishcarge, suspension, transfers, demotions, and loss of pay.
By March 20th every striking employee received a letter of suspension
and contemplated discharge and an injunction telegram for violating
Rules 41, 42, and 46 of the Rules and Regulations for the Direction
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of the Officers and Employees of the Massachusetts Correctional
Institutions for Males. The very next day, telegrams rescinding the
suspensions and contemplated discharges were sent to all employees.
On March 22, letters were sent to all the employees notifying them
again of contemplated discharge and scheduling a hearing date of
March 28, 1973. The hearings were continued on a daily basis by the
Commissioner at the request of counsel for the union, Augustus J.
Camelio, who represented all the employees in this matter. Despite
the continuances, Boone was adamant about taking some disciplinary
action against the guards because he would never be able to
exercise minimum control over them otherwise. Legally, Boone was
entitled to take some disciplinary action, but the question was
could he impose sanctions against the guards in actuality? Boone
admitted that all he could really do was to suspend them with pay,
and usually they were re-instated and placed back on the job. Rules
of the guards' union prevented the transfer of guards from one prison
to another; because of civil service regulations it was virtually
impossible to fire guards, and finally, there were no real sanctions
nor penalties Boone could impose on the guards to force them to
adhere to the new policies once they started to rebel. In terms of
reforming the guard culture, Boone was able to do little more than
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strengthen management procedures and institute training programs to
upgrade the performance of the guards.
The guards violated the law, by striking despite prohibitions
in the General Laws against strikes, work stoppages, slowdowns or
withholding of services by state employees. They also employed extra-
legal means to legitimize their walk-out. They did not report for
work, had an excuse; or they did not report for work, and had no
excuse. Some reported for work but did not work, and had no excuse,
while others reported for work, but did not work and had an excuse.
Walpole corrections officers refused to work in the interior of the
institutions or at other duties which brought them into contact with
inmates. Since the strike began, state troopers guarded the perimeter
and manned the wall towers and the gates at the institution. The
strike was the latest development in a three sided controversy between
guards, inmates an dprison administrators over who would exercise
control over the institution. The guards said that prisoners ran the
institution and they demanded that the control of the prison be
returned to them. Prisoners sought greater input into prison policies.
Boone and his administration wanted order so that the Massachusetts
prison system could be reformed. In this aspect of the struggle for
control, Boone lost because Governor Sargent did not fire the guards.
Instead, the Governor got a court order which forced the striking
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guards to return to work from their week old strike. The guards were
ordered to return to work where they were faced with disciplinary
hearings, the possibility of dismissal and a requirement of strict
adherence to every rule and regulation of the Department of Correction.
In their program of retraining and gradual re-entry into their jobs,
the guards were given crash reorientation courses in department rules
and regulations and some officers from every shift were picked for
more formal training sessions outside the prison. While the training
was not viewed as punishment, the officers viewed it that way and
resented the training and the slow rate of their return to work. By
this time, Governor Sargent began having serious concerns about
Boone's capability as an administrator and the political costs of
corrections reform, given its tumultuous brief history. Everywhere
the Governor went he encountered severe criticism over the continuing
unrest at Walpole. A decisive consideration in the Governor's delib-
erations over Boone's future was the fact that many one-time supporters
of the Commissioner no longer supported him.
Three very significant events occurred during the strike. The
most positive was that inmates ran the prison, quite efficiently, dur-
ing the strike. They took their own head counts; NPRA members pro-
cessed new arrivals; they operated the cafeteria, and they provided
attractive and nutritious meals for the population. The period of
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of the guards' strike was allegedly one of the most peaceful periods
in Walpole in several years. An inmate gave his interpretation of
that period:
For eleven weeks the National Prisoners Reform Association
was left with the job of running the prison internally, and
during that time there was very little difficulty between
convicts; there was an air of hope. Things were not perfect
(what human endeavor is?). There were a few who took advantage
of the situation, but this was minimal. As far as I'm concerned
it was proven that convicts really run a penitentiary, and police
are needed only to lock doors and stay in the gun-towers, if that.
Those weeks were evidence that people are goverpgd only with their
consent, I don't mean repressed and controlled.
NPRA's ability to maintain the prison in a safe, secure and orderly
fashion increased the organization's credibility, improved its image
and demonstrated that many inmates were capable of assuming responsi-
bility. Perhaps the presence of the observers made the NPRA task
easier. What is significant about this period is that for a time,
the "worst prison in the United States" functioned reasonably well.
The newspapers never emphasized the point that with no guards
and with the inmates in control, assisted by citizen observers, there
were no stabbings and no murders in Walpole. This period of calm and
orderliness at MCI-Walpole is significant because the guards are
implicated as a possible source and a definite contributing factor to
the earlier violence and security breakdown at MCI-Walpole. The
events during the guards' strike also legitimize the contention of
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many reformers, that when most prisoners are accorded dignity, respect
and the opportunity to make decisions, they are able to handle them
as well as a comparable group outside the walls. Leadership of NPRA
understood the importance of keeping things controlled if for no other
motive than to make the guards look bad. Members of NPRA were also
sufficiently politicized to understand that the least amount of turmoil
during the strike would strengthen the position of the opponents of
reform and would be damaging not only to prison reform, but personally
to Boone. The media and policymakers ignored the success of the
inmates' administration of MCI-Walpole for fear of legitimizing
inmates' demands for involvement in the administration of the prison
and also as a way of protecting the guards' and their interest. The
danger of the Walpoles of the world is not the prisoners themselves
as much as in the prison equation of which they are a part. When
the guards removed themselves from this formula and went on strike,
it did not surprise the prisoners that conditions improved.
Shortly before the guards walked out, inmates at MCI-Walpole
called upon the Ad Hoc Committee on Prison Reform to provide citizen
observers around the clock to prevent reprisals. During the first
two weeks, more than 400 individuals volunteered approximately 4,000
hours in the observers program. From the time the observers were
present, beginning March 8, 1973, including a time the guards were
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present and the arrival of the State Police, there were no incidents
of violence or disruption. Each of the observers' reports indicated
there was an atmosphere of calm and tranquility. In addition, the
observers reported that the prisoners displayed great self-control,
discipline and orderliness. 29
Though the turmoil in the prisons subsided to a degree and ef-
forts were underway by Walpole's new superintendent, Walter Waitkevich,
to restore order, Boone's problems were exacerbated. On March 25,
1973 murderer and convicted lifer, Joseph Subilosky, escaped while
on a 12 hour furlough from MCI-Walpole. The public furor surrounding
this escape was incredible. Citizens were outraged! This escape
confirmed their fears that murderers and rapists would be freed to
prey upon innocent people under the new reforms. They were scared
and began to question not only the administration of the furlough
program at Walpole, but the value of the furloughs and other reforms
mandated by Chapter 777 and most importantly, Boone's ability to
administer the Massachusetts corrections system. Mistakes were made
in the administration of the reforms proposed in Chapter 777; among
the mistakes was the Subilosky furlough. The circumstances surrounding
this furlough were quite controversial. Of major concern was the
question, who was to blame for Subilosky's furlough? Most of the blame
fell on Boone because under the furlough program inmates convicted
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of murder and other violent crimes or sex offenders were only granted
furloughs with the approval of the Commissioner.
Boone ordered an investigation into the Subilosky furlough,
which he claimed was granted against his personal orders. He
instructed Walter Waitkevich, Walpole's acting superintendent, to
conduct a thorough investigation of the circumstances leading to the
furlough to determine if the action -was an honest mistake involving
a breakdown in communication or actually an effort to undermine the
furlough program at Walpole. Lt. Governor Donald Dwight stated that
he had received information earlier of the furlough and a planned
escape. He relayed the information to Boone whom Dwight said
personally cancelled the furlough, but that obviously someone went
ahead and let Subilosky out. Despite the escape, Boone continued
to defend the corrections system furlough program. Controversy
continued, however, over responsibility for the release on furlough
of Walpole lifer, Subilosky. The administrator of Walpole's
furlough program during that time, Richard Fields, was suspended.
Fields was a counselor who served as furlough officer at Walpole
from March 21st to March 26th and denied he ever received an order,
either verbal or written to cancel Subiloxky's furlough. Until
March 21st, Field was assigned to the Director of Treatment at
Walpole. On March 21, Deputy Commissioner Walter Anderson had Fields
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succeed Deputy Superintendent John Bates as head of treatment against
Field's will. In spite of these events there were other questions:
where were Subilosky's original furlough papers? Which Walpole
Superintendent signed off on them? Why was Fields appointed furlough
officer? Boone blamed Fields for Joseph Subilosky's escape and sent
letters of reprimand to Fields for his very serious mistake. On the
other hand, Walter Anderson, the previous associate superintendent at
Walpole State Prison and the District Attorney of Norfolk County,
placed the blame with Boone.
In addition to the investigation ordered by Commissioner
Boone, the Legislative Commission on Correction, chaired by Rep.
Colo, held public hearings on the furlough program and the Subilosky
excape. Those involved denied responsibility and none of the investi-
gations came up with anything more conclusive than the fact that the
Subilosky furlough was handled irregularly. (Subilosky was recaptured
thirty-seven days after his escape at a Hooksett, New Hampshire
trailer camp.) After the Subilosky escape there was a moratorium
on the furlough program. The number of people demanding that Boone
step down as Commission of Corrections also increased tremendously as
a result of the Subilosky escape. It was reported in the newspapers
that Attorney General Quinn had suggested to Boone that he ought to
resign as Commissioner because he had outlived his effectiveness.
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Shortly after announcing his candidacy for Secretary of State,
Senator Quinlan joined forces with those people calling for Boone's
resignation. He wanted Boone to resign because the condition of
prisons in Massachusetts had deteriotated. Walpole unrest had, in
fact, brought the executive branch of the state government almost
to a halt, with little or no time available for other major
governmental concerns. There were a few moderating voices in state
government however, after the Subilosky escape. Senate President
Kevin Harrington's was one such voice. Senator Harrington said
that he wanted Boone's administration of the Department of
Corrections changed, but that he had no intention of asking for his
resignation. In late May, Governor Sargent came to Boone's defense.
He affirmed his belief that Boone was doing the best he could under
the most trying circumstances and added that it was unfair to make
one person the "fall guy" for the myraid problems in the prisons.
Unfortunately for Boone, things worsened. On May 18, a
directive was issued from the acting superintendent, Waitkevich, to
inmates that there would be a 48 hour lock-up and shakedown. The
men allegedly didn't disapprove of the lock-up and shakedown, but
they were concerned that their representatives, NPRA, were not
consulted about the lock-up and knew nothing about it. They were.
also opposed to the restrictions on visits from family or friends
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during the lock-up and became quite paranoid that the lock-up would
result in one similar to Porelle's infamous December 1972 lock-up.
The men felt betrayed because the air of trust that had been created
was disregarded and men would have to have passes or special
permission to move about within the institution. When the directive
was issued, numerous rumors circulated throughout the institution
and the inmates' fears were heightened when Waitkevich refused to
come into the prison to discuss the matter. Some inmates refused to
enter their cells for the 10 p.m. count and others were prevented
from returning from the maximum security unit to the minimum security
unit and vice versa by guards who had locked the doors separating the
units. Feeling trapped, betrayed and desperate, the inmates panicked
when they learned the State Police were coming. Tear gas was fired
by the law enforcement agents, inmates were wounded when guards fired
shots at them from the Control Room window, inmates set fires and
destroyed property. Damages resulting from this riot were estimated
at more than half a million dollars.
Perhaps it is coincidental, but Boone was out of town at the
time of the May riot. In addition, he had no part in the decision
to send the guards in for a shakedown. Boone also was not consulted
nor involved in the decision to summon the State Police. According
to a confidential source, Boone was set up. A deputy commissioner
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informed the staff on May 19th, that the State Police would not be
utilized during the disturbance, when, in fact they had already
been dispatched to MCI-Walpole. One source noted that the State
Police had been alerted for stand-by duty the day before the uprising
took place. One could never document the May uprising as a contrived
event, but circumstantial evidence suggests that possibility.
In mid-June, the period from June 12th through June 16th,
to be exact, there were two inmate murders. A Walpole inmate died
when lacquer was poured over his body and matches thrown into the
cell to ignite a fire. Despite the inmate's cries for help and the
pleas of other inmates for assistance, no guards came to the inmate's
aid until his body was totally consumed by the fire. Immediately
after this incident, Commissioner Boone suspended the guard, who
had responsibility for the cell area where the tragedy occurred, with
pay and without prejudice. This action was taken after the Ad Hoc
Committee on Prison Reform sharply criticized the (alleged) absence
of an officer from the cell area in the murder by fire of a maximum
security inmate at Walpole. Four days after the inmate was burned
to death, on June 16th, another Walpole inmate was stabbed to death.
Following these violent deaths, Commissioner Boone ordered daily
shakedowns without lock-ups at Walpole. He also attributed the
murders to gang wars, individual grudges, and an old system with
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serious middle management problems. These murders occurred less than
one month after the riots in May causing nearly half a million dollars
worth of damage and only about two months after the fierce public
controversy over the Subilosky escape. All of these incidents
were used by Boone's opponents as indications of his inability to run
the corrections system. Reports from the Department of Corrections
announcing a success rate of 98.6 percent with the furlough program
and other accomplishments of Boone's administration did little to
quiet the opponents. That 4,209 furlough passes had been issued by
the Department of Corrections since November and there were only 61
AWOLS was not important to the opposition and had little effect on
most of the public as compared with the adverse reaction to the
Subilosky escape.
Representative Colo's Legislative Commission on Corrections
made several recommendations to Governor Sargent and the Great and
General Court, including one calling for Boone to step down as Commis-
sioner. In addition, a Special Senate Committee on Corrections called
for the establishment of a new Department of Correction and Rehabili-
tation at the level of a secretariat. Legislators criticized Governor
Sargent for what they termed his inaction and insensitivity during the
problems at Walpole State Prison. Not only was there public pressure
on Boone, but political pressure was exerted on the Governor to fire
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Boone. Every aspect of corrections and particularly corrections
reform became a political liability. Because an election year was
imminent, the pressure on Governor Sargent was not ignored. Several
interviewees indicated that the Governor's political opponents planned
to use violence and chaos in the prison as campaign issues in order
to discredit him. Seemingly the Governor was not aware of the full
political implications of his initial commitment to corrections. When
the political stakes became quite costly, he backed down in his
support of Boone and corrections reforms. Perhaps as a good adminis-
trator, there was no choice to be made. Sargent had gone as far as
he could go in support of Boone.
As late as June 18th, newspaper reports expected Governor
Sargent to reaffirm his support for Commissioner Boone and to reject
the several recommendations to fire him. Boone continued to insist
that he had no plans to leave Massachusetts nor his post as Commissioner.
Even as late as June 20th, Boone was reported in the Boston Globe as
saying he had not been approached nor pressured by Governor Sargent
to leave Massachusetts and that he had not considered resigning.30
He said, "If I become a roadblock, they know what to do. In the mean-
time, I came to this state to do a job and I'm going to do it." The
very next day, June 21st, 1973, Boone was essentially fired by Governor
Sargent.31 In a statewide television appearance, Governor Sargent
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announced Mr. Boone's removal as Commissioner of Corrections: "John
Boone resigned today. At my request--against his wishes. He is no
quitter. He wanted to keep going." The Governor diplomatically
praised Boone for his achievements which included the work release
program, education release, training programs for the guards, and
new approaches to rehabilitation that don't just return an inmate to
society, but restore self-respect to a human being.3 The Governor
pledged his continued support for the reform principles and defended
his request for Boone's resignation by stating that Boone had become
the symbol of a major failure , the turmoil at Walpole Prison:
John Boone is not the cause of the problem at Walpole--he
is the victim of it. He must go because his effectiveness
has been crippled by the onslaught of assault upon him. He
must go because he can no longer maintain a working chain
of command. He must go becage his ability to do the work
he began has been destroyed.
Following the announcement of Mr. Boone's ouster, Governor Sargent
appointed Deputy Commissioner Joseph Higgins as acting Commissioner.
In addition, Governor Sargent took a hardline with riotous inmates
at Walpole by turning prison operations over to the State Police.
He authorized State Police Colonel John Moriarty to take over Walpole
Prison and to serve as its temporary superintendent. State troopers
were also to tighten internal security in the cell blocks, including
unannounced shakedown inspections for contraband. Visiting
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privileges at Walpole were greatly reduced, presumably to protect
against the smuggling of drugs and weapons into the prison. The
Governor ordered that the furlough program at Walpole be completely
suspended until Col. Moriarty was satisfied it could function
consistent with security.
In spite of the Governor's promises, the real question was,
did Boone's ouster mean an end to an era of corrections reform in
Massachusetts? Sargent's pronouncements were to the contrary and
in his speech he pledged his continued commitment to penal reforms.
He also stressed that the measures for ending the chaos at Walpole
were temporary, they were confined solely to Walpole prison and they
were designed to deal with an emergency. The answer to this question
is difficult, many felt that Governor Sargent would have given Boone
more time to bring things under control at Walpole and throughout
the corrections system had an election year not been so imminent.
This perspective does have some credence, but after the guards struck
in March 1973, and Boone could not and did not fire them, because the
Governor came up with a diplomatic and placative solution, it was
clear that the trade off at that time was for political expediency
rather than a commitment to corrections reform at all costs. The
irony was that Governor Sargent felt he had to replace Boone for the
sake of salvaging the reforms which the Commissioner had inaugurated.
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One other disconcerting element in the Boone affair was that the
Governor realized that the Commissioner's departure would not
necessarily improve the situation at Walpole. He knew that Boone's
ouster would appease the guards and then perhaps an atmosphere for
resolving the prison crises could be established.
Violence in the prisons was detrimental to Commissioner
Boone's efforts to implement the Omnibus Prison Reform Act. In a
statement before the Colo Commission, former Walpole Superintendent
R. H. Donnelly predicted that long years of neglect of the prison
system lead to increasing problems in the effective management and
control of prisons. He predicted that the remedies would most
probably involve an exhausting, costly and perhaps even bloody
struggle over the question of control of the correctional institutions:
To sum up then for the immediate future, I believe the
Department must pay much more attention to running the
institutions . . . I believe it only a matter of time until
a confrontation is reached between administration and
a inmates if administration attempts to take over control
of institutions rather than pacify inmates. I hope I
am wrong, but I foresee a period of disturbances and
property damages when administration finally makes its
move an9 3the confrontation will not be over quickly nor
easily.
Donnelly's words were prophetic and offered one interpretation of the
underlying reasons for the violence in the prisons. That there was
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an ongoing struggle for power was indisputable but the contestants
and issues in that struggle changed.
The cause of the violence and upheavals in the prison system
during Boone's tenure were numerous. One explanation was that the
murders, stabbings, and assaults occurred because of the fight for
control of the prison rackets by the Irish gangs and Italian Mafia.
The Irish group was headed by Peter Wilson. He had control of the pills
that came into MCI-Walpole. He was assisted by a few other inmates,
including some in Block Ten, in the pill traffic. The Italian group
was headed by Peter Limone. Other leaders of this Mafia linked group
controlled heroin traffic at Walpole. One black inmate was a dealer
for the Italians, but aside from his involvement, Blacks were excluded.
In a letter to the Commissioner, inmate Y stated:
It has occurred to me that the troubles in this prison
date from the time the Mafia men were allowed from
segregation on death row into the general population;
coincidentally you became Commissioner shortly there-
after, so it is possible you have been a general scape-
goat for many troubles and incidents actually perpetuated
by the Mafia through various groups and committees.34
Another explanation was that the violence occurred because of crime
wars outside the prisons. Gangs vied for the leadership role "on
the streets" and these power struggles extended into the prisons with
the Department of Correction not being able to quell such disturbances.
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Individual inmates were involved in this fight for control,
because often they wanted more direct involvement in the prison
rackets by getting one of the choice jobs in the laundry, the kitchen,
or canteen. These fights for control, ususally did not involve black
inmates. One former top aide in the Department of Corrections
explained the situation.
We can't document collusion between the corrections
officers and the inmates. We can't document or prove
that the "boss cons" actually order rub outs, but the
Department of Corrections will be told that someone
will be killed and it happens. The Department doggn't
seem to be able to do much to protect these guys.
Another reason for the violence was the nature of the inmate
culture and prison life. Prisons are dehumanizing institutions in
which human life becomes very expendable. As a result, murders or
vicious assaults were ways of settling accounts. An unpaid debt, a
homosexual rebuff, a theft, or an argument could eventually result in
death or serious injury for the perpetrator of the misdeed. There is
no evidence to indicate that the violence in the prisons was racially
motivated. Victims of the murders were by and large white inmates
and in the instances where the assailants are known, they were usually
other white inmates.
Violence and chaos in the prisons were almost a natural
consequence of and response to correctional change. As discussed in
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the preceding chapter, peace and tranquility in closed institutions,
like prisons, were based on a tenuous balance of power and a series
of informal peacekeeping arrangements between the guards and the
inmates. The system of informal order maintenance was legitimized by
the fact that the inmates and guards recognized and accepted its
authority. The following anecdotes indicated that the informal arrange-
ments were institutionalized to a degree: A newly arrived inmate at
one of the state's correctional facilities was brought to his cell
by a guard who explained the procedure for the head counts of the
inmate population. As the guard spoke, another inmate, a "boss con,"
who was in a cell a few doors down interrupted and told the new inmate
rather authoritatively, "That's wrong, that's not how we do it; you
stand in the front of your cell door!" The new inmate was confused
with these two sets of conflicting instructions on the proper
procedure for a head count. Later the new inmate told a seemingly
friendly gurad what had happened and sought advice on how to proceed.
The friendly guard told the new inmate to follow the orders of the
"boss con" because he could be killed or injured by other inmates if
he did not, whereas to disobey the guards would probably result in no
reprisals, or a disciplinary report at most. The important role
of the informal order maintenance system among the inmates and the
guards was substantiated by the fact that the guards usually knew all
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about the drug peddling, the laundry racket, the extortion, and most
of the other illicit activities which occurred inside the prison, yet
they did very little, if anything at all to stop this trafficking. The
reason for the guards' silence was that they themselves were sometimes
actively involved and profited from the dope peddling within the walls;
corruption in the use and misuse of prison industries; stealing of
food, and other of the more profitable rackets within the prison walls.
Another explanation was that there was nothing the guards could do
about it.
Corrections reforms, particularly those allowing the inmates
significant outside contact, such as furloughs, work release, education
release and other types of community correctional programs, disrupted
the informal order maintenance system of the prisons. The inmate, to
the degree that one was eligible for participation in the reform
programs, was no longer solely dependent on the boss cons and guards
for such things as drugs, liquor, cigarettes, clean clothes, special
foods, and the like. Once outside, the inmate had direct access to
these goods and at a fraction of the cost paid for them inside the
prison. The reforms therefore, loosened and, in some instances, almost
totally displaced the informal authority of the boss cons and guards.
Other inmates attempted to compete with the traditional providers,
while others no longer relied on prison sources for goods and services.
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Reforms lead to reduced profits for some of the inmate and guard
racketeers and much more aggressive competition for customers. It
would be quite difficult to specifically document this view, but
officials within the Department of Corrections and observers of the
Massachusetts correctional system agreed with this analysis. The
documentation that existed for these claims was contained in a series
of confidential letters, memoranda, and notarized statements in the
Department of Corrections file. These records indicated that certain
guards at Walpole conspired against the Commissioner by coercing
inmates into filing suits against Boone which challenged his quali-
fications and alleged that his policies and practices were the cause
of unrest and high tension which jeopardized the safety of the inmates.
Other records gave the names of correction officers and inmates who
were involved in the trafficking of weapons and drugs (heroin and
pills). The information was supplied by an inmate, Inmate X, whose
brother, Inmate Y, had been in protective custody for more than six
years because of his cooperation with law enforcement officials,
including the Norfolk County District Attorney, the Suffolk County
District Attorney, members of the organized Crime Group assigned to
the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office and to Boston Police
headquarters, and the Federal Strike Force, as well as the Criminal
Division of the Attorney General's office in cases against organized
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crime. In affadavits sworn during October 1972, Inmate X stated
that officers in Walpole did not believe Boone was qualified to hold
the position of Commissioner of Corrections because he was Black
and catered to the inmates. Inmate X also stated that Officers 0.
and C., who were employed at MCI-Walpole first approached him and
his brother about the conspiracy against Boone while they were in
10 block. The officers wanted Inmate Y to draw up a civil suit against
Boone stating that since Boone became Commissioner he was in constant
fear of his life because of the way Boone handled security and that
there had never been such turmoil in the institution. Inmate X
concluded this sworn statement with the following remarks:
Mr. 0. agreed with me that the chain of events that took place
in Walpole while Mr. Boone had power would have happened no
matter who was in office. However, the incidents such as the
March riot, the MacIntyre murder and 16 stabbings cannot be
blamed on Mr. Boone's policies, although Mr. 0. wanted me to
say that I felt they were. In return for this Mr. 0. would
grant freedom of the block for me and Inmate Y and a transfer
of any inmate on our floor to a tighter security down stairs
that we thought was a threat (sic) to us, or for any other
reason. When I did not agree to this I was placed in my cell
for 24 hours a day and let out once a week for a shower. My
brother Inmate Y, agreed and was let out from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m.
everyday. Inmate Y told me that I should've went along with
Officer 0. and for doing O.'s legal work Officer was bringing
Inmate Y in on illegal pills. Officer told Inmate 6not to
trust me after I refused to go along with him . . .
In his third affadavit, Inmate X stated that inmate J. F., a
part of the Italian power faction in Walpole, headed the heroin traffic
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at Walpole. Two inmates who worked outside the wall brought the heroin
inside once J. F.'s outside man had delivered it. The large drug
shipments were then smuggled into the prison through the vehicle trap
about every three weeks. Corrections employees were involved in this
trafficking, but they did not choose particular sides. They were just
"bought" and took orders from whomever owned them. The officer
assigned to the vehicle trap knew the drug shipments were going through,
but turned his head and accepted his payoffs. Other officers
acquired television sets, radios, whiskey and even weapons for the in-
mates. Inmate X also reported that some contraband came in through
visits and that although inmates controlled the illicit activities,
they were aided by the guards and other employees at the corrections
institutions:
My involvement with Mr. D. (an instructor at Walpole) started
with inmate R. D. I asked R. D. if he could have a fifty dollar
bill changed for me. He said yes. When he came back with the
change I asked him if the person who changed it would be willing
to make some money for himself. He said definitely (yes). I
approached Mr. D. and asked if he would bring in two pints of
whiskey. He said yes and he did. For this I was charged 10
dollars. Since that time he brought me in pills and has changed
at least 10 fifty dollar bills. At a later date he asked me if
I knew J. P., I said yes. He admitted to me that he was deadly
afraid of him. At an even later date I was asked by J. P. to go
to the plate shop and pick up a .45 caliber, automatic pistol,
from Mr. D. I said yes and I did bring it up to the prison. I
them brought it down to the max basement, I opened the grease
trap, and placed the pistol in it. From what I know now the gun
has been moved during my stay at 10 block by inmate L. M. presently
an inmate also assigned to the plumbing detail. It is my
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understanding there is also two more guns, a .32 caliber and
a .38 caliber pistols. One belongs to a black party that was
seen the night of the March riot by institution guards. I have
reason to believe that the other pistol belongs to R. D. and D. R.
and J. B. This gun was to be used only in mass confusion for3
the killing of officers and inmates and in an escape attempt.
What was significant about Inmate X's statements was that independent
investigations by law enforcement officials corroborated them. The
Norfolk County District Attorney ascertained that Inmate X's brother
received a watch from the "Mafia" men on death row at Walpole; that
this Mafia group also flew his sister to California where she received
$10,000 from the aunt of an imprisoned high-ranking Mafia figure; and
that more than $2,000 was received by Inmate X through an attorney.
Reports from the Organized Crime Unit of the Boston Police established
that several corrections officers, including some identified by Inmate
X, were observed at clubs that were frequented by and run by underworld
figures. It was also common knowledge among law enforcement offials
that at least one officer at Walpole was a "leg man" for the "Mafia,"
and because of his deep involvement with organized crime, he would not
be able to extricate himself. In spite of this objective evidence,
once Boone transmitted the new confidential information to District
Attorney Burke and Attorney General Quinn, they took no decisive
action on it, nor did they investigate the charges. When Boone
attempted to suspend the corrections officers who were implicated in the
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illegal activities, he came under fire from Burke. Boone was clearly
without the necessary official support at this time. Even before
the Porelle lock-up at Walpole, both the District Attorney and the
Attorney General, by their inaction, showed their lack of confidence
in Boone. This entire scenario is extremely significant because
for the first time we can establish that violence in the Massachusetts
correctional system was preciptated largely by factors not directly
related to Commissioner Boone, his abilities as administrator, nor
the implementation of Chapter 777.
Regardless of the causes of the violence, the important
thing to understand is that it could not have occurred so continuously
and unabashedly without the complicity of the corrections officers.
This is not to say that the corrections officers directly and actively
participated in the violence, but their failure to perform their
duties or their absence from strategic guard posts at critical times
made them responsible for some of the violence in the institution.
The guards fought prison reform by instigating the riots and other
disturbances within the prison and also by turning their backs on
violence among the inmates in the institutuion.
The media, especially the print medium, played a critical role
in the corrections reform drama. In the early seventies, corrections
in Massachusetts was great copy because of the turmoil and upheavals
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present there. According to a former News and Public Information
Director for the Department of Corrections, newspapers sell because
of an aspect of sensationalism:
Sensationalism sells newspapers because the public gets a vicarious
enjoyment from the misfortunes of others. Prior to the late sixties
there was a certain mystique about prisons, but with the increased
political consciousness of inmates and greater intervention by the
courts in prison administration and with more stories in the news-
papers about prisons, they at3 east became something that greater
numbers of people knew about.
Boone's very liberal media policies were predicated on his belief that
access of outsiders into the institutions was essential if meaningful
reforms were to occur. He felt that the general public had to have
its awareness of the problems of prisons improved. His approach was
therefore to have an open media policy. Allowing such extensive
publicity on prison related activities molded and even divided
public opinion either for or against corrections reform.
Media forces, particularly the Boston Herald American created
further polarization with its inflammatory reporting. As previously
mentioned, this newspaper fully supported the guards in their efforts
to obstruct reform of the Massachusetts correctional system. This
newspaper even took credit for Boone's ouster. Civil servants in the
Department of Corrections, especially those aligned with the "outgroup,"
established a link beteeen DOC headquarters and the Herald American
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about problems in the institutions and within the Department, in some
instances, even before Boone acted upon them. The problem of leaks
became so intolerable that in September of 1972, Boone had imposed a
decade old "gag rule" which had been previously ignored on all depart-
mental and institutional personnel. Under the gag rule, only the
superintendents, the commissioner and persons authorized by them could
release information pertaining to inmates or institutional occurrences
to the news service.
Media accessibility was very important as a means of keeping
the public informed about the operation of the prisons and of making
bureaucratic systems more accountable. This was particularly the case
in closed institutions, like prisons. Before Boone was Commissioner,
reporters were not allowed to go into the prison freely, but Boone
opened up the prisons. Since Boone's forced resignation, the
departmental policy regarding media accessibility was to deny reporters
inside the prisons. No cameras or other communications equipment .at
all have been allowed inside the prisons since his ouster. Rather
than nullify the liberal media policy, the present Commissioner denies
access by declaring an existing state of emergency within the
Massachusetts prisons. Ironically, Commissioner Boone's liberal
media policy contributed, in some degree, to his ouster in the end.
That prisons and the Department of Corrections were open and making
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headlines, aroused many public responses and placed Boone, the
institutions, and the Department of Corrections under a great deal
of very critical public scrutiny. In Boone's case, the policy
had dual effects, because he was identified with the good and bad
aspects of reforms in the prison system. Very little, if anything
was hidden from public view while he was Commissioner.
It was still the case that the vociferous opposition of the
corrections officers was the single most devastating and detrimental
attack on Boone and his reform administration. Boone's attitude
was that the prison guards could be handled and dealt with, because
as Commissioner he signed the checks which paid their salaries. He
was a strong believer in getting control of the guards, "If you
control the inmates you have to have some control of the guards."
The problem with this seemingly reasonable position was that the
Governor reneged on his support for Boone. There was a great deal
of public and political ambivalence and later resistance to de-
institutionalization, especially in terms of what should be done with
people having special needs. At the core of many of the guards concerns
was what do you do with the hard core or incorrigible inmate? The
assupmtion among Boone and the reformers was that they constituted only
a very small minority of the inmate population so they posed no real
threat or that better classification would resolve the particular
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problem. Reformers, generally did not realistically nor substantively
deal with the question of what should be done with the genuinely
dangerous offenders. The issue of how to implement reforms and
neutralize opposition, by such forces as the guards was also left
unresolved. Forcing reforms and ignoring the opposition to a degree
was the approach taken. Perhaps an alternate strategy would be
to retrain the guards for some other work, because the long term
consequence of de-institutionlaization was that guards may become
expendable.
Yes, I think they did everything that they possibly could
to undermine the progressive tools--to destroy our concepts
and implementation of re-integration.
They are the most powerful guards in the country. They
start off at a higher salary than social workers and
educators. That alone shows you what kind of penal
system we have here--one of containment and not
rehabilitation.
We pay them to guard prisoners, and yet they don't guard!
They let down their guard; they let people get killed.
I could have dealt with the guards' union if the admin-
istration had been willing to bite the bullet with me.
To risk the politics of it all.
Those guards violated the law. They struck twice. They
walked out of that prison and left their peers there to
keep what they themselves call "dangerous criminals," the
true hardcore.
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And if I couldn't fire them, I was determined to take
advantage of every opportunity to transfer some of them.
But . . . you don't mess with civil servants in Massachusetts.
My hands were tied--they were tied! 39
Not only were Boone's hands tied, but the guards' defiance and violence
in the prisons effectively thwarted efforts to reform the Massachusetts
corrections system.
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C H A P T E R V I
CONCLUSIONS
In February 1975, some three years after Chapter 777 of the
Acts of 1972 became law, the Massachusetts Research Center published
a monograph entitled, Implementation of Chapter 777. The findings of
the MRC study were dismal. With the exception of the furlough pro-
gram, few of the other provisions of Chapter 777 were implemented.1
A similar conclusion was reached in a preliminary majority report
from the Massachusetts Legislative Commission Studying Corrections:
"Throughout the almost two years of its existence, the Massachusetts
Commission Studying Corrections observed no significant shift
toward a community-based system of corrections."2 Not only was there
no community based system of corrections in Massachusetts, according
to these studies, but in general implementation of the provisions
of Chapter 777 had not occurred. Basically, the reformers wanted to
see the majority of eligible inmates out of prisons and placed in
community correctional alternatives to prisons. As an interim mea-
sure they wanted the education, employment and vocational programs
in prisons upgraded and expanded; the liberal policies for media
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access, visiting hours and voluntary citizen involvement continued;
as well as the full and immediate implementation of Chapter 777.
This final section analyzes the implementation of Chapter 777 and
presents some conclusions about the movement for corrections reform
in Massachusetts during the seventies.
Since Chapter 777 became law, very little has happened to
change the plight of the majority of offenders incarcerated in
state prisons in Massachusetts. Eventhough the Corrections Reform
Act gave broad powers to the Commissioner of Corrections relative to
the maintenance, rehabilitation and reintegration of committed
offenders into the community, minimal progress was made in this
direction. Inmates are still victimized by the absence of programs
within the institutions and limited community based alternatives to
incarceration. When institutional programs and community based
corrections do exist, many eligible inmates are denied the opportu-
nity to participate, because of the arbitrary decisions by correc-
tions personnel at the institutions.
As a result of Chapter 777, the legal authority was given
to the Commissioner to establish the furlough program, education and
work release programs, community correctional facilities which
included Boston State Pre-Release Center, The Shirley Drug REhabili-
tation and Pre-Release Center, and contracts with private agencies
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for several halfway houses. During the two year period from 1971
to 1973, the most significant improvements in the Massachusetts cor-
rectional system occurred because of the initiative of the Correc-
tions Commissioner, John Boone. Even without specific reform
legislation, Boone instituted a liberal policy towards the media
which allowed reporters to have access to the prisons and to inmates;
he permitted citizen volunteers to participate in various programs
within the prisons; he depopulated the prisons in Massachusetts
through the liberal use of parole and by closing the East Wing of
MCI-Concord during his eighteen months as head of Massachusetts cor-
rectional system. Other reforms initiated by Boone while he was
Commissioner included making MCI-Framingham a coed institution;
allowing prisoners greater freedom for political activity, which lead
to the organization of a chapter of the National Prisoners' Reform
Association (NPRA) at MCI-Walpole; the hiring of minority group
members as corrections officer trainees; and inservice training pro-
grams for the older corrections officers. Without a legislative
mandate for reform, Boone implemented his corrections philosophy
which was based on his beliefs that prisons were harmful to most
offenders, and that as many as 90 percent of the inmates in prisons
would be better off in community-based alternatives to incarceration.
The important point is that the implementation of reforms in the
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Massachusetts Correctional System was more dependent on the initia-
tive and assertiveness of the Commissioner than on the existence of
a piece of corrections reform legislation. Further evidence of this
point is the fact that in the Massachusetts Department of Youth
Services, during Jerome Miller's tenure as Commissioner, the train-
ing schools and other juvenile detention facilities were shut down
and replaced by a regional system of specialized community based
programs all with no new legislation. It is quite true that Miller's
client group was children and the public attitude toward juveniles
tends to be somewhat benevolent, but here, again, the Commissioner
took the initiative in moving towards a community based correctional
system.
A major lesson of the legislative battle to pass the Correc-
tions Reform Act in Massachusetts was that passing a law was not
synonymous with the inauguration of political and social reforms.
Though legislation was necessary to effect changes in public policy,
without an aggressive policymaker/administrator to implement the
changes, little was accomplished. The examples of former Commis-
sioners Boone and Miller indicate that both reform legislation and
an aggressive policymaker/administrator are necessary to implement
policy changes. Many reformers who became policymakers are thwarted
in their efforts to make changes because they lack legislative
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authority. In other instances, reform administrators make changes
through their administrative authority, but these changes are often
shortlived. Because these changes were not mandated by legislation,
when the reformer is replaced, the successor is not obliged to
carry forth the reformer's administrative changes. Massachusetts
had both, comprehensive reform legislation and an aggressive
policymaker/administrator, at least for a time, and yet, the con-
clusions are that the corrections reform movement was unsuccessful.
Before Chapter 777 is completely condemned, a review of its provi-
sions and accomplishments are in order.
Of the reforms mandated by Chapter 777, the furlough program
was the most controversial and the most widely implements. Sections
of Chapter 777 relating to furlough authorized the Department of
Corrections to grant furlough to carefully screened inmates for
the following reasons: to attend the funeral of a relative; to
visit a critically ill relative; to obtain medical, psychiatric,
psychological, or other social services when adequate services were
not available at the facility and could not be obtained by temporary
placement in a hospital; to contact prosepctive employers; to
secure a suitable residence for use upon release; and for any other
reason consistent with the reintegration of a committed offender
into the community. The reasons consistent with the reintegration
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of an offender into the community were determined by the Superinten-
dent of the institution and the institutional furlough committee.
Under the furlough program, selected inmates were released
no more than 14 days in the course of a year. Inmates serving life
sentences or sentences for a violation or attempt to violate certain
specified sexual and violent crimes could be furloughed only upon
the recommendation of the Superintendent and the express approval of
the Commissioner. An institutional furlough committee composed of
at least five members designated by the Superintendent and including
corrections officers, was responsible for recommending or rejecting
inmates' requests for furloughs.
According to the records of the Department of Corrections,
during the first five months of the furlough program, 2,966 fur-
loughs were granted to 968 inmates. For that period, only 38 resi-
dents failed to return and were listed as escapes. Of the 38
"escapes," 22 either returned voluntarily to a correctional facility
or were subsequently apprehended. This escape rate compared favor-
ably with that of other correctional jurisdictions across the nation.
The Department of Corrections viewed the furlough program as an
effective correctional tool because it eased the transition from
prison life to community life for inmates and it afforded offenders
the opportunity to re-establish family and community ties. During
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the first two years of the furlough program, 15,044 furloughs were
granted and escape warrants were issued in 234 cases. The Depart-
ment of Corrections computed the success rate of the furlough pro-
gram at 98.5 percent at that time.
One of the difficulties in assessing the extent of inmate
participation in the furlough program is that the Department's
records do not reflect furloughs granted per individual offenders.
Inmates and particularly Black inmates alleged that the furlough
program was administered in a discriminatory manner, because a few
white inmates were granted a large number of furlough while the
majority of inmated received significantly fewer furloughs and most
Black inmates received none. Clearly, there is a need for the
Department of Correction to evaluate the program in terms of the
number of furloughs granted per inmate with respect to the inmate's
race, offense, length of sentence, and his institutional adjustment.
The data collected from such an evaluation would provide a more
accurate basis for modifying the program. In spite of the furlough
program's early and continuing success rate, there were legislative
efforts to curtail inmate participation in the furlough program.
Implementation of the furlough program faced an unexpected setback
when convicted murderer and lifer, Joseph Subilosky, escaped after
being furloughed under questionable circumstances. 3
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Officials in the Department of Corrections and even certain
segments of the public felt that the furlough program was successful
and that it needed no legislative change. The only changes recom-
mended were that its administration be strengthened and information
about the program and its success be available to the public. Sup-
porters of community corrections argued that neither furloughs nor
any other community based program could realistically be expected to
be 100 percent successful and that a success rate of over 98 percent
was extremely important and a sufficient basis for continuing and
expanding the furlough program.
The second most widely discussed provision of Chapter 777
was its community release programs. Chapter 777 mandated several
types of community based correctional programs such as work release,
education release and furloughs in order to allow offenders into
the community on a limited basis prior to parole. These programs
in the community were important because they allowed inmates the
opportunity to re-establish family and community ties, to acquire
educational and vocational skills, and to find employment and
suitable housing.
Work and education release programs existed and were func-
tioning to a degree at most of the Co-monwealth's correction insti-
tutions. But the number of inmates participating in the programs
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was quite small. Inmates attended classes at the University of
Massachusetts at Boston under the terms of the Higher Education in
Prosons Program (HEPP). Some inmates attended classes at other
universities and community colleges within the Commonwealth, though
primarily in the Boston metropolitan area. As of October 1974,
only 41 inmates or roughly 4 percent of the total inmate population,
participated in the program. The Department of Correction operated
a job bank for the purpose of matching inmates to jobs. Those
inmates who participated in work release did not feel that the job
bank was effective in matching inamtes to jobs, because most of them
had found their present jobs themselves. In the fall of 1974, 107
inmates or approximately 5 percent of the total inmate population
participated in the Department's work release program.
The very low level of inmate participation in the work
release program was due to problems of administration of the program,
eligibility requirements and transportation. Another obstacle to
wider participation in the work release programs in the Massachusetts
correctional system was that work release operated through the
Department's pre-release centers instead of the prisons. If an
inmate were not in a pre-release center he could not participate in
the work release program.
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While education and work release programs which allowed
selected inmates into the community on a limited basis, were not
entirely new concepts in corrections, the potential for extensive
use of community release programs under Chapter 777 was indeed new.
An inmate who was within eighteen months of his parole eligibility
date could participate in these programs. Though some semblance of
work release existed at most institutions, the programs were plagued
with problems. Inmates from Walpole were usually not involved in
work release programs because most were sentenced to very long terms
and therefore were not within eighteen months of their parole eligi-
bility or release date. Expansion of the work release programs was
hampered by funding. Work release programs were funded entirely with
federal money. As the federal money comes to an end, it is not clear
that the Commonwealth will underwrite the costs of operating and
expanding community based correctional programs such as work release.
With bleak projections for the Commonwealth's economic future, it is
likely that reductions in spending for human and rehabilitative ser-
vices will occur and that at best the community corrections programs
might be continued, but not beyond their current levels.
Another program authorized by Chapter 777 was a system of
pre-release centers. The Department of Corrections established two
state operated pre-release centers: Boston State Pre-Release
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Center with a capacity of 51, and Shirley Per-Release Center with a
capacity of 50. In addition to these two state pre-release centers,
there were four other facilities in the pre-release system which were
operated by private agencies under contact with the Department of
Corrections. Contract facilities serving the Department included
Brooke House and Coolidge House with combined capacity of 30, Roxbury
Multi-Service Center with a capacity of 25, and Charlotte House with
a capacity of 12. With the exception of the Charlotte House Pre-
Release Center, all the pre-release centers served men. Charlotte
House exclusively served women from MCI-Framingham on pre-release
status.
The system of pre-release centers had a total maximum capa-
city of 168 at any one time, though more than 50 percent of the
1,100 inmates of the ocrrections system's total population were
eligible for pre-release status. Since they opened in February 1974,
the Commonwealth's pre-release centers have been filled at about
80 to 93 percent of their capacity. With such a small number of beds
available in these community release facilities, only a negligible
number of prisoners, approximating 6 to 8 percent of the total prison
population, was reached. Another state pre-release center was pro-
posed in the western part of the Commonwealth near Springfield-
Westfield. This proposal for a new pre-release center was met with
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violent opposition by the residents who lived in the vicinity of
the proposed site. Thus, plans for that pre-release center were
halted. In an effort to more fully develop the Department's commun-
ity release capability, the Department of Corrections relied on the
forestry and work camps at Monroe, Warwick and Plymouth. Even though
the forestry camps were not pre-release centers, work release is
available there. In October 1974, 49 men comprising 76 percent of
the forestry camp's total population were on work release.
The pre-release centers did not operate at full capacity for
several reasons. In addition to the statutory limitation which
restricted participation in community release programs to those
within eighteen months of parole eligibility, there were further
restrictions on inmate participation in such programs which were
largely due to the administrative policies of the Department of
Corrections. For example, inmates within 30 months of parole eligi-
bility could be considered for residence at the forestry camps.
Those inmates who were within 18 months of parole eligibility could
be considered for residency at the community correctional centers.
For residency at the Shirley Pre-Release Center, inmates had to be
within 12 months of parole eligibility; at Boston State Pre-Release
Center, inmates were required to be within 8 months of parole eligi-
bility in order to be reviewed for residentcy; and for residency at
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the contract facilities, it was necessary for inmates to be within
3 to 6 months of parole eligibility. Several other administrative
guidelines within the Department of Corrections further restricted
inmates' eligibility for residency in a pre-release center including
the following requirements: that an inmate must not have an escape,
an attempted escape citation, nor any major disciplinary report for
at least 30 days prior to official consideration of his suitability
for a pre-release program; that an inmate could not have any major
outstanding detainers and warrants; that he must have good health;
and that he must be clear from a sexually dangerous person status.
Other provisions of Chapter 777 covered both state and
county correctional facilities. State correctional facilities
included the Commonwealth's major institutions, the forestry camps,
the combination state correctional institution for women and coed
pre-release center, and the six community correctional facilities.
Even though all these institutions comprise the components of the
Department of Corrections, they functioned independently of one
another. They were so independent that their superintendents could
invent policy. One of the aims of Chapter 777 was to systematize
correctional policies and procedures. The thirteen jails and houses
of corrections acattered throughout the Commonwealth were all
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administered by the county sheriffs. Only specific sections of
Chapter 777 affected the county institutions.
One of the major duties of the Commissioner of Corrections
under Chapter 777 was to establish, publish and enforce minimun
standards for state and county correctional facilities. These stan-
dards were to apply in the areas of discipline, safety, nutrition,
recreation, religious service, communication and visitation, employ-
ment, care and custody for inmates, sanitation, classification, edu-
cation, training discipline, and grievance procedures.
Two years after the Corrections Reform Act had been in effect,
the Department of Corrections still had not produced a comprehensive
list of minimum standards for the state correctional facilities. A
series of separate departmental orders, however, did exist which
covered education, training, and employment programs, access to news
media, mail from courts and attorneys to inmates, and visitation by
parolees and releases. There were no standards for grievance pro-
cedures which resulted in inmates not knowing what their rights were.
The one improvement that did occur in the area of grievances
was that disciplinary proceedings were established by prison officials
after several years of successful litigation and agitation by
prisoners and supporters of corrections reforms. Under the new pro-
cedure, inmates accused of violations within the institutions were
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afforded some due process safeguards. Segregation units remain in
operation even though inmates are now granted disciplinary hearing
at which arguments against their administrative charges may be pre-
sented by the inmate or legal counsel. Basically, there has been a
reduction in the number of inmates placed in segregation units for
disciplinary reasons since the reform laws went into effect. No
concrete proposals exist in Chapter 777 to find more suitable methods
for handling disciplinary problems within the correctional institu-
tions other than segregation. In the absence of alternative
methods for resolving the problem of protective custodies, those
inmates who seek removal from the general population because of the
fear or threat of physical danger, the serious questions of the
need for isolation of inmates for whatever reasons and the condi-
tions governing isolation were not addressed in Chapter 777. The
absence of these and other standards in such areas as safety, health
and sanitation, and classification for state correctional institu-
tions conveyed to many the idea that the Commonwealth's policymakers
were insensitive and unconcerned about the plight of inmates in the
Commonwealth's correctional system.
In the county correctional system, policymakers acknowledged
and responded to the more apparent need for the state to develop
minimum standards for these institutions. Most of the jails were
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built in the 1800's and still lacked plumbing, therefore, standards
were needed which applied not only to physical structures, but to
health, sanitation, and safety. The county sheriffs' advice was
sought in establishing the county standards. Whenever standards for
the county correctional institutions are adopted, there will be a
problem, because the bill makes no provision for enforcing the stan-
dards short of closing down the institutions. One of the deficien-
cies of Chapter 777 generally is that it mandates correctional
changes without time guidelines and without any enforcement
mechanisms.
A major problem within the corrections system of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts was the classification process. Until 1974,
most inmates were sent to MCI-Walpole, the maximum security prison
prior to assignment to another correctional facility. The exception
to this procedure occurred in instances where inmates were serving
indefinite sentences with less than a five year minimum. These
inmates were sent to MCI-Concord. The effect of using the maximum
security facility for classification, and evaluation was that all
inmates, regardless of length of sentence and offense, were placed
together.
The problem of an inadequate classification and evaluation
process was addressed in Chapter 777. The law required the
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Commissioner of Corrections to establish a classification system for
those inmates committed to the custody of the Department of Correc-
tion in order to develop individualized rehabilitation programs and
to determine the custody requirements and program needs of offenders
at the time of commitment and periodically during the sentence.
In the Spring of 1974, a Reception and Diagnostic Center was
opened at MCI-Norfolk where new inmates to the Massachusetts adult
corrections system were evaluated, classified, and assigned to insti-
tutions according to their needs for programs. In addition, depart-
mental classification teams were established to handle interinstitu-
tional transfers and placements in community based correctional
programs. According to the Department of Corrections departmental
orders, a diagnostic team at the Reception Center, consisting of a
case manager, a psychiatric social worker, the staff psychologist,
a correctional officer and the offender was to compile a classifica-
tion report which contained a case history and a current evaluation
of the offender's needs. The departmental classification team then
made recommendations for institutional assignment, security rating,
and a needs and goals individual priority rating. The initial classi-
fication process required that offenders spend four to six weeks at
MCI-Norfolk for classification and evaluation purposes. Aside from
the small numbers of offenders who were sent to the center during its
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early months of operation, another deficiency at the Reception and
Diagnostic Center was the absence of activities for inmates either
recreational, educational or otherwise during the one and one-half
month period.
The irony of the classification system is that it assumes the
existence of a variety of programs for inmates. In order to give
classification meaning, there must be various programs to which
inmates can be assigned. Chapter 777 explicitly states that classi-
fication is for the purpose of developing individual rehabilitative
programs. As discussed in previous sections, programs of any kind
are generally lacking within the institutions of the Massachusetts
correctional system. Until more programs are developed and until
more and more community based, work release and educational release
programs are established, the real potential of a classification
system will not be realized.
To clearly understand the failure to implement Chapter 777
and to move forward toward community based corrections system in
Massachusetts, one need only examine the areas in which funds were
appropriated by the General Court and staff assignments. Approxi-
mately 10 to 12 percent of the total budget in 1974 was appropriated
for the operation of prison industries, while slightly less than
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2 percent of the budget was spent for educational programs that same
year.
Under the prison industries program, inmates who have little
else to do, and who face possible retribution for non-participation
work for very low wages (from $.25 to $1.50 per day) in such
activities as institutional house cleaning, producing road signs,
license plate making, flag sewing, mattress stuffing, brush making
and other jobs whish provide them with no skills that will render
them employable in the civilian labor force. If any skill building
occurs in prison industry programs they are skills which are useful
only in another correctional institution. The prison industries prog-
ram is a relic of the past and is inconsistent with a reform approach
to corrections. One critic described prison industries as closely
resembling slave labor camps. Because inmates earn such meager wages
from the prison industries, they are not provided the opportunity to
view their work with pride and dignity; they are not able to provide
monetary support to their families; nor can they save money for their
release. The prison industries therefore are at best a means of
escape from the idleness and boredom which characterize prison life
for many inmates. Unfortunately, they do very little to aid the
offenders reintegration into society as a productive member. The
present prison industries program fails to provide worthwhile
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employment for inmates, fails to provide training for inmates, and
fails to pay inmates adequately for the work performed. Chapter 777
does not address the issue of the quality of prison industries, at
all, nor does it establish guidelines or criteria for prison indus-
tries, rather the law merely advocates the establishment and develop-
ment of work and education programs in state prisons and in community
facilities.
In addition to the prison industries program, the only other
institutional programs for inmates are educational. The education
programs within the Massachusetts correctional system differ widely
from institution to institution but because they operate on such a
small percentage of the entire departmental budget, the programs at
the institutions are generally underdeveloped, understaffed and under-
funded. This lack of commitment of departmental resources and
administrative support to improving the quality and quantity of
institutional educational programs greatly reduced the prospect of
enabling inmates to develop skills to become creative and construc-
tive participants in society. Implicit in Chapter 777 is the idea
that greater opportunities for education, training and employment
programs committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections
will help them become law abiding citizens. The validity of this
assumption is of course debatable, but it is a notion that is widely
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held and one which the proponents of Chapter 777, including Commis-
sioner Boone, accepted.
Most of the educational programs in the state prisons focused
on remedial courses and those geared toward ontaining a high school
equivalency diploma. Academic programs beyond the high school level
were at MCI-Norfolk. Revisions in the college and pre-college curric-
ulum at MCI-Norfolk made available correspondence courses, a college
prepatory program for more specialized interests, and a program at the
University of Massachusetts which made it possible for inmates to
obtain an associate's degree. Educational programs at MCI-Bridgewater
and MCI-Framingham were described in a report by the Department of
Corrections as running reasonably well. Educational programs at both
MCI-Concord and MCI-Walpole were interrupted because of institutional
turmoil. Historically, educational opportunities at MCI-Walpole were
limited. In the county correctional facilities when educational or
training programs existed, they were usually offered by volunteers.
Though Chapter 777 provided for vocational training in all
the state facilities, in effect, such programs do not exist. A few
unrelated vocational programs were scattered throughout the various
correctional facilities. MCI-Concord offered courses in automotive
repair and carpentry and MCI-Framingham had a course in computer
programming and data-processing. Since passage of Chapter 777, the
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one hopeful move toward improving the quality, variety and availabil-
ity of vocational educational programs with the prisons was that in
1975, the Board of Community Colleges for the Commonwealth accepted
the task of developing an integrative, vocational program, which
coordinated community resources with prisoners' needs.
By almost any objective criteria, it is fair to say that
corrections reform in Massachusetts has not occurred because those
features of Chapter 777 that were implemented were available only
to a minority of the eligible inmates. Though the law existed on
the books, there was a real disparity between the law's existence and
its successful implementation. One explanation for the poor imple-
mentation was that there had been no long term and systematic
administrative planning for what would occur beyond passage of the
Corrections Reform Act. In addition, Chapter 777 contained no
implementation process, nor procedure for evaluating the progress
of implementation, nor were there any goals established for determin-
ing the successful implementation of the bill's provision. Another
problem with the bill was the absence of time guidelines. Given the
absence of goals and guidelines for executing the provisions for the
bill within a specific time period, implementation of Chapter 777
therefore rested largely on the administrative aggressiveness and
correctional philosophy of the Commissioner of Corrections. During
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Boone's tenure as Commissioner, he exercised his administrative
authority to the upper limit.
Beyond Boone and the legislation, the corrections officers,
with their power to implement or sabotage the reforms authorized
in Chapter 777, represented the single most important actors in
the Massachusetts corrections reform drama. Prior to the time
that Chapter 777 became law, the guards never really expected it
to pass. The guards felt that with their allies in the legisla-
ture, and because of the power of the law enforcement lobby of which
they were a part, the bill could not pass. Essentially this was
an optimistic analysis, but it ignored the effective lobbying
campaign of the reformers and the significance of the method for
voting on the bill. As was pointed out in the earlier chapters, a
roll call vote would probably have meant defeat for the bill. For
that reason, reformers and supporters of the bill in the legislature
made sure that only a voice vote would be necessary for the bill's
passage. Having misjudged their strength and influence in the
legislature, the corrections officers were determined that implement-
ing the new law would not be an easy task for Boone.
Generally, the guards were hostile to Boone from the outset.
They did not cooperate with him because he was an outsider, he was
Black, and he had what they termed a "liberal and permissive"
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corrections philosophy which was inconsistent with their own. They
criticized Boone because they felt he was trying to make too many
changes too quickly and at the expense of safety and security in the
institutions. The guards also opposed Boone, because they felt they
were being ignored, and that "do-gooders and radicals" had a more
effective voice in the operation and administration of the state
prison system than did professionals like themselves. Boone came
to symbolize change to guards and not just ordinary change, but the
kind of change that threatened the very essence of the guards'
professional lives and identities. Chapter 777 reinforced the
corrections officers fears and caused an even more negative reaction
to Boone. If prisoners were granted more rights and privileges; if
insitutions were depopulated through various community based pre-
release programs; if guards were held accountable for their actions;
and if the public had greater access to prisons, the guards percieved
this as ushering in an era of lawlessness and violence in the prisons
which would be dangerous for everyone. After the shock of having
the corrections reform bill pass, the guards then had to prove to
the public just how dangerous and unsafe all these reform ideas
and changes were. The proof was based on rather strained logic--Boone
symbolized change, change was embodied in the new corrections
reform legislation, and the reform legislation created a violent
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environment in the prisons, and therefore Boone was the cause of the
uncontrollable situations in the Commonwealth's correctional system
because he was the chief architect of Chapter 777. Not only was
the logic strained, but one of the conclusions was erroneous because
the reform legislation was being discussed even before Boone came to
Massachusetts as Commissioner. Regardless of the problems with the
logic, the guards were astute in reasoning that if Chapter 777 were
to be successful, it had to be implemented while order and security-
were maintained in the institutions. The corrections officers were
the key to order maintenance and security in the prison system.
Because the guards felt that they had lost much of their power after
the bill passed, the way they chose to regain some of this power and
self respect was to cause turbulence in the prisons and then to blame
the problems on Boone and the new reforms. The effect would be to
reestablish their own credibility while destroying Boone's credibility.
Boone was the victim of a masterful conspiracy orchestrated by the
corrections officers which convinced the public that Boone and his
reform policies and practices were the cause of the unrest and the
violent disruptions in the Massachusetts prison system.
The guards opposed almost every attempt by Boone to change the
prison system. After Boone's forced resignation, and things were
back to the status quo with guards in control, for the most part,
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there were still some upheavals in the prisons, but they were not
even mentioned in the press. Several years after Chapter 777, for
most prisoners, conditions are no better today then they were before
passage of the corrections reform law.4 Clearly the guards could not
perceive their jobs, status, or security as threatened by the new
correctional policies, if the reforms were to even have a chance for
successful implementation.
Policymakers and reformers alike never analyzed the imple-
mentation requirements of the proposed reforms. This was a serious
error! A thorough analysis would have revealed the necessity for
a very high level of cooperation between the Department of Corrections,
the Superintendents, the corrections officers, the inmates, politi-
cians and the public if the reform programs were to be successfully
implemented.
The Department of Corrections, the principle agency
mandated to implement major changes in the Massachusetts prison
system was hampered in its efforts to implement Chapter 777. There
were difficulties not only because planning, implementation, and
evaluation were ignored in the legislation, but also because only
federal grants were available for funding the new programs. In
addition, effective implementation of Chapter 777 was halted by the
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change in the administration of the Department of Corrections when
John Boone resigned as Commissioner and Governor Sargent named Frank
Hall as his successor.
When Hall replaced Boone as Commissioner in August 1973, he
made it clear that his administrative style was to move slowly and
methodically. He announced that he would not be permissive with
reformers nor inmates and that any correctional changes that he
implemented would occur in an orderly fashion. Much of Hall's atti-
tude was shaped by the fact that he was instructed by the Governor to
bring the prisons under control and to restore. A less aggressive
campaign by Governor Sargent and the new Commissioner to make
improvements in the correctional system after Boone was ousted slowed
the pace of corrections reform in 1973. With the Governor's defeat
in the 1974 gubernatorial race and a growing backlash and anti-
corrections reform sentiment in the public which caused some poli-
ticians to recant in their earlier support of correctional changes,
very little was accomplished which altered the corrections system in
Massachusetts.
Earlier sections of this essay discussed the actors and
influences on the corrections reform drama in Massachusetts. Efforts
during the early seventies aimed at adult corrections reform in the
Commonwealth were important because they catalyzed a movement for
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social change in which individuals and organizations submerged
ideological, class and personality differences to work for the
successful passage of an omnibus corrections reform bill. That
Chapter 777 became law, indicated that active citizen participation
in the political process can influence legislative policies. The
absence of an active citizens' lobby, likewise, usually means that
reforms are defeated. Because citizens did not lobby and agitate to
have Chapter 777 implemented, the bill's real contribution to changes
in the Massachusetts prison system has been negligible. While the
Massachusetts experiment in adult corrections reform was not a
utopian success, it demonstrated that some changes in correctional
policies and orientation could be made in a relatively short period
of time and under very difficult circumstances.
In general, reformers and their movements for change struggle
against time, primarily because a single issue cannot be sustained
forever. After Boone's ouster in June, 1973, and the initial furor
over his departure, many reformers redirected their energies and
attention to issues of school desegregation and proposed cuts in the
Commonwealth's budget for welfare. This was not to imply that all the
problems of the Commonwealth's corrections system were resolved, but
rather because the violence had subsided, the situation in the prisons
was perceived as less critical. Another explanation for the shift in
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in the reformer's interest was frustration and hopelessness about
the possibility of implementing reforms in the Massachusetts prisons.
As a result, the reformers could move on to the next pressing social
issue and hope for some tangible victory.
Despite their humanitarian concern and history of social
activism, the reformers were myopic. They did not foresee the
resistance which corrections reform movement encountered. Some
reformers did not have respect, tolerance, patience, nor an under-
standing of the culture of the corrections system, nor of the
incentives and perspectives which move people in closed institutions
like prisons.5 The reformers underestimated the guards' power to
sabotage implementation of the reform legislation. Because of this
shortsightedness, the reformers tended to respond to and organize
around crises. As a result they faced many frustrations. Some of
these frustrations arose because of the difficulty they had in making
continuous long term committments to the movement; focusing their
energies on appropriate issues; devising effective strategies and
tactics for bringing about social change; and refining issues in the
light of new developments. Reformers had varying frustration
tolerance levels and one of the antidotes to overwhelming frustration
was success. The reformers needed to have tangible results and an
affirmation of the significance of their efforts. To many, the
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enactment of Chapter 777, the ultimate symbol of success, fulfilled
these needs. The reform movement focused on getting a bill passed,
and as a result, it cannot be shown to have failed, because the bill
passed. Once the bill passed, however, reformers failed to realize
that it required enormous public pressure for successful implementa-
tion of the law. Reformers ignored the requirements for implementing
the bill because they equated the bill's passage with implementation.
The responsibility for getting the bill implemented was not
necessarily a job for reformers alone. Much more than the reformers,
the legislators could have worked for implementation of Chapter 777,
but they were first and foremost politicians. As politicians, they
spent a great deal of their time "campaigning" for re-election,
whether an election was imminent or not. As a result, legislators
were very concerned with their public image and issues that enhanced
their public image among the largest segment of the electorate. Often
image making occurred at the expense of legislators acting to pass
substantive and significant legislation. In the Fall of 1971,
corrections reform was a popular political issue. At that time the
public was very sympathetic toward making some changes in corrections
systems all over the country. As a response to crises in the Massa-
chusetts corrections system and partially as an effort to satisfy
voters, who were clamoring for some positive action which would end
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the unrest in the prisons, the General Court of the Commonwealth
enacted the Omnibus Corrections Reform Act. In addition to the
political motives for support of the bill, some legislators supported
the Corrections Reform Act out of a disillusionment and distrust of
the existing corrections bureaucracy and the penal philosophy which
emphasized a custodial and punitive approach to corrections. Governor
Sargent's support of the bill, along with the support of the leader-
ship of the legislature helped guarantee its enactment into law.
Because of the above realities, the initial absence of any organized
opposition, and proper timing in terms of the convergence of public
sympathy for corrections reform and turmoil within the prisons of
Massachusetts which dramatized the problems in the prisons, the
Corrections Reform Act became law.
Corrections reform in Massachusetts during the seventies
illustrated the same pattern as the reforms of the fifties, that is,
prison disruptions and inmate uprisings leading to forward reforms of
very short duration, usually of one to two years, then a retrenchment
and general tightening up by politicians and prison officials. At
the same time of this official retrenchment, there is a growing lack
of interest in prisons, prisoners and related issues among the public
until finally, the public memory dims completely about the critical
problems of prisons and the need for prison reforms. Public inaction,
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apathy and a lack of concern for non-crisis situations in the prisons
impeded the implementation of Chapter 777. In 1975, prison reforms
were a pressing issue for very few people in Massachusetts.
Actors in the corrections reform movement in Massachusetts
were plagues by their inability to resolve many of the conflicts
inherent in discussions and actions around corrections reform. These
conflicts were often ignored in developing the issues, tactics and
strategies necessary to bring about correctional change in Massachu-
setts. It was difficult to develop a true corrections reform ideology,
because of the absence of a science of rehabilitation. An observation
regarding this point is that both the abolitionists and the pragmatists
questioned the validity of rehabilitation as a major goal of correc-
tions. We really do not know how to rehabilitate! Rehabilitation
implies the ability to change values, attitudes, and behavior.
Most of the reformist fervor in corrections was motivated by
a belief or a feeling that the system as it presently existed was not
working. Reformers felt that large, congregate institutions just had
not effectively rehabilitated nor improved the likelihood of a crime
free future for most offenders. This disillusionment with prisons
meant that the corrections system had not reduced crime. If offenders
were rehabilitated, there would probably be lower rates of recidivism
and less crime. The evidence, however, does not exist that small,
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community based institutions will work any better. We only know with
certainty that over time it is cheaper to operate a system of
community correctional programs that a system of large correctional
institutions.
The foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion that Chap-
ter 777 was a narrow approach to corrections reform in that the under-
lying premise of the bill was a commitment to theories of rehabilita-
tion. In Chapter 777, the rehabilitative setting changed from a
total reliance on large custodially oriented prisons to smaller
community based programs at the later stages of the sentence. Implicit
in Chapter 777 was the assumption that rehabilitation could best
occur in a community correctional setting. Theoretically, as
conceived in Chapter 777, community based corrections offered no real
alternative to incarceration. The real irony of the corrections
reform movement in Massachusetts was that starting from assumptions
and premises similar to earlier corrections reformers, they ended up
rhetorically supporting alternatives to corrections, but in actuality
devising a system of mini urban prisons. The rhetoric of corrections
reform in Massachusetts during the early seventies outstripped the
reality of what was politically feasible and the ability of Boone to
achieve it.
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Subilosky was furloughed two days later and subsequently escaped.
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CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE MASSACHUSETTS
CORRECTION REFORM MOVEMENT
July 22, 1971. Governor's Committee on Crime and Law
Enforcement announces the availability of $300,000 in federal funds
to support community corrections in Massachusetts.
September 17, 1971. Attica evokes response, Governor Sargent
disturbed and wants to promote progressive prison reforms in Massa-
chusetts. Legislators are fearful of another Attica in the Common-
wealth and as solutions some propose penal reforms and others propose
a "get-tough" policy. Peter Goldmark, the new Secretary of Human
Services, gives penal reforms a high priority and hires an aide to
concentrate on prisons.
September 25, 1971. Beginning of a four day non-violent
stoppage by inmates at MCI-Walpole and MCI-Norfolk to protest penal
and parole conditions.
September 29, 1971. Walpole inmates air gripes to top offi-
cials; they seek immediate implementation of changes recommended in
the report of the President's Crime Commission modern penal code,
e.g., restructuring of parole system, better educational facilities
and conjugal privileges. Legislators pledge help to improve prison
conditions. Goldmark announces the names of the persons selected by
the Governor to form the Massachusetts Citizens Committee on Correc-
tions. The Citizens Committee's mandate was to study specific griev-
ances of prisoners and the guards and to report back to the Governor.
October 1, 1971. Steps taken toward reform by Department of
Corrections administrators and prison officials: Mail no longer read
by prison officials, but only checked for contraband when it is incom-
ing and Governor asked legislature to repeal the two-thirds law.
Inmates at Walpole and Norfolk go back to work. Controversial points
still under negotiation: increased visiting privileges to three times
per week including one-night visitation; no splitting of families
during visiting period; opening of new gym in former tobacco shop;
weekly phone calls at prisoner's expense; increased funds for educa-
tion and an audit of finances in that department over alleged fund
discrepancies; removal of several staff members for alleged
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incompetency, discrimination or improper procedures. Convicts offer
list of reforms for which they solicit public support: repeal of
present two-thirds law, vocational educational programs in county
jails and prison camps; granting sheriffs and the corrections commis-
sioner power to allow carefully selected inmates parole eligibility
for lifers; equalizing good behavior time at all institutions; and
revision of parole board membership and selection.
October 20, 1971. Governor Sargent in the wake of Attica
rebellion and unrest in Massachusetts prison files bill to repeal
two-thirds parole law even though it failed in the House earlier in
the year.
--Senator Backman says "Legislation alone will not cure the
ills of our penal institutions."
November 3, 1971. Massachusetts prison officials urge the
following reforms: home furloughs already in existence for forestry
camp inmates, extended to 150 of 2000 prisoners in state institutions;
high school diploma required for new prison officers; all guards over
50 years old to take re-orientation training; 2 1/2 days good conduct
time per month to inmates enrolled in work programs at State mental
hospital and schools for the retarded.
--Perennial reform measures refiled after defeat last year:
creation community correctional centers; transfer of some lifers to
forestry camps; permitting forestry camp inmates to attend classes
at nearby vocational schools; allow more prisoners to take part in
work release; allow prisoners who are within 90 days of discharge or
parole to leave prison to secure employment or living quarters.
November 5, 1971. Walpole inmates locked in their cells
following work stoppage.
November 7, 1971. Night raids at Norfolk Prison by State
Police and prison guards in which 16 alleged troublemakers are forci-
bly transferred from Norfolk into Walpole and Concord.
--Allegedly Commissioner Fitzpatrick knew about the transfers
and had approved them. Subsequently 14 of the 16 were exonerated at
disciplinary hearing.
--Raid and transfers attributed to inmate threats that prison
would be burned and guards murdered.
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November 9, 1971. About two days after the Norfolk raid,
Comr. Fitzpatrick announced his resignation due to ill health;
resignation effective when new commissioner is found.
November 18, 1971. Norfolk prison guard, George M. Moore
charged that prisoners were dragged from their cells in their bare-
feet and underclothes; one inmate was "used as a battering ram to
open a door;" prisoners taken in raid "at the indiscriminate whim"
of prison guards.
November 21, 1971. According to Dominic Presti, president
at the Officers' Union at Walpole, a planned rebellion in which
inmates at Walpole and planned to seize at least 20 corrections
officers and civilian employees as hostages was averted by a general
lockup of inmates until a thorough search for weapons and other
contraband was completed.
November 30, 1971. Telegram sent to Gov. Sargent by a group
of 100 religious, legal, academic and community leaders and originated
by Packard Manse, Inc. urging him to visit correctional institutions
to see conditions for himself; close by executive order the solitary
confinement units at Bridgewater; to tell public of need for prison
reform; tell Drisoners of his concern for them and urge them to re-
sist temptation to self-destructive actions; point out to correctional
officers his concern for their fears and their difficult role; and
assure them that their safety and self-interest are best protected
by constructive prison reform.
December 2, 1971. Judge Harry Elam, Chairman of the Citizens
Committee on Corrections released report. The major flaw of Mass.
corrections system was an emphasis on punishment and control rather
than corrections and rehabilitation. Other problems were inadequate
and obsolete vocational and educational programs and a call for repeal
of the 2/3s law. Recommendations were to improve treatment and living
conditions of offenders.
December 6, 1971. Twenty representatives of groups concerned
with prison reform requested Sargent to close Bridgewater segregation
units; visit prisons and forestry camps; make a policy statement on
future penal reform in Mass; endorse peaceful negotiations between
inmates and prison administrators; order return to Norfolk of those
inmate negotiators transferred to other prisons last Nov. 7; appoint
a citizen advisory panel to help implement the committee on correction
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recommendations; and allow private prison reform groups to interview
Fitzpatrick's successor.
December 8, 1971. Gov. Sargent begins first of several
unannounced visits to Massachusetts corrections institutions at
Bridgewater facility.
December 17, 1971. Boone offered position as Massachusetts
Commissioner of Corrections and he would become the second black
department head in Gov. Sargent's administration and would join Wel-
fare Commissioner Steven Minter to integrate the cabinet.
December 21, 1971. Governor announced his prison reform plan;
state-wide system of halfway houses and community corrections centers
for offenders; repeal of current 2/3s parole law; creating a non-
profit prison industry corporation paying inmates $1.75 per hour;
recruiting black and Spanish speaking correctional workers; and
establishing inmate staff councils in all state prisons.
--prison reform program seen as facing a tough battle in
legislature because of problems of implementation mainly in funding
and location of halfway houses.
December 22, 1971. Boone appointed and officially introduced
as the new Commissioner of Corrections.
January 7, 1971. John 0. Boone sworn in by Gov. Sargent as
head of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections succeeding
John H. Fitzpatrick.
February 16, 1972. Boone closes segregation unit at Bridge-
water.
-- Department officials announce opening of four halfway
houses for parolees in the spring.
February 18, 1972. Boone appoints two out-of-staters as new
superintendents: Robert H. Donnelly at Walpole and George H.
Bohlinger at Norfolk.
February 28, 1972. Boone speaks out against the death penalty.
March 15, 1972. SRO crowd at public hearing give community
endorsement to plans for correctional halfway house and diagnostic
center at Boston State Hospital in Mattapan.
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March 16, 1972. Boone went to Concord in response to
complaints by inmates of poor conditions and inadequate facilities
and to their request to see him.
--Promised them paint and other supplies to refurbish their
94 year old cells.
March 17, 1972. Walpole State Prison inmates "riot;" major
disturbance,rampage, fires set, black inmate stabbed in the back,
damage originally estimated at $200,000 by Dept. of Corrections,
but later official estimates set damage at $1.6 million
--inmates contend that guards instigated the rampage in
an attempt to embarass the prison officials.
March 21, 1972. Comr. Boone and Mel Bernstein, a Goldmark
aide, talked to women at Framingham who staged a nonviolent demonstra-
tion of sympathy for Walpole inmates.
--Billerica inmates staged a peaceful sympathy sitout to
demonstrate solidarity with Walpole prisoners.
-- Continued violence at Walpole caused Boone and Bernstein
to be airlifted to Walpole where Boone addressed the entire prison
population by intercom.
--Boone started crash training program for correction officers
because violence at Walpole demonstrated curcial need for training
guards.
March 22, 1972. Fired and rehired Mrs. Gloria Cuzzi, Supt.
of Framingham within a 45 minute period because of her inability to
cope with volatile sitin at the institution.
--When Framingham guards threatened to quit if Mrs. Cuzzi
was fired, Boone reinstated her.
March 23, 1972. Boone questioned for 2 hours by House Ways
and Means Committee on $30 million budget request.
--Boone denied newspaper stories which quoted him as blaming
the legislature for not providing enough funds for his Department
and for not enacting Governor's prison reform bill.
March 24, 1972. Sargent said present unrest in Mass. prisons
is because Boone is new and his new superintendents are being tried
out and tested by inmates and officers.
--Boone reshuffling personnel within the Department of
Corrections.
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March 25, 1972. About 20 Jaycees, acting as community
representatives visited inmates at Walpole in six hour shifts around
clock, listening to their complaints.
--Dominic Presti, President of Walpole guards union, denied
that officers are testing Boone, but insisted that if Gov. had met
with guards as they had requested since early fall, some of the recent
problems in prisons would have been averted.
April 1, 1972. Guards at Walpole, Framingham and Bridgewater
stage a "sick-out;"
-- 34 Walpole guards later disciplined with five-day
suspensions.
April 2, 1972. Massachusetts Penal Committee, an umbrella
organization of corrections officers lobbying for a bill to end
"permissiveness" and to take corrections out of state Office of
Human Services and lodge it within the Office of Public Safety.
-- Guards' union officials and Rep. Flaherty call Boone a
puppet and contend that Goldmark actually runs the Department of
Correcti ons.
April 7, 1972. Sen. Francis McCann charges that Boone's
appointment is illegal on the grounds that he does not have 5 years
adult correctional administrative experience.
April 20, 1972. Mass. State Labor Council AFL-CIO sharply
attacked Boone's plan to use $4 per day inmate labor on state
financed correction project at Boston State Hospital as inappropriate
in a tight labor market and contrary to Sargent's reform package.
April 24, 1972. 200 riot equipped state troopers ringed
Norfolk Prison after scuffle between inmates and officers touched
a rebellion by about 40 prisoners.
April 25, 1972. Walpole guard stabbed; the stabbing leads to
a shakedown where knives and a homemade bomb were found.
April 26, 1972. Walpole guards threaten wildcat strike to
protest lack of security within institution; Boone holds meeting with
them.
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April 29, 1972. Sickout at Framingham; 33 out of 39 guards
and instructors called in sick in what Boone termed a "full-fledged
work stoppage"
May 2, 1972. Widespread sickout growing to include Framing-
ham, Walpole, Bridgewater and creating a state of emergency within
the prisons.
--Boone indicated that guards' grievances were not formally
atriculated to him and also there was the possibility of court
action and sanctions including dismissal of the more than 200
guards who called in sick.
May 3, 1972. Volunteer help such as Jaycees sought to keep
prisons functioning if the walkout by guards continued beyond Monday
night.
May 4, 1972. Comr. Boone appointed Walter E. Williams, man-
power director of ABCD as his deputy commissioner for community
services responsible for the Dept. of Corrections administration
and finances as well as its halfway houses.
May 4, 5, 1972. Initially 16 corrections officers at Walpole
suspended for 5 days without pay for allegedly failing to have a
doctor certify their claim of being too ill to work during last
Monday's sickin.
May 24, 1972. Two Walpole inmates killed when trying to make
a bomb which exploded; shakedown ordered and some weapons were found.
May 25, 1972. Norfolk County DA Burke launches investigation
to determine how contraband materials for making guns and bombs ended
up in the hands of two Walpole State Prison inmates.
May 26, 1972. Boone asked legislature for $500,000 for
improved security and rehab programs at state penal institutions.
--Boone pledged tighter security and pleaded for viable
programs and other incentives for tractable inmate majorities.
--Supt. of Norfolk asked legislature for $300,000 for
supplement to pay his workers and operate prison until June 30.
June 7, 1972. Comr. Boone fired Mrs. Cuzzi as acting Supt.
of Framingham because of their long-standing dispute over prison
policy.
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--Named Kenneth Bishop, director of treatment at Framingham
as interim replacement.
July 31, 1972. Boone named Dorothy L. D. Chase as Framingham
superintendent.
August 2, 1972. Presidents of the guards' unions of five
state institutions met with Governor and Boone and demanded ouster
of the Comr. of Corrections and threatened drastic action, legal
or otherwise if Boone is not ousted.
--demanded that guards be placed under the Department of
Public Safety and given police powers.
-- guards cited Boone's policy changes at all institutions over
the objections of superintendents and employees as leading to a low
morale among guards.
--union officials charged laxity in not immediately trans-
ferring 6 inmates involved in planning of a potential escape plot
as leading to multiple murder which could have been avoided.
August 3, 1972. Boone's life has been threatened three times
since he took office 6 months ago.
-- Legislators ask for suspension of all visiting privileges
at the 5 institutions and a shakedown search for weapons and contra-
band; they also requested a special Senate investigating committee
to look into problems at state prison .'
--Rep. Royal Bolling accused prison guards of deliberately
conducting a campaign to discredit Boone in an attempt to force his
resignation; also charged that system operated for the convenience
of the guards with emphasis on job security and personal advancement.
--Sargent backs Boone and has no plans to oust him.
August 8, 1972. Guards' wives request Sargent to issue
immediate executive order ousting Boone and to convene a special
session of the legislature to consider placing Dept. of Corrections
under the Dept. of Public Safety.
--suit for Boone's removal filed by attorney for state
correctional institution employees and charged: "that unrest,
agitation, bloodshed, division and controversy run rampant within the
Department of Corrections and threatens to spread; the plaintiffs
question the lawfulness of their Dept. heads appointment and authority
to control their emplyement relationship; and that an actual con-
troversy has arisen as to the plaintiffs' compliance with the
purported comr's directives."
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--Sargent and 400 Walpole inmates voice support for Boone.
"I don't think he's been given a chance by some people," Sargent says.
--Walpole resumed its usual routine yesterday after a 2 day
lockup of all 593 prisoners during shakedown which followed after
4 inmates were caught last Saturday night allegedly preparing to
escape.
August 9, 1972. Mass. prison guards' unions petition Supreme
Judicial Court to declare Commissioner Boone unqualified for his job
because he lacks the five years adult correctional administrative
experience prescribed by law.
--Mass. Council on Crime and Correction offered to conciliate
the differences between prison officers and Commissioner Boone and
reaffirmed their support for Boone and the state's corrections
reform act of 1972 and urged constructive communication among all
sides.
August 11, 1972. Legislative Commission on Correction
questioned a policy reportedly instituted by Boone to end alleged
harassment of inmates visitors in state's correctional facilities
which forbade prison officials from searching visitors and ordered
guards "not to stare" at visitors while they were talking to
inmates; instructed prison officials to have inmates "shaken down"
after their visitors leave and before they were returned to prison
population.
--Guards circulating a petition in support of Supt. Donnelly
and appealing to him to remian at his post.
--18 black organizations support Boone and call upon leader-
ship of guards' unions to cease their opportunistic and self-serving
attacks upon the Comr. and join with us in affirming his authority.
August 17, 1972. AGs office told the Mass. Supreme Court
that corrections officers do not have legal authority to question
the qualifications of Boone; even if guards successfully prove
their charges, they cannot result in Boone's ouster.
August 18, 1972. Fact-finding committee headed by former
Commissioner John Gavin absolved Boone and Norfolk prison personnel
of any blame in connection with the July 31 shootout at Norfolk;
concluded that incidents which resulted in the tragic deaths at
Norfolk were in no way related to reform policies which were being
pursued.
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August 29, 1972. Norfolk County DA blamed a "wrong policy"
followed by Boone's office for contributing to the July 31 shootout
at Norfolk.
--Burke, the DA, had urged Commissioner's office to transfer
Elliot just 6 days before the tragedy because of an escape plot.
--Burke, also charged the Boone's new prison policies were
leading to organized crime setting up and operating out of Walpole
and Norfolk prisons; also charged a 10 fold increase in crime inside
prison walls since January.
September 5, 1972. Boone rushed to Walpole after inmates
declared a work stoppage in protest of what they term "intolerable
conditions."
--Inmates believed that fellow con who died in Sunday's
stabbing at institution could have been saved with prompt medical
assistance and questioned whether the entire episode was set up by
the guards.
September 6, 1972. AG Quinn's office considered seeking court
action to remove Boone because he allegedly does not have experience
required by law for position.
September 8, 1972. AG Quinn's office to defend Commissioner
against suit challenging Boone's qualifications for the post; after
reviewing the case AGs office believed Boone had about six years
of adult correctional administrative experience.
--AG convinced that correctional administrative work includes
any phases of rehabilitation and social work.
September 11, 1972. Boone blamed Mass. prison unrest on
revolutionary philosophical transformations which all penal institu-
tions in the country are experiencing;
--major emphasis of new philosophy is on institutional treat-
ment of prisoners is shifting to an emphasis on helping a man re-enter
the community with a greater promise to function responsibly; refused
to criticize guards, but placed source of conflict with guard leader-
ship.
September 18, 1972. Rep. Thomos Colo chairman of Special
Commission on Corrections which has conducted a six-month inquiry into
Mass. penal system questioned and challenged Boone's administrative
capacity to pull people together and to pull programs together.
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September 25, 1972. Goldmark and Boone among top state
officials called before the Norfolk County Grand Jury to discuss the
continuing unrest at Walpole State Prison and Norfolk Prison Colony.
September 29, 1972. Norfolk County grand jury returned
26 indictments in its investigation of violence at Norfolk Prison
Colony and Walpole State Prison.
October 2, 1972. Mass. Comr. Corr. Boone intends to enforce
a gag rule which has applied to all departmental employees for a
decade, but previously ignored and prison employees intend to fight
it.
--as of September 19, the gag rule was to be strictly
enforced so that only the Superintendent or persons authorized by
him or, by the commissioner could release information pertaining to
inmates or the institution to news services.
October 10, 1972. Boone testified for more than three hours
before Supreme Judicial Court defending himself against charges that
he is not qualified to head the state Dept. of Corrections.
November 8, 1972. Supreme Judicial Court ruled that Comr.
Boone has all qualifications and experience required by Mass. law to
hold his job as head of state Dept. of Corrections.
November 13, 1972. Boone installed Raymond Porelle as
superintendent of Walpole which for the past 10 months was plagued
with unrest and violence.
-- Boone promised that Porelle will provide "the discipline,
security and fairness we so badly need."
November 14, 1972. Walpole inmate Ray Rich murdered.
November 21, 1972. Fourteen Concord inmates escape during
disturbance.
December 3, 1972. Walpole inmate Robert Bennett murdered,
stabbed 50 times.
--4th murder victim at Walpole in 1972.
December 20, 1972. Guard held hostage in Walpole cellblock
several hours by seven inmates, released unharmed.
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December 29, 1972. Porelle instituted 24 hour cell lockup for
inmates; shakedown for contraband.
-- State troopers back up guards
-- Boone deputy held briefly at gunpoint by guard on prison
driveway.
January 4, 1973. Porelle transferred nine inmate "trouble-
makers" to other prisons throughout the country.
-- Federal judges later rule that inmates' due process rights
were violated.
January 5, 1973. Porelle displayed 300 plus contraband
items, knives, bombs, files, spikes, narcotics, home brew, pornography
confiscated during shakedown.
January 7, 1973. Prisoners' Rights Project lawyer accused
10 guards of "systematic brutality," later files damage suits for
three inmates.
January 16, 1973. Boone, Porelle, and Goldmark asked to
appear before Social Welfare Committee after an impromptu visit by
several committee members to Walpole.
January 19, 1973. Porelle announced creation of "cadre
quarters" for more inmates, promises lockup to end in a few days.
January 27, 1973. Inmates allowed first visitors since
December 29.
-- Lawyers previously let in on Federal Court orders.
February 6, 1973. Boone's plan for 20-man cadet corp of
correction officer trainees to be recruited from the ranks of
minority groups came under attack from legislators who said if whites
were excluded Boone would be violating both the Provisional Appoint-
ments Law as it applies to veterans and also the Unlawful Practices
Law which is designed to guarantee employment to all.
February 8, 1973. Porelle announced beginning of sweeping
security crackdown, breakup of "prostitution" and inmate "laundry
racket"
--End of shakedown and lockup.
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February 12, 1973. Inmate fire-setting disturbances quieted
by outside firemen, guards, with state trooper back up force.
--inmates put under 24 hour lockup.
--Norfolk County DA to meet with Boone before deciding whe-
ther to press charges against the Dept. of Corr. for noncompliance
with the law requiring that his office be informed of irregularities
at either Walpole or Norfolk State Prisons.
February 14, 1973. Porelle took leave on order of his doctor
and Boone, who praised Porelle's "bravery and leadership."
February 19, 1973. Lockup ends at Walpole.
--outside observers enter prison.
February 20, 1973. Inmate "union" National Prisoners' Rights
Association (NPRA) claims recognition by prison administration.
--"cadre quarters" abolished and Boone predicted disassocia-
tion of this cadre of inmates to whom Porelle granted special priv-
ileges because their cooperation with the administration would lessen
tensions at Walpole.
February 21, 1973. State Rep. William Owens charged that
guards "deliberately sabotaging" prison operations at Walpole.
February 22, 1973. Porelle returns from leave.
February 23, 1973. Walpole's Catholic chaplain, Rev. John
Foley, calls last shakedown, "savage, inhumane."
February 27, 1973. Black Caucus urged Boone to take immedi-
ate steps to alleviate present conditions at Walpole Prison and to
restore confidence of the inmates and administration.
--7 week lockup and shakedown had devastating effect and
reformers found Boone's response to prohibitions against reporters
and external organizational representatives entering the prison as
puzzling.
--stated that it is clear that Porelle is incapable or unwill-
ing to enter into meaningful negotiations with the inmates.
--time for Boone to exercise full responsibility vested in
his position.
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February 28, 1972. Porelle declares state of emergency, allows
news media inside prison, first such access since December 28.
--NPRA demands Porelle's removal.
March 1, 1973. Boone and Rep. Colo presented with 14 point
list of demands by Walpole leaders of NPRA which ended with statement
that "the only answer to crisis at Walpole is immediate removal of
Porelle"
--inmates cited excessiveness of Porelle lockups; latest
lockup at Walpole ended Feb. 19; but on Feb. 28, Porelle declared a
state of emergency after leaders of the 570 inmates broke off nego-
tiations for resuming regular prison activities and cellblocks were
littered and defaced.
--in written message to all Walpole inmates, Boone tacitly
reaffirmed his support for Porelle and invited responsible men of
Walpole to join him and Porelle in resolving grievances that have
caused a 3 day stalemate at the facility and in making Walpole an
integral part of the new correctional process; prolonged lockups at
Walpole could be considered a harsh measure, but said they were
necessitated by 7 inmate fatalities in 1972.
--Boone to give detailed responses to 14 points when he
communicates with State Rep. Colo chairman of the Legislative
Commission on Correction.
March 2, 1973. Porelle says guards "gaming" him, tells Boone
he's quitting leaves prison for last time at 11 p.m.
March 3, 1973. NPRA says inmates will return to work, clean
up debris, and enter "good faith" negotiations after what they
believed to be Porelle's resignation.
March 4, 1973. Acting Supt. of Walpole Kenneth Bishop agreed
to disciplinary hearings for inmates in segretation, says strip
searches of visitors ended, restored inmate telephone privileges.
March 5, 1973. 11 of 57 inmates moved from segregation to
regular cellblocks at Walpole.
March 6, 1973. Walpole inmate stabbed 11 times and hospital-
ized.
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March 7, 1973. Corrections officer at Walpole cut by inmate.
--Guards called Boone to prison locker room meeting and tell
him to "pack your bags".
--Boone's track record at Walpole: 7 murders, 30 stabbings
and with Porelle's resignation, 5 superintendents in one year.
March 8, 1973. Inmates agreed to go back to work in return
for outside observers in Walpole Prison around the clock.
March 9, 1973. Boone accuses guard culture of managing
Walpole.
--Walpole's calmest day in 11 weeks as inmates went back to
work; guards reported to work on time for all shifts; outside observ-
ers entered prison to watch for possible reprisals against inmates.
March 13, 1973. 3 male inmates transferred from Concord
have taken up residence at Framingham Women's Reformatory; later in
the week, 9 more inmates from Walpole State Prison will join
Concord trio; all these male inmates are considered safe security
risks and will help out in the facility's maintenance.
--Guards' union threatens strike in two days over segragation
hearings, inmate headcount procedures, other issues.
March 14, 1973. Boone declared state of emergency at prison;
threatens to fire strikers; and mobilizes skeletal staff to run
Walpole.
March 15, 1973. Corrections officers, their wives, and other
foes of Boone testified in State House hearing that conditions at
Walpole have become intolerable since Comr. Boone took office; called
for transfer of Department of Corrections from Human Services to
Dept. of Public Safety in order to maintain safety and security of
institutions; prevent the loss of life to inmates and personnel; and
end inmate control of prison which resulted from permissive policies.
--Day and evening guard shifts 120 men report for duty,
walkout on strike, are suspended five days without pay; Disciplinary
hearings for 205 guards, civilian strikers scheduled but later
postponed indefinitely.
March 16, 1973. Acting Supt. Walter Williams offers to lift
suspensions if striking workers (guards and civilian employees) go
back to work.
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March 22, 1973. Each of 111 corrections officers of Walpole
prison who were suspended for refusing to work in maximum security
facility have been notified when their individual cases will be
reviewed and possible penalties, e.g., discharge, further suspension,
transfer, demotion, or loss of pay.
--officers will be allowed legal counsel at the disciplinary
hearings.
March 23, 1973. Walter Waitkevich, one of Comr. Boone's
trouble shooters named acting Supt. at Walpole succeeding acting Supt.
Kenneth Bishop who will become special assistant to Supt. Chase at
coed institution (Framingham).
March 25, 1973. Dept. of Corr. sought contempt citation
from AG against guards for refusing to work in interior of Walpole.
--prisons being manned by supervisory personnel, including
those from other prisons who have received special training.
--scattered work stoppages, latest development in 3-sided
controversy beteeen guards, inmates, and prison administrators with
guards saying prisoners were running the institution and demanded
prison control be given back to them.
--they work only on prison wall at check points and on
other duties which have dept them away from the inmates because
they fear physical violence if they come in direct contact with
inmates.
--inmates taking their own noonday headcount.
--murderet and convicted lifer Joseph Subilosky escaped
while on 12 hour furlough from Walpole; public furor arises.
March 26, 1973. Boone ordered investigation into granting
of a 12 hour furlough to a lifer against his personal orders.
--Told Acting Supt. Waitkevitch to determine if the
action was the result of a mistake involving a breakdown in
communication or actually an effort to undermine the furlough
program at Walpole.
March 31, 1973. Boone defended state's prison furlough
system in the heat of growing controversy of responsibility over
release of Walpole lifer.
--Administrator of Walpole's prison furlough program was
suspended/resigned pending clarification.
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April 3, 1973. Legislation filed to prohibit granting of
furloughs to inmates sentenced to life imprisonment.
April 8, 1973. Boone stated that he had no intention of
resigning and that he had no knowledge of AG Quinn's suggestion that
he ought to quit because he had outlived his effectiveness.
April 9, 1973. Senate Pres. Kevin Harrington said he wanted
to see Boone's administration of the department changed, but he has
no intention of asking for his resignation.
April 12, 1973. Controversy over responsibility for the fur-
lough to convicted murderer Joseph Subilosky continued to rage with
Boone blaming and sending letters of reprimand to Richard Fields, a
prison counselor who served as furlough officer from March 21 to
March 26 and Walter Anderson previous acting associate supt. of Wal-
pole and Norfolk D.A. Burke laying the blame on Boone.
--Controversy continued in public hearing before the Legis-
lative Commission on Corrections chaired by Rep. Colo.
May 12, 1973. Sen. Quinlan newly announced candidate for
Sec'y of State joined with those who were calling for Boone's
resignation.
--Boone should resign because prison situation in Mass.
has moved from one of chaos to an impasse.
May 15, 1973. Boone insists that he has no present plans
to leave Mass. amidst growing rumors that he has applied and is
being considered for the top corrections post in Illinois.
May 18, 19, 1973. Walpole inmates rioted causing $429,000
in damages.
May 21, 1973. Sargent says Boone doing "best he could under
most trying circumstances," adds it is unfair to make one person the
fall guy.
June 4, 1973. Correction Dept. says furloughs 98.6 percent
successful, with 61 AWOLS out of 4209 passes issued since November.
June 12, 1973. Walpole inmate died when lacquer was poured
over his body and matches thrown into the cell to ignite a fire.
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--Boone suspended a guard with pay and without prejudice after
the Ad Hoc Committee on Prison Reform sharply critized the alleged
absence of an officer from the cell area in the fire murder of a
maximum security inmate at Walpole.
June 16, 1973. Walpole inmate stabbed to death, four
days after inmate burned to death.
June 18, 1973. Gov. Sargent expected to reaffirm his
support for Comr. Boone tomorrow by rejecting several recommendations
.by a legislative commission including one calling for Boone's
ouster.
--Boone ordered daily shakedowns without lockups at Walpole
prison after Saturday night stabbing death of a recent Walpole inmate.
--Boone attributed murders to "an old system with serious
middle management problems."
-- Gangwars and individual grudges, but not racial problems
given as possible causes of latest two Walpole murders.
June 20, 1973. Boone stated that he had not been pressured
by Sargent to leave Mass. and has not considered resigning.
-- "If I become a roadblock and they decide that I am a
roadblock, they know what to do. In the meantime, I came to
this state to do a job and I'm going to do it."
June 21, 1973. Special Senate Committee on Corrections called
for the establishment of a new Dept. of Correction and Rehabilitation
at the level of a secretariat.
--legislators criticized Sargent for his inaction and insen-
sitivity during the problems at Walpole.
--State Police investigators assigned to Norfolk County DA
Burke have records of 50 felonies committed inside Walpole in the
last month.
June 22, 1973. Sargent announced Boone's removal "at my
request" over statewide television appearance.
-- Prison reform under Boone was a major failure, but vowed
he would not abandon it in principle.
-- Sargent taking a hardline with riotous inmates at Walpole
by turning prison operations over to State Police; named State
Police Colonel John Moriarity to take over Walpole Prison and to
serve as its temporary Supt.
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--suspended furlough program at Walpole; ordered State
troopers to tighten internal security in the cell block.
--reduced visiting rights to protect against the smuggling
of drugs and weapons into the prison.
--appointed Deputy Comr. Joseph Higgins as acting comr.
--inmates were furious over Boone's firing; they threw
food at the guards, rammed their beds against cell doors. Sargent
indicated that Boone would be kept on state payroll in some capacity,
"Boone resigned against his wishes. He is no quitter. He wanted
to keep going."
APPENDIX B
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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
Bender, Evelyn, Corrections Specialist, League of Women Voters of
Massachusetts. Interviews, Fall 1974.
Bernstein, Mel, Former Director of Public Information, Massachusetts
Department of Corrections, Boston, Massachusetts. Interview.
Blake, Frank, Former Legislative Assistant to Senator Jack Backman,
New York, New York and Cape Cod, Massachusetts. Interview.
Boone, John 0., Former Commissioner of Corrections, Boston, Massa-
chusetts, 1973-1975. Interviews.
Brin, Louis, Editor Jewish Advocate and Veteran Social Activist,
Boston, Massachusetts. Interview.
Bryant, David, Director of Programs, Boston Pre-Release Center,
Boston, Massachusetts, Interview.
Carney, Frank, Director of Research and Planning, Massachusetts
Department of Corrections, Boston, Massachusetts. Interview.
Carver, John, Director Massachusetts Council on Crime and Corrections,
Boston, Massachusetts. Interview.
Coles, Arnold, Chairman External Board of the National Prisoners'
Reform Association of Massachusetts. Interview.
Demone, Dr. Harold, Executive Director United Community Planning
Council, Boston, Massachusetts. Interview Spring 1975.
Hanson, Herb, Deputy Director of the Massachusetts Correctional
Association, Boston, Massachusetts. Interview.
Lanckton, Van, Attorney, Executive Office of Human Services, Boston,
Massachusetts. Interview Fall 1974.
409
Lazarus, Carol, Former Staff Member, Massachusetts Council on Crime
and Corrections, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Interview Spring
1975.
LeClair, Dan, Staff Associate, Department of Corrections, Boston,
Massachusetts. Interview Spring 1973.
Lindsay, Margot, Chairperson, Committee for the Advancement of
Criminal Justice, Boston, Massachusetts. Interview Fall 1974.
Mascarello, Henry, Director, Massachusetts Correctional, Boston,
Massachusetts. Interview Fall 1974.
McDonald, Brian, Director Massachusetts Research Center, Boston,
Massachusetts, Interview Spring 1975.
Palmer, Robert, Chairman of the Governor's Advisory Committee on
Correction, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Interview Winter 1975.
Perry, Dain, Deputy Director, Massachusetts Council on Crime and
Correction, Boston, Massachusetts. Interview Fall 1974.
Riley, J. Bryan, Executive Director of Massachusetts Halfway Houses,
Inc., Boston, Massachusetts. Interview.
Ryan, Phyllis J., Organizer and Press Spokesperson for the Ad Hoc
Committee for Prison Reform, Newton, Massachusetts. Interview.
Saltonstall, Tom, Former Legislative Aide to Senator Quinlan, Boston,
Massachusetts. Interview, Spring 1975.
Sargent, Francis, Former Governor Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Boston, Massachusetts. Interview Summer 1975.
Sesling, Skip, Legislative Assistant to Sen. Jack Barkman, Boston,
Massachusetts. Interview, Fall 1973.
Siris, Peter, President MERIC, Inc., Boston, Massachusetts. Interview
Spring 1974.
Speicher, Don, Former Aide to Mr. Boone. Boston, Massachusetts.
Interview.
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Stern, Dr. Walter, United Community Planning Council, Boston,
Massachusetts. Interview.
Tyler, Sam, Former Executive Director Massachusetts Council on Crime
and Corrections, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Interview.
Williams, Walter, Former Deputy Commissioner of Community Corrections,
Boston, Massachusetts. Interview.
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QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEWS
1. What were the origins of the corrections reform movement in
Massachusetts during the early 1970's? What specific factors
provided impetus for prison reform through progressive legis-
lation? What was your role in the corrections reform move-
ment?
2. Who were the prison reformers? How did they propose to reform
the prisons? What were their strategies for change? What
ideology or world view shaped their ideas about prison reform?
3. How did Chapter 777 come into being and what kind of ideology
or world view does it reflect? Who were the principle actors
involved in drafting the legislation? What was your input
into the development of the reform legislation?
4. How and why did the reform bill proceed through the legislature
successfully? What was your role in the bill's passage?
5. Why was Mr. Boone selected as Commissioner of Corrections? What
was his penal philosophy? What were his views on corrections
reform? How did he respond to the continuing unrest in the
institutions? What did Mr. Boone accomplish as Commissioner?
6. Who were the opponents of prison reform in Massachusetts? Did
these opponents also oppose Mr. Boone as the state's top
corrections administrator? What were their interests in
opposing prison reform? What did the opponents accomplish?
7. What was/is the significance of the corrections reform effort
in Massachusetts. What happened as a result of the reform
movement?
8. What did Chapter 777 accomplish? What was not accomplished by
Chapter 777? Did Chapter 777 bring about any lasting reform?
Was Chapter 777 successful or unsuccessful in terms of its
consequences? Its effective implementation, etc.?
APPENDIX C
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413
Distribution of LEAA Funds FY 1969-1973
(in thousands)
Comprehensive Plans
Action Grants
Discretionary Grants
Aid for Correctional
Institutions and
Programs
(E Block & E Disc.)
Manpower Development
National Institute
of Law Enforcement
and Crimina: Justice
Data Systems and
Statistical Assistance
Technical Assistance
Administration
1971 1972
*An additional $14.2 miion in approprialed LEAA funds were transferred to the Department
of Justie.
$698,723
$35,000
$841.166*
$48.535
$480,180
$86,887
$103,264
$43,934
$267,937
$21,000
$182,750
$32,000
$18,000
$7,500
$528,954
$26,000
$340,000
$70.003
$47,500
$22,500
$7,500
$4.000
$4,000
$7,454
$31,598
$21,200
$10,000
$15,563
$1,000
$1,200
$4,487
1970
$60,000
$19,000 /
$24,650
$4,350
$6,500
$3,000
$ . .
$5 --
$2,500
1969
'0
$413,695
$73,005
$97,500
$31,000
$21,000
$9,700
$6,000
$11,823
1973
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MASSACHUSETTS JOINT CORRECTIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION
January 1972
Alben Barrows
286 Newbury Street
Peabody, MA. 01960
John 0. Boone, Commissioner
Department of Correction
100 Cambridge Street
Boston, MA. 02202
Sheriff John J. Buckley
Box 565
Billerica, MA 01821
James B. Carson
Assistant Commissioner
Department of Public Welfare
600 Washington Street
Boston, MA 02111
Martin Davis, Chairman
Parole Board
100 Cambridge Street
Boston, MA. 02202
Harold W. Demone, Jr., Ph.D., Co-Chairman
Executive Director
United Community Services
14 Somerset Street
Boston, MA. 02100
Michal Feldman, Senior Attorney
Boston Legal Assistance Project
84 State Street
Boston, MA. 02109
thief Thomas F. Ganley, President
Massachusetts Chiefs of Police
Association
Lynnfield, MA. 01940
Peter C. Goldmark, Jr., Chairman
Secretary of Human Services
100 Cambridge Street - Room 904
Boston, MA. 02262
Phillip Green
Department of Health, Education
and Welfare
Region I
John F. Kennedy Building
Boston, MA. 02203
Commissioner John S. Louis
Massachusetts Rehabilitation
Commission
296 Boylston Street
Boston, MA. 02116
Mrs. Charles Lynch (Margaret)
619 Jerusalem Road
Cohaset, MA. 02025
John P. Manning
Associate Commissioner (Acting)
Massachusetts Department of
Education
Division of Occupational Education
182 Tremont Street
Boston, MA. 02108
Henry J. Mascarello, Executive
Director
Massachusetts Correctional
Association
33 Mount Vernon Street
Boston, MA. 02108
Commissioner Joseph V. McBrine
Penal Department, Suffolk County
Commissioner's Residence
Deer Island
Winthrop, MA. 02152
A. Louis McGarry, M.D., Director
Division of Legal Medicine
Department of Mental Health
190 Portland Street
Boston, MA. 02114
Thomas McGlynn
Boston Court Resource Project
14 Somerset Street
Boston, MA. 02108
Dr. Jerome C. Miller, Commissioner
Department of Youth Services
14 Somerset Street
Boston, MA. 02108
The Honorable Robert H. Quinn
Attorney General of Massachusetts
State House
Boston, MA. 02133
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Derek.Rohinson, M.D.
Division of Community Operations
Room 360
Department of Public Realth.
600 Washington Street
Boston, MA. 02111
Arnold R. Rosenfeld, Executive Director
Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Criminal Justice
80 Boylston Street
Boston, MA. 02116
C. Eliot Sands, Commissioner
Office of the Commissioner of Probation
New Court House Room 206
Boston, MA. 02100
Mrs. Lois Elease Stryker
Principal Counselor
Division of Employment Security
Charles F. Hurley Building - 1st Floor
Corner of Stantford and Cambridge Streets
Boston, MA. 02114
Lamont L. Thompson, Vice President
W B Z
1170 Soldiers Field Road
Boston, MA. 02134
Reverend Robert J.
Chairman, Advisory
Correction
8 Parcher Avenue
Old Orchard, Maine
Material should he sent to the following:
Benedect S. Alper, Boston College
David S. Dayton, TDC
George Fosque, Governor's Committee
James Isenberg, Human Services
J. Bryan Riley, MHHI
Stephen Teichner, Governor's Office
White
Committee on
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SENATE . .*. . . . No. 1161
MESSAGE FROM
HIS EXCELLENCY, THE GOVERNOR,
FRANCIS W. SARGENT,
RECOMMENDING LEGISLATION TO ACCOMPLISH
NECESSARY REFORMS IN THE CORRECTIONAL
PROCESS.
February 9, 1972.
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EXECuTIvm DEPARTMENT,
STArsi Housn, BosToN, February 9, 1972.
To the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives:
Today, I file for your consideration perhaps one of the most
important pieces of legislation that I will present to you this ses-
sion. The legislation, attached as an appendix, calls for a com-
prehensive and complete overhaul of the structure of the Depart-
ment of Correction. It is designed to provide our Department with
the tools necessary to rehabilitate the offenders committed to It
so as to allow them to re-enter society with a lesser likelihood of
committing another crime. We can no longer afford to have men
and women who have been incarcerated released on the streets of
our communities unprepared to accept responsibility and to con-
tribute to society. It has become time for us to give the profes-
sionals who run our Department of Correction the tools they need
In order to perform this task.
Concern about the ability of our Department of Correction to
perform its duties. is not limited to the Executive Department.
The legislation that is being submitted today has been produced
in a non-partisan, deliberate forum under the sponsorship of the
Joint Correctional Planning Commission. The Attorney General
has contributed thoughtful criticism and has helped provide im-
portant leadership to the task force. Five legislators have repre-
sented the majority and minority sides of the House and Se.ate:
Senators Bulger and McKenzie, Representatives Flaherty, Colo,
and Healy.
All of us believe this legislation points in the direction toward
which the Commonwealth must now move, and all of us believe
this bill provides an important and reasonable framework around
which to focus our efforts.
The legislation outlines in great detail the duties of the Com-
missioner of Corrction. It also claifies the relationship between
the state and county institutions and proposes an update of laws
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dealing with prison -industries so as to allow the inmates to learn
a viable profession. Finally, and perhaps most important of all,
it proposes a system with continuity in it. No longer will an in-
mate be allowed to fall through the cracks of a bureaucracy. The
Commissioner is charged with classification of the inmate and
with periodic review of the progress that inmate is making. We
are also insured, under this legislation, that an inmate will have
the advantage of being supervised by the same person or groups of
people from-the day he enters the institution until the day he is
finally off parole. There are some who say that this is all a waste.
You can't really rehabilitate these people. We can no longer acA
cept this logic. The time has come for us to face the reality. Over
90 per cent of the people who are presently incarcerated in our
prisons some day will be released. That means that they will be
returning to our communities. We have a choice. We can have
them released prepared or we can have them released on a hit-or-
miss basis. I suggest to you that the old system has been hit-or-
miss. The one I propose today is a rational plan to protect society.
urge you to pass this reorganization of the Department of Cor.
rection.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANCIS W. SARGENT,
Governor,
Commonwealth of Mfassachusett.
423
1972.] SENATE - No. 1161. 5
0J4t (ritt rtilh Di fpu3Lilx3
In the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Two.
AN ACT TO ACCOMPLISH NECESSARY REFORMS IN THE CORRECTIONAL
PROCESS.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General
Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:
1 SECTION 1. Chapter 27 of the general laws is hereby
2 amended by striking out section one, as most recently
3 amended by chapter 116 of the acts of 1971, and inserting in
4 place thereof the following section: -
5 Section 1. There shall be a department of correction, under
6 the supervision and control of a commissioner of correction.
7 The commissioner shall be the executive and administrative
8 head of the department and all state correctional facilities
9 shall be under his supervision and control. He shall receive
10 a salary of twenty-four thousand nine hundred and ten do'lars
11 and shall devote his full time during business hours to the
12 duties of his office. Upon expiration of the term of office of
13 a commissioner, his successsor shall be appointed by the
14 governor for a term coterminous with that of the governor.
15 At that time of appointment to said office, a person so ap-
16 pointed shall be qualified by educational background, shall
17 have had at least five years of professional experience In
18 correctional administration, shall have an established record
19 of high character and qualities of leadership, and shall have
20 demonstrated inter( t and knowledge of criminal justice ad-
21 ministration and the custody and rehabilitation of criminal
22 offenders.
1 SECrION 2. Said chapter 27 is hereby further amended by
2 striking the first paragraph of section two, as most recently
3 amended by chapter 1, 102 of the acts of 1971, and Inserting
4 in place thereof the following paragraph: -
5 The commissioner shall, with the approval of the governor,
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6 appoint and may, with like approval, remove a deputy com-
7 missior"er for jreftutional. services, a deputy commissioner
8 for classification and treatrnenLi, a deputy commissioner for
9 personnel and training, and a deputy commissioner for com-
10 munity services, each of whom shall receive a salary of eighteen
11 thousand seven hundred dollars and each shall devote his full
12 time during business hours to the duties of his office. Alf
13 such deputy commissioners shall possess qualifications of
14 character and ability similar to that required of the com-
15 missioner, and shall have had training and experience in work
16 generally similar to those required of the commissioner or
17 otherwise suitzbly preparing them for the work of their re-
18 spective offices. They shall not be subject to the chapter
19 thirty-one.. The commissioner may designate any deputy
20 commssioner to discharge the duties of the commissioener
21 during his absence or disability.
1 SECTION 3. Said chapter 27 is hereby further amended by
2 striking out section five, as most recently amended by chap-
3 ter 769 of the acts of 1965, and inserting in place thereof
4 the following section: -
5 Section 5. The Parole Board shall: (a) within its jurisdic-
6 tion, as defined in section one hundred and twenty-eight of
7 chapter one hundred and twenty-seven, determine which com-
8 mitted offenders may be released on parole, and when and un-
9 der what conditions, and the power within such jurisdiction to
10 grant a parole permit to any committed offender and to re-
11 voke, revise, alter or amend the same, and the terms -'nd
12 conditions on which it was granted shall remain in the parole
13 board until the expiration of the maximum term of the sen-
14 tence or sentences for the service of which such offender
15 was committed, or until the date which has been determined
16 by deductions from the maximum term of his sentence or
17 sentences for good. conduct, or unless otherwise terminated;
18 (b) be the advisory board of pardons with the powers and
19 duties in relation thereto set forth in section one hundred and
20 fifty-four of chapter one hundred and, twenty-seven; (c) keep
21 records of its decisions and acts and notify the. commissioner
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22 of correction of its decisions relating to parole of committed
23 offenders; (d) employ subject to appropriation and the re-
24 quirements of chapter thirty and chapter thirty-one an ex-
25 ecutive secretary and such hearing officers, clerks, attorneys,
26 and other employees and consultants as the work of the
27 parole board may require (e) make, promulgate and publish
28 rules and regulations relating to parole eligibility, to conduct
29 of parole hearings, the conditions of parole, and other mat-
30 ters relating to the policies and procedures of the parole
31 board; (f) coordinate the work of the parole board with the
32 work of the department and, from time to time, meet with
33 the commissioner and his deputies to develop, plan, review and
34 approve policies and procedures relating to community based
35 correctional programs; (g) make an annual report to the
36 governor, general court, secretary of human services, and
37 the commissioner.
38 Any three members of the board may be appointed by the
39 chairman to act as the parole board having jurisdiction over
40 the granting or revocation of paroles. He may also designate
41 any member to act in his absence as the executive and ad-
42 ministrative head of the board.
1. SECTION 4. Chapter 30A of the general laws Is hereby
2 amended by adding after section one the following new sec-
3 tion: -
4 Section 1A. The department of correction shall be subject
5 to sections one through eight, Inclusive, and shall not other-
6 wise be subject to this chapter, notwithstanding the exclusion
7 of said department from the definition of the word "agency"
8 In section one.
1 SECTIoN 5. Chapter 111 of the general laws is hereby
2 amended by striking section twenty, as most recently amended
3 by chapter 76 of the acts of 1947, and Inserting in place
4 thereof the following section: -
5 At least twice cach year the department shall Inspect each
6 correctional facility, as defined in section one of chapter one
7 hundred and twenty-five, in the commonwealth, and shall file
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8 a report of its findings and recommendations with respect to
9 each such facility with the department of correction, the
10 secretary of human services and the superintendent or ad:
11 ministrator of each such; facility.
1 SEC'rIoN 6. Chapter 124 of the general laws is hereby
2 amended by striking out section one, as most recently amended
3 by chapter 731 of the acts of 1965, and inserting in place
4 thereof the following section: -
5 Section 1. In addition to exercising the powers and per-
6 forming the duties which are otherwise given him by law,
7 the commissioner of correction, in this chapter called the
8 commissioner, shall:
9 (a) designate, establish, -Maintain, -and administer such
10 state correctional facilities as he deems necessary, and may
11 discontinue the use of such state correctional facilities as he
12 deems appropriate for such action;
13 (b) maintain security, safety and order at all state cor-
14 rectional facilities, utilize the resources of the department to
15 prevent escapes from any such facility, take all necessary
16 precautions to prevent the occurrence or spread of any dis-
17 order, riot or insurrection at any such facility, and take
18 suitable measures for the restoration of order;
19 (c) establish and enforce standards for all state correctional
20 facilities;
21 (d) establish standards -for all county correctional facilities
22 and secure compliance -with such standards, if necessary,
23 through the enforcement provisions of section seventeen of
24 chapter one hundred and twenty-seven;
25 (e) establish, maintain and administer programs of rehabili-
26 tntion, including but not limited to education, training and
27 employment, of persons committed to custody of the depart-
28 ment, designed as far as practicable to prepare and assist
29 each such person to assume the responsibilities and exercise
30 the rights of a citizen of the commonwealth;
31 (f) establish a system of classification of persons committed
32. to the custody of the department for the purpose of develop.,
33 ing .a rehabilitation for ,each person;
427
1972.] SENATE -No. 1161. 9
'34 (g) determine at the time of commitment, and from time to
35 time thereafter, the custody requirements and program needs
36 of each _person committed to the custody of the department
37 and assign or transfer such persons to appropriate facilities
38 and programs;
39 (h) establish training programs for employees of the de-
40 partment and, by agreement, other corrections personnel, Ir
41 accordance with the provisions of section nine of chapter one
42 hundred and twenty-five;
43 (I) investigate grievances and inquire into alleged mis-
44 'conduct within state correctional facilities;
45 (j) maintain adequate records of persons committed to the
46 custody of the department;
47 (k) establish and maintain programs of research, statistics
'48 and planning, and conduct studies relating to correctional
49 progms and responsibilities of the department;
50 (1) utilize, as far as practicable, the service and resources
51 of specialized community agencies and other local community
52 groups in the rehabilitation of offenders, development of pro-
53 grams, recruitment of volunteers and dissemination of infor-
54 mation regarding the work and needs of the department;
55 (m) make and enter any contracts and agreements neces-
56 sary or incidental to the performance of the duties and execu-
57 tion of the powers of the department, including but not limited
58 to contracts to render services to committed offenders, parolees
59 and ex-offenders, and to provide for training or education for
60 correctional officers and staff; .
61 (n) seek to develop civic interest in the -work of the de-
62 partment and educate the public and advise the general court
63 as to the needs and goals of the corrections process;
64 (o) expend annually in the exercise of his powers, per-
65 formance of his duties, and for the necessary operations of
66 the department such sums as may be appropriated therefore
67 by the general court;
68 (p) report annually to the secretary of human sermice, the
69 governor and the general court;
70 '(q) make and promulgate necessary rules and regulations
71 incident to the exercise of. his powers and the perfornai=
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72' of his duties including but not limited to rules and regulations
73 regarding nutrition, sanitation, safety, discipline, recreation,
74 religious services, communication and visiting privileges, classi-
75 fication, education, training, employment, care, and custody
76 for all persons committed to correctional facilities.
1 SECTION 7. Said chapter 124 is hereby further amended
2 by striking the last paragraph of section two, as most re-
3 cently amended by chapter 770 of the acts of 1955, and in-
4 serting in place thereof the following two paragraphs: -
5 Subject to the supervision and control of the commissioner,
6 the deputy commissioner for community services shall be re-
7 sponsible for (a) planning and directing community programs
8 and services provided to committed offenders, (b) furnishing
9 to the parole board all records and information the parole
10 board may require including but not limited to reports pre-
11 pared by institutional parole officers, offenders' parole plans,
12 reports of prior criminal records, and records of offenders'
13 conduct while under custody, (c) supervising offenders re-
.14 leased on parole permits granted by the parole board and
15 supervising offenders pardoned on parole conditions, (d) as-
16 signing, directing and supervising filed parole officers, institu-
17 tional parole officers, and other employees and agents to su-
18 pervise and assist committed offenders and parolees to. pre-
19 pare for release and attain successful readjustment within
20 the community.
21 Each of the said deputy commissioners shall perform such
22. other duties as may be assigned to him from time to time by
23 the commissioner.
1 SECTION 8. Said chapter 124 is hereby further amended by
2 striking from the second sentence of section six, as most re-
3 cently amended by chapter 770 of the acts of 1955, the words,
4 "the institutions named in section fifty-one of chapter one
5 hundred and twenty-seven" and inserting in place thereof
6 the words, "state and county correctional facilities."
1 StcnoN 9. Said chapter 124 is horeby furLhortamended by
2 adding the following section:t-
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3 Section 10. The department shall be a corporation for the
4 purpose of taking, holding and administering in trust for
5 the commonwealth any grant, gift or bequest made either to
6 the commonwealth or to It, for the use of persons under Its
7 control in any correctional facility of the department or for
8 expenditure upon any work which the department is au-
9 thorized to undertake. The department may accept, receive
10 and use money, goods or services given for the general pur-
11 poses of the department by the federal government or from
12 any other source, public or private, and may comply with
13 such conditions and enter into such agreements upon such
14 covenants, terms and conditions as the department deems.
-15 necessary or desirable, provided the agreement is not In con-
16 flict with state law.
.17 The department, subject to the approval of the governor,
.18,.shall select the site .of any new-state correctional facility and
19 any land to be taken or purchased by the commonwealth for
20 the purposes of any new or existing state correctional facility.
21 If any land or property is taken or purchased by the depart-
22 ment, title shall be taken in the name of the commonwealth.
1 SECTION 10. Chapter 125 of the general laws Is hereby
2 amended by strildng section one, is most recently amended
3 by chapter 731 of the acts of 1956, and inserting in place
4 thereof the following section:
5 Section 1. As used in this chapter and elsewhere in the
6 general laws, unless the context otherwise requires, the follow-
7 ing words shall have the following meanings:
8 (a) "administrator", chief administrative officer of a county
9 correctional facility;
10 (b) "commissioner", the commissioner of correction;
11 (c) "committed offender", a person convicted of a crime
12 and committed, under sentence, to a correctional facility;
13 (d) "correctional facility", any building, enclosure, space or
14 tructure used for the custody, control and rehabilitation of
15 committed offenders and of such other persons as may be
16 placed in custody therein in accordance with law-
17 (e) "correctional Institution", correctional facility;
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18 (f) "county correctional facility", any correctional facility
19 owned, operated, administered or subject to the control of a
20 county of the commonwealth;
21 (g) "department", the department of correction;
22 (h) "discharge", the final termination of the sentence of a
23 committed offender;
24 (1) "escape", unlawful self-removal from official custody or
25 failure to return to official custody following authorized ab-
26 sence from a correctional facility;
27 (j) "gainful employment", employment within or without
28 any correctional facility including but not limited to labor for
29 the operation and maintenance of any correctional facility;
30 (k) "in custody", subject to the direction or supervision of
31 an official of the department or of a correctional facility;
32 (1) "inmate", a committed offender or such other person
33 as is placed in custody in a correctional facility In accordance
34 with law;
35 (m) "institution", facility;
36 (n) "penal institution", correctional facility;
37 (o) "prison", correctional facility;
38 (p) "prisoner", a committed offender and such other per-
39 son as is placed in custody In a correctional facility in ac-
40 cordance with law;
41 (q) "state correctional facility", any correctional facility
.42 owncd, operated, administered or subject to the control of the
43 department of correction, Including but not limited to: Massa-
44 chusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole; Massachusetts Cor-
45 rectional Institution, Norfolk; Massachusetts Correctional In-
46 stitution, Concord; Massachusetts Correctional Institution,
47 Framingham; Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Bridge-
48 water; Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Plymouth;
49 Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Warwick; Massachu-
50 sctts Correctional Institution, Monroe;
51 (r) "state prison", Massachusetts Correctional Institution,
52 Walpolo;
53 (s) "superintendent", the chief administrative offilcer of a
54 state correctional facility.
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1 SECMON 11. Said chapter 125 is hereby further amended
2 by striking section nine, as most recently amended by chapter
3 494 of the acts of 1957, and inserting in place thereof the
4 following section: -
5 Section 9. The commissioner shall establish a training
6 academy and such other courses or places of training as he
7 deems necessary for the training of correction officers, other
8 employees of the department, persons appointed as correction
9 officer trainees in accordance with this section and, by agree-
10 ment, officers of county correctional facilities. The commis-
11 sioner may appoint as a correction officer trainee, for a period
12 of full-time training including on-the-job training, any citizen
13 of the commonwealth who meets the qualifications required
14 of applicants for appointment to the position of correction of-
15 ficer. Appointment to the position of correction officer trainee
16 shall not be subject to section nine A and nine B of chapter
17 thirty, or chapter thirty-one, nor shall a correction' officer
18 trainee be entitled to any benefits of such laws or civil service
19 rules. Such appointment may be terminated in accordance
20 with such conditions as the commissioner may prescribe. A
21 correction officer trainee shall receive such compensation and
22 such leave with pay as the commissioner shall determine and
23 shall be considered an employee of the commonwealth for
24 the purposes of workmen's compensation. Upon successful
25 completion of training, a correction officer trainee shall be
26 appointed, if a vacancy exists, to the position of provisional
27 correction officer.
28 In accordance with civil service laws and rules the division
29 of civil service shall certify the names of applicants from an
30 established list for corrnion officers tQ the commissioner who
31 shall appoint said appuicants as correction officers. Newly ap-
32 pointed correction officers who have not successfully com-
33 pleted training as correction officer trainees shall be assigned
34 to a period of training as the commissioner shall prescribe.
35 Notwithstanding any civil service law or rules, a correction
36 officer must serve a probationary period of nine months be-
37 fore becoming a full-time perniument employee of the depart.
38 ment. Tinie spent in training shall be considered a part of
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39 the probationary period.
40 A correction officer trainee shall not be subject to or entitled
41 to the benefits of any retirement or pension law nor shall
42 any deduction be made from his compensation for the pur-
43 pose thereof; but a correction officer trainee who during the
44 period of his training, or provisional appointment status passes
45 a competitive civil service examination for appointment to
46 the Department of Correction and is appointed a permanent
47 full-time correction officer, shall have his trainee service con-
48 sidered as "creditable service" for purposes of retirement,
49 provided he pays into the annuity savings fund of the retire-
50 ment system such amount as the retirement board determines
51 equal to that which he would have paid had he been a mem-
52 ber of said retirement system during the period of his train-
53 Ing.
54 Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, but
55 subject, however, to the provisions of section sixty of chapter
56 one hundred and nineteen, no person who has been convicted
57 of a felony, or who has been confined in any jail or house of
58 correction, shall be appointed to any position in the department
59 of correction unless the commissioner certifies that such ap-
60 pointment will contribute substantially to the work of the
61 department, except that in no case shall such a person be
62 appointed to the position of correction officer.
63 The commissioner may expend such sums as may be ap-
64 propriated or otherwise received to maintain and operate the
65 training academy and other training centers and prograsn and
66 maintain trainees and employees during any period of train-
67 Ing.
1 SECTION 12. Said chapter 125 is hereby further amended by
2 striking the first sentence of section sixteen, as most recently
3 amended by chapter 868 of the acts of 1970, and inserting in
4 place thereof the following sentence: -All females convicted .
5 of crimes in the courts of the commonwealth and sentenced to
6 Imprisonment or otherwise committed to the custody of the
7 department shall be committod to-the Massachusetts Correc-
.8 tional Institution, Framingham, or to such other correctionl
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9 facility or facilities as the commissioner may from time to
10 time designate as appropriate for the purpose.
1 SECTION 13. Chapter 127 of the general laws is hereby
2 amended by striking section sixteen, as most recently amend-
3 ed by chapter 777 of the acts of 1957, and inserting in place
4 thereof the following section: -
5 Section 16. In accordance with paragraphs (d) and (q) of
6 section one of chapter 124 the commissioner shall establish
7 minimum standards for the care and custody of all persons
8 committed to county correctional facilities. Prior to establish-
9 ,ing such minimum standards the commissioner shall visit,
10 consult with and receive the recommendations of the sheriffs
11 of the several counties and the penal institutions commission-
12 er of the city of Boston, The commissioner shr4l require
13 from the sheriffs of the several counties and the penal in-
14 stitutions commissioner of the city of Boston periodic reports
15 on the population, operation and conditions of all county cor,
16 rectional facilities.
17 The commissioner may provide consultation scrvices for the
18 design and _construction of facilities, studies and surveys of
19 programs and administration and any other technical asist-
20 ance hedeems proper and necessary. In cooperation with the
21 county commissioners and administrators of each county, the
22 commissioner may develop and administer programs of grants-
23 In-aid or subsidies for any county correctional facility.
24 The commissioner shall approve all plans for the construc-
25 tlon or remodeling of any county correctional facility.
I SECTION 14. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended by
2 striking section seventeen, as most recently amended by chap-
.3 ter 770 of the acts of 1955, and inserting in place thereof the
4 following section: -
5 Section 17. At least once each six months the commission-
6 er or his delegate shall inspect each county correctional facil-
7 Ity' to determine compliance with minimum standards. The
8 results of such inspections shall be summarized in the annual
9 report of the commissionei to the general court, Personnel
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10 of the department shall be admitted to all county correctional
11 facilities as required for the purposes of this section.
12 If, in the opinion of the commissioner, any county correc-
13 tional facility does not comply with the standards established
14 by him for county correctional facilities, the commissioner
15 shall give notice of the alleged violation to the sheriff and the
16 county commissioners of the county in which such facility is
17 located except that in the case of the Suffolk County House of
18 Correction such notice shall be given to the penal institutions
19 commissioner of the city of Boston. Said notice shall specify
20 the particular standards that in the commissioner's opinion
21 have not been met by such. facility. The officials so notified
22 shall have the right to be heard by the commissioner with
23 regard to the alleged violation and shall have a reasonable
24 period of time to remedy any such violation. If. in the opinion
25 of the commissioner, the facility has not been brought into
26 compliance with the aforesaid. standards within a reasonable
27 time from the date when notice of their violation is given, the
28 commissioner may petition the Superior Court in equity in
29 the county in which the facility is located for an order to
30 close the facility or for other appropriate relief. The Superior
31 Court shall have jurisdiction to enter such an order.
1 SECTIoN 15. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended by
2 striking section 18, as most recently amended by chapter 77
3 of the acts of 1933, and Inserting in place thereof the follow-
4 ing section :-
5 Section 18. All correctional facilities shall provide, either
6 within such facilities or by access to medical facilities, medical
7 services sufficient to meet the needs of every person commit-
8 ted to such facilities. No person committed to any correctional
9 facility shall be compelled to participate in any manner in
10 any medical or other scientific experiment.
1 SECTION 16. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended by
2 striking section nineteen, as appearing In the Tercentenary
3 Edition, and inserting .inplace thereof the following section: -
4 Section 19. A committed offender shall have the right of
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5 free exercise of his religious belicfs,. the right to change or
6 adopt such beliefs, and the right to receive visitations from a
7 clergyman or other representative of his faith, provided that
8 a request for such visitation is submitted to the superintend-
9 ent or administrator. No committed offender shall be ordered
10 or compelled to participate in any religious activities. The ex-
11 ercise of religious beliefs may be restricted only upon a de-
12 fei-minination by the commissioner that such exercise would
13 interfere unreasonably with the maintenance of discipline
14 and security at a correctional facility.
1 SEcrIoN 17. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended
2 by striking section twenty, as most recently amended by chap-
3 ter 731 of the acts of 1956, and inserting in place thereof the
4 following section: -
5 Section 20. Every person committed to any correctional
6 facility shall be provided, in writing, all information necessary
7 to enable such person to understand both his rights and his
8 obligations while so committed. Such information shall be
9 provided immediately upon commitment arid on a continuing
10 basis thereafter, and shall include all current and revised reg-
11 ulations governing the treatment of persons in his category,
12 the disciplinary requirements of the facility, the authorized
13 methods of seeking information and making complaints, and
14 all other rules and regulations to which such person is subject
15 while in custody. If an offender is literate only in Spanish,
16 the aforesaid information shall be provided to such person In
17 Spanish. If an offender is literate in a language other than
18 English or Spanish, or is illiterate in all languagess, the afore-
19 said information shall be conveyed to such person orally in a
20 language which such person can understand.
1 SECTION 18. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended by
2 striking section twenty-one, as most recently amended by
3 chapter 770 of the acts of 1955, and inserting in place thereof
4 the following section: -
5 Section 21. The commissioner shall establish and maintain
6' classifidation programs for persons committed to the custody
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7 of the department. The administrators of county correctional
8 facilities shall establish and maintain such programs for per-
9 sons committed to such facilities under a sentence of twelve
10 months or more.
1 SECTION 19. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended
2 by striking sections 32 and 33 as most recently amended by
3 chapter 777 of the acts of 1957.
1 SECTION 20. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended
2 by striking section 36A, as most recently amended by chapter
3 777 of the acts of 1957, and inserting in place thereof the
4 following section:
5 Section 36A. All committed offenders shall have the oppor-
6 tunity to confer regularly with their legal counsel. If a com-
7 mitted offender in any correctional facility expresses a desire
8 to see and confer with a particular practicing attorney, or if
9 an attorney representing such offender so requests, or if an
10 attorney must interview any committed offender who may
11 be a witness in a case involving another client of said at-
12 torney, the superintendent or administrator of the facility
13 shall authorize the admittance of such attorney to the facility.
14 Any committed offender consulting with an attorney shall
15 have the right to confer alone and in private at the facility,
16 and for as long as necessary so far as practicable.
1 SECTION 21. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended by
2 inserting after section 38C the following new section: -
3 Section 38D. The commissioner shall make and promulgate
4 rules and regulations regarding procedures for reviewing the
5 grievances of all offenders committed to state correctional
6 facilitiesincluding a permanent mechanism for the recording
7 and review of complaints. The administrators of all county
8 correctional facilities shall make and promulgate rules arid
9 regulations for like procedures. The commissioner or his dle-
10 gate and other public officials shall have the opportunity,
11 during any inspection or authorized visit of a correctional fa-
12 cility, to qucstion or interview conmitted offenders out,of the
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13 hearing of the superintendent or administrator and other cor-
14 rectional personnal. A committed offender's right to file griev-
15 ances shall not be restricted nor shall discipline be Imposed
16 because of use of the grievance procedure or complaint to
17 any person.
1 SECTION 22. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended
2 'by striking sections 39 and 40, as most recently amended by
3 chapter 777 of the acts of 1957, and Inserting In place thereof
4 the following sections: -
5- Section 39. No committed offender shall be punished except
6 under the order of the commissioner or the superintendent or
7 administrator of the correctional facility in accordance with
8 applicable rules and regulations of the commissioner. The com-
9 missioner may order the transfer of a committed offender In
10 any state correctional facility, for such period as the commis-
11 sioner may determine,_to a segrggated unit__within-any state
12 correctional facility, for the enforcement of discipline or at the
13 request ofthecommitted offender.
14 Such segregated unit shall provide regular meals, fully furn-
15 Ished cells, limited recreational facilities, adequate medical
16 care, rights of visitation and communication by those proper-
17 ly. authorized, and shall meet such other standards as the
18 commissioner may establish.
19 Section 40. The commissioner may order that a committed
20 offender in any state correctional facility be conflned, for the
21 enforcement of discipline, to an isolated unit. No such con-
22 finement shall exceed fifteen days as the result of a single
23 disciplinary proceeding.
24 Such isolation units shall provide regular meals, adequate
25 medical care, -light, ventilation, adequate sanitary facilities
26 and shall meet such other standards as the.commissioner may
27 establish.
1 SECTION 23. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended by
2 striking the last paragraph of section 41, os, most recently
3 amended by chapter 770 of the acts of 1955, and Inserting
4 In place thereof the f6lloxvig paragraph:
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5 Such isolation units shall provide regular meals, adequate
6 medical care, light, ventilation, adequate sanitary facilities
7 and shall meet such other standards as the commissioner may
8 establish.
1 SEcTIoN 24. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended by
2 striking section 48, as most recently amended by chapter 770
3 of the acts of 1955, and inserting in place thereof the follow-
4 ing section: -
5 Section 148. The commissioner shall establish and maintain
6 education, training and employment programs for persons
7 committed to the custody of the department. The administrat-
8 ors of county correctional facilities shall establish and main-
9 tain such programs for persons committed to such facilities.
10 Such programs shall include opportunities for academic edu.
11 cation, vocational education, vocational training, other related
12 prevocational programs and employment, and may be made
13 available within correctional facilities or, subject to the re-
14 strictions set forth in section 49, at other places approved by
15 the commissioner. In determining which employment pro-
16 grams to establish and maintain under the authority of this
17 section, the commissioner or administrator 6hall take intLo ac-
18 count, first, the training value of the program, second, the
19 job market and employment conditions In the community and
20 third, in the case of programs to be carried out within a
21 correctional facility, the types of goods and services required
22 by the commonwealth and its subdivisions.
23 The commissioner shall make and promulgate rules and
24 regulations governing programs established under this seca
25 tion which shall include provisions for hours and conditions
26 of employment, wage rates, and incentive payments for edua
27 cation and training program participants.
1 SECrION 25. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended
2 by striking section 48A, as most recently amended by chap-
3 ter 590 of the acts of 1960.
1 SECTIoN 26. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amendeo by
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2 striking section 49, as most recently amended by chapter 770
3 of the acts of 1955, and inserting in place thereof the follow-
4 Ing section: -
5 Sertion 49. No committed offender who Is serving a life
6 sentence or a sentence for violation of section 1. 13B, 14, 15,
7 15A, 15B, 16, 17, 18, 18A, 19, 20, 21, 22, 22A, 23, 24, 24B, 25,
8 or 26 of chapter 265, or section 17, 34, 35, 35A. of chapter 272
9 or for an attempt to commit any crime referred to in -aid
10 sections shall be eligible to participate in education, tral. g
11 or employment programs established under section 48 ou
12 side a correctional facility until the date which is two years
13 before his first parole eligibility date, unless a majority of
14 the parole board authorizes such participation on a recom-
15 mendation by the commissioner or administrator on behalf of
16 a particular committed offender.-
'17 Any committed offender who is gainfully employed with-
18 In a correction facility shall be paid in accordance with wage
19 rates establishcd pursuant to chapter 151; provirded that such
20 wage rates shall not apply to volunteer work performed for
21 corporations organized under the provisions of chapter 180;
22 provided further that such wage rates shall not apply to labor
23 in programs certified by the Massachusetts Rehabilitation
24 Commission as evaluation or training programs designed to
25 determine vocational aptitude or to develop work habits or
26 to teach skills and knowledge related to specific job objectives.
27 In the case of a committed offender who participates in any
28 program outside a correctional facility established tinder sec-
29 tion 48, the time spent on such participation shall be tabu-
30 lated toward the serving of his sentence in the same manner
31 as though he had served such time within the facility. A
32 committed offender enrolled in any such program shall re-
33 main subject to the rules and regulations of the correctional
34 facility and shall be under the direction, control and super-
35 vision of the officers thereof during the period of his particid
36 pation in the program. The commissioner shall make and
37 promulgate rules and regulations regarding programs estab-
38 lished under section 48 outside correctional facilities. Such
39 rules and regulations shall Include pmvLsIons for resonabla
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40. periods of confinement to particular correctional facilities be-.
41 fore a committed offender may be permitted to participate In
42 such programs and provisions for feeding, housing and sup-
43 ervising participants in such programs in such manner as will
44 be calculated to maintain morale and prevent the introduction
45 of contraband to the facility.
1 SECIoN 27. Said chapter 127 Is hereby further amended
2 by adding the following section: -
3 Section 50. The commissioner shall regularly notify all
4 commonwealth purchasing agents and other Interested com-
5 monwealth, county, municipal and town officials concerning
6 goods and services available through employment programs
7 carried out under section forty-eight within correctional fa-
8 cilities. Upon such notification, no purchase of the same or
9 substitute goods or services shall be made without obtaining
10 a statement of exemption from the commissioner. Statements
11 of exemption shall be granted when suitable goods or serv-
12 ices cannot be supplied by the department or a county cor-
13 rectional facility within a reasonable time at prices competi-
14 tive with wholesale rates for similar goods and services.
1 SECrioN 28. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended
2 by striking section 51, as most recently amended by chapter
3 777 of the acts of 1957, and inserting in place thereof the fol-
4 lowing section: -
5 Section 51. Committed offenders who are gainfully em-
6 ployed outsidc a correctional facility may be so employed by
7 'an agency of the commonwealth other than the departmenf
8 of correction or by public or private employers. The rates
9 of pay and other conditions of employment for a committed
10 offender so employed shall be the same as those paid or re-
11 quired in the locality in which the work is performcd pro-
12 vided that no committed offender employed by an agency of
13 the commonwealth shall be subject to sections 9A or 9B of
14 chapter 30 or chapter 31, and in no case shall such rates of
15 pay.be less than those pid by his employer to other employ.
16 ees. doing similar work. No committed offender ishall to ed
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17 employed at a place where there exists any strike or work
18 stoppage arising from a labor dispute of any kind. No com-
19 mitted offender In a county correctional facility who is so
20 employed shall be deemed to be an employee of the county
21 under chapter 152.
1 SECMION 29. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended
2 by striking section 52, as most recently amended by chapter
3 770 of the acts of 1955, and Inserting in place thereof the
4 following section: -
5- Section 52. A committed offender participating in any
6 program in the case of a person committed to a county cor-
7 rectional facility, to the administrator thereof, his total earn-
8 ings or incentive payments less payroll deductions authorized
9 by law, including income taxes. Upon receipt of such earnings
10 or payments the commissioner or administrator, to the extent
11 reasonable, shall: - (a) deduct an amount determined by the
12 commissioner or administrator for substantial reimbursement
13 to the commonwealth or county for providing food, lodging
14 and clothing for the committed offender; (b) cause to be
15 paid any fine imposed on a committed offender by the court
16 which imposed sentence, any restitution included as part of a
17 committed offender's sentence, such sums as have been order-
18 ed by a court for the support of the family of the committed
19 offender and, with the consent, such other sums as are needed
20 for the support of his family and for payments of interest
21 and principal cn any of his outstanding debts; (C) allow the
22 person to draw from the balance of his earnings or incentive
23 payments a sufficient sum to cover his necessary or incidental
24 expenses; (d) credit to the person's account such amount as
25 remains after reductions are made in accordance with the pro-
26 visions of this section, paying the balance of his account to
27 him upon release on parole or discharge.
1 SECTION 30. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended by
2 striking sections 53, as appearing in the Tercentenary Edi-
3 tion, 54, as most recently amended by chapter 770 of the acta
4 of;1955, and 55 through 58 inclusive and 60 and 61; as' ap-
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5 pearing In' the Tercentenary Edition.
1 SECTION 31. Said chapter 127 Is hereby further amended
2 by striking sections 67, as most recently amended by chapter
3 777 of the acts of 1957, and 67A, as appearing in chapter 252
4 of the acts of 1932, and inserting in place thereof the following
5 section: -
6 Section 67. Goods and services produced in any correctional
7 facility shall, with the approval of the commissioner, be sold
8 by the superintendent or administrator at not less than the
9 wholesale market price prevailing at the time of sale for
10 goods or services of the same description and quality. The
11 proceeds of such sales shall be paid by the purchasers to the
12 respective correctional facilities from which the goods are de-
13 livered or at which the services are performed.
1 SECTION 32. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended
2 by striking from section 68, as most recently amended by
3 chapter 770 of the acts of 1955, the words "sections 67 and
4 67A, goods manufactured therein" and inserting in place
5 thereof the words "section 67, goods and services produced
6 therein."
1 SECTIoN 33. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended by
2 striking from section 69, as most recently amended by chapter
3 777 of the acts of 1957, the words, "state and county correc-
4 tional facility."
1 SECTION 34. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended
2 by striking section 72, as most recently amended by chapter
3 777 of the acts of 1957.
1 SECTION 35. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended
2 by striking the first sentence of section 73, as most recently
3 amended by chapter 777 of the acts of 1957, and inserting
4 In place thereof the following sentence: -
5 The superintendent or administrator of any correctional fa-
6 clty may sue or be sued upon any contract of purchase or
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7 sale made by him under sections 48 through 69 inclusive.
1 SECTION 36. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended
2 by striking sections 83E, as most recently amended by chapter
3 363 of the acts of 1957, 85, as most recently amended by
4 chapter 777 of the acts of 1957, 86, as most recently amended
5 by chapter 770 of the acts of 1955, 86A, as most recently
6 amended by chapter 715 of the acts of 1956, 86B, as most
7 recently amended by chapter 399 of the acts of 1960, 86C, as
8 most recently amended by chapter 312 of the acts of 1960,
9 86D, 'as most recently amended by chapter 478 of the acts of
10 1970, 86E, as appearing in clpter 723 of the acts of 1967,
11 86F, as appearing in chapter 821 of the acts of 1967, 86G,
12 as appearing in chapter 363 of the acts of 1968, 88 and 89,
13 as most recently amended by chapter 777 of the acts cf 1957,
14 90, as most recently amended by chapter 770 of the acts of
15 -1952, 90A, as most recently amended by chapter 40 of the
16 acts of 1970, 92 and 93, as most recently amended by chapter
17 770 of the acts of 1955, and 94, as appearing in the Ter-
18 cententenary Edition.
1 SECTION 37. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended
2 by striking section 97, as most recently amended by chapter
3 731 of the acts of 1956, and section 97A, as appearing In
4 chapter 624 of the acts of 1968, and inserting in place there-
5 of the following section: -
6 Section 97. The commissioner may transfer any committed
7 offender: (a) from one state correctional facility to another;
8 (b) with the approval of the sheriff of the county, from a
9 state correctional facility to a county correctional facility ex-
10 cept that a committed offender serving a sentence of impris-
11 onment for life may not be transferred to a county correc-
12 tional facility, or from a county correctional facility to a
13 state correctional facility except the Massachusetts Correc-
14 tional Institution, Walpole; (c) with the approval of the sher-
15 Iffs of both counties,. from a correctional facility of one
16 county to a correctional facility or another county; (d) with
17 the approval of the appropriate officials of the federal gov-
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18 ermnent, from a state correctional facility to any available
19 or appropriate correctional institution maintained and super-
20 vised by the federal government within the confines of the
21 continental United States; (e) to a correctional facility of
22 another state in accordance with any interstate compact to
23 which the commonwealth is a party. The commissioner may,
24 with the approval of the governor, enter Into reciprocal
25 agreements, contracts or other mutual plans to accomplish
26 transfers of committed offenders. Committed offenders so
27 transferred shall be subject to the terms of their original
28 sentences and, with the exception of committed offenders
29 transferred from one county correctional facility to another,
30 shall also be subject to the provisions of law governing par-
31 ole and discharge from state correctional facilities. The sher-
32 iff of any county, except Suffolk, may transfer committed
33 offenders from one correctional facility to another within
34 his own county. The commissioner shall make and promul-
.35 gate rules and regulations regarding transfer of committed
86 offenders pursuant to this section..
1 SECTION 38. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended by
2 adding the following three sections: -
3 Section 99. The commissioner may, on such terms and con-
4 ditions he may prescribe and in accordance with any com-
5 pact to which the cormmonwealth is a party, receive into the
6 custody of the department any person convicted by any court
7 of the United States or of any other state. While any such
8 person is confined at any state or county correctional facility
9 he shall be eligible for participation in the Eame rehabilita-
10 tion programs and subject to the same rules and discipline as
11 other committed offenders at such facility. All payments re-
12 ceived from the United States or from any other state for
13 the confinement of such persons shall be made to the state
14 treasurer.
15 Section 100. No committed offender shall be transferred for
16 reasons of mental illness to or from any facility of the de-
17 partment of mental health except in accordance with the
18 provisions of section 18 of chapter 123.
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19 Section 101. The commissioner may extend the limits of
20 the place of confinement of a committed offender at any
21 state correctional facility by authorizing such committed of-
22 fender under prescribed conditions to be away from such
23 correctional facility for a specified period of time, not to ex-
24 ceed 14 days. .The administrator of a county correctional fa-
25. cility may grant like authorization to a committed offender
26 in such facility. Such authorization may be granted for any
27 of the following purposes: (a) to attend the funeral of a rela-
28 tive; (b) to visit a critically ill relative; (c) to obtain medical,
29 psychiatric, psychological or other social services when ade-
30 quate by temporary placement in a hospital under sections
31 117, 117A, and 118; (d) to contact prospective employers; (e)
32 to secure a suitable residence for use upon release on parole
33 or discharge; (f) for any other reason consistent with the
34 reintegration of a committed offender into the community.
35 A person away from a correctional facility pursuant to this
36 section may be accompanied by an employee of the depart-
37 ment, in the discretion of the commissioner, or an officer of
38 a county correctional facility, in the discretion of the admni-
39 istrator.
40 Any expenses incurred under the provisions of this section
41 may be paid by the correctional facility in which the com-
42 mitted offender is committed. A committed offender shall,
43 during his absence from a correctional facility under this
44 section be considered as in the custody of the correctional
45 facility and the time of such absence shall be considered as
46 part of the term of sentence.
1 SECTIoN 39. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended
2 by striking the first paragraph of section 158, as most recent-
3 ly amended by chapter 770 of the acts of 1955, and inserting
4 in place thereof the following paragraph: -
5 Parole officers and agents assigned by the deputy com-
6 mIssioner for community services in accordance with section
7 2 of chapter 124 shall supervise, counsel and advise commit-
8 ted offenders released on parole from correctional facilities
9 and shall assist them in securing employment. Such officers
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10 and agents shall also render assistance and counsel to dis-
11 charged offenders who are in need of such help and perform
12 such other duties relative to discharged or released offenders
13 as the commissioner of correction may require.
1 SECTION 40. Notwithstanding any other provision of this
2 act, the amendments to section 5 of chapter 27 and to section
3 158' of chapter 127 effected by sections 3 and 39 of this act,
4 respectively, shall take effect ninety days after the qualifica-
5 tion of the deputy commissioner of community services ap-
6 pointed under the provisions of section 2 of chapter 27, as
7 amended by section 2 of this act. Notwithstanding any other
8 provision of this act, the requirement of section 49 of chap-
9 ter 127, inserted by section 26 of this act, that committed of-
10 fenders gainfully employed within correctional facilities shall
11 be paid in accordance with wage rates established pursuant
12 to chapter 151, shall take effect one year after the effective
I3 date of this act.
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Representatives present petitions to clerk of
House. With few exceptions (those which go
to the Rules Committees). petitions then go
to joint committee after concurrence by both
branches.
(2) 1ills may he rcported In either branch. If re-
p orted in Senate they are called "Senate
tills." If ill House, "liouse Bills."
(3) Hills lbvolviig expenditure of state, county,
or intuiiciial mney, after first reading In the
Senote. are referred to Senate Commnttee on
Ways anl lleans, Coitii.t., or Municipal Fi-
n:1n1e nles; the bill h1:1i Ien considerled by
the apppriate joilt coinumittee.
(4) 1Uill. ti ctin Atate finaiinces or inivolvin the
exp-eit~me of county or municipal n money
after first re.ading in the loius', are referred
to House Committee on Way. and Means,
Counties, or Municipal Finance unless the
bill has been considered by the appropriate
joint committee.
(5) First stag-c of debate In eIther branch on the
main questiom.
(6) All bills must be approved by Committee on
Ilills in 'l hird Ite-ding of either branch before
being rend a third time.
(7) Conmmittee of Conference may be requested at
any stage of a bill if difference arises between
the branches.
(8) When a lill containingr aln emeirgecy in-e-
Amble ha ar.a r epor I i.,atly and truly en-
e act by Hon V Conmmittr on Ungrossed
I1li. netion n msthe! r. hlle! alIne inj.t pre-
cede enlactlanmat 'A the bill. If tle hlouse adopta
the preamble and the Senate concurs, the bill
then reurns to the House for enactment.
(D) Governor may veto bill. Bill may become law
without his siglature if passed by two-thirds -
vote In both House and benate. Bill becomes
law if Governor does not sign it within five
dnys (legis!ature still being in sesGion). Gov-
ernor may send b;ack bill with nmendmncipt
reconmnnemnled. If again enacted, it may not
be sent back a seconad time.
All bill., affecting the General Laws become law
In 90 day~s. Special bill! hm-mome law. in 30 days,
unteass the lill carries, a dille rent provision. A ,ill
with an etmergencmay preanml. imecumes !:awe iimme-
diately.
The coir.;(e of Senate Milis is shown by solid lines.
The c.-urse of I1jume liili is shoawn by dot and
dalsha lines.
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CHAPTER 777
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THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousaid Nine Hundred and Svcienty- two
AN 1 CTRELATIVE TO THE ADKINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTIONS AND FACILITIES IN THE COMMONWEALTR.
Be it enacted bv the Scnate and HIouse of Representatives in General Court
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 2 of chapter 27 of the General Laws is hereby amended
by striking the first paragraph, as most recently amended by section 37 of
chapter 300 of the acts of 1971, and inserting in place thereof the following
parag-raph:-
The commissioner shall, with the approval of the governor, appoint and may,
with like approval, remove a depaty commissioner for institutional services, -3
deputy commissioner for classification and treatment, a deputy commissioner for
personnel and training, and a deputy commissioner for community services, each
of whom shall receive a salary of nineteen thousand five hundred and four
dollars and each shall devote his full time during business hours to the duties
of his office. All such deputy commissioners shall possess qualifications of
character and ability similar to that required of the commissioner, and shall
have had training and experience in work generally similar to those required of
the commissioner or otherwise suitably preparing them for the work of their
respective offices. They shall not be subject to the provisions of section
nine A and nine B of chapter thirty, or chapter thirty-one. The commissioner
may designate any deputy commissioner to discharge the duties of the commissioner
during his absedce or disability.
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SECTION 2. The- first paragraph of section 5 of said chapter 27, as appearing
in section 2 of chapter 765 of the acts of 1960, is hereby amended by inserting
after the word ''commissioner'', in line 32, the words:- ; (h) employ subject
to appropriation and the requirements of chapter thirty and chapter thirty-one
an e:'ecutive secretary and such hearing officers, clerks, attorneys, and other
employees and conzultants as the work of the parole bor! iy r! ;!ire.
SECTiON 3. Cha;cr 30A of the Cereral Laws is hereby amended by inserting
after section 1 the following section:-
Section IA. The department of correction shall be subject to sections one
through eight, inclusive, and shall not otherwise bp subject to this chapter,
notwithstanding the exclusion of said department from the definition of the
word ''agency'' in section one.
SECTION 4. Chapter 111 of the General Laws is hereby amended by striking
section 20, as most recently amended by chapter 76 of the acrs of 1947, and
inserting -in place thereof the following section:
Section 20. At least twice each year the department shall inspect each
correctional institution, as defined in section one of chapter one hundred and
twenty-five, and shall file a report of its findings and recommendations with
respect to each such facility with the department of correction, the secretary
of human services, the superintendent or administrator of each such facility, and
the general court.
SECTION 5. Chapter 124 of the General Laws is hereby amended by striking
out section 1, as most recently amended by chapter 731 of the acts of 1965,
and inserting in place thereof the following section:-
Section 1. In addition to exercising the powers and performing the duties
which are otherwise given him by law, the commissioner of correction, in this
chapter called the commissioner, shall:
(a) designate, establish, maintain, and administer such state correctional
facilities as he deems necessary, and may discontinue the use of such state
correctional facilities as he deems appropriate for such action; provided that no
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state or county correctional facility named in paragraph (n) of section one of
chapter 125 shall be discontinued without specific authorization and approval
of the General Court;
(b) maintain security, safety and order at all ztate correctional facilities,
utilize the resources of the department to prevent escapes frcm any such facility,
take all necessary precautions to prevent the occurrence or spread of any disorder,
riot or insurrection at any such facility, including but not limited to the
development, planning, and coordination of emergency riot procedures with the
commissioner of public safety, and take suitable measures for the restoration of
order;
(c) establish and enforce standards for all state correctional facilities;
(d) establish standards for all county correctional facilities and secure
compliance with such standards, if necessary, through the enforcement pro-
visions of section fifteen B of chapter one hundred and twenty-seven;
(e) establish, maintain and administer programs of rehabilitation, including
but not limited to education, training and employmnent, of persons committed to
the custody of the department, designed as far as practicable to prepare and
assist each such person to assume the responsibilities and exercise the rights
of a citizen of the commonwealth;
(f) establish a system of classification of persons committed to the custody
of the department for the purpose of developing a rehabilitation program for
each such person;
(g) determine at the time of commitment, and from time to time thereafter,
the custody requirements and program needs of each person committed to the custod
of the department and assign or transfer such persons to appropriate facilities
and programs;
(h) establish training programs for employees of the department and, by
agreement, other correction's personnel;
(i) investigate grievances and inquire into alleged misconduct within state
correctional facilities;
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(J) maintain adequate records of persons committed to the custody of the
department;
(k) establish and maintain programs of research, statistics and planning,
and conduct studies relating to correctional programs and responsibilities of
the department;
(1) utilize, as far as practicable, the services and resources of specializel
community agencies and other local community groups in the rehabilitation of
offenders, development of programs, recruitment of volunteers and dissemination
of information regarding the work and needs of the department;
(in) make and enter any contracts and agreements necessary or incidental
to the performance of the duties and execution of the powers of the department,
including but not limited to contracts to render services to committed offenders,
and to 'provide for training or education for correctional officers and staff;
(n) seek to develop civic interest in the work of the department and educate
the public and -advise the general court as to the needs and goals of the
corrections process;
(o) expend annually in the exercise of his powers, performance of his
duties, and for the necessary operations of the department such sums as may be'
appropriated therefor by the general court;
(p) report annually to the secretary of human services, the governor and
the general court;
(q) make and promulgate necessary rules and regulations incident to the
exercise of his powers and the performance of his duties including but not limited
to rules and regulations regarding nutritibn, sanitation, safety, discipline,
recreation, religious services, communication and visiting privileges,
classification, education, training, employment, care, and custody for all
persons committed to correctional facilities.
SECTION 6. Section 2 of said chapter 124 is hereby amended by striking out
the last paragraph, as appearing in section 8 of chapter 770 of the acts of
1955, and inserting in place thereof the following two paragraphs:-
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Subject to the supervision and control of the commissioner, the deputy
commissioner for community -services shall be responsible for planning and
directing community programs and services provided to committed offenders.
Each of the said deputy commissioners shall perform such other duties as
may be assigned to him from time to time by the commissioner.
SECTION 7. Said chapter 124 is hereby further amended by adding the follow-
ing section:
Section 10. The department shall be a corporation for the purpose of taking,
holding and administering in trust for the commonwealth any grant, gift or bequest
made either to the cotmonwealth or to it for the use of persons under its control
in any correctional facility of the department or for expenditure upon any work
which the department is authorized to undertake. The department may accept,
receive and use money, goods or services given for the general purposes of the
department by the federal government or from any other source, public or private,
and may comply with such conditions and enter into such agreements upon such
covenants, terms and conditions as the department deems necessary or desirable,
provided the agreement is not in conflict with state law.
The department, subject to the approval of the governor, shall select the
site of any new state correctional facility and any land to be taken or purchased
by the commonwealth for the purposes of any new or existing state correctional
facility. If any land or property is taken or purchased by the department, title
shall be taken in the name of -the commonwealth.
SECTION 8. Chapter 125 of the General Laws is hereby amended by striking
section 1, as most recently amended by chapter 731 of the acts of 1956, and
inserting in place thereof the following section:-
Section 1. As used in this chapter and-elsewhere in the general laws,
unless the context otherwise requires, the following words shall have the
following meanings:
(a) 'administrator'', chief administrative officer of a county correctional
facility'
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(b) ''commissioner'', the commissioner of correction;
(c) 'committed offender'', a person convicted of a crime and committed,
under sentence, to a correctional facility;
(d) ''correctional facility'', any building, enclosure, space or structure
used for the custody, control and rehabilitation of co:r~mitted offenders and of
such other persons as may be placed in custody therein in accordance with law;
(e) ''correctional institution'', correctional facility;
(f) ''county correctional facility'', any correctional facility owned,
operated, administered or subject to the control of a county of the commonwealth;
(g) 'department'', the department of correction;
(h) ''gainful employment'', employment within or without any correctional
facility including but not limited to labor for the operation and maintenance of
any correctional facility;
(i) ''inmate'', a committed offender or such other person as is placed in
custody in a correctional facility in accordance with law;
(j) "institution'', facility;
(k) ''penal institution'', correctional facility;
(1) ''prison'', correctional facility;
(m) ''prisoner'', a committed offender and such other person as is placed
in custody in a correctional facility in accordance with law;
(n) ''state correctional facility'', any correctional facility owned, operated
administered or subject to the control of the department or correction, including
but not limited to: Massachusetts Correc-tional Institution, Walpole; Massachusetts
Correctional Institution, Norfolk; Massachusetts Correctional Institution,
Concord; Massachtfsetts Correctional Institution, Framingham; Massachusetts
Correctional Institution, Bridgewater; Massachusetts Correctional Institution,
Plymouth; Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Warwick; Massachusetts
Correctional Institution, Monroe;
(o) ''state prison'', Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole;
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(p) ''superirtendent'', the chief administrative officer of a state
correctional facility.
SECTION 9. Said chapter 125 is hereby further amended by striking out
section 9, as most recently amended by chapter 494 of the acts of 1957, and
inserting in place thereof the following section:-
Section 9. The commissioner shall establish a training academy in
cooperation with the municipal police training council and using their
facilities and programs where appropriate and such other courses or places of
training as he deems necessary for the training of correction officers, other
employees of the department, persons appointed as correction officer trainees
in accordance with this section and, by agreement, officers of county correc-
tional facilities. The commissioner may appoint as a correction officcr trainee,
for a period of full-time training including on-the-job training, any citizen
of the commonwealth who meets the qualifications required of applicants for
appointment to the position of correction officer. Appointiment to the
position of correction officer trainee shall not be subject to section nine A
and nine B of chapter thirty, or chapter thirty-one, nor shall a correction
officer trainee be entitled to any benefits of such laws or civil service rules.
Such appointment may be terminated in accordance with such conditicns as the
commissioner may prescribe. A correction officer trainee shall receive such
compensation and such leave with pay as the commissioner shall determine and
shall be considered an employee of the commonwealth for the purposes of work-man's
compensation. Upon successful completion of training, a correction officer
trainee shall be appointed, if a vacancy exists, to the position of provisional
correction officer, provided there is no suitable civil service eligible- list for
correction officer.
A correction officer trainee shall not be subject to or entitled to the
benefits of any retirement or pension law nor shall any deduction be made from
his compensation for the purpose thereof; but a correction officer rainee who
during the period of his training or provisional appointment status passes a
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competitive civil service examination for appointment to the department of
correction andis appointed a permanent full-time correction officer shall have
his trainee service considered as "creditable service" for purposes of
retirement, provided he pays into the annuity savings fund of the retirement
system such amount as the retiremcnt board determines equal to that which he
would have paid had he been a member of said retirement system during the period
of his training.,
In accordance with civil service laws and rules the division of civil
service shall certify the naes of applicants from an established list for
correction efficers to the commissioner who shall appoint said applicants as
correction officers. Newly appointed correction officers who have not
successfully completed training as correction officer trainees shall be
assigned to a period of training as the commissior.er shall prescribe. Notwith-
standing any civil service law or rules, a correction officer must serve a
probationary period of nine mouths before becoming a full-time permanent
employee of' the department. Time spent in training shall be considered a part
of the probationary period.
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, but subject, however,
to the provisions of section sixty of chapter one hundred and nineteen, no
person who has been convicted of a felony, or who has been confined in any jail
or house of correction, shall be appointed to any position in the department of
correction unless the commissioner certifies that such appointment will contribute
substantially to the work of the department,, except that in no case shall such
a person be appointed to the position of correction officer, superintendent,
deputy superintendent, assistant superintendent, or any other position involving
the regulation of state or county correctional facilities.
The commissioner may expend such sums as may be appropriated or otherwise
received to maintain and operate the training academy and other training centers
and programs and maintain trainees and employees during any period of training.
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SECTION 10. The first paragraph of section 16 of said chapter 125, as
amended by section 18 of chapter 863 of the acts of 1970, is hereby further
amended by striking out the first sentence and inserting in place thereof the
following sentence:- All females convicted of crimes in the courts of the
commonwealth and sentenced to imprisonment or otherwise committed to the custody
of the department shall be committed to the Massachusetts Correctional
Institution, Framingham, or to such other correctional facility or facilities
as the commissioner may from time to time designate as appropriate for the
purpose.
SECTION 11. -Chapter 127 of the General Laws is hereby amended by adding
after section 1 the following two sections:-
Section 1A. In accordance with paragraphs (d) and (q) of section one of
chapter one hundred and twenty-four the commissioner shall establish, and shall
from time to time revise, minimum standards for the care and custody of all
persons committed to county correctional facilities. Prior to establishing
or revising such minimum standards the commissioner shall visit. ccnsult with
and receive the recommendations of the sheriffs of the.several counties and the
penal institutions commissioncr of the city of Boston. The commissioner shall
require from the sheriffs of the several counties and the penal institutions
commissioner of the city of Boston periodic reports on the population, operation
and conditions of all county correctional facilities.
The commissioner may provide consultation services for the design and
construction of facilities, studies and surveys of programs and administration
and any other technical assistance he deems proper and necessary. In cooperation
with the county commissioners and administrators of each county, the commissioner
may develop and administer programs of grants-in-aid or subsidies for any county
correctional facility.
Section 1B. At least once each six months the commissioner or his delegate
shall inspect each county correctional facility to determine compliance with
minimum standards. The results of such inspections shall be summarized in the
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annual report of the commissioner to the general court. Personnel of the
department shall be admitted to all county correctional facilities as required
for the purposes of this section.
If, in the opinion of the commissioner, any county correctional facility
does not comply with the standards established by him for county correctional
facilities, the commissioner shall give notice of the alleged violation to the
sheriff and the county commissioners of the county in which such facility is
located except that in the case of Suffolk County House of Correction such notice
shall be given to the penal institutions commissioner of the city of Boston.
Said notice shall specify the particular standards that in the commissioner's
opinion have not been met by such facility. The officials so notified shall
have the right to be heard by the commissioner with regard to the alleged
violation and shall have a'reasonable period of time to remedy any such viola-
tion. If, in the opinion of the commissioner, the facility has not been brought
into compliance with the aforesaid standards within a reasonable time from the
date when notice of their violation is given, the commissioner may petition the
Superior Court in equity in the county in which such facility is located for an
order to close the facility or for other appropriate relief. The Superior
Court shall have jurisdiction to enter such an order.
SECTION 12. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended by striking out
section 48, as amended by section 32 of chapter 770 of the acts of 1955, and
the caption preceding it and inserting in place thereof the following caption
and section:-
EDUCATION, TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS
Section 48. The commissioner shall establiTsh and mnintain education,
training and employment programs for persons committed to the custody 
of the
department. The administrators of county correctional facilities 
shall establish
and maintain such programs for persons committed to such facilities. Such
programs shall include opportunities for academic education, vocational
education, vocational training, other related pievocational programs 
and
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employment, and may be made available within correctional facilities or, subject
to the restrictions set forth in sections forty-nine and eighty-six F, at-other
places approved by the commissioner or administrator. In determining which
employment programs to establish and maintain under the authority of this
section, the commissioner or administrator shall take into account, first, the
training value of the program, second, the job market and employment conditions
in the community and third, in the case of programs to be carried out within a
correctional facility, the types of goods and services required by the common-
wealth and its subdivisions.
The commissioner shall make and promulgate rules and regulations governing
programs established under this sectipn which shall include provisions for hours,
conditions of employment, wage rates for employment program participants,
incentive payments for education and training program participants, and deduction:
from said wages pursuant to the provisions of section eighty-six F.
SECTION 13. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended by striking out
section 49, as most recently amended by section 34 of chapter 770 of the acts
of 1955, and inserting in place thereof the following two sections:-
Section 49. The commissioner of correction, subject to rules and regulation:
established in accordance with the provisions of this section, may permit an inma
who has served such a portion of his sentence or sentences that he would be
eligible for parole within eighteen months to participate in educatian, training,
or employment programs established under section forty-eight cutside a correc-
tional facility; provided that no committed offender who is serving a life
sentence or a sentence in a state correctional facility for violation of section
thirteen, thirteen B, fourteen, fifteen, fifteen A, fifteen B, sixteen, seventeen
eighteen, eighteen A, nineteen, twenty, twenty-one, twenty-two, twenty-two A,
twenty-three, twenty-four, twenty-four B, twenty-five, or twenty-six of chapter
two hundred and sixty-five, or section seventeen, thirty-four, thirty-five, or
thirty-five A, of chapter two hundred and seventy-two, or for an attempt to
commit any crime referred to in said sectkons shall be eligible to participate
in education, training or employment pr6grams outside a correctional facility,
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as established under section forty-eight, except on the recommendation of the
superintendent on behalf of a particular committed offender and upon the
approval of the commissioner.
In the case of a committed offender who participates in any program outside
a correctional facility established under section forty-eight, the time spent in
such participation shall be credited toward the serving of his sentence in the
same manner as though he had served such time with'in the facility. A committed
offender enrolled in any such program shall remain subject to the rules and
regulations of the correctional facility and shall be under the direction,
control and supervision of the officers thereof during the period of his
participation in the prograi. The commissioner shall make and promulgate rules
and regulations regarding programs established under section forty-eight outside
correctional facilities. Such rules and regulations shall include provisions
for reasonable periods of confinement to particular correctional facilities before
a committed offender may be permitted to participate in such programs and pro-
visions for feeding, housing and supervising participants in such programs in
such manner as will be calculated to maintain morale and prevent the introduction
of contraband to the facility.
If any inmate who participates in any program outside a correctional
facility established under the provisions of section forty-eight leaves his place
of employment, or having been ordered by the commissioner to return to the
correctional facility, neglects or refuses to do so, said inmate shall be held
to have escaped from said prison or institution and shall, upon conviction of
such escape, be sentenced'to a state correctional facility for a term of not
less than three years and not more than five years, and all deductions from the
sentence or sentences he was serving at the time of such escape, authorized by
section one hundred and twenty-nine, shall be forfeited, but said inmate shall
be entitled to a deduction of sentence on any sentence imposed for said escape.
Committed offenders who are gainfully employed outside a correctional
facility may be so employed by an agency of the commonwealth other than the
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department of correction or by public or private employers. The rates of pay
and other conditions of employment for a committed offender so employed shall
be the same as those paid or required in the locality in which the work is
performed providea that no committed offender employed by an agency of the
commonwealth shall be subject to sections -nine A or nine B of chapter thirty,
or chapter thirty-one, and in no case shall such rates of pay be less than those
paid by his employer to other employees doing similar work. No committed offender
shall be so employed at a place where there exists any strike or work stoppage
arising from a labor dispute of any kind.
Section 49A. Before any inmate may be considered for participation in
education training, or employment programs established under section forty-eight
outside a correctional facility, or in any other program outside a correctional
facility exclusive of parole, he shall first demonstrate that he is responsible
and deserving of these opportunities.
The commissioner shall establish, in each state correctional facility, one
or more committees made up of representatives fr6m all segments of department
of corrections staff, especially correction officers. Said committees shall take
the form of teams of five correctional staff members, appointed by the super-
intendent of the correctional facility, at least two of whom shall be correction
officers.
Said committees shall evaluate the behavior and conduct of inmates within
the prison. In evaluating an inmate's behavior and conduct within the prison,
said committee shall interview the inmate, and shall have access to disciplinary
reports and other appropriate records. After evaluating the inmate's behavior
and conduct within the prison, said committee shall make a recommendation to the
superintendent of the correctional facility as to whether or not the inmate
shall be permitted to participate in any program outside a correctional -facility,
exclusive of parole. Said recommendation shall be made in writing, and shall
include the vote of said committee in making said recommendation.
SECTION 14. Section sixty-seven A of said chapter one hundred and twenty-
seven is hereby repealed.
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SECTIQN 15. Section 68 of said chapter 127, as most recently amended by
section 42 of chapter 770 of the acts of 1955, is hereby further amended by strikin
out, in lines 6 And 7, the words "sections sixty-seven and sixty-seven A, goods
manufactured therein'' and inserting in place thereof the words:- section sixty-
seven, goods and services produced therein.
SECTION 16. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended by striking out
section 71, as most recently amended by chapter 180 of the acts of 1964, and
inserting in place thereof the following section:-
Section 71. At least once each montk all money received frcm the sale of
products, by-products, or services of ccmmnitted offenders shall be credited on
the books of the commonwealth to a fund to be known as the Correctional
Employment Fund. Subject to appropriation the commissloaer may employ such
fund to defray operating expenses of employment programs, including cost of
materials, supplies, and equipment, maintenance of industrial facilities and
compensation to committed offenders gainfully employed.
At the end of each fiscal year the unexpended balance remaining in the
correctional employment fund of the state correctional facilities shall be
transferred to the General Fund. At least once in each month the receipts from
the labor of committed offenders in county correctional facilities and from
charges for services rendered by a sheriff, master or deputy master of a county
correctional facility to persons visiting such a facility shall be paid to the
county. So much thereof as is necessary to pay the expenses of maintaining
the industries in said county correctional facilities shall be expended from the
county treasury for that purpose, but not until schedules of such expenses have
been sworn to be the administrator and approved by the commissioner. Whenever,
in the opinion of the administrator of a county correctional facility, and the
county commissioners and county treasurer, the accumulated funds in the county
treasury from the receipts from the labor of committed offenders in county
correctional facilities exceed the sunis necessary to pay the expenses of main-
taining the industries by which they were produced, the administrator of a county
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correctional facility and the county commissioners and the county treasurer
shall direct that the surplus shall be transferred into the general revenue
of the county. The administrator of a county correctional facility shall, as
often as he has in his possession money to the amount of five thousand dollars
received from the labor of committed offenders in such county correctional
facility, pay it into the county treasury.
SECTION 17. Sections eighty-five, eighty-six, eighty-six D and eighty-
six E of said chapter one hundred and twenty-seven are hereby repealed.
SECTION 18. Said chapter 127 is hereby further amended by striking out
section 90A, as most tecently amended by chapter 460 of the acts of 1910, and
inserting in place thereof the following section:-
Section 90A. The commissioner may extend the limits of the place of
confinement of a committed offender at any state correctional facility by
authorizing such committed offender under prescribed conditions to be away from
such correctional facility but within the commonwealth for a specified period
of time, not to exceed fourteen days during any twelve month period rmr more than
seven days at any one time; provided that no committed offender who Is servihg a
life sentence or a sentence in a state correctional facility for violation of
section 13, 13B, 14, 15, 15A, 15B, 16, 17, 18, 18A, 19, 20, 21, 22, 22A, 23, 24,
24B, 25, or 26 of chapter 265, or section 17, 34, 35, or 35A, of Chapter 272, or
for an attempt to commit any crime referred to in said sections shall be eligible
for te4orary release under the provisions of this section except on the
.recommendation of the superintendent on behalf of a particular committed offender
and upon the approval of the commissioner. The administrator of a county
correctional facility may grant like authorization to a committed offender in
such facility. Such authorization may be granted for any of the following pur-
poses: (a) to attend the funeral of a relative; (b) to visit a critically ill
relative; (c) to obtain medical, psychiatric, psychological or other social
services when adequate services are not available at the facility and cannot be
obtained by temporary placement in a hospital under sections one hundred and
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seventeen, one hundred and seventeen A, and one hundred and eighteen; (d) to
contact prospective employers; (e) to secure a suitable residence for use upon
release on parole or discharge; (f) for any other reason consistent with the
reintegration of a committed offender into the community. For the purposes of
this section the word ''relative'' shall mean the committed offender's father,
mother, child, brother, sister, husband or wife and, if his grandparent, uncle,
aunt or foster parent acted as his parent in rearing such committed offender, it
shall also mean such grandparent, uncle, aunt or foster parent.
A person away from a correctional facility pursuant to this section.may
be accompanied by an employee of the department, in the discretion of the
commissioner, or an officer of a county correctional facility, in the discretion
of the administrator.
Any expenses incurred under the provisions of this section may be paid
by the correctional facility in which the committed, offender is committed. A
committed offender shall, during his absence from a correctional facility under
this section, be considered as in the custody of the correctional facility and
the time of such- absence shall be considered as part of the term of sentence.
House of Representatives, July 7 1972.l
Passed to be enacted, Speaker.
In Senate, July 7 , 1972.
Passed to be enacted, , President.
J u 1 y , 1972.
Approved,
Governor. .l
APPENDIX I
LOCKE COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS
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RECOMMENDAIONS AND FINDINGS
I. Relative to Administration
1. The committee emphasizes its concern for the speedy im-
plementation of those sections of Chapter 777 of the Acts of 1972,
which provide that intensive and on-going educational and training
programs be available to corrections officers.
2. The committee urges that Massachusetts corrections officers
be afforded opportunities for promotion to high administrative
positions. The committee feels that executive judgements relative
to the qualifications of corrections officers serve to reflect
the quality of training offered by the executive branch; and hence,
as measures are taken to improve the latter, there also must be
incretaseed reliance upon corrections personnel in filling higher
positions.
3. The committee expects that the Commissioner of Corrections
will explain and discuss in all cases the nature, scope, and content
of new administrative policies with superintendents and other of-
ficials involved in the institution of such policies. The committee
expects that should the Commissioner intend to be absent from his
office, he will instruct competent staff members in appropriate
responses to questions of routine and emergency nature which may
arise within the Department.
4. The committee strongly urges that an up-to-date handbook
of regulations and procedures be devised and continuously reviewed
by the Department for the use of inmates and officers; the committee
expects that such a written code of conduct will help to eliminate any
arbitrariness which may exist in judgement of individual's behavior.
- 12 -
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5. The committee deplores the great disparity between numbers
of black and Spanish-speaking inmates, and numbers of corrections
officers with similar racial and ethnic backgrounds; and expects
that efforts will be made by the Department to attract, recruit,
and train such individuals to the corrections service.
6. The committee feels the Department ought to explore in a sys-
tematic fashion the feasibility and advisability of instituting links
between inmates and unions in order to determine the efficacy of this
technique for expression of grievances, or the institutionalization
of a scale of wages for inmate work that is similar to the union scale.
7. The committee feels the Department of Corrections should re-
tain its present location within the Executive Office of Human Ser-
vices, rather than be transferred to the Executive Office of Public
Safety.
8. The committee recommends that the Department of Corrections study
the possibility of at some future date integrating county correctional
institutions within and under the state corrections system.
II. Relative to Classification
9. The committee strongly recommends the immediate establishment
of a diagnostic reception center at a location the Department deems
suitable.
10. Upon the establishment of a diagnostic reception center, the
committee recommends that consideration be given to a policy by which
offenders can be sentenced to the Corrections Department generally,
rather than to a specific facility; and subsequent to theit being
so sentenced, their needs, whether medical, rehabilitative etc., be de-
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-fined on an individual basis. Following such appraisal, the committee
intends that the offender be admitted to the institution which can
best meet such rehabilitative and security needs.
11. The committee strongly recommends that a youthful and first
offenders facility be established immediately in order to insure
that young offenders may be separated from the population of older
inmates with records of repeated crime.
12. The committee strongly recommends the establishment of a
distinct facility for intensive treatment of drug-dependent inmates.
13. The committee encourages continued development of community-
based half-way houses promoting the re-integration of inmates into
community life, and the exploration of increased use of forestry camps.
III. Relative to Discipline and Safety
14, The committee strongly recommends the establishment of a dep-
artmental adjustment center where that small percentage of inmates
who consistently manifest violently aggressiveor otherwise dangerous
behavior may be confined; the committee intends that such a center
provide inmates with all such psychiatric and medical treatment, coun-
selling, and other services, as may be needed to ensure prompt re-
turn to the general population.
15. The committee deplores the failure of officials to conduct
frequent and thorough "shakedowns", and expects that such searches
will be made far more regularly and rigorously in the future to en-
sure the maintenance of "clean" institutions.
16. The committee strongly recommends that metal detectors be used
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on a continuing basis in all institutions where they are currently
installed to promote the security of inmates, other employees, and
visitors; the committee further urges that safety items be substituted
for any implements which may be converted easily into weapons.
17. The committee recommends that administrative options relative
to parole eligibility following completion of one third of a sentence
be employed in all cases where such eligibility is merited; the com-
mittee further recommends that good-time deductions be awarded to in-
mates completing constructive activities or programs during their con-
finement.
18, The committee recommends that all individuals who complete sen-
tences without occasion for parole supervision be given access to the
benefits of job assistance and other supportive services subsequent to
their release which they otherwise might not recieve.
19. The committee recommends that a Board of Pardons be established
to consider, in conjunction with the Board of Parole, the advi.ability
of expunging the records of former offenders, or commuting the sen-
tences of offenders, in order that such considerations remain as ob-
jective as possible.
IV. Relative to Education
20. The committee notes the paucity of elementary education courses
available to inmates and urges the Corrections Department to survey
and provide for such needs.
21. The committee recommends that grammar and high school education
courses now offered be coordinated and improved, with consideration be-
ing given to the establishment of a Corrections Department School District
- 15 -
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22. The committee urges the Department of Correction to explore
the possibility of employing student teachers from state higher ed-
ucational institutions to reduce the shortage of instructors in cor-
rections facilities while minimizing costs for an expanded teaching
staff.
23. The committee recommends that educational counsellors be av-
ailable in institutions during evening hours in order that inmates
who work or attend classes by day may have opportunities for such
consultation.
24. The committee urges that administrative and security pro-
cedures be streamlined and standardized to expedite the entry of
volunteer instructors from industry or other private organizations
into corrections facilities.
25. The committee strongly recommends that libraries in cor-
rections facilities be expanded, with attention given to the inclusion
in such libraries of law books and other legal texts; the committee
urges the Corrections Departmtrent to explore the possibility of ac-
quiring volumes through donations made by private citizens, businesses,
and other organizations.
V. Relative to Work
26. The committee urges that training sequences and corrections
industries which conform closely to outside employment opportunities
be developed and established within institutions; the committee sug-
gests that such sequences and industries include computer technology,
automobile mechanics, refrigeration, electronics, and so on.
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27. The committee urges that the Corrections Department work
closely with labor unions in facilitating the entry of former of-
fenders, who have completed apprenticeship training programs in
corrections institutions, into appropriate unions upon their re-
lease, in order to afford them opportunities for job security and
the earning of minimum wages.
28. The committee urges that corrections industries be oriented
to the production of goods saleable at attractive prices on the
open market; -and that profits of such sales be used to maintain
corrections industries, but also to increase inmate wages.
29. The committee recommends that work-release programs be fur-
ther developed under Chapter 777 of the Acts of 1972, in order that
inmates who demonstrate a capacity and responsibility to handle such
employment be given opportunities to do so.
30, The committee strongly recommends that inmate wages be raised,
particularly as new corrections industries show profit; and urges
the establishment of savings accounts for inmates, in order that
post-release financial security be ensured. The committee suggests
further that a portion of inmate earnings be directed to the main-
tenance of inmate's families currently receiving public assistance;
and that the Commonwealth be reimbur'sed out of inmate savings for
riot damages to state or county institutions, where responsibility
for such damages may be ascertained.
31 The committee urges that consideration be given by the Gen-
eral Court to state tax incentives for industries which contribute
personnel and equipment to the Corrections Department for the in-
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struction and training of inmates, or hire ex-offenders after release.
32. The committee recommends that the Corrections Department
consult with the Department of Communities and Development in the
establishment of job-training sequences which will best prepare in-
mates for post-release employment.
33, The committee urges that private industry and business par-
ticipate in the implementation of public policy by working to el-
iminate any employment discrimination which may be directed against
former offenders.
VI. Relative to Medicine
34. The committee expects that corrections institutions will be
stocked properly and adequately with medical supplies and equipment;
and that such materials will be securely stored and appropriately
dispensed in drder to prevent their abuse.
35. The committee expects that medical record-keeping procedures
will be rendered more comprehensive and orderly in all facilities.
36. The committee deplores the absence of hygenic and extensive
medical facilities in all institutions and expects that the Cor-
rections Department will make every effort to evaluate and improve
such facilities with due haste.
37. The committee expects that all medical personnel in corrections
facilities whether working on a full-time or a part-time basis, will
afford services to the Commonweal'th commensurate with their salaries;
the Committee recommends that the Corrections Department eliminate any
abuse of such state employment.
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38. The committee urges that salary schedules and employment ben-
efits for medical personnel in corrections facilities be made com-
petitive with such schedules and benefits in the outside community.
39. The committee recommends that state hospitals be used to augment
medical services offered by corrections facilites.
40. The committee recommends that the Corrections Department make
provision for the hiring of additional paramedical personnel; the com-
intends that interested inmates be afforded opportunities for training
and employment as paramedics.
41. The committee recommends that additional counsellors be em-
ployed in corrections facilities to offer services relative to psy-
chiatric, drug, and other problems; and that such counsellors provide
post-release evaluation and assistance to former offenders.
VII. Relative to Social Dimensions
42. The committee urges that metal detectors currently installed
be used consistently in checking both inmates and visitors to control
the flow of contraband into corrections institutions, and that matrons
continue to be assigned to oversee entry of female visitors.
43. The committee recommends that the Department of Corrections no-
tify the local police when an offender is released on furlough.
44. The committee urges the Corrections Department to review con-
tinuously policies relative to personal communications (mail and tel-
ephone calls), in order to promote equalization and non-discrimination
of privileges among inmates; and that consideration be given to the
viability of more flexible and extensive communications privileges.
45. The committee deplores the existence of racial hostility in
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corrections institutions, whether among inmates or between inmates
and officials; and urges that personnel evaluations take into con-
sideration any unwarranted antagonism emanating from racial prejudice.
46. The committee requests the Commissioner of the Department of
Corrections to submit to the Governor and the General Court, one
year from the date of enactment of appropriate legislation included
herein, and the filing of this report, a report indicating
its intention, measures, and progress relative to each of the above
recommendations.
APPENDIX J
SUMMARY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
RESEARCH GROUP'S REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF
CHAPTER 777
477
SUMMARY
This report is a review of the progress of the Department
of Correction in implementing Chapter 777, in five basic areas,
two years after the act has been in effect. The findings are as
follows:
--The Department of Correction (D.O.C.) has not established
minimum standards for state and county correctional facilities.
Ironically, the Department of Correction is closer to establishing
comprehensive minimum standards for county institutions than for
state institutions.
--A classification system is being developed for the Department
of Correction. The Reception Diagnostic Center and departmental
classification teams have been organized, but institutional
classification teams are still in the developmental stage.
--Within the correctional institutions, education programs
are lacking and vocational programs are practically non-existant.
Work and education release programs are being instituted, but
statistics show they only reach 14% of the inmate population.
--A community release program has been established by the
D.O.C. The pre-release houses have been filled to 80-93%
capacity. The proportion of the prison population that participates
in this program averages from 6% to 8%.
-- A prison furlough program has also been established. It has
granted 15,044 furloughs and has a success rate of 98.4%.
This is a review of the Department of Correction's implementa-
tion of the Omnibus Correction Act of 1972. These findings, with the
exception of the furlough program, are not encouraging. The Governor's
Advisory Committee on Corrections commented on this matter in their
letter to Governor Sargent of December 18, 1974, noting " .
we do not believe the inherent slowness of progress or change in Massa-
chusetts corrections can be attributed to any one person. Real
changes in corrections in Massachusetts will have to be supported by
the state administfation, the state legislature, and the citizens of
the Commonwealth."
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